Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

The title is clear. – In the body he does three things: first, he treats the opinion of the Porretan; second, that of Praepositinus¹; third, he answers the question raised².

Before proceeding further, note that opinions on the matter at hand can vary in four ways: first, by holding that the properties are neither persons nor in persons; second, that they are persons but not in persons; third, on the contrary, that they are in persons but are not persons; fourth, that they are both persons and in persons. For a fifth way cannot be imagined. And these signify different relations to ly esse and ly in: for ly esse signifies identity, while ly in signifies formal denomination.

Therefore all these modes, except the third, were adopted by those holding opinions, as is clear in the article. For the first, namely that the properties are neither persons nor in persons, the Porretans maintained on this ground, because they considered relations as assisting, in their order toward another. – But this is censured in the text, for the reason stated several times: namely, that relation is the same as the divine essence.

II. Concerning this part a doubt arises: for the opinion of the Porretan seems to be misrepresented. Since, as was cited in the preceding question³, he held that relation is person, but that person is not essence: therefore it is wrongly attributed to him here that relation is not person.

To this it is briefly said that in this passage the Author supposes the person to be identified with the essence: which he did not suppose, but was asking about, in Article I of the preceding question. And therefore he stated what is true both here and there. For, when speaking of a divine person, without considering whether it is the same as the essence, the Porretan said that the relation itself, as assisting, is the person. But once it is supposed that the person is the same as the essence, it followed from the Porretan position that the relation is not the person: because the relation assists, and is not identified with the essence. Now thus it is clear that in this article the discussion concerns the person: and so there is no error.

III. As to the second point⁴, the Prepositine held that the properties are persons, and not in the persons, for the reason that in q. XXXII⁵ he denied the notions, always expounding the abstract as standing for the concrete. – Hence he is also censured in the text: because it is necessary to posit the properties in the abstract as formal principles of the persons, as was proved there.

IV. As to the third⁶, the responsive conclusion embraces the fourth mode. And it is: The properties are the person, and are in the persons. – And it is made evident in two ways. First, by reason, thus. It belongs to the nature of a form to be in that of which it is the form: therefore a property must be in the person. And the inference is proved: because it is the form of the person. – Second, as to both parts at once, by a similar case: The deity is in God, and is God; therefore.

V. Note here that the properties being in the persons can be understood both transitively and intransitively. And if it is indeed understood intransitively, the opinion of Praepositinus returns: for nothing else is signified except that the properties are the persons. – If, however, transitively, it can be understood in two ways. First, so that ly in denotes a transition according to the thing itself: and thus it is false. In another way, so that it denotes a transition according to reason, not of any sort whatever, but as that of a form in a supposit: and thus it is taken in the proposition at hand.

VI. But the compelling reason for both affirmations, namely that it is a person and in a person⁷, is this: if only identity were posited, since the property is also identical with the essence, the property would not be in a person in more ways than it is in the essence. And thus the judgment would be the same about "paternity is in the Father"paternitas est in Patre and "paternity is in the essence"paternitas est in essentia: yet the latter is only identical, while the former is both identical and formal. – And know that the foundation of identity is real indistinction; but the foundation of formal denomination requires something according to reason, namely a distinction between the what and the whereby.

VII. And from these you can easily answer the arguments of Gregory of Rimini, in the twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh distinctions of Book I⁸, who denies that there are properties in the persons. For all are resolved by attending to the fact that formal transition is signified only according to reason.

Hence also the argument made in the text rests on this same foundation: namely, that just as it belongs to the notion of an inherent form, supposing its existence in reality, that it be really present in that in which it inheres, so it belongs to the notion of a form or formal principle in knowing that it be present according to reason. Thus the only distinction signified by ly inest is a distinction according to reason: for the conjunction of a property in a supposit is according to reality, just as the form is in the supposit.

In the title the question is asked not about just any distinction, but about the first distinctive: namely, whether the relations distinguish the persons first.

In the body he does four things: first, he sets out certain necessary preliminaries; second, he reports a certain opinion¹; third, he refutes it²; and fourth, he answers the question raised³.

II. As to the first, he sets down three preliminary points, namely: the necessity of what is sought, because there are there several things sharing in one. – And the limits of the question: because one must not wander about in seeking the distinctive features, but must remain within these two, namely relation and origin, since it is according to these two that the persons differ. – And the difference between these two and their agreement: for they are one thing, and differ in their mode of signifying; for relation is signified in the manner of a form, whereas origin is signified in the manner of an act.

