Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title, "ly idem" signifies real identity. – In the body he does four things: first, he gives the reason for what was asked; second, he reports a certain opinion, there: But because as Boethius¹; third, he refutes it, there: But as was shown above²; fourth, he answers the question, there: From which it follows³.

II. As to the first point, note that it could have been objected to the Author that this article was superfluous: since above, in Question III⁴, on the divine Simplicity, it was asked and determined that in God the supposit is altogether one and the same with the essence. And therefore at the beginning of this article he assigned the reason for its necessity, intending that, as far as simplicity is concerned, this question was evident and not to be repeated; but from the side of the Trinity of supposits or persons, shown afterward⁵ to be one in the unity of essence, a difficult question emerged, and therefore to be discussed anew: for then there was no place for this treatise.

III. As to the second point, the opinion of the Porretans, it seems, is that a person is not the same as the essence. Because relation is only assisting, and consequently does not pass over into the essence: therefore neither is a person, since it is the relation itself.

IV. As to the third point, this opinion is criticized because it assumes a false antecedent. For relation in created things not only assists, but inheres. Therefore in God it is not only present, but has substantial esse; as was said more fully in question XXVIII⁶

V. As to the fourth point, the responsive conclusion is: The Person is really identical with the essence; yet the Persons themselves are really distinguished from one another. – And this is proved as to both parts. A Person is a subsisting relation in the divine nature: therefore it is really identical with the essence, and really distinct from the other Person relatively opposed to it. – And the inference is proved: because relation in God, compared to the essence, does not differ in reality (re) but only in reason (ratione); but compared to the opposed relation, it has real distinction, and this by virtue of a real relative opposition.

VI. Concerning that proposition, relation, or person, does not differ in reality, but only in reason, from the divine essence, the objections of Scotus arise, in I, distinction II, question IV. For he holds that person and essence are distinguished without any act of the intellect. He therefore argues with reasons and authorities.

The first reason is as follows. The Father, setting aside the act of the intellect, has in himself a communicable entity and an incommunicable entity: therefore he has in himself a thing of diverse formal rationes. – The inference is proved: because if there were in him a thing of one ratio only, it would be either merely communicable or merely incommunicable; and each of these is heretical.

The second argument is this. The Father, understanding himself in the first sign of origin, either understands the essence and paternity as two formally distinct objects, or he does not. If so, the point is established: for intuitive cognition is of a thing according to its esse as present in itself. If not, then they are distinguished only in the mode of conceiving: therefore from the distinction between them there is not something communicable, and this incommunicable. — And the inference holds: because a distinction according to the mode of conceiving produces nothing in reality.

The authorities, however, are those of Augustine, in Book VII of On the Trinity⁷: Every essence that is spoken of relatively is something apart from what is relative. And again in the same place: If the Father is not something in himself, he is not related to another. And again⁸, concerning the Son: not insofar as he is Wisdom is he the Word. For from all these it is evident that being an absolute thing in itself and being relative to another are not formally the same.

VII. For the evidence of these things, know that, just as in God, according to the thing or in the real order, there is one reality that is neither purely absolute nor purely respective, nor a mixture or composition of both, nor resulting from both; but possessing in an eminent and formal way what belongs to the respective (indeed to many respective realities) and what belongs to the absolute: so in the formal order, or order of formal rationes, considered in itself—not as regards us speaking—there is in God a single formal ratio, neither purely absolute nor purely respective, neither purely communicable nor purely incommunicable; but containing in an eminent and formal manner both whatever absolute perfection there is and whatever the respective trinity requires. It must be so, however, because to any most simple reality, maximally one in itself, there must correspond one adequate formal ratio: otherwise it would not be per se first one intelligible by any intellect. – And this is confirmed: because the Word of God is only one. For it is evident that a word, if it is perfect, must be adequate to that of which it is.

