Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

A clear title from what is said in the body, and above ¹ after the discussion concerning the name of the Father and of the Word.

In the body there is one distinction, with one conclusion. The distinction is: Love can be taken essentially, and personally. – The conclusion, however, is: Love, taken personally, is the proper name of the Holy Spirit. – And four things are at the same time made manifest, in the following order.

First, the difference between the divine processions is set forth in general, with respect to the knowledge and the naming that pertain to them.

Second, there: Yet likewise, a correspondence is posited between them with respect to two things: namely, the mode of producing, because just as by understanding itself it produces the word, which is the concept of the thing understood in the one understanding, so by loving itself it produces the impression or affection of the thing loved in the one loving; and the number of the relations, because just as there are three relations there—namely, to the thing understood, to the word, and conversely, that is, of the word to its principle—so here there are three, namely, to the thing loved, to the affection, and of this latter to its principle.

Third, there: But on the side of, he shows in particular the difference between these processions with respect to the naming of the relations mentioned above. Namely, because in the intellect all of them are named, whereas in the will only the first is named, for the names of the first are accommodated to the others.

Fourth, there: Thus therefore, he infers from what has been said the distinction first, and then the conclusion; as is clearly evident in the text.

II. Note here that that distinction of love into essential and personal, as is clearly had from this article, is not a distinction of the thing, but of the word in its various significations. For the whole reason for the distinction is the accommodation of the term to another signification; just as if the name "notion" were accommodated to the Word. Hence there are not two loves in the divine, one essential and the other personal. But the word love, on account of the poverty of terms, sometimes signifies the divine love, which is without doubt something essential; and sometimes the third Person proceeding by way of will and love. Hence vain is the labor of the arguments of Aureol, in distinction XXXII of Book I, at Capreolus², against this distinction, insofar as it belongs to St. Thomas: since it is understood thus.

The remaining matters pertaining to this article have been discussed above, in question XXVII³.

In the title, note that, although the question is proposed concerning the thing itself, asking, Whether the Father and the Son etc.; nevertheless the difficulty concerns the truth of the proposition; namely, whether this proposition is true, The Father and the Son love each other in the Holy Spirit. For concerning the thing itself, whether loving is taken notionally or essentially, it is evident how the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are related to one another.

II. In the body he does three things: first, he shows the cause of the difficulty; second, he sets out five opinions; third, he answers the question.

III. As to the first, the reason for the difficulty concerns the proposition, because that ablative Spiritu Sancto seems to import a relation of principle with respect to love in the Father and the Son: which, however, is impossible.

As to the second, the opinions are sufficiently clear in the text.

IV. As to the third point, he posits two conclusions, according to the members of the distinction set out above, namely: to love is taken in two ways, essentially and notionally. The first conclusion is that, taking "to love" essentially, the Father and the Son do not love each other by the Holy Spirit. — The second is that, taking "to love" notionally, the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Spirit.

And he declares and proves them, drawing the fifth opinion to a good sense, from two foundations. One concerns the term formal; the other, the mode of denomination. — The first, then, is this: every denominating thing, as such, has the character of something formal. And this is declared in two ways: first, because things are commonly denominated by forms; second, by the example of clothing. — The second, however, is this: that which produces can be denominated by that which proceeds from it not only as an action but also as an effect—but this when the effect itself is contained within the intellect of the action. The first part of this is declared in fire and heating; the second, however, in the tree and its blossoms.

For from these things, with the intellect of loving notionally subjoined, the following argument is to be formed for the second conclusion. Whenever the effect is included within the action of the intellect, the agent can be denominated both from the action and from the effect: but to love, taken notionally, is an action of this kind: therefore the Father and the Son can be denominated both by love and by the Holy Spirit. — The minor is explained in two ways: first, by expounding the term to love notionaliter; second, by a similar that speaking.

But since Augustine's first conclusion has been proven by authority, it is left as evident.

V. Concerning what has been said for the second conclusion, there are several doubts. Scotus, indeed, in Book I, distinction XXXII, question I, argues in four ways. First, against the foundation of the position. To build implies a building, since it is to make a temple; and yet it is not said that the builder builds with a temple. And in the case at hand, to breathe implies breath, for it is to emit breath; and yet it is not granted that they breathe with the Holy Spirit. Therefore the foundation is worthless.