III. Concerning the limits of the question under investigation, note first that Scotus, in the twenty-sixth distinction of the First Book⁴, unless he feared to contradict the Church, shows that he would willingly hold that in a divine person, besides the essence common to the three and the relation and origin proper to each person, there is a certain absolute incommunicable entity, which is constitutive of the divine person. And he begins this position from a certain saying of Bonaventure, in the twenty-fifth distinction of the First Book. – And he grounds himself upon the authority of Scripture, Proverbs XXX⁵: What is his name, and what is the name of his Son, if you know? arguing thus. A question seeks what is doubtful, and presupposes something certain: this question presupposes the name of the Son, and asks for his proper name: therefore filiation is not his proper and constitutive name. – He also adduces many arguments and authorities; but since he himself answers them, they may be set aside, and the two aforementioned points must now be explained.

IV. St. Bonaventure is not, in the first place, of the opinion that the divine persons are absolute: as is expressly clear in the twenty-sixth distinction of his First Book⁶, where he holds that the properties, as origins, distinguish the persons, in such a way that, once they are abstracted, no hypostases remain. And he holds that all the properties are relations or origins, except innascibility, which is negative.

But those words which Scotus adduces are indeed Bonaventure's, yet for a different purpose. For in distinction XXV of the First Book, article I⁷, inquiring into the signification of this name "person," he holds that person, in its general and first signification, imports substance; but in its special and last signification, it imports relation, because in God the personal property is a relation. And he argues against himself: for being said according to substance and being said according to relation are distinguished in God by opposition; therefore person cannot at once be said according to substance in its general and first signification, and according to relation in its special and last. And he answers that being said according to substance is found in two ways: first, according to the substantial essence; second, according to hypostasis. And that being said according to substance in the first way is distinguished from being said according to relation; but not in the second way, because substance, that is, hypostasis, is contracted in God through relation.

From this statement it is evident even to the blind that Bonaventure does not posit a twofold absolute being, one essential and one hypostatic, as Scotus would like to imagine: but it is held only that substance is taken in two ways, both for essence and for hypostasis (which is also found in Book V Metaphysics⁸); and that substance in the second way, that is, hypostasis, is said formally of the divine person; and that at one and the same time the divine person is a hypostasis, and yet a relation, etc. For all these things are common to all theologians. – It is, however, most strange that this should be imputed to Bonaventure, since at the end of that article⁹ he expressly says that the person of the Father cannot be abstracted from paternity while preserving his personality. What could be clearer? etc.

V. To that saying of Solomon¹⁰, which Scotus so highly esteems, it is most easily answered that there is an equivocation in the name "Son of God." For He can be named, just as He can be conceived, in two ways: in one way, according to His, so to speak, quod quid est; in another way, according to concepts and names abstracted from creatures. And in the first way, we have no name, not only of the Son, but not even of God: for it is written, Isa. LIII¹¹, who shall declare His generation? And thus Son is the proper name of the second divine Person, among names that beget in us knowledge that He is. And with this, the proper name pertaining to the knowledge of what He is is ineffable. Just as also God is the proper name of God Himself: and yet the name signifying what God is is ineffable.

VI. Concerning the same limits, the question having been raised¹², note secondly that by the name relation the Author understands relation itself indistinctly; that is, without taking care to distinguish it in itself as it has the act of relation, and in itself as it has the act of property. And therefore he says many times in this text "property or relation" together. I say this, however, because, as will be made clear below¹³, in a divine person there is one respective reality, signified as origin, and as relation insofar as it is a relation, and as individual or personal property. The text nevertheless comprehends the latter modes under one here, for three reasons, I think. First, because we do not have names of first intentions pertaining to the properties except those of relation or of origin, as is evident upon review. Second, because the other member, namely relation, could be subdivided while preserving its own character; as was in fact done in the text of the fourth article of this question. Third, because, since personality according to truth is a relation, and places person in the genus ad aliquid (the word "genus" being taken broadly), it follows that the act should here be given to relation.

