Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

The title is clear. – In the body he does three things: first, he treats the opinion of the Porretan; second, that of Praepositinus¹; third, he answers the question raised².

Before proceeding further, note that opinions on the matter at hand can vary in four ways: first, by holding that the properties are neither persons nor in persons; second, that they are persons but not in persons; third, on the contrary, that they are in persons but are not persons; fourth, that they are both persons and in persons. For a fifth way cannot be imagined. And these signify different relations to ly esse and ly in: for ly esse signifies identity, while ly in signifies formal denomination.

Therefore all these modes, except the third, were adopted by those holding opinions, as is clear in the article. For the first, namely that the properties are neither persons nor in persons, the Porretans maintained on this ground, because they considered relations as assisting, in their order toward another. – But this is censured in the text, for the reason stated several times: namely, that relation is the same as the divine essence.

II. Concerning this part a doubt arises: for the opinion of the Porretan seems to be misrepresented. Since, as was cited in the preceding question³, he held that relation is person, but that person is not essence: therefore it is wrongly attributed to him here that relation is not person.

To this it is briefly said that in this passage the Author supposes the person to be identified with the essence: which he did not suppose, but was asking about, in Article I of the preceding question. And therefore he stated what is true both here and there. For, when speaking of a divine person, without considering whether it is the same as the essence, the Porretan said that the relation itself, as assisting, is the person. But once it is supposed that the person is the same as the essence, it followed from the Porretan position that the relation is not the person: because the relation assists, and is not identified with the essence. Now thus it is clear that in this article the discussion concerns the person: and so there is no error.

III. As to the second point⁴, the Prepositine held that the properties are persons, and not in the persons, for the reason that in q. XXXII⁵ he denied the notions, always expounding the abstract as standing for the concrete. – Hence he is also censured in the text: because it is necessary to posit the properties in the abstract as formal principles of the persons, as was proved there.

IV. As to the third⁶, the responsive conclusion embraces the fourth mode. And it is: The properties are the person, and are in the persons. – And it is made evident in two ways. First, by reason, thus. It belongs to the nature of a form to be in that of which it is the form: therefore a property must be in the person. And the inference is proved: because it is the form of the person. – Second, as to both parts at once, by a similar case: The deity is in God, and is God; therefore.

V. Note here that the properties being in the persons can be understood both transitively and intransitively. And if it is indeed understood intransitively, the opinion of Praepositinus returns: for nothing else is signified except that the properties are the persons. – If, however, transitively, it can be understood in two ways. First, so that ly in denotes a transition according to the thing itself: and thus it is false. In another way, so that it denotes a transition according to reason, not of any sort whatever, but as that of a form in a supposit: and thus it is taken in the proposition at hand.

VI. But the compelling reason for both affirmations, namely that it is a person and in a person⁷, is this: if only identity were posited, since the property is also identical with the essence, the property would not be in a person in more ways than it is in the essence. And thus the judgment would be the same about "paternity is in the Father"paternitas est in Patre and "paternity is in the essence"paternitas est in essentia: yet the latter is only identical, while the former is both identical and formal. – And know that the foundation of identity is real indistinction; but the foundation of formal denomination requires something according to reason, namely a distinction between the what and the whereby.

VII. And from these you can easily answer the arguments of Gregory of Rimini, in the twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh distinctions of Book I⁸, who denies that there are properties in the persons. For all are resolved by attending to the fact that formal transition is signified only according to reason.

Hence also the argument made in the text rests on this same foundation: namely, that just as it belongs to the notion of an inherent form, supposing its existence in reality, that it be really present in that in which it inheres, so it belongs to the notion of a form or formal principle in knowing that it be present according to reason. Thus the only distinction signified by ly inest is a distinction according to reason: for the conjunction of a property in a supposit is according to reality, just as the form is in the supposit.