We are mistaken, however, in proceeding from the absolute and the relative to God, because we imagine the distinction between the absolute and the relative as somehow prior to the divine reality; and consequently we believe that it must be placed under one or other of its members. And yet it is entirely the opposite. For the divine reality is prior to being (ens) and to all its differences: for it is above being (ens) and above the one, etc. And therefore, just as the lower virtues, not as articulated and distinct among themselves, are elevated to a single virtue of the sun even formally; much more are the absolute and the relative elevated to one divine reality and formal reason.

VIII. Hence, to the first argument of Scotus⁹, the consequence is denied. And to its proof, the conditional assumed is denied. For from the fact that something is of one ratio in itself, it does not follow that it is therefore only communicable or only incommunicable: rather it stands that it may be both communicable and incommunicable; and this on account of the infinity of that formal ratio. Nor is it more marvelous for one formal ratio to have both than for one thing to do so: indeed, according to right philosophy, the latter follows from what is posited by faith. – You may also distinguish that conditional for novices, saying that it is true of one formal ratio limited; but not of one unlimited, as happens in the case at hand.

To the second, it is said that the Father does not understand the essence and paternity as two formal objects in themselves: but as one formally and many virtually, as is clear from what has been said¹⁰. Not in such a way that in that supreme reality and formal reason paternity and essence are virtually present, but rather so that they are formally and really present: but their distinction is virtual, because there they are as if they were distinct; and again because they exercise the proper functions of each as if they were distinct. Hence Scotus erred, abandoning this manner of speaking, and introducing as most proper another mode of formal distinction from the nature of the thing. For this new mode is indeed very alien to the formal eminence of the divinity: for it disarticulates it formally. But the one which we have followed accords, however imperfectly, with a matter of such magnitude.

To the authorities, however, it is said that, because stammering as best we can, we resound the lofty things of God¹¹, therefore Augustine and the Doctors speak of essence and relation as formally distinct. For this, on the part of the thing itself, is founded upon this: that they are virtually, though not actually, formally distinct. On our part, however, because by objective reason they are distinguished actually among us; but this posits nothing in God except a relative denomination of a being of reason.

IX. In response to the first objection, note that the substance of the reply consists in this: that that argument does not hold where the nature is absolute and the supposit relative, and this on account of relative opposition, as is clear from what was said above¹²

X. In response to the second, note that the argument is confirmed by Aureol against this response, as found in Capreolus, on the Second Distinction of the First Book, question III¹³, thus: An effect in act has a cause in act: but that the communicable and the incommunicable, the distinct and the non-distinct, do not contradict each other is an effect in act, prior to every act of the intellect: therefore it has a cause in act. But its cause is distinction: therefore there is distinction there prior to every act of the intellect. – Nor does it suffice to reply that there is distinction there fundamentally. For then the cause would not be in act, and yet the effect would be in act; contrary to the Philosopher, V Metaphysics¹⁴ and II Physics¹⁵

XI. To this some respond by denying the minor: since the negation, which is one extreme of a contradiction, is not in act prior to the work of the intellect, because it is nothing but an ens rationis. – But this response is of no avail. For it errs by failing to distinguish between the non-being that negation signifies in exercised act, and that very non-being insofar as it takes on the character of an ens rationis. That man is not an ox signifies neither a real being nor an ens rationis, but rather that man is not an ox; and although, with no intellect considering it, this proposition would not exist, and that non-being would not have the character of being; nevertheless, what the proposition signifies does not depend on the intellect.

XII. But the argument can be made, as it were, stronger. An effect in act has a cause in act: but affirmations including within themselves contradictories, namely the common and the proper, are effects in act, etc.

Yet to all these and similar objections a single answer is given, by universally denying that proposition, namely that only distinction is the cause of this effect. For this effect can arise from distinction as from a quasi-univocal cause: and from that which virtually contains distinction, as from an equivocal cause. Now it is evident that, when an effect can arise from a univocal cause alone and from an equivocal cause alone, the positing of the effect in act does not determinately follow one or the other of the causes, but under a disjunction. And since this is the case in our question, I concede that an effect in act has a cause in act: but that cause is either distinction in act, or that which virtually contains distinction: and in the latter member this is true in our question, nor does any of the objections militate against this. – Note this well in all matters where you will be troubled by the Scotists and others concerning the cause of distinction according to reason on the side of the thing itself: for with this one point you will stop the mouths of them all.

