Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title, know that here there is a question both about the thing itself, whether it is so, namely, that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit by numerical unity: and about that proposition, whether, properly understood, it is true.

In the body he does two things: first, he answers the question as regards the thing; second, as regards the property of the proposition¹.

II. As to the first, this is the conclusion: The Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit. – And it is proved. The Father and the Son are one in all things in which they are not distinguished by relative opposition: therefore they are one principle of the Holy Spirit. – And the inference holds: because in that which is the being of a principle of the Holy Spirit, they are not relatively opposed to one another. III. As to the second, he does three things. First, he reports a certain opinion holding that this proposition is improper, for the following reason. The term principle signifies a property: therefore it is used adjectivally: therefore it cannot be added to another adjective: and thus the term one is not used nominally: therefore, for the proposition to be true, the term one is used adverbially: and consequently it is improper.

Second, he argues against the opinion, and against both of its foundations, in reverse order. First indeed, that the word one is not to be taken adverbially. For then it could be said the Father is not one principle of the Son and of the Holy Spirit: because He is their principle in several ways. — Second, that this inference does not hold: principle signifies a property, therefore it is taken adjectively. Since it signifies a property substantively; as is also evident in creatures, in the names father and son.

And so, thirdly, he infers the opposite of the aforementioned opinion, confirming it by reason and example. The reason is: Principle is a substantive noun; therefore it takes number according to the number of the form signified by it; but the form signified, that is, the property, is one in number in the Father and the Son; therefore it is most fittingly said, the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit. — The example, however, is that for this same reason it is said, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one God: namely, because deity is one in number in them.

IV. In response to the first, concerning those words, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as they are more than one, a doubt arises: whether the spirative principle which requires, as such, a plurality of supposits. Now I say as such in order to exclude the concurrence of plurality per accidens, as happens in the creative principle: for it is accidental to creation that it be from three Persons; God would create no less if He were not triune. The doubt, then, is this: whether spiration itself is from two per se, or not, but rather quasi per accidens, as creation is from three. For Scotus, in I, dist. XII, holding that plurality is not required, grounds himself upon the all-perfect character of the spirative principle in one supposit. But St. Thomas, in I Sentences, dist. XI, art. ult., ad 2, positing a difference between creation and spiration in this respect, seems to hold the opposite view, in accordance with the determination he made in article 2 of the same distinction. And the present text seems to confirm this.

V. The reason for doubting in this matter is that no compelling argument appears for either side. For the perfection of the principle which and by which seems to be preserved in a single supposit alone because otherwise the Father alone would be an imperfect principle of the Holy Spirit. But given the complete perfection of both principles in one supposit, there follows the truth of this conditional: that if that supposit alone existed, it could perfectly spirate the Holy Spirit. And thus a plurality is not required per se in the principle which spirates.

The manner of proceeding, however, as a nexus, communion, and unitive mutual love, which is said to belong to the Holy Spirit, cannot be understood unless it be from at least two. And therefore plurality must be found per se in the spirative principle which.

VI. Yet neither of these paths leads necessarily to the intended goal. The first indeed falls short, because not by reason of imperfection, but by reason of the spiration not being possessed, nor of its being possible to be possessed in a single supposit, the Father alone or the Son alone could not breathe forth the Holy Spirit, consubstantial and personally distinct, etc.

The second, however, falls short, because to connect, to unite, and the like do not belong to the Holy Spirit by reason of His personal property, but by reason of the essential property included therein, namely love; as is stated in the following question, article 1, ad 3, where the text says so, and it will be made clearer in the same place.

VII. And although such things do not compel, yet since St. Thomas expressly said above in this same question ² that it belongs to the notion of the Holy Spirit to be from the Father and the Son; and here he adds the note of reduplication, saying that He proceeds from the Father and the Son inasmuch as they are several persons; and since it has been the common saying of the Saints that the Holy Spirit is the mutual love of the Father and the Son: I judge that it must be held that the spirative principle as that which, insofar as it is such, requires plurality. So that duality is a condition of the spirator, adding no perfection above the unity of the supposit; but the second person adds only the condition required for the principle which, for want of which—taking "defect" negatively—a single person alone would not spirate; just as on account of its abstraction from perfection and imperfection, none spirates imperfectly, but each one spirates perfectly.

