Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

The title is clear from what has gone before. — In the body he does two things: first, he reports a certain opinion; second, he refutes it, and at the same time answers the question¹.

II. As to the first, there was a certain opinion that essential names of themselves supposit properly for the essence, but from the notional adjunct they are drawn to stand for the person. And the foundation of this is the divine simplicity, by which it comes about that the essence, for which the abstract term supposits, is the same as the supposit, for which the concrete term supposits.

III. As to the second point, the aforementioned opinion is first disproved. For in the propriety of speech both must be considered, namely, signification and mode of signifying. The aforesaid opinion, however, considered only signification, to which it pertains that having and the thing had are the same in being.

There is then set forth a second opinion, responsive to the question, namely: Essential names in the concrete can properly supposit for persons. – And it is proved from the same foundation. From their mode of signifying, Deus and similar terms signify nature in one who has it: therefore they can supposit for persons. – The antecedent is shown inductively in ly homo, etc.

Third, it is explained how in fact ly God sometimes supposits for one person, or for two, or for three.

IV. Concerning the things said here, three doubts occur, in accordance with three statements impugned by Aureolus, in Capreolus, in I, dist. IV, qu. I, art. 3. - The first is that the term God sometimes stands for the essence and sometimes for the person. God always stands for that which has deity; therefore always for a person. – And this is confirmed, because this is the reasoning of the text grounding the responsive conclusion.

Second is that in this proposition, God creates, the term "God" supposits for the essence. Actions belong to supposits: therefore. – Moreover, creation is not abstracted from the supposits, just as neither is the essence clearly seen: therefore.

Third is that in ly to the King of the ages etc., ly God stands for three supposits. For this contradicts the preceding statement. For honor and glory are owed to him alone who creates: but that one, according to you, does not demonstrate any supposit; therefore neither does this one. If this one shows three supposits, then so too does that one there.

V. Besides these three doubts, there are still three other doubts concerning three statements made in the response to the third, which must be treated together with these, so that the teaching of connected matters may be easier and briefer. – It is said, therefore, first in the response to the third, that the difference is between 'God' and 'man' in suppositing, etc. Here the reason for doubt is twofold. The first is: Either this difference is considered with respect to supposition for a determinate person, or for a person taken indistinctly. If in the first way, there is no difference: because neither does 'God' stand for the Father or the Son without an addition, nor does 'man' stand for Socrates or Plato without some restricting term. – If in the second way, again there is no difference: because just as 'man' naturally supposits for one having human nature indefinitely, so 'God' stands for one having divine nature indistinctly, as St. Thomas also says, in I, dist. IV².

The second reason, however, is that this difference seems to contradict what was said in the body of the text, where it was said that God stands for a person of itself, by reason of its mode of signifying; and the other opinion was reproved, the one saying that standing for a person comes from a notional adjunct. But here he falls into the reproved opinion, when he says that ly God and ly man differ in that ly God stands for the nature of itself, and for a person by an adjunct, whereas ly man supposes the other way around. For these clearly seem to be contrary to one another.

VI. Second, the doubt is about what is said there, namely that this is false: God does not generate. Against this you have many arguments in Capreolus, Book I, distinction IV, question I, article 2, which must be answered. – Aureolus therefore argues first as follows. In the statement God does not generate, the term 'God' stands for the nature, as you say; therefore it is true. The inference is proved: because the nature does not generate, as is clear from the Extra, De Summa Trinitate³ – Furthermore, not generating is a notion: therefore it restricts the term 'God' to standing for a person. The antecedent is proved: because affirmation and negation are of the same kind. – Furthermore, God does not generate and every God generates are contradictories; therefore they supposit for the same things. But in the second it supposits for a person; therefore also in the first.

Next, Durandus and Gregory of Ariminum argue that, by the force of the term, this proposition is true; although, on account of the danger of error, it is not accepted by the Masters. – Durandus, then, argues thus⁴: Everything that is verified of the divine persons is predicated of God: but not generating is verified of two persons: therefore. – Furthermore, God according to nature is singular, but according to the supposits is made many: therefore with respect to the essential predicates he has the force of a singular term, but with respect to the personal ones he has the force of a common indefinite term; as is clear, because we say, God is generating, God is generated, and it is verified of distinct supposits. Therefore the consequence, or concomitance, namely generates and does not generate, must likewise be verified.