In the title [ only this is to be noted: that the question concerns the proposition, namely whether it is true and fitting.

II. In the body there is a single conclusion, responsive to the question in the affirmative, namely: We say one essence of three Persons, and three Persons of one essence. - It is proved. Divine things are named by us according to our mode, not their own, but according to what is found in created things: therefore essence in God is signified as the form of the three Persons: therefore we say one essence of three, and three of one.

The antecedent is proved: for thus we know divine things. – The consequence, however: because in sensible things nature is individuated through matter, and stands as form; and the individual as the supposit of it. – The second is indeed proved: because in these, the form is said to be of the supposit; and the supposit is of the form, if an adjective placed alongside determines the form; as is clear by way of exemplar. For all things are clear in the text.

In the title it is notably said, that this name "God", in order to indicate that the present question concerns essential names taken concretely, whether they be adjectives or substantives.

In the body he does two things: first, he distinguishes the subject of the question, proposing, in accordance with the members of the distinction, two conclusions responsive to what is asked; second, he proves them together¹.

II. With respect to the first, the distinction is: Of the essential divine names, some are substantives, and some are adjectives. – The first conclusion is: Substantives are predicated of the three Persons in the singular only, and not in the plural. – The second is: Adjectives are predicated of the three Persons in the plural number.

III. As regards according to, both conclusions are proved in the following order: first, the major premise is stated in general; second, before the minor is applied to the divine persons, the major itself is explained in creatures, there: In creatures, however²; third, the minor is applied, and both conclusions are inferred, while the words of Athanasius are also explained³.

IV. The reason, therefore, is drawn from the difference between substantives and adjectives in their mode of signifying. Substantives signify by the mode of substance, while adjectives signify by the mode of accident: therefore the singularity or plurality of a substantive is considered with respect to the form signified, but that of an adjective with respect to the supposit. – And the inference holds as to the first part, since substance, just as it has being (esse) from itself, so also has unity and plurality from itself. An accident, however, just as it does not have being (esse) except in a subject, so also receives unity and multitude from that very subject. V. Concerning this part a doubt arises: first, about the rule; second, about the force of the argument adduced.

As to the rule, there is indeed a doubt: first, because, as was touched upon in question XXXVI,⁴ Socrates, possessing several arts, is not said to be several artisans. – Second, because St. Thomas expressly says below, in the Third Part, question III, article 7, ad 2, that if the Word of God were to assume two human natures, He would not be said to be two men: and yet the form signified by the name "man" would be multiplied.

VI. But concerning the reason, since Scotus, in I, dist. XII, considers this reason insufficient, arguing against it as follows. A numerical term places its signified meaning around the signified meaning of its determinable: but the meaning of an adjective and of a substantive is the same, because each signifies a form: therefore in both cases it determines the form; nor can the mode of signifying take this away from it. Therefore the reason is worthless.

VII. To the first doubt⁵ it must be said that the difference between an adjective and a substantive consists in this: that the plurality of the substantive requires both a plurality of form and a plurality of supposit, whereas for the adjective the plurality of supposits suffices.

Nor is the doctrine of the Author thereby diminished: for it was not necessary to express here anything except that in which the substantive differs from the adjective. For to one comparing them it readily appears that they agree in the plurality of supposita, and differ with respect to the unity and plurality of form: for the plurality of each requires several supposita, but the plurality of an adjective does not require a plurality of form, while that of a substantive does so. It was therefore sufficient at this point to have expressed this difference, speaking of concrete substantives as they differ from adjectives. – Nor, however, did he pass over the remaining condition in silence. For above, in question XXXVI⁶, he makes mention of it, in refuting that proposition, the Father is several principles. And he taught the same most clearly in its proper place, namely where it was required, namely in the Third Part, at the place cited: where he also censures the contrary opinion, which he himself had followed in III Sentences, distinction I, question II, article 5⁷, setting aside whatever others have said.