VII. Concerning the difference assigned between relation and origin¹⁴, a doubt arises: for it seems false that they differ in their mode of signifying. For both are signified in the abstract and in the concrete, both adjectivally and substantively, and in the other modes of signifying; therefore they do not differ in this respect.

There is also another greater doubt concerning the proposed distinction, namely that relation is signified in the manner of a form, while origin is signified in the manner of an act. For either to be signified in the manner of a form means to be signified as the formal principle in denominating, that is, as that by which something is such: and thus there is no difference, since just as paternity is that by which someone is and is called father, so generation is that by which someone is and is called generating. – Or it means being signified as a thing inhering. And thus it is false that relation is signified in the manner of a form, since, as St. Thomas himself taught in the Questions On the Power of God, question VIII, article 2, relation, although it inheres, is nevertheless not signified as inhering. Indeed there would be no difference at all, since, as is said in the same place, action and relation are the same in this respect with regard to their ratio.

VIII. To these points it is said at once that the discussion here is not about the modes of signifying grammatically, or on the side of the name as signifying; but rather metaphysically, or on the side of the thing signified, inasmuch as by calling several rationes of one thing we call them several modes of it. Therefore the intention of the text is that this one thing is signified in another way, that is, under another ratio, by the name of origin and by the name of relation; whether in the abstract, or in the concrete, or in any other grammatical manner whatever.

And from this, consequently, the answer is given to the second ambiguity: because form is that which gives being (esse) to a thing formally, to be signified in the manner of a form means, in our present case, to be signified in the manner of that which gives being formally. And since this can happen in two ways, namely on the side of the name and on the side of the signified meaning; and it has already been said that here we are not speaking of the mode of signifying on the side of the name: therefore the second member is conceded. — And to the objection raised against this position, it is said, as has already been touched upon¹⁵, that it is one thing to speak of relation as relation, and another thing to speak of real relation simply. For relation as relation is not something inherent; yet it belongs to the meaning of real relation that it be inherent. Therefore between real action and real relation there is this difference: action, both as action and as real action, has the character of an outgoing principle, even though perhaps it may be inherent. Real relation, however, although as relation it does not have the character except of an accompanying principle; nevertheless, as real relation, it has the character both of an accompanying and of an inherent principle; and therefore, on the side of the signified meaning, it is signified in the manner of a form. And in this it differs from origin: and this is the reason why below¹⁶ it is attributed to relation to distinguish and constitute the person, and not to origin, as will more fully appear in the fourth article¹⁷.

IX. With respect to the second¹⁸, the opinion followed by Bonaventure¹⁹ is recited, which says three things. First, that relation does not distinguish the hypostases, because it follows upon an act. Second, that origin distinguishes them, for the same reason: namely, because it is prior to relation. Third, that relations manifest the distinction, just as individual properties do in creatures.

X. As to the third²⁰, two arguments are brought against the aforementioned opinion. The first is: That which distinguishes must be intrinsic and proper; therefore neither origin nor essence distinguishes; therefore relation. — The antecedent is proved in creatures, in whom distinction is either through matter or through form. — The first consequence, as to its first part, is proved: because origin, as such, has the character of a way from a thing or to a thing, and thus is not intrinsic. As to the second part: because essence is common, and thus is not proper. — The second consequence is proved by the argument from division: since in a person, besides essence and origin, only relation remains.

The second reason, however, is this. The personal distinctive in the divine is constitutive of a person: but origin is repugnant to being constitutive of a person, whereas relation is not: therefore it is not origin but relation that distinguishes. — The antecedent is explained by indicating a twofold mode of distinguishing: namely, by constituting what is distinct, or by merely distinguishing, according to the twofold mode of standing to what is distinct. For it can happen that a preexisting thing is distinguished, as is clear in the division of water: and then only distinction is required. It can also happen that a thing not preexisting is distinguished: and then both constitution and distinction are required at once. The divine essence, therefore, although it is understood to preexist the distinctive relations, is nevertheless not divided or distinguished by the relations: since it always remains undivided. And for this reason the distinctives must both distinguish and constitute the persons, as not preexisting; as was assumed in the antecedent. — The minor, however, as regards its first part, is proved: because origin, actively, presupposes a person; passively, however, it is the way into it. As regards the second part: because the relations are the very subsistent persons, since there abstract and concrete do not differ.

