Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

The title from what has been said¹ is clear. – In the body there is one conclusion, answering the question affirmatively: The Gift, taken personally in the divine realities, is the proper name of the Holy Spirit. – And it is proved. A Gift is an irrevocable giving: therefore it contains within itself the intelligibility of a gratuitous donation: therefore of love: therefore love is the first Gift: therefore the Holy Spirit proceeds as the first Gift: and thus Gift is his proper name.

The antecedent is clear from the authority of the Philosopher. The first consequence is explained: because an irredeemable giving is a free gift. The second, however: because we give freely to someone precisely because we will his good. The third, however: because love, together with that which is the reason for giving, is itself a given thing. The fourth, however: because the Holy Spirit alone proceeds as Love. – And the conclusion is confirmed by the authority of Augustine.

II. Concerning the foregoing, the first common doubt that arises is whether the Gift signifies primarily a personal property of the Holy Spirit; or an aptitudinal relation to rational creatures; or something else.

III. There also arises a doubt from Aureol, as reported by Capreolus, in the eighteenth distinction of the First Book², and it is manifold. First, because this text contradicts the preceding question. For there it was said³ that the Holy Spirit proceeds as an impression; here, however, that he proceeds as love. – Second, because this statement is false. For if the Holy Spirit proceeds as love, then whatever belongs to him as Spirit belongs to him as love; therefore as God, good and wise, etc., since love is something essential to being. – Third, because when it is said, the Holy Spirit proceeds as love, either the term love is taken essentially or personally. If essentially, it is not to the point. And it would also follow that the Holy Spirit, by force of his procession, would enclose a special causality with respect to creatures, namely that which essentially taken love encloses. If personally, the inference proves nothing, therefore he proceeds as the first gift; for the account of the first gift was proved of love taken essentially: for it is the account of every gratuitous bestowal.

IV. To make this evident, it must be known that gift in general manifestly imports three things: namely, the thing capable of being given; the respect of givability; and the respect of a kind of possession, that is, that it belongs to the one who can give it. But it imports the thing capable of being given denominatively, because it denominates it. The respect of givability, however—that is, its aptitude to be given to another—it signifies first, as is taken from the text of both articles: for in this respect it appears in each article, as is evident to one who considers. The respect toward the giver, moreover, consignifies more than it signifies, in my judgment—or let it be said that it signifies him secondarily.

But the Gift in the divine persons, because it is the first gift, denominates love as a thing donable: for it belongs to the giver by origin, and it signifies the relation of the constitutive procession of the Holy Spirit; but because it is donable only to rational creatures, it signifies a respect of reason toward them: in the same order, in my judgment, that we stated concerning gift in general.

V. Nevertheless, the order in reality is not the same as the order in signification. For to the Holy Spirit there first belongs His proper personal property, by reason of which He is the Gift of the Father and of the Son giving; second, love, by reason of which He is said to be first gift-able; and third, the respect of gift-ability. That the respect of gift-ability belongs to the Holy Spirit by reason of the essential love included in Him is proved by reason, namely because no personal term as such includes a respect toward creatures; and it is established by the testimony of the text, in the response to the fourth article of the first question, where we are expressly taught that just as something essential is included in the definition of person, so too in the notion of Gift; and that by reason of that essential element a respect toward a creature is conveyed, while by reason of the notional element it is a personal name. That essential love is included under the name of Gift is evident from the same foundation: namely, because a respect toward a creature requires that something essential be included in what signifies it.

Therefore, in reality and in name—except for the order of signification—the Gift is related to the Word in the same way. For just as "Word" signifies three things, namely the relation of origin, knowledge, and a relation to the things spoken and also to be brought into being; so "Gift" signifies the relation of origin, love, and a relation to the things loved and receptive of the gift. And just as there the argument from things to names, and conversely, does not hold: since it is not valid that "Word," insofar as it is Word, signifies a relation to the things spoken; therefore the property of the Son signifies such a relation, nor conversely, the property of the Son does not signify such a relation; therefore neither does "Word," insofar as it is Word—because the name "Word" imports more than that property—in the same proportionate way must one judge concerning the Gift. For it is not valid to argue from the name of Gift to the property of the Holy Spirit, or conversely: because the name of Gift includes more, as is evident from what has been said.

Be cautious, therefore, in observing whether the discussion is purely about the things themselves, or whether it digresses to things under their names. For if the discussion is purely about the things, then no proceeding person, by the force of its procession, has any proper thing, real or of reason, except the relation of origin, which is identical with itself. And thus neither does knowledge, or a respect toward the things mentioned, belong properly to the person of the Word; nor love, or the relation whereby it is given, to the person of the Holy Spirit. But if the discussion is about those same persons as they are signified by these terms, namely Word and Gift, then we say that a respect toward the things mentioned is proper to the person of the Word, and a respect toward things capable of the gift is proper to the person of the Gift, etc.

VI. And by this the solution of many arguments in Capreolus is clear, where above⁴ he wishes that the respect of donability is not proper to any one Person. For this is true by reason of the personal property considered simply: but false by reason of the absolute included not extrinsically, but as falling obliquely in its notion. Just as in the definition of person rational nature is posited: and if divine person were defined, divine nature would fall in its notion. And similarly, if the divine Word were defined, it would be defined through the divine intellect: and similarly the Gift through the divine love, etc.

VII. Coming therefore to the arguments of Aureol⁵, it is said that, on account of the poverty of terms, it is said at one time that the Holy Spirit proceeds as an impressio, at another as an impulsus, at another as love, etc.; so that by these many names we may be able to signify a reality obscure and without a name.

But that it is false that the Holy Spirit proceeds as love is denied: for this seems to be a common saying of the Saints. – And to the first proof to the contrary, the consequence must be denied, when we are speaking of essential love. For the Holy Spirit is not the Holy Spirit by that whereby He is love; although by one and the same procession He is Spirit, and God, and love, and blessed, etc., as is clear from Augustine and Hilary, in the eighteenth distinction of the First Book.

To the second objection it is said that love is taken personally; and that the consequence holds: the Holy Spirit proceeds as love, that is, as an impression proceeding by way of loving, therefore he proceeds as the first gift, because love taken essentially is included in the notion of that impression obliquely, by reason of its mode of proceeding; just as we said⁶ concerning the Word with respect to knowledge, and the person with respect to nature. And thus nothing prevents it from having been proved that essential being (ens) is a gift, and yet that this belongs to Love taken personally by reason of what is contained within it.

Although it can be said, and truly, that esse as the first gift is proved from that impression in general, and then, ascending to the divine, it is inferred that it befits the Holy Spirit, who is that impression; yet since he is a relative being, and this respect of the gift is found to befit the impression in general under the aspect of something absolute, therefore we understand implicitly that this befits the Holy Spirit under the aspect of something absolute, as contained within the aspect of what is relative.

It could also be said in a third way that, when it is said the Holy Spirit proceeds as Love, the word as signifies the mode of essential love: for he truly proceeds according to the mode of that love. And thus, from the mode of proceeding rather than from the property of the one proceeding, it is proved that Gift, with respect to the relation of reason to its recipients, is a proper name of the Holy Spirit, the relation of origin being understood along with it.

VIII. And lest you be deceived by names of this kind that import several things, judge of them as of complexes composed of the notional and the essential, for instance Wisdom begotten, Love proceeding, and the like. For each of these is a proper name of some Person by reason of the whole conjunction taken together: or else one part is reckoned among the proper terms by reason of the other. So it happens with Gift and the like, as is evident of itself when one resolves what is hidden in their significations.