VIII. To the second doubt, however⁸ it is said that the major is altogether false. For the numerical term of itself and first posits its signification with respect to the supposit of the determinable, and this both in substantives and in adjectives, as is clear from what has been said⁹. But in concrete substantives, because they are substantives, it also posits its signification with respect to the signification of that supposit. And thus neither does the objection avail anything: nor is the mode of signifying excluded whereby substantives are numbered, or determined by a numerical term, even as regards their form.

IX. The Author, therefore, having established the rule as universal, in place of the major premise, manifests it from reason in creatures¹⁰. Here he teaches two things. First, that between the unity of form in several divine supposits and in created supposits there is this difference: that in several created supposits a form one in number is not found except by the unity of order, whereas in the divine supposits it is found one in number essentially and indivisibly. – Second, that even in this minimal unity created things bear witness to the aforementioned rule, as is evident in collegiatis.

X. Finally, taking up the minor premise¹¹, namely that the divine essence is simple and supremely one in the three Persons, he concludes the first conclusion, that is, concerning substantives. And he applies it to the difference between the three individuals of man and the three divine supposits. – Then he infers the second conclusion, concerning adjectives taken adjectivally; this on account of Athanasius, who used adjectives as substantives in the Creed. Nor is any further explanation needed.

The title is clear from what has gone before. — In the body he does two things: first, he reports a certain opinion; second, he refutes it, and at the same time answers the question¹.

II. As to the first, there was a certain opinion that essential names of themselves supposit properly for the essence, but from the notional adjunct they are drawn to stand for the person. And the foundation of this is the divine simplicity, by which it comes about that the essence, for which the abstract term supposits, is the same as the supposit, for which the concrete term supposits.

III. As to the second point, the aforementioned opinion is first disproved. For in the propriety of speech both must be considered, namely, signification and mode of signifying. The aforesaid opinion, however, considered only signification, to which it pertains that having and the thing had are the same in being.

There is then set forth a second opinion, responsive to the question, namely: Essential names in the concrete can properly supposit for persons. – And it is proved from the same foundation. From their mode of signifying, Deus and similar terms signify nature in one who has it: therefore they can supposit for persons. – The antecedent is shown inductively in ly homo, etc.

Third, it is explained how in fact ly God sometimes supposits for one person, or for two, or for three.

IV. Concerning the things said here, three doubts occur, in accordance with three statements impugned by Aureolus, in Capreolus, in I, dist. IV, qu. I, art. 3. - The first is that the term God sometimes stands for the essence and sometimes for the person. God always stands for that which has deity; therefore always for a person. – And this is confirmed, because this is the reasoning of the text grounding the responsive conclusion.

Second is that in this proposition, God creates, the term "God" supposits for the essence. Actions belong to supposits: therefore. – Moreover, creation is not abstracted from the supposits, just as neither is the essence clearly seen: therefore.

Third is that in ly to the King of the ages etc., ly God stands for three supposits. For this contradicts the preceding statement. For honor and glory are owed to him alone who creates: but that one, according to you, does not demonstrate any supposit; therefore neither does this one. If this one shows three supposits, then so too does that one there.

V. Besides these three doubts, there are still three other doubts concerning three statements made in the response to the third, which must be treated together with these, so that the teaching of connected matters may be easier and briefer. – It is said, therefore, first in the response to the third, that the difference is between 'God' and 'man' in suppositing, etc. Here the reason for doubt is twofold. The first is: Either this difference is considered with respect to supposition for a determinate person, or for a person taken indistinctly. If in the first way, there is no difference: because neither does 'God' stand for the Father or the Son without an addition, nor does 'man' stand for Socrates or Plato without some restricting term. – If in the second way, again there is no difference: because just as 'man' naturally supposits for one having human nature indefinitely, so 'God' stands for one having divine nature indistinctly, as St. Thomas also says, in I, dist. IV².

