Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title, "ly idem" signifies real identity. – In the body he does four things: first, he gives the reason for what was asked; second, he reports a certain opinion, there: But because as Boethius¹; third, he refutes it, there: But as was shown above²; fourth, he answers the question, there: From which it follows³.

II. As to the first point, note that it could have been objected to the Author that this article was superfluous: since above, in Question III⁴, on the divine Simplicity, it was asked and determined that in God the supposit is altogether one and the same with the essence. And therefore at the beginning of this article he assigned the reason for its necessity, intending that, as far as simplicity is concerned, this question was evident and not to be repeated; but from the side of the Trinity of supposits or persons, shown afterward⁵ to be one in the unity of essence, a difficult question emerged, and therefore to be discussed anew: for then there was no place for this treatise.

III. As to the second point, the opinion of the Porretans, it seems, is that a person is not the same as the essence. Because relation is only assisting, and consequently does not pass over into the essence: therefore neither is a person, since it is the relation itself.

IV. As to the third point, this opinion is criticized because it assumes a false antecedent. For relation in created things not only assists, but inheres. Therefore in God it is not only present, but has substantial esse; as was said more fully in question XXVIII⁶

V. As to the fourth point, the responsive conclusion is: The Person is really identical with the essence; yet the Persons themselves are really distinguished from one another. – And this is proved as to both parts. A Person is a subsisting relation in the divine nature: therefore it is really identical with the essence, and really distinct from the other Person relatively opposed to it. – And the inference is proved: because relation in God, compared to the essence, does not differ in reality (re) but only in reason (ratione); but compared to the opposed relation, it has real distinction, and this by virtue of a real relative opposition.

VI. Concerning that proposition, relation, or person, does not differ in reality, but only in reason, from the divine essence, the objections of Scotus arise, in I, distinction II, question IV. For he holds that person and essence are distinguished without any act of the intellect. He therefore argues with reasons and authorities.

The first reason is as follows. The Father, setting aside the act of the intellect, has in himself a communicable entity and an incommunicable entity: therefore he has in himself a thing of diverse formal rationes. – The inference is proved: because if there were in him a thing of one ratio only, it would be either merely communicable or merely incommunicable; and each of these is heretical.

The second argument is this. The Father, understanding himself in the first sign of origin, either understands the essence and paternity as two formally distinct objects, or he does not. If so, the point is established: for intuitive cognition is of a thing according to its esse as present in itself. If not, then they are distinguished only in the mode of conceiving: therefore from the distinction between them there is not something communicable, and this incommunicable. — And the inference holds: because a distinction according to the mode of conceiving produces nothing in reality.

The authorities, however, are those of Augustine, in Book VII of On the Trinity⁷: Every essence that is spoken of relatively is something apart from what is relative. And again in the same place: If the Father is not something in himself, he is not related to another. And again⁸, concerning the Son: not insofar as he is Wisdom is he the Word. For from all these it is evident that being an absolute thing in itself and being relative to another are not formally the same.

VII. For the evidence of these things, know that, just as in God, according to the thing or in the real order, there is one reality that is neither purely absolute nor purely respective, nor a mixture or composition of both, nor resulting from both; but possessing in an eminent and formal way what belongs to the respective (indeed to many respective realities) and what belongs to the absolute: so in the formal order, or order of formal rationes, considered in itself—not as regards us speaking—there is in God a single formal ratio, neither purely absolute nor purely respective, neither purely communicable nor purely incommunicable; but containing in an eminent and formal manner both whatever absolute perfection there is and whatever the respective trinity requires. It must be so, however, because to any most simple reality, maximally one in itself, there must correspond one adequate formal ratio: otherwise it would not be per se first one intelligible by any intellect. – And this is confirmed: because the Word of God is only one. For it is evident that a word, if it is perfect, must be adequate to that of which it is.

We are mistaken, however, in proceeding from the absolute and the relative to God, because we imagine the distinction between the absolute and the relative as somehow prior to the divine reality; and consequently we believe that it must be placed under one or other of its members. And yet it is entirely the opposite. For the divine reality is prior to being (ens) and to all its differences: for it is above being (ens) and above the one, etc. And therefore, just as the lower virtues, not as articulated and distinct among themselves, are elevated to a single virtue of the sun even formally; much more are the absolute and the relative elevated to one divine reality and formal reason.