XI. Concerning this argument, there is a doubt about this final proof, with respect to two things. First, what those words mean: relations constitute the persons inasmuch as they are the very persons themselves. Second, what force they have, together with that added proposition: the abstract and the concrete do not differ there. — The reason for doubting, however, is that, if it is true, then to constitute a person belongs to everything that is the very person itself, as is clear from the reduplicative inference; and thus origination, inasmuch as it is the very person itself, constitutes it; and likewise the essence, etc. — Nor does it seem meaningful to say that this constitutes that inasmuch as it is itself, unless the same thing constitutes itself: which is not to the point. — Also beside the point seem those words about the abstract and the concrete. — As for their efficacy, however, there is no appearance of it, even granted that they are true: since both being persons and the abstract not differing from the concrete are verified of the originations.

XII. To these it is said that by esse of persons the Author does not understand identity merely, but identity arising from the very account of the property or relation itself. For in this, as was said above²¹, it differs from origin, that the latter by its own account inheres: in whose place, in the divine, is the very one whose it is. Origin, however, according to its proper account, does not inhere: and consequently is not identified with the one to whom it is attributed. — But "in" is taken inasmuch as not reduplicatively, but specificatively. For it determines the condition according to which it belongs to the relation, and not to origin, to constitute; as when it is said, man is curly inasmuch as he is endowed with hair. For it belongs to the relation, insofar as it signifies some esse in the divine person, to constitute that person itself. And because it does not constitute it as a part, nor distinguish it as something adventitious, therefore he said that it constitutes it inasmuch as it is itself. Hence the sense is that, because the relation is, by its own account, not a part, nor something adventitious, but the person itself, therefore it both constitutes and distinguishes; always understanding the discourse to be about the proper persons. — And to make manifest that the relation is the person itself, and not a part or something²², it was adduced that there the abstract is the same as the concrete: for this is not true of things related as whole and part. — Whence the response to all the objections is clear: for the hidden meaning was the occasion of the objections.

But you should understand these things insofar as they serve this argument. However, how the proposition relation constitutes inasmuch as it is the person itself is true absolutely, according to the Author, will be said in the following article, ²³

XIII. Concerning what is said in these arguments²⁴, note two things. The first²⁵ is in the first argument, namely that every distinction must be by something intrinsic, that is, by form or matter. For this must be held as a foundation in the matter of the principle of individuation, so that quantity is not posited as an intrinsic principle distinguishing Socrates from Plato²⁶. — The second is in the second argument, namely that it happens that persons are distinguished both constitutively and non-constitutively. And this must be kept in view in the question concerning the distinction of the Son from the Holy Spirit, as we said at length in qu. XXXVI²⁷.

XIV. As to the fourth²⁸, the responsive conclusion is: The divine Hypostases are better said to be distinguished by relations than by origin. — And since better presupposes that both are good, in declaring the conclusion, he first says that both are true. — Second, that this is the better, because, according to our mode of understanding, they are distinguished by relations prior and more principal. — And finally he draws a corollary, consisting in the difference between the name of Father and of Begetter: for Father is a name not only of property but also of person, whereas Begetter is a name of property only. And the inference is evident: because relation constitutes, but origin does not.

But against the foundation of the other opinion²⁹, namely, that origin is prior to relation, as following upon it, an answer is given in the fourth article, where relation is distinguished.

XV. In response to the first, note that we can speak of the divine persons in two ways. Namely in themselves: and thus it is true that they are distinguished by themselves; as Praepositivus and Gregory of Rimini³⁰ hold. And St. Thomas expressly concedes this in I Sent., dist. XXVI, qu. II, art. 1, ad 5. — But if they are considered as signs and as signified to us, then, since they are not distinguished from the relations except in their mode of signifying, they are constituted and distinguished by the relations; just as God is constituted and distinguished from all else by deity.

XVI. In response to the third, note that relative distinction is placed first among real distinctions. First, because, according to the truth of the matter, it alone is simply and absolutely necessary: for the others do not involve a contradiction in not being, since they exist outside God. — Second, because it posits or presupposes nothing of imperfection: and therefore it is first in the order of perfection. And understand this as ordering the distinctions in the order of being (ens) simply; otherwise it would be different in the order of distinctions as such, as we discussed at length in Postpraedicamentis³¹

XVII. In response to the fourth, you have three points. First, that a subsistent relation makes a supposital distinction: and of this we shall speak below³² — Second, that the other placed in the definition of ad aliquid or of the relative stands for the correlative. And from this you have how consistently we spoke in q. XIII³³ concerning the term of the relative. — Third, that the other is not presupposed by the relative, but is simultaneous with it. And hence you have how well it was also said³⁴ that one relative defines the other, not as prior, but as simultaneous in nature and in intellect.