The second reason, however, is that this difference seems to contradict what was said in the body of the text, where it was said that God stands for a person of itself, by reason of its mode of signifying; and the other opinion was reproved, the one saying that standing for a person comes from a notional adjunct. But here he falls into the reproved opinion, when he says that ly God and ly man differ in that ly God stands for the nature of itself, and for a person by an adjunct, whereas ly man supposes the other way around. For these clearly seem to be contrary to one another.

VI. Second, the doubt is about what is said there, namely that this is false: God does not generate. Against this you have many arguments in Capreolus, Book I, distinction IV, question I, article 2, which must be answered. – Aureolus therefore argues first as follows. In the statement God does not generate, the term 'God' stands for the nature, as you say; therefore it is true. The inference is proved: because the nature does not generate, as is clear from the Extra, De Summa Trinitate³ – Furthermore, not generating is a notion: therefore it restricts the term 'God' to standing for a person. The antecedent is proved: because affirmation and negation are of the same kind. – Furthermore, God does not generate and every God generates are contradictories; therefore they supposit for the same things. But in the second it supposits for a person; therefore also in the first.

Next, Durandus and Gregory of Ariminum argue that, by the force of the term, this proposition is true; although, on account of the danger of error, it is not accepted by the Masters. – Durandus, then, argues thus⁴: Everything that is verified of the divine persons is predicated of God: but not generating is verified of two persons: therefore. – Furthermore, God according to nature is singular, but according to the supposits is made many: therefore with respect to the essential predicates he has the force of a singular term, but with respect to the personal ones he has the force of a common indefinite term; as is clear, because we say, God is generating, God is generated, and it is verified of distinct supposits. Therefore the consequence, or concomitance, namely generates and does not generate, must likewise be verified.

Gregory, however, says thus⁵. This proposition is indefinite, and it has two true singulars; just as does this one, a divine person does not generate, which is admittedly true at the same time as the other indefinite proposition, namely, a divine person generates. Therefore it is not false.

VII. The third doubt concerns the meaning of the text, namely that when it is said, God does not generate, it is given to be understood that generation is repugnant to the divine nature. This, says Aureolus⁶, is not true: for from the negation of something by a nature, repugnance does not follow; it can stand that it be abstracted from it.

VIII. To make this evident, it must be noted most carefully that between God and the other substances there is this difference: in the others, these two—namely, nature and that which has the nature—must stand in such a relation that what has the nature is the supposit, while the nature is the very essence. In God, however, that which has the nature is found in two ways: namely, as supposit, as Father or Son, and as singular, that is, this God. Therefore in the divine there are three things to be considered: namely, essence, this God, and the divine supposits, namely, Father and Son and Holy Spirit. In the others, however, only two are found, for instance humanity and Socrates: for this man is nothing other than Socrates. Yet this God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit, and he begets and is begotten, etc., of whom it is written, Exod. XV⁷: This is my God, and I will glorify him, as St. Thomas explains at the end of the last article of this question.

The reason for the diversity, however, is that the divine nature subsists of itself and does not beg its subsistence from the supposits; rather, it confers subsistence upon them, whereas the other natures do not subsist except in a supposit. Now, since it is most natural for any concrete term to stand as subject for the one having the signified form, it follows that God first stands for this God. And because this God signifies the singular of the divine nature, therefore it is said to stand for the nature in the concrete. And because this singular is common to the three supposits, therefore it is sometimes said that it stands for the persons indistinctly. And because it is the same for each supposit, and is signified concretely, therefore it can stand for each of the individual persons.

IX. From this foundation, then, answering each point individually; and beginning with the first doubt in the response to the third⁸, on account of the order of the doctrine, it is said that between God and man there is a difference to be noted in suppositing as regards supposition for a person indeterminately. And the difference consists in this: that God, without any addition, makes a proposition singular, because it supposits for this God, common in reality to the three persons; whereas man, without any addition, constitutes an indefinite proposition, because it supposits personally, though indeterminately. And conversely, man by an addition constitutes a singular proposition, when it has simple supposition, as for instance, man is a species; whereas God by an addition constitutes an indefinite proposition, suppositing personally. And this arises, as is said in the text, from the fact that this God is found in the nature of things common to the three persons; but not this man.

