Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title the question is asked not about just any distinction, but about the first distinctive: namely, whether the relations distinguish the persons first.

In the body he does four things: first, he sets out certain necessary preliminaries; second, he reports a certain opinion¹; third, he refutes it²; and fourth, he answers the question raised³.

II. As to the first, he sets down three preliminary points, namely: the necessity of what is sought, because there are there several things sharing in one. – And the limits of the question: because one must not wander about in seeking the distinctive features, but must remain within these two, namely relation and origin, since it is according to these two that the persons differ. – And the difference between these two and their agreement: for they are one thing, and differ in their mode of signifying; for relation is signified in the manner of a form, whereas origin is signified in the manner of an act.

III. Concerning the limits of the question under investigation, note first that Scotus, in the twenty-sixth distinction of the First Book⁴, unless he feared to contradict the Church, shows that he would willingly hold that in a divine person, besides the essence common to the three and the relation and origin proper to each person, there is a certain absolute incommunicable entity, which is constitutive of the divine person. And he begins this position from a certain saying of Bonaventure, in the twenty-fifth distinction of the First Book. – And he grounds himself upon the authority of Scripture, Proverbs XXX⁵: What is his name, and what is the name of his Son, if you know? arguing thus. A question seeks what is doubtful, and presupposes something certain: this question presupposes the name of the Son, and asks for his proper name: therefore filiation is not his proper and constitutive name. – He also adduces many arguments and authorities; but since he himself answers them, they may be set aside, and the two aforementioned points must now be explained.

IV. St. Bonaventure is not, in the first place, of the opinion that the divine persons are absolute: as is expressly clear in the twenty-sixth distinction of his First Book⁶, where he holds that the properties, as origins, distinguish the persons, in such a way that, once they are abstracted, no hypostases remain. And he holds that all the properties are relations or origins, except innascibility, which is negative.

But those words which Scotus adduces are indeed Bonaventure's, yet for a different purpose. For in distinction XXV of the First Book, article I⁷, inquiring into the signification of this name "person," he holds that person, in its general and first signification, imports substance; but in its special and last signification, it imports relation, because in God the personal property is a relation. And he argues against himself: for being said according to substance and being said according to relation are distinguished in God by opposition; therefore person cannot at once be said according to substance in its general and first signification, and according to relation in its special and last. And he answers that being said according to substance is found in two ways: first, according to the substantial essence; second, according to hypostasis. And that being said according to substance in the first way is distinguished from being said according to relation; but not in the second way, because substance, that is, hypostasis, is contracted in God through relation.

From this statement it is evident even to the blind that Bonaventure does not posit a twofold absolute being, one essential and one hypostatic, as Scotus would like to imagine: but it is held only that substance is taken in two ways, both for essence and for hypostasis (which is also found in Book V Metaphysics⁸); and that substance in the second way, that is, hypostasis, is said formally of the divine person; and that at one and the same time the divine person is a hypostasis, and yet a relation, etc. For all these things are common to all theologians. – It is, however, most strange that this should be imputed to Bonaventure, since at the end of that article⁹ he expressly says that the person of the Father cannot be abstracted from paternity while preserving his personality. What could be clearer? etc.

V. To that saying of Solomon¹⁰, which Scotus so highly esteems, it is most easily answered that there is an equivocation in the name "Son of God." For He can be named, just as He can be conceived, in two ways: in one way, according to His, so to speak, quod quid est; in another way, according to concepts and names abstracted from creatures. And in the first way, we have no name, not only of the Son, but not even of God: for it is written, Isa. LIII¹¹, who shall declare His generation? And thus Son is the proper name of the second divine Person, among names that beget in us knowledge that He is. And with this, the proper name pertaining to the knowledge of what He is is ineffable. Just as also God is the proper name of God Himself: and yet the name signifying what God is is ineffable.

VI. Concerning the same limits, the question having been raised¹², note secondly that by the name relation the Author understands relation itself indistinctly; that is, without taking care to distinguish it in itself as it has the act of relation, and in itself as it has the act of property. And therefore he says many times in this text "property or relation" together. I say this, however, because, as will be made clear below¹³, in a divine person there is one respective reality, signified as origin, and as relation insofar as it is a relation, and as individual or personal property. The text nevertheless comprehends the latter modes under one here, for three reasons, I think. First, because we do not have names of first intentions pertaining to the properties except those of relation or of origin, as is evident upon review. Second, because the other member, namely relation, could be subdivided while preserving its own character; as was in fact done in the text of the fourth article of this question. Third, because, since personality according to truth is a relation, and places person in the genus ad aliquid (the word "genus" being taken broadly), it follows that the act should here be given to relation.