VIII. Hence, to the first argument of Scotus⁹, the consequence is denied. And to its proof, the conditional assumed is denied. For from the fact that something is of one ratio in itself, it does not follow that it is therefore only communicable or only incommunicable: rather it stands that it may be both communicable and incommunicable; and this on account of the infinity of that formal ratio. Nor is it more marvelous for one formal ratio to have both than for one thing to do so: indeed, according to right philosophy, the latter follows from what is posited by faith. – You may also distinguish that conditional for novices, saying that it is true of one formal ratio limited; but not of one unlimited, as happens in the case at hand.

To the second, it is said that the Father does not understand the essence and paternity as two formal objects in themselves: but as one formally and many virtually, as is clear from what has been said¹⁰. Not in such a way that in that supreme reality and formal reason paternity and essence are virtually present, but rather so that they are formally and really present: but their distinction is virtual, because there they are as if they were distinct; and again because they exercise the proper functions of each as if they were distinct. Hence Scotus erred, abandoning this manner of speaking, and introducing as most proper another mode of formal distinction from the nature of the thing. For this new mode is indeed very alien to the formal eminence of the divinity: for it disarticulates it formally. But the one which we have followed accords, however imperfectly, with a matter of such magnitude.

To the authorities, however, it is said that, because stammering as best we can, we resound the lofty things of God¹¹, therefore Augustine and the Doctors speak of essence and relation as formally distinct. For this, on the part of the thing itself, is founded upon this: that they are virtually, though not actually, formally distinct. On our part, however, because by objective reason they are distinguished actually among us; but this posits nothing in God except a relative denomination of a being of reason.

IX. In response to the first objection, note that the substance of the reply consists in this: that that argument does not hold where the nature is absolute and the supposit relative, and this on account of relative opposition, as is clear from what was said above¹²

X. In response to the second, note that the argument is confirmed by Aureol against this response, as found in Capreolus, on the Second Distinction of the First Book, question III¹³, thus: An effect in act has a cause in act: but that the communicable and the incommunicable, the distinct and the non-distinct, do not contradict each other is an effect in act, prior to every act of the intellect: therefore it has a cause in act. But its cause is distinction: therefore there is distinction there prior to every act of the intellect. – Nor does it suffice to reply that there is distinction there fundamentally. For then the cause would not be in act, and yet the effect would be in act; contrary to the Philosopher, V Metaphysics¹⁴ and II Physics¹⁵

XI. To this some respond by denying the minor: since the negation, which is one extreme of a contradiction, is not in act prior to the work of the intellect, because it is nothing but an ens rationis. – But this response is of no avail. For it errs by failing to distinguish between the non-being that negation signifies in exercised act, and that very non-being insofar as it takes on the character of an ens rationis. That man is not an ox signifies neither a real being nor an ens rationis, but rather that man is not an ox; and although, with no intellect considering it, this proposition would not exist, and that non-being would not have the character of being; nevertheless, what the proposition signifies does not depend on the intellect.

XII. But the argument can be made, as it were, stronger. An effect in act has a cause in act: but affirmations including within themselves contradictories, namely the common and the proper, are effects in act, etc.

Yet to all these and similar objections a single answer is given, by universally denying that proposition, namely that only distinction is the cause of this effect. For this effect can arise from distinction as from a quasi-univocal cause: and from that which virtually contains distinction, as from an equivocal cause. Now it is evident that, when an effect can arise from a univocal cause alone and from an equivocal cause alone, the positing of the effect in act does not determinately follow one or the other of the causes, but under a disjunction. And since this is the case in our question, I concede that an effect in act has a cause in act: but that cause is either distinction in act, or that which virtually contains distinction: and in the latter member this is true in our question, nor does any of the objections militate against this. – Note this well in all matters where you will be troubled by the Scotists and others concerning the cause of distinction according to reason on the side of the thing itself: for with this one point you will stop the mouths of them all.