In the title, by abstractis, which had to be distinguished, is distinguished at the beginning of the body. By proprietates, however, he understands notions, whether personal or not.

In the body he does three things: first, he distinguishes the abstraction stated in the title; second, he answers the question¹; third, he treats a certain opposing opinion².

II. As to the first point, he distinguishes abstraction and applies it to divine things. He distinguishes, indeed, between total and formal abstraction: that is, that by which the universal whole is abstracted from its subjective parts, and that by which form is abstracted from matter. And he posits a single difference between them, namely, that in total abstraction only the concept of what is abstracted remains, whereas in formal abstraction both remain, namely, of what is abstracted and of that from which it is abstracted, as is clear in the examples of the letter. And if you wish to see these abstractions discussed at length, read our Commentary on De Ente et Essentia (On Being and Essence), question 1. – He applies this to divine things not according to the thing itself, but according to the mode of signifying, making use of the authority of Damascene.

III. As to the second, he answers the question with three conclusions. The first, in accordance with total abstraction: When the properties are abstracted, the persons do not remain, but only the essence. – And it is proved: because the persons stand as particulars, the essence as universal. That is, God remains, and the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit do not remain: for God stands to the persons as the universal to the particulars, as Damascene said.

IV. The second conclusion, according to formal abstraction, is: once the non-personal properties are abstracted, the persons remain. – And it is explained in both cases, namely in innascibility and in spiration.

V. Concerning this conclusion a doubt arises. For it seems to contradict the doctrine handed down in question XXXVI³, where it was said that, if spiration were abstracted from the Son, He would not be distinguished personally from the Holy Spirit. For if, with spiration abstracted, the Son remains a person, as is said here, then He remains a hypostasis distinct from the persons that can be in the divine nature; and consequently He is not distinguished personally from the Holy Spirit by spirating. And conversely, if He is distinguished personally by spirating, then He does not remain a hypostasis distinct, with spiration abstracted—the opposite of what is said here.

To this, briefly, on the foundation laid above⁴, it is said that both, rightly understood, are true. For if spiration is abstracted, the hypostasis of the Son remains, as is said here; and yet, if spiration is abstracted, the distinction of that hypostasis from the Holy Spirit does not remain, as is said there. These, however, do not contradict one another; and the reason is that that hypostasis is relative, and from that from which the relative would not remain, it would not remain distinct. For it is false that a divine person, and universally a relative thing, is constituted and relatively distinguished from the others by one and the same thing, even within the same nature, as was shown above⁵.

VI. The third conclusion, according to the same formal abstraction, is: When the personal properties are abstracted away, no hypostases remain. – And it is proved from both acts of a personal property, namely to constitute and to distinguish. From its constituting: personal properties do not accrue to pre-existing hypostases, but carry their supposits with them, inasmuch as they are the very being (esse) of those supposits; therefore, once they are abstracted away, no supposits remain. From its distinguishing: a hypostasis is an individual substance; therefore it is something distinct in God; therefore, once the personal relation is removed, no hypostasis remains. And this last inference holds because relation alone is what distinguishes there.

VII. Concerning this part, note that that proposition repeated many times⁶, namely, the properties constitute the persons, or carry the supposits with them, inasmuch as they are the very persons is not singular, but common to all pure and simple beings. For deity constitutes God, inasmuch as He is God Himself; and gabrielity constitutes Gabriel, inasmuch as he is Gabriel, if they are altogether identical. And these propositions signify a special mode of constituting. For since it happens in two ways that something is constituted—first, as a form constitutes a composite; second, as a simple being constitutes a simple being—when we speak of the first mode of constituting, which is a real constitution, we say simply that the rational soul constitutes man, etc.; and thus the constituting thing is not the thing constituted. But when the second mode of constituting is under discussion, by contrast with the first, it is said with an addition that it constitutes inasmuch as it is the very thing constituted, intending nothing else thereby than that the constitutive principle is said to constitute precisely insofar as it posits itself: for by positing itself, it constitutes, because the term itself points to the thing constituted. And this is what inasmuch as it is itself signifies. – Therefore Paternity, by positing itself, constitutes the Father, because it itself is the Father. And so the term inasmuch as is taken reduplicatively, and it reduplicates the mode of constituting in simple beings. Hence from this you have an easy way of answering those who object against propositions of this kind.