Second, even if such a predication were at times to be granted, it would still not be convertible upon the agent. Yet this is what happens in the case at hand, when it is said, they love themselves.

Third, in a transitive construction, an effect, as effect, is never construed in the ablative: to love, however, is a transitive verb: therefore.

Fourth, he argues against the example of to flower in two ways. First, because to flower is not to produce flowers. Then because it is a neuter verb, which signifies the same thing as its adjective would signify if one were imposed; just as to be hot is to be warm. Then because, as Aureol adds¹, if God impressed flowers upon a tree, the tree would not on that account be said to flower any more than before. — Then because the example is not parallel. For an ablative with a neuter verb, such as to flower, is not construed as the term of the action; but here we are speaking of the term of the action in the ablative with respect to an active verb, such as to love.

VI. To make the ambiguity of this clear, note two things. First, that when it is said in the foundation of the position, when in the intellect of action etc., this can be understood in two ways: first, of the intellect of action absolutely; second, of the intellect of action as thus signified. In what is at issue it is not understood in the first way, but in the second. For the notional act by which the Father and the Son produce the Holy Spirit is of one reason only absolutely; yet it is signified by one name as spirating, and by another name as loving, insofar as something is included in its reason when it is signified by the name of love which is not included when it is signified by the word of spiration; as is stated in the text, in the reply to the second objection.

Second, note that in the intellect the act so signified can include its effect in two ways. In one way, as specifying or determining the quality of the action, as in to whiten whiteness is included, and in to heat heat is included, and so with the others: for just as it is shown that not any making whatever but such a one is signified, we say to heat and to whiten and to build. In the second way the effect is included as conjoined to that action as the product to its production; as in "ly" I say, taken vocally, the vocal word is included; for to say is to utter a word. And it is taken in this way in the present case. So that the sense of that foundation is: Whenever in the intellect of an action signified by such a term there is included an effect as an effect conjoined to its own production, then the producer can be denominated from that effect in the ablative, etc.

And if one asks the cause why certain terms signify in this way and others do not, there is no other reason except that these have been imposed to signify in this way, while those have not. Yet these are distinguished from those in this respect: that words which thus include their effect, if they are constructed transitively with something else, are not signified as having the relation of the producer to the thing produced, as is clear when Socrates tells the history of Troy is said. But those do so, as is clear from saying, Socrates builds the heavens. And this arises from the first difference: namely, that those contain within themselves their proper effect, while these do not; and thus the relation to the effect remains in those unaltered with respect to the term, but in these it is determined according to what is adjoined.

VII. These points standing, the answer to the first² is clear, by denying the assumption: for to build, to breathe, and other things of this kind import their effect only specifically.

To the second, it is said that a reflexive construction upon itself can occur when the object of the act can be the agent itself, as happens in the case at hand and in similar cases: for Socrates can speak of himself no less than of the history of Troy.

To the third, moreover, the assumption is also denied in the words that close within themselves an effect and pass over onto an object, such as to love, to say, etc. For they are constructed transitively with the object, as the term of the transition, in the accusative; and with the effect as that which denominates; as is clear from saying, Socrates says the history with a word.

But as to what is brought forward in the fourth place against the example of florere, it can easily be said that we posit examples not so that it may be thus, etc.³ Nevertheless, granting the example, we say that florere truly signifies to put forth flowers, as is clear from the usage of speakers. – Nor does the neutrality of the verb conflict with this: for this pertains to the mode of signifying, not to what is signified. – But if God were to imprint flowers, although the tree would truly be called florida, it would not yet be said that it floruit: for this proposition would be true: the tree which has not flowered is flowering (in bloom). – It is also apparent that the last assumption is false in this example; nor has the opposite been proved by them.

VIII. And note that in this matter, in my judgment, it is sufficient to bring forward what is reasonable by reason of the matter, namely, of the words: for all these things happen from terms signifying in this way. Hence it is also clear from the response to the second point that, although it may fittingly be said, Socrates says history with a word, nevertheless it would be unfitting to put the whole of its signification in place of says, saying, Socrates utters a word, the word, the history of Troy. For this happens from the diverse aptitude of the terms for construction: namely, because to utter cannot be constructed with that effect denominating; but says, so. And the like holds for breathing forth and loving with respect to the Holy Spirit, and begetting and speaking with respect to the Word, as is evident in the text.