Nor do these statements conflict with what was said in the body, as the second argument objected. For in the body the discussion of the articles de potentia concerned suppositing personally: and it was said that it can, by its mode of signifying, supposit for a person, just as homo does. In the response to the third argument, however, the discussion is de modo reductionis potentiae ad actum. And it is said that ly Deus, although it can of itself supposit for the essence, that is, for hoc Deo, and for a person, that is, for the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit; in order to supposit actualiter for hoc Deo, it does not need anything reducing it: but in order to supposit for the persons, it is reduced by something added. In homine, however, in whose signification nothing common is found except as underlying to the intellect, the reduction happens contrariwise. Hence there is no conflict between the statements.

X. To the first doubt raised in the body of the article⁹, the answer is briefly clear from what has been said¹⁰. For the inference must be denied: it supposits for the one having deity, therefore for a person; for it stands that it supposits for this God. – Nor do I approve what others seem to think, namely that it is St. Thomas's mind that God always stands for a person, distinctly or indistinctly. First, because in the present text it is expressly distinguished when God stands for persons, even all of them, and when he stands for the essence. Second, because otherwise the difference stated in the text in the reply to the third objection is not preserved. Third, because in this proposition, God does not generate, if "God" stood for the essence, it would be true, as being indefinite. Fourth, because in this proposition, God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit, or Trinity, "God" does not stand for a supposit, as the text says against Porretanus in the sixth article¹¹, but for one common thing in number. – Nor is it an obstacle if sometimes, when suppositing for the nature, it is said also to supposit for the persons indistinctly. For this must be understood concomitantly. For first it supposits for the nature in concreto: and because the predicate is at times verified of the persons as well, therefore to supposit for the persons indistinctly can then be admitted, though only secondarily.

As to the second doubt raised in the body of the text, it is now clear that the objector was deceived, taking essence to mean essence in the abstract, whereas the Author is speaking of essence in the concrete; for when he says that in this God creates, the word "God" stands for the nature. For in truth it stands for this one singular God, common to the three supposits. And therefore the action of creation, by reason of that nature, belongs to all the supposits. – Nor is it true that actions belong to supposits universally: but only to singular subsisting things, such as this God is. – And it makes no difference that actions of this kind are not abstracted from supposits; as is evident of itself.

As for the third doubt raised there, it is said that, as is already clear from what has been said, there is no incompatibility—indeed sometimes the one follows from the other—in God's standing for the nature and for all the persons, though dissimilarly, as has been said. Hence, although in both of these, namely God creates and to God alone honor and glory, God is verified both for this God and for the Trinity: yet since Augustine expounds the latter as exclusive with respect to the whole Trinity, as was held in question XXXI¹², therefore I take this one, which was brought forward as an example. But this member must be distinguished against the first, because the first is separated from it: for God sometimes stands for the nature and not for any supposit, as has been said.

XI. To the second doubt, however, raised in the response to the third¹³, concerning the truth of this statement, God does not generate, an answer is given from the foundation already stated¹⁴. And as to the first point of Aureol, it is already clear that he equivocates on nature. For we say that it stands for nature in the concrete, that is, for this God; of whom it is false to say he does not generate, although it is verified of the deity.

To the second, it is denied that not generating is notional. For notional being (esse) requires that something be special: but not generating is common, since it belongs even to the nature. – Nor does it follow from the fact that negation and affirmation are of the same genus that not generating is notional: for this is understood of the genus of the thing, not in the genus of the principle of knowing. For if an affirmation is the proper reason for knowing something, it does not follow that a negation is the proper reason for knowing some other special thing: since a negation is verified as much of being (ens) as of non-being. That the notional has a proper reason for knowing, however, is clear from what has been said¹⁵.