VIII. Nor do we believe this without reason. For if the procession of the Holy Spirit is necessarily from the Father and the Son, as was proved above³, it necessarily follows that He proceeds from them insofar as they are such. Therefore insofar as they are several: for they are not intelligible as such unless as several.

The reason also taken from the text, namely that it proceeds as unitive love, makes the intended meaning clear, if we observe that in this matter we likewise lack words of our own; and thus it is necessary to understand and convey what is proper by means of what is appropriated.

To this may be added the reason assigned by St. Thomas in I Sent., dist. XXIX, art. ult.⁴, namely that spiration is a personal act.

IX. Nor should you believe that I have forgotten the foregoing because of these points. For these stand together, namely, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son inasmuch as they are two in this way, that is, inasmuch as they possess such a plurality or duality; and that the procession of the Holy Spirit does not differ sufficiently from the generation of the Son by reason of its being from two and the latter's being from one, since supposital duality absolutely does not suffice for this, as we said above⁵

But Scotus's arguments need not be brought forward, because they do not militate against our position, the duality of supposits on the side of the principle that speaks only, except for what we have adduced concerning perfection ⁶; but against Henry, who posits concord, etc.

X. In response to the second, there is a doubt concerning those words, The Father cannot be said to be several principles, because a plurality of supposits would thereby be implied. For if the rule concerning the pluralization of a substantive noun according to the plurality of the form signified is true, it seems arbitrary to except the pluralization of "principle" in the Father: for it is evident that the forms signified are several, namely paternity and spiration. — Nor can it rightly be said, as some believe, that this rule is true only when there is a real plurality of the form signified. For it is evident that the art of shoemaking is really distinct from the art of making bridles; and yet Socrates, possessing both, is not two craftsmen.

XI. To this it is said that it is one thing to speak of a substantive noun, and another to speak of a concrete substantive concrete. For the substantive, as such, is pluralized in respect of the plurality of the form signified; sufficiently indeed, if it is abstract, but exactly and absolutely if not; that is, that for its own plurality it requires a plurality of the form signified, whether this suffices or not. But the concrete substantive, because it is substantive, requires a plurality of form; and because it is concrete, it requires a plurality of supposita. And thus, since principle is a concrete substantive, it is very well said in the text that a plurality of supposita would be implied by saying, the Father is several principles. Nor does one depart from the rule concerning the substantive, rightly understood, as we have explained.

XII. In response to the fourth and fifth arguments, the doubt is a logical one, raised by Gregory, treated in the twelfth distinction of the First Book of the Sentences, and discussed by Capreolus at the end: namely, how the term principle supposits confusedly. First, because nothing is confusive. — Then, because if it stood confusedly, it would be permitted to descend under the predicate to its singulars by a proposition with a disjunct extreme: which is not permitted here.

XIII. To the first of these there are two replies. First, that one need not seek a confusive term with respect to the common concrete substantive term, because it has this from its natural supposition, as St. Thomas says in III Sent., dist. I, qu. II, art. 4⁷; but one would need to seek a distinctive term when it supposited determinately. — Second, it is said that it is confused by the word "is" (ly et), when it is a predicate.

To the second argument, likewise there is a twofold reply. First, that this rule has no place where under the predicate there are not several singulars, as happens in the case at hand: for the singular of the principle is not the Father or the Son, but this principle. But since there are not several principles in number there, but the Father and the Son are one principle in number of the Holy Spirit, there remains no descent to singulars of the principle. But if one comes to the Father or the Son, we are already outside the rule; and it is a sophism of Figure of Speech. – Second, it is said by others, granting the consequence and denying the falsity of the consequent, as you can see in Capreolus.

XIV. In response to the sixth, note that here the Author settled what he left undecided in I Sent., dist. XXIX⁸, ad ult.

XV. In response to the seventh, note that here the Author argues against the opinion which he himself followed in I Sent., dist. XI and XXIX⁹, in the final articles. – But the argument adduced in the text will be examined in the third article of question XXXIX, where the matter of adjectival and substantive being (ens) will be treated ex professo.