VIII. As to the third point⁷, it matters, and he refutes a certain opinion, which holds that when the relations are abstracted, the hypostases remain, but not the persons. The reason for the first is that the origins that distinguish remain. The reason for the second is that relations pertain to dignity, which belongs to the notion of person, but not of hypostasis.

It is refuted in two ways. First, the argument for the first claim: for it has been proved that relations are the first distinctive principle. – Second, the argument for the second claim: because the dignity by which a person differs from a hypostasis holds on the side of nature. For a person adds, on the side of nature, intellectuality over and above a hypostasis; but on the side of the individual itself it adds nothing at all, as is clear from Boethius's definition. Hence, since relations hold on the side of individuation, it is false that relations are properties of the person and not of the hypostasis: for person and hypostasis are equally abstracted on the side of individuation, although, on the side of the more dignified nature, the person is something more determinate.

IX. In response to the second, note that, as is said in Book V of the Metaphysics⁸, it is not unfitting that certain things be said relative to something according to specific names, which are not said relative to it according to generic names. And therefore it is not unfitting that the same happen similarly in the matter at hand: namely, that the Father is referred to the Son by name and in reality by the name "Father"; but that the person is referred to that same one indeed in reality, yet not by name. For this happens because, as is said in the text, by paternity the Father both is and is Father and person: but "person" signifies that being in the manner of something absolute. — I have said these things on account of the arguments of Aureol and Scotus, which I judged should be passed over in silence: for from this they are easily resolved.

The title is sufficiently clear from what precedes. – In the body he does two things: first, he answers according to the opinion proved above¹ less fully; second, he answers according to the way he follows.

II. As to the first point, the conclusion, according to them, is a single one: Relations follow upon the notional acts. - And it is made evident: because in their view they neither distinguish nor constitute the hypostases, etc.

III. As to the second point, first he distinguishes origin into active and passive, making them clear by way of exemplar. – Second, he states one conclusion concerning passive origin: Passive origin precedes the properties of the persons proceeding, even their personal properties. This is proved: because it is signified as a way to a person constituted by a property. – Third, he states the second conclusion, concerning active origin: Active origin precedes the relation of the originator that is not personal. And this is made clear in common spiration, both as it is an act and as it is a relation. – Fourth, he distinguishes the personal property of the Father, which alone remained; and this can be considered in two ways, namely as a relation, and as constitutive of the person. And he states this conclusion: that paternity, as a relation, follows generation; but as constitutive of the person, it precedes generation. And he declares the first part: because a relation is founded upon an act. The second part, however: because action presupposes an agent who is a being.

IV. Concerning the last things said, a doubt arises. First, because these seem to contradict what was said above in article 2. For either we speak of origin and relation according to the thing itself: and thus they do not differ. Or according to the concept: and thus, since each of them is multiple (for origin can be taken as origin, and as constitutive of the person, just as relation can); and neither relation as relation, nor origin as origin, constitutes: either one ought to have distinguished concerning origin, as was distinguished concerning relation; or it ought not to have been affirmed that relation rather than origin constitutes and distinguishes.

V. Concerning the same part, a greater doubt arises. For paternity, for example, is either a constitutive form under the express notion of paternity itself, or under some other notion. If under the notion of paternity, then insofar as it is a relation: and thus there is no distinction. If under another notion, then what was said above collapses, by which the Author tried to show that to constitute and distinguish the person is the act of relation, as distinguished against essence and against origin, as is clear in articles 2 and 3.

VI. And the doubt is confirmed and increased. For from St. Thomas we have four real predicates by reason of which it is attributed to relation to constitute the person. The first is the divine essence. For he says in Quaestiones de Potentia, q. VIII, art. 3, in reply to 7, that relations constitute the hypostases insofar as they are the divine essence. – The second is the divine esse. For he says in I Sent., dist. XXVI, art. 2, ad 2, that relation, insofar as it is divine, distinguishes the hypostasis. – The third is the subsistent esse. For he said in the second article of this question, in reply to 4, that relation, if it be subsistent, carries with it supposital distinction. – The fourth is the very person itself. For he said in the aforesaid article that relations constitute and distinguish the hypostases insofar as they are the subsisting persons themselves.