To the third, it is said that although it is wicked to say omnis Deus, since there is only one in number; nevertheless, in response it is denied that in ly omnis Deus ly Deus the term stands for supposits. For it cannot be distributed except for the individuals of the deity: which are known to be only one. And if you take them for supposits, they are not contradictory.

To the arguments of Durandus and Gregory, however, it is briefly answered that the things belonging to the persons are of two kinds: some are proper to the supposits, such as to generate and to be generated, and the like; and some are common to the supposits and the natures, such as to be distinguished, not to generate, and the like. These differ only in that the proper ones draw their terms to stand suppositionally, because they are proper to the supposits; but the common ones, precisely because they are common, do not draw them. And from this follows another difference: namely, that the proper predicates, when predicated of the persons, are also predicated of the concrete substantials; for from the fact that they draw those concretes to supposit personally, they do not signify a personal determination of the essence, but only the supposits. The common ones, however, although verified of the persons, are not predicated of the concrete substantials; for if they drew them, it would be signified that personal attributes belong to the essence. And therefore, although it is granted that the Father is really distinguished from the Son, nevertheless this is not granted: God is really distinguished from God.

And from this the arguments of both Durandus and Gregory are answered: for each is founded on this, that whatever is predicated of some person can be predicated of God. — There is also another error in each of them here, in that they think that this proposition, God does not generate, is indefinite, when it is in fact singular, since it supposits for this God.

XII. To the final doubt at last¹⁶ it is said that, although from a negation repugnance does not follow universally, it does nevertheless follow in necessary matter: for whatever is attributed necessarily must either befit or repugn. Now it is clear that to generate and not to generate can be attributed to God only necessarily: since these do not befit by an act of the will.

The title is clear. – In the body he does two things: first, he reports the error of Abbot Joachim; second, he answers the question.

II. As to the first point, Abbot Joachim, as is clear at the beginning of the Decretals¹, held the affirmative position. And his foundation was the divine simplicity, together with the authority of Augustine, badly understood.

III. As to the second point, the responsive conclusion is negative: namely, that abstract names of this kind cannot stand for persons. – And it is proved. For the truth of propositions requires that both the thing signified and the mode of signifying be preserved: but God and deity have different modes of signifying; therefore, etc. For the plain sense of the text is clear. – And a confirmation leading to an absurdity is added. For if personal terms were said of such abstract names, a distinction would be signified in them.

IV. In response to the fifth, note that in those words, we may say that the essence is a thing or God generating, if "thing" and "God" stand for the person, but not if they stand for the essence; "to stand for the essence" here is taken according to the claim of the present article, namely for the essence in the abstract: and it is not taken for the essence in the concrete, according to the claim of the preceding article. – And the compelling reason for this exposition is that of anything whatever that can be denied, the contradictory can be affirmed. And consequently, since of the essence in the concrete the negative proposition is false, namely "God does not generate"; the contradictory affirmative must be true, namely "God generates". And thus this affirmative proposition is true, not only taking "God" for the Father, but also for the essence in the concrete. Therefore in this text "essence" is taken for the essence in the abstract.

A clear title. – In the body there is one conclusion, having two parts. And it is this: Names both personal and notional, if they are adjectives, are not predicated of the essence; but if they are substantives, they are predicated of it.

As to the first part, it is sufficiently established from the preceding article. – As to the second, however, it is made manifest from the real identity between the essence and each and all of the persons; and this with respect to the essence both in the abstract and in the concrete; so that both are true: the essence is three Persons, and God is three Persons; as is clearly evident in the text.

And note that what is said of substantives, although it is verified with respect to the essence both in the abstract and in the concrete, yet what was said of adjectives in the first part of the conclusion must be understood only with respect to the essence in the abstract. For the judgment concerning adjectives is the same as that concerning verbs: and therefore, of that of which "it generates" is verified, "it is generating" is also verified; and where one is denied, the other is denied; and it is already clear from what has been said¹ how much these differ with respect to the concrete and the abstract of substance.