Gregory, however, says thus⁵. This proposition is indefinite, and it has two true singulars; just as does this one, a divine person does not generate, which is admittedly true at the same time as the other indefinite proposition, namely, a divine person generates. Therefore it is not false.

VII. The third doubt concerns the meaning of the text, namely that when it is said, God does not generate, it is given to be understood that generation is repugnant to the divine nature. This, says Aureolus⁶, is not true: for from the negation of something by a nature, repugnance does not follow; it can stand that it be abstracted from it.

VIII. To make this evident, it must be noted most carefully that between God and the other substances there is this difference: in the others, these two—namely, nature and that which has the nature—must stand in such a relation that what has the nature is the supposit, while the nature is the very essence. In God, however, that which has the nature is found in two ways: namely, as supposit, as Father or Son, and as singular, that is, this God. Therefore in the divine there are three things to be considered: namely, essence, this God, and the divine supposits, namely, Father and Son and Holy Spirit. In the others, however, only two are found, for instance humanity and Socrates: for this man is nothing other than Socrates. Yet this God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit, and he begets and is begotten, etc., of whom it is written, Exod. XV⁷: This is my God, and I will glorify him, as St. Thomas explains at the end of the last article of this question.

The reason for the diversity, however, is that the divine nature subsists of itself and does not beg its subsistence from the supposits; rather, it confers subsistence upon them, whereas the other natures do not subsist except in a supposit. Now, since it is most natural for any concrete term to stand as subject for the one having the signified form, it follows that God first stands for this God. And because this God signifies the singular of the divine nature, therefore it is said to stand for the nature in the concrete. And because this singular is common to the three supposits, therefore it is sometimes said that it stands for the persons indistinctly. And because it is the same for each supposit, and is signified concretely, therefore it can stand for each of the individual persons.

IX. From this foundation, then, answering each point individually; and beginning with the first doubt in the response to the third⁸, on account of the order of the doctrine, it is said that between God and man there is a difference to be noted in suppositing as regards supposition for a person indeterminately. And the difference consists in this: that God, without any addition, makes a proposition singular, because it supposits for this God, common in reality to the three persons; whereas man, without any addition, constitutes an indefinite proposition, because it supposits personally, though indeterminately. And conversely, man by an addition constitutes a singular proposition, when it has simple supposition, as for instance, man is a species; whereas God by an addition constitutes an indefinite proposition, suppositing personally. And this arises, as is said in the text, from the fact that this God is found in the nature of things common to the three persons; but not this man.

Nor do these statements conflict with what was said in the body, as the second argument objected. For in the body the discussion of the articles de potentia concerned suppositing personally: and it was said that it can, by its mode of signifying, supposit for a person, just as homo does. In the response to the third argument, however, the discussion is de modo reductionis potentiae ad actum. And it is said that ly Deus, although it can of itself supposit for the essence, that is, for hoc Deo, and for a person, that is, for the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit; in order to supposit actualiter for hoc Deo, it does not need anything reducing it: but in order to supposit for the persons, it is reduced by something added. In homine, however, in whose signification nothing common is found except as underlying to the intellect, the reduction happens contrariwise. Hence there is no conflict between the statements.

X. To the first doubt raised in the body of the article⁹, the answer is briefly clear from what has been said¹⁰. For the inference must be denied: it supposits for the one having deity, therefore for a person; for it stands that it supposits for this God. – Nor do I approve what others seem to think, namely that it is St. Thomas's mind that God always stands for a person, distinctly or indistinctly. First, because in the present text it is expressly distinguished when God stands for persons, even all of them, and when he stands for the essence. Second, because otherwise the difference stated in the text in the reply to the third objection is not preserved. Third, because in this proposition, God does not generate, if "God" stood for the essence, it would be true, as being indefinite. Fourth, because in this proposition, God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit, or Trinity, "God" does not stand for a supposit, as the text says against Porretanus in the sixth article¹¹, but for one common thing in number. – Nor is it an obstacle if sometimes, when suppositing for the nature, it is said also to supposit for the persons indistinctly. For this must be understood concomitantly. For first it supposits for the nature in concreto: and because the predicate is at times verified of the persons as well, therefore to supposit for the persons indistinctly can then be admitted, though only secondarily.