From all of which is woven together the ambiguity as to whether, according to the mind of St. Thomas, relation is constitutive of person, standing within the breadth of relation and its conditions: whether it constitutes insofar as it includes essence, or some essential element. On every side there are straits. For if it constitutes within the range of the relative, the arguments alleged from the passages cited collapse. But if it constitutes as being identical with something absolute, it follows that personality in God is formally absolute: whose opposite we have confessed².

VII. There are also the arguments of Aureol, as found in Capreolus, on distinction 26 of the First Book³, specifically against that dictum taken from the Questions on the Power of God⁴. – And again, against the third dictum, taken from article 2 of this question, namely, that relation as subsistent constitutes: by asking what the phrase "as subsistent" signifies; and, briefly, inferring that this is nothing other than that the same thing constitutes itself, or that what constitutes, as constituted, constitutes.

VIII. To make these things evident, know that, although Thomists holding the opposite are not lacking, on account of those things adduced from Qq. Dispp., and the passages alluding to them in I Sent.; yet it seems to me to be the mind of St. Thomas that those relations which we call personal, namely the first and incommunicable ones, within their own relative breadth, nevertheless constitute the persons. I am moved, moreover, by the doctrine of this question. For expressly, in the first place, the act of constituting personally is attributed in article 2 to relation, as it is distinguished against essence, and also against origin. Therefore not insofar as it is essence does it constitute a person. – Then in article 3 it was expressly said that the personal relations carry their supposits with them. If therefore they carry them with them, they supposit not insofar as they are essence: for it is evident that they do not carry essence with them. – Afterwards also there, in the reply to objection 2, it was explicitly said that the Father is by paternity not only Father, but someone and a hypostasis. Now it is evident that what belongs formally to a person by paternity does not belong to him insofar as he is one with the essence, but rather as he is distinguished from it.

IX. That all things may be in harmony, however, and that the intended point may be better understood, know that it is one thing for something to have a relation because it is the same as the essence, and another thing for it to have a relation to something as it is an essence. For the first signifies having that relation from the essence radically, while the second formally. An example of the first: the relation is a real thing; an example of the second: the relation is creative.

Hence, in the matter at hand, I imagine that, just as that relation is real not on account of being a relation, but on account of the esse which belongs to the number of essential realities, as was said above⁵ against the Porretans; and yet reality belongs to that relation through itself formally, but through the essence radically: so too the esse of a subsistent nature, namely hypostatic subsistence, belongs to that relation, say paternity, through itself formally, but through the essence radically. And thus that relation, not insofar as it is a relation (for in that way it would belong to every relation), but insofar as it is that relation, that is, insofar as it is a relative thing hypostatic and first, constitutes the person. Therefore the esse constitutive of hypostasis, or hypostatic esse, does not belong to it formally by reason of some absolute, but by reason of itself.

X. Nor do they will the places cited⁶. For in the Disputed Questions he intends that they have from the essence radically; as is clear from q. IX, art. 5, ad 13, where he gives the same judgment on this matter, and on the reason why the Father is paternity, namely because of identity with the essence; which is evidently to be understood radically. – A relation also can be called divine in two ways: one way identically, namely because it is the same as the deity; another way formally, namely because it is in the genus of divine things. In the case at hand, the relation is divine in this second way: for that paternity is of the uncreated and supreme being, and hence of the divine order, formally through itself; although it has this radically from the essence, with which it is identical. – And since a thing, by the fact that it is divine formally, is subsistent or substantial (for nothing divine can have the nature of an accident); therefore saying relation as divine and as subsistent comes to the same thing. So that a relation, say paternity, as a relative substantial thing constitutes the person of the Father; other conditions being understood, namely incommunicability and primitivity; by contrast with spiration, which even if it belonged to the Father alone, since it is not first, would not constitute a person. Hence what is meant by relation as subsistent⁷ is clear: namely, as it is formally through itself the nature of a substantial thing. For from this it has both that it constitutes a hypostasis, and that it does not include the essence intrinsically, but connotes it as its root. – And since, according to the truth of the matter, there is here no distinction between the constituting and the constituted except in the mode of signifying; therefore, to intimate this, it was said that the relation constitutes inasmuch as it is itself the person; that is, the relation constitutes the person in this one way only, namely by positing itself, because it is itself the person. And therefore the constituting and the constituted are entirely the same really and formally, and distinct only in the mode of signifying.