II. In response to the second, a difficulty arises. For in qu. VIII On the Power of God, art. 2, ad 6, the Author expressly says that it is not an essential predication when paternity is predicated of the essence—indeed, that there the fallacy of Accident occurs; yet here he says that this is essential and in no way accidental: God is Father.

And the doubt could be increased without qualification; but since a single word dissolves the difficulty, I pass over it, distinguishing that per se predication is twofold: one kind is identical, and the other formal. Between these there is only this difference, that the identical per se is not called per se absolutely, but with a determination, namely per se identical: the latter, however, is called per se simply. But since propositions of this kind are called identical in both places, the truth being preserved, it could there be said that they are not per se, because not formal, as is explained there; and here, that they are per se, in the breadth of identical propositions, as is intimated here and at the beginning of the reply, and in what is intended. For he intends that it does not accrue to God to be the Father, although it does accrue to an animal to be identified with man. It is therefore in no way per accidens with respect to identity: and yet the fallacy of Accident intervenes with respect to formality. – And thus all things are consonant: and the arguments concerning formal and direct and per se predications are dissolved, according to the modes set out in the books Posterior Analytics²; for none of these troubles identical predication, properly speaking.

In the title, appropriari does not signify to be made proper, since what is essential cannot be made proper to any Person: rather it signifies to be accommodated and adapted, as the Doctors have been accustomed to do, attributing wisdom to the Son because He is the Word, etc.

II. In the body he does two things. First, he answers the question affirmatively with a single conclusion: It was fitting, for the manifestation of the faith, that the essential attributes be appropriated to the Persons. — And he proves it briefly as follows. The Trinity, though indemonstrable, is nevertheless made known through things more manifest to us: therefore it is fitting that it be made manifest through the essential attributes: therefore it is fitting to appropriate the essential attributes to the Persons.

The first consequence is proved in two ways. First, because the essential attributes can be known by natural reason, whereas the personal properties cannot. Second, from a likeness: just as the Persons are made manifest through the likeness of the vestige or of the image, so too through the essential attributes. — The second sequel is then explained: because appropriation, in the matter at hand, is nothing other than the manifestation of the Persons through the essential attributes.

Second, he posits two general modes of appropriating: namely, by way of similitude to the proper characteristics of the Persons; or by way of dissimilitude to the imperfections found among us in the persons of the same names, for instance, fathers or sons, etc.; as is clearly evident in the following article.

The title is very broad: for it embraces questions concerning as many proper attributes as are touched upon in argument; all of which seem to be contained in what has been handed down in Scripture¹ (1).

I think nothing needs to be added to the body: since it is distinct, ordered, formed, and easily intelligible of itself. Hence it has need of reading rather than exposition.

(1) The 1514 edition proceeds as follows. He sets out five conclusions in the body of the text. The first of which is: A fourfold consideration concerning God presents itself to us. It is proved. Because since our intellect is led by the hand from creatures to the knowledge of God, it must consider God according to the mode which it takes from creatures. But in the consideration of any creature, four things present themselves to us in order: for first, the thing is considered absolutely, inasmuch as it is a being (ens); second, inasmuch as it is one; third, according to the power of acting that inheres in it; fourth, according to its relation to its effects. Therefore. – The second conclusion: Inasmuch as God is considered absolutely according to his esse, in this way eternity is appropriated to the Father by Hilary, species to the Son, and use to the Holy Spirit. – The third conclusion: Inasmuch as he is considered as one, in this way Augustine appropriates unity to the Father, equality to the Son, and concord or connection to the Holy Spirit. – The fourth conclusion: Inasmuch as there is considered in God a sufficient power for causing, the third appropriation is taken, namely of power, wisdom, and goodness. – The fifth conclusion: Insofar as God is considered in his relation to his effects, that appropriation is taken, namely from whom, through whom, and in whom. – The proofs of these conclusions are clearly evident in the text, and they are easy and intelligible: hence they need reading rather than exposition.