As to the second doubt raised in the body of the text, it is now clear that the objector was deceived, taking essence to mean essence in the abstract, whereas the Author is speaking of essence in the concrete; for when he says that in this God creates, the word "God" stands for the nature. For in truth it stands for this one singular God, common to the three supposits. And therefore the action of creation, by reason of that nature, belongs to all the supposits. – Nor is it true that actions belong to supposits universally: but only to singular subsisting things, such as this God is. – And it makes no difference that actions of this kind are not abstracted from supposits; as is evident of itself.

As for the third doubt raised there, it is said that, as is already clear from what has been said, there is no incompatibility—indeed sometimes the one follows from the other—in God's standing for the nature and for all the persons, though dissimilarly, as has been said. Hence, although in both of these, namely God creates and to God alone honor and glory, God is verified both for this God and for the Trinity: yet since Augustine expounds the latter as exclusive with respect to the whole Trinity, as was held in question XXXI¹², therefore I take this one, which was brought forward as an example. But this member must be distinguished against the first, because the first is separated from it: for God sometimes stands for the nature and not for any supposit, as has been said.

XI. To the second doubt, however, raised in the response to the third¹³, concerning the truth of this statement, God does not generate, an answer is given from the foundation already stated¹⁴. And as to the first point of Aureol, it is already clear that he equivocates on nature. For we say that it stands for nature in the concrete, that is, for this God; of whom it is false to say he does not generate, although it is verified of the deity.

To the second, it is denied that not generating is notional. For notional being (esse) requires that something be special: but not generating is common, since it belongs even to the nature. – Nor does it follow from the fact that negation and affirmation are of the same genus that not generating is notional: for this is understood of the genus of the thing, not in the genus of the principle of knowing. For if an affirmation is the proper reason for knowing something, it does not follow that a negation is the proper reason for knowing some other special thing: since a negation is verified as much of being (ens) as of non-being. That the notional has a proper reason for knowing, however, is clear from what has been said¹⁵.

To the third, it is said that although it is wicked to say omnis Deus, since there is only one in number; nevertheless, in response it is denied that in ly omnis Deus ly Deus the term stands for supposits. For it cannot be distributed except for the individuals of the deity: which are known to be only one. And if you take them for supposits, they are not contradictory.

To the arguments of Durandus and Gregory, however, it is briefly answered that the things belonging to the persons are of two kinds: some are proper to the supposits, such as to generate and to be generated, and the like; and some are common to the supposits and the natures, such as to be distinguished, not to generate, and the like. These differ only in that the proper ones draw their terms to stand suppositionally, because they are proper to the supposits; but the common ones, precisely because they are common, do not draw them. And from this follows another difference: namely, that the proper predicates, when predicated of the persons, are also predicated of the concrete substantials; for from the fact that they draw those concretes to supposit personally, they do not signify a personal determination of the essence, but only the supposits. The common ones, however, although verified of the persons, are not predicated of the concrete substantials; for if they drew them, it would be signified that personal attributes belong to the essence. And therefore, although it is granted that the Father is really distinguished from the Son, nevertheless this is not granted: God is really distinguished from God.

And from this the arguments of both Durandus and Gregory are answered: for each is founded on this, that whatever is predicated of some person can be predicated of God. — There is also another error in each of them here, in that they think that this proposition, God does not generate, is indefinite, when it is in fact singular, since it supposits for this God.

XII. To the final doubt at last¹⁶ it is said that, although from a negation repugnance does not follow universally, it does nevertheless follow in necessary matter: for whatever is attributed necessarily must either befit or repugn. Now it is clear that to generate and not to generate can be attributed to God only necessarily: since these do not befit by an act of the will.