VII. Concerning the difference assigned between relation and origin¹⁴, a doubt arises: for it seems false that they differ in their mode of signifying. For both are signified in the abstract and in the concrete, both adjectivally and substantively, and in the other modes of signifying; therefore they do not differ in this respect.

There is also another greater doubt concerning the proposed distinction, namely that relation is signified in the manner of a form, while origin is signified in the manner of an act. For either to be signified in the manner of a form means to be signified as the formal principle in denominating, that is, as that by which something is such: and thus there is no difference, since just as paternity is that by which someone is and is called father, so generation is that by which someone is and is called generating. – Or it means being signified as a thing inhering. And thus it is false that relation is signified in the manner of a form, since, as St. Thomas himself taught in the Questions On the Power of God, question VIII, article 2, relation, although it inheres, is nevertheless not signified as inhering. Indeed there would be no difference at all, since, as is said in the same place, action and relation are the same in this respect with regard to their ratio.

VIII. To these points it is said at once that the discussion here is not about the modes of signifying grammatically, or on the side of the name as signifying; but rather metaphysically, or on the side of the thing signified, inasmuch as by calling several rationes of one thing we call them several modes of it. Therefore the intention of the text is that this one thing is signified in another way, that is, under another ratio, by the name of origin and by the name of relation; whether in the abstract, or in the concrete, or in any other grammatical manner whatever.

And from this, consequently, the answer is given to the second ambiguity: because form is that which gives being (esse) to a thing formally, to be signified in the manner of a form means, in our present case, to be signified in the manner of that which gives being formally. And since this can happen in two ways, namely on the side of the name and on the side of the signified meaning; and it has already been said that here we are not speaking of the mode of signifying on the side of the name: therefore the second member is conceded. — And to the objection raised against this position, it is said, as has already been touched upon¹⁵, that it is one thing to speak of relation as relation, and another thing to speak of real relation simply. For relation as relation is not something inherent; yet it belongs to the meaning of real relation that it be inherent. Therefore between real action and real relation there is this difference: action, both as action and as real action, has the character of an outgoing principle, even though perhaps it may be inherent. Real relation, however, although as relation it does not have the character except of an accompanying principle; nevertheless, as real relation, it has the character both of an accompanying and of an inherent principle; and therefore, on the side of the signified meaning, it is signified in the manner of a form. And in this it differs from origin: and this is the reason why below¹⁶ it is attributed to relation to distinguish and constitute the person, and not to origin, as will more fully appear in the fourth article¹⁷.

IX. With respect to the second¹⁸, the opinion followed by Bonaventure¹⁹ is recited, which says three things. First, that relation does not distinguish the hypostases, because it follows upon an act. Second, that origin distinguishes them, for the same reason: namely, because it is prior to relation. Third, that relations manifest the distinction, just as individual properties do in creatures.

X. As to the third²⁰, two arguments are brought against the aforementioned opinion. The first is: That which distinguishes must be intrinsic and proper; therefore neither origin nor essence distinguishes; therefore relation. — The antecedent is proved in creatures, in whom distinction is either through matter or through form. — The first consequence, as to its first part, is proved: because origin, as such, has the character of a way from a thing or to a thing, and thus is not intrinsic. As to the second part: because essence is common, and thus is not proper. — The second consequence is proved by the argument from division: since in a person, besides essence and origin, only relation remains.

The second reason, however, is this. The personal distinctive in the divine is constitutive of a person: but origin is repugnant to being constitutive of a person, whereas relation is not: therefore it is not origin but relation that distinguishes. — The antecedent is explained by indicating a twofold mode of distinguishing: namely, by constituting what is distinct, or by merely distinguishing, according to the twofold mode of standing to what is distinct. For it can happen that a preexisting thing is distinguished, as is clear in the division of water: and then only distinction is required. It can also happen that a thing not preexisting is distinguished: and then both constitution and distinction are required at once. The divine essence, therefore, although it is understood to preexist the distinctive relations, is nevertheless not divided or distinguished by the relations: since it always remains undivided. And for this reason the distinctives must both distinguish and constitute the persons, as not preexisting; as was assumed in the antecedent. — The minor, however, as regards its first part, is proved: because origin, actively, presupposes a person; passively, however, it is the way into it. As regards the second part: because the relations are the very subsistent persons, since there abstract and concrete do not differ.