Gathering everything, then, since it has been said: Relation constitutes the person, because it is the divine essence, because divine, because subsistent, because it is the very person itself; essence expressed the root, divine the formal condition in common, subsistence the same condition in particular, and the very person itself the mode of constituting a person. For a constitution of such loftiness had to be expounded by several names, insofar as it involves several conditions.

XI. Hence all of Aureol's arguments⁸ cease entirely. For, taking note when the discourse concerns the root, when the formal condition, and when the mode of constituting, and not confusing one with another, they will likewise perceive either that they labor in equivocation, or that what appears unfitting is not unfitting—for instance, that the constituting principle constitutes insofar as it is itself constituted, if "insofar"inquantum specifies the mode of constituting, etc.

XII. The final difficulty having been dispatched, then, by pursuing the order in reverse, we must speak of the remaining ones. And to the second⁹ indeed it is said that, just as among the logicians relation is signified in two ways, namely as conceived and as exercised, and yet it is one and the same relation; so in the matter at hand paternity, as exercised, follows the act of generation; and that same paternity, under the explicit intelligibility of paternity as conceived, precedes generation and constitutes the hypostasis. Hence the members do not coincide. Nor does it follow, therefore, that paternity precedes insofar as it is a relation (sharing words with the letter): for in the letter paternity as relation signifies paternity as exercising the act of relation insofar as it is a relation; but paternity as constitutive of the person signifies that same paternity as exercising the act of a hypostatic form. And although both are comprehended within the breadth of that relative being, they are nevertheless not simultaneous according to the order of reason: rather paternity, as it precedes generation, constitutes and distinguishes the relative person of the Father in relative hypostatic being really and formally, but not relatively exercised (and therefore paternity is called such not as a relation, but as constitutive); but as it follows generation, it constitutes and distinguishes the same person, not in hypostatic being, but in exercised relative being (and therefore paternity is called such as a relation). So that there are not two relative beings in the Father, but only one, given by paternity formally before generation as hypostatic, and after generation as exercised. And likewise there is one single relative distinction of the Father from the Son, but given first as hypostatic, and afterward as exercised. And thus of similar cases.

XIII. And if you perceive these things, all will be in harmony. And you will see how Scotus's argument, in I, dist. XXVIII, qu. ult., against this distinction of the text is worthless: because it labors under an equivocation, not perceiving that as relation here signifies not the nature but the act or office of the relation, as has already been explained. – You will also perceive how vain was so great a labor of his in the Quodlibets, qu. IV¹⁰, polluted by the same sin. For paternity as constitutive and as relation imports not two natures but one, and that an atom, namely paternity; signifying distinct rationes of the same relation, according to one of which it precedes generation, and according to the other follows it. But the word "relation" deceived him, and the motive concerning which there will be discussion in qu. XLII, art. 3¹¹, where the remaining points will be resolved.

XIV. To the first¹² it is said that relation, and not origin, ought to have been distinguished and affirmed. First, because those who hold the opposite do not distinguish concerning origin, but rather make it the very constituent, paying no heed to the mode of signifying. – Second, because real relation, as has been said¹³, according to its proper character not only is present but is, as was said against the Porretans; origin, however, as such, has the character of a way only. – Third, and most importantly, because in the divine only two genera are preserved, according to Boethius¹⁴, namely substance and ad aliquid. But the divine person is formally ad aliquid, as we suppose: and consequently the constituent of the person must be ad aliquid. And therefore relation had to be affirmed, and then distinguished into its twofold act, namely of being a relation, and of being such, as has been explained¹⁵. – If, however, the common doctrine of the Saints had posited in the divine the genera of origin, say of action and passion, and not of relation; without doubt origin would have been affirmed as constitutive, and distinguished. Since, therefore, the opposite is in fact the case, for this reason relation is most fittingly pre-affirmed and distinguished.