Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title, by abstractis, which had to be distinguished, is distinguished at the beginning of the body. By proprietates, however, he understands notions, whether personal or not.

In the body he does three things: first, he distinguishes the abstraction stated in the title; second, he answers the question¹; third, he treats a certain opposing opinion².

II. As to the first point, he distinguishes abstraction and applies it to divine things. He distinguishes, indeed, between total and formal abstraction: that is, that by which the universal whole is abstracted from its subjective parts, and that by which form is abstracted from matter. And he posits a single difference between them, namely, that in total abstraction only the concept of what is abstracted remains, whereas in formal abstraction both remain, namely, of what is abstracted and of that from which it is abstracted, as is clear in the examples of the letter. And if you wish to see these abstractions discussed at length, read our Commentary on De Ente et Essentia (On Being and Essence), question 1. – He applies this to divine things not according to the thing itself, but according to the mode of signifying, making use of the authority of Damascene.

III. As to the second, he answers the question with three conclusions. The first, in accordance with total abstraction: When the properties are abstracted, the persons do not remain, but only the essence. – And it is proved: because the persons stand as particulars, the essence as universal. That is, God remains, and the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit do not remain: for God stands to the persons as the universal to the particulars, as Damascene said.

IV. The second conclusion, according to formal abstraction, is: once the non-personal properties are abstracted, the persons remain. – And it is explained in both cases, namely in innascibility and in spiration.

V. Concerning this conclusion a doubt arises. For it seems to contradict the doctrine handed down in question XXXVI³, where it was said that, if spiration were abstracted from the Son, He would not be distinguished personally from the Holy Spirit. For if, with spiration abstracted, the Son remains a person, as is said here, then He remains a hypostasis distinct from the persons that can be in the divine nature; and consequently He is not distinguished personally from the Holy Spirit by spirating. And conversely, if He is distinguished personally by spirating, then He does not remain a hypostasis distinct, with spiration abstracted—the opposite of what is said here.

To this, briefly, on the foundation laid above⁴, it is said that both, rightly understood, are true. For if spiration is abstracted, the hypostasis of the Son remains, as is said here; and yet, if spiration is abstracted, the distinction of that hypostasis from the Holy Spirit does not remain, as is said there. These, however, do not contradict one another; and the reason is that that hypostasis is relative, and from that from which the relative would not remain, it would not remain distinct. For it is false that a divine person, and universally a relative thing, is constituted and relatively distinguished from the others by one and the same thing, even within the same nature, as was shown above⁵.

VI. The third conclusion, according to the same formal abstraction, is: When the personal properties are abstracted away, no hypostases remain. – And it is proved from both acts of a personal property, namely to constitute and to distinguish. From its constituting: personal properties do not accrue to pre-existing hypostases, but carry their supposits with them, inasmuch as they are the very being (esse) of those supposits; therefore, once they are abstracted away, no supposits remain. From its distinguishing: a hypostasis is an individual substance; therefore it is something distinct in God; therefore, once the personal relation is removed, no hypostasis remains. And this last inference holds because relation alone is what distinguishes there.

VII. Concerning this part, note that that proposition repeated many times⁶, namely, the properties constitute the persons, or carry the supposits with them, inasmuch as they are the very persons is not singular, but common to all pure and simple beings. For deity constitutes God, inasmuch as He is God Himself; and gabrielity constitutes Gabriel, inasmuch as he is Gabriel, if they are altogether identical. And these propositions signify a special mode of constituting. For since it happens in two ways that something is constituted—first, as a form constitutes a composite; second, as a simple being constitutes a simple being—when we speak of the first mode of constituting, which is a real constitution, we say simply that the rational soul constitutes man, etc.; and thus the constituting thing is not the thing constituted. But when the second mode of constituting is under discussion, by contrast with the first, it is said with an addition that it constitutes inasmuch as it is the very thing constituted, intending nothing else thereby than that the constitutive principle is said to constitute precisely insofar as it posits itself: for by positing itself, it constitutes, because the term itself points to the thing constituted. And this is what inasmuch as it is itself signifies. – Therefore Paternity, by positing itself, constitutes the Father, because it itself is the Father. And so the term inasmuch as is taken reduplicatively, and it reduplicates the mode of constituting in simple beings. Hence from this you have an easy way of answering those who object against propositions of this kind.

VIII. As to the third point⁷, it matters, and he refutes a certain opinion, which holds that when the relations are abstracted, the hypostases remain, but not the persons. The reason for the first is that the origins that distinguish remain. The reason for the second is that relations pertain to dignity, which belongs to the notion of person, but not of hypostasis.

It is refuted in two ways. First, the argument for the first claim: for it has been proved that relations are the first distinctive principle. – Second, the argument for the second claim: because the dignity by which a person differs from a hypostasis holds on the side of nature. For a person adds, on the side of nature, intellectuality over and above a hypostasis; but on the side of the individual itself it adds nothing at all, as is clear from Boethius's definition. Hence, since relations hold on the side of individuation, it is false that relations are properties of the person and not of the hypostasis: for person and hypostasis are equally abstracted on the side of individuation, although, on the side of the more dignified nature, the person is something more determinate.

IX. In response to the second, note that, as is said in Book V of the Metaphysics⁸, it is not unfitting that certain things be said relative to something according to specific names, which are not said relative to it according to generic names. And therefore it is not unfitting that the same happen similarly in the matter at hand: namely, that the Father is referred to the Son by name and in reality by the name "Father"; but that the person is referred to that same one indeed in reality, yet not by name. For this happens because, as is said in the text, by paternity the Father both is and is Father and person: but "person" signifies that being in the manner of something absolute. — I have said these things on account of the arguments of Aureol and Scotus, which I judged should be passed over in silence: for from this they are easily resolved.