XI. Concerning this argument, there is a doubt about this final proof, with respect to two things. First, what those words mean: relations constitute the persons inasmuch as they are the very persons themselves. Second, what force they have, together with that added proposition: the abstract and the concrete do not differ there. — The reason for doubting, however, is that, if it is true, then to constitute a person belongs to everything that is the very person itself, as is clear from the reduplicative inference; and thus origination, inasmuch as it is the very person itself, constitutes it; and likewise the essence, etc. — Nor does it seem meaningful to say that this constitutes that inasmuch as it is itself, unless the same thing constitutes itself: which is not to the point. — Also beside the point seem those words about the abstract and the concrete. — As for their efficacy, however, there is no appearance of it, even granted that they are true: since both being persons and the abstract not differing from the concrete are verified of the originations.

XII. To these it is said that by esse of persons the Author does not understand identity merely, but identity arising from the very account of the property or relation itself. For in this, as was said above²¹, it differs from origin, that the latter by its own account inheres: in whose place, in the divine, is the very one whose it is. Origin, however, according to its proper account, does not inhere: and consequently is not identified with the one to whom it is attributed. — But "in" is taken inasmuch as not reduplicatively, but specificatively. For it determines the condition according to which it belongs to the relation, and not to origin, to constitute; as when it is said, man is curly inasmuch as he is endowed with hair. For it belongs to the relation, insofar as it signifies some esse in the divine person, to constitute that person itself. And because it does not constitute it as a part, nor distinguish it as something adventitious, therefore he said that it constitutes it inasmuch as it is itself. Hence the sense is that, because the relation is, by its own account, not a part, nor something adventitious, but the person itself, therefore it both constitutes and distinguishes; always understanding the discourse to be about the proper persons. — And to make manifest that the relation is the person itself, and not a part or something²², it was adduced that there the abstract is the same as the concrete: for this is not true of things related as whole and part. — Whence the response to all the objections is clear: for the hidden meaning was the occasion of the objections.

But you should understand these things insofar as they serve this argument. However, how the proposition relation constitutes inasmuch as it is the person itself is true absolutely, according to the Author, will be said in the following article, ²³

XIII. Concerning what is said in these arguments²⁴, note two things. The first²⁵ is in the first argument, namely that every distinction must be by something intrinsic, that is, by form or matter. For this must be held as a foundation in the matter of the principle of individuation, so that quantity is not posited as an intrinsic principle distinguishing Socrates from Plato²⁶. — The second is in the second argument, namely that it happens that persons are distinguished both constitutively and non-constitutively. And this must be kept in view in the question concerning the distinction of the Son from the Holy Spirit, as we said at length in qu. XXXVI²⁷.

XIV. As to the fourth²⁸, the responsive conclusion is: The divine Hypostases are better said to be distinguished by relations than by origin. — And since better presupposes that both are good, in declaring the conclusion, he first says that both are true. — Second, that this is the better, because, according to our mode of understanding, they are distinguished by relations prior and more principal. — And finally he draws a corollary, consisting in the difference between the name of Father and of Begetter: for Father is a name not only of property but also of person, whereas Begetter is a name of property only. And the inference is evident: because relation constitutes, but origin does not.

But against the foundation of the other opinion²⁹, namely, that origin is prior to relation, as following upon it, an answer is given in the fourth article, where relation is distinguished.

XV. In response to the first, note that we can speak of the divine persons in two ways. Namely in themselves: and thus it is true that they are distinguished by themselves; as Praepositivus and Gregory of Rimini³⁰ hold. And St. Thomas expressly concedes this in I Sent., dist. XXVI, qu. II, art. 1, ad 5. — But if they are considered as signs and as signified to us, then, since they are not distinguished from the relations except in their mode of signifying, they are constituted and distinguished by the relations; just as God is constituted and distinguished from all else by deity.

XVI. In response to the third, note that relative distinction is placed first among real distinctions. First, because, according to the truth of the matter, it alone is simply and absolutely necessary: for the others do not involve a contradiction in not being, since they exist outside God. — Second, because it posits or presupposes nothing of imperfection: and therefore it is first in the order of perfection. And understand this as ordering the distinctions in the order of being (ens) simply; otherwise it would be different in the order of distinctions as such, as we discussed at length in Postpraedicamentis³¹

XVII. In response to the fourth, you have three points. First, that a subsistent relation makes a supposital distinction: and of this we shall speak below³² — Second, that the other placed in the definition of ad aliquid or of the relative stands for the correlative. And from this you have how consistently we spoke in q. XIII³³ concerning the term of the relative. — Third, that the other is not presupposed by the relative, but is simultaneous with it. And hence you have how well it was also said³⁴ that one relative defines the other, not as prior, but as simultaneous in nature and in intellect.