Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

The title is clear. – In the body he does three things: first, he states what use he has of this question; second, he treats two opinions¹; third, he determines².

II. As to the first, he makes three points: first, the usage of the Greeks; second, that of the Latins; third, that of sacred Scripture; all of which are clearly evident in the text.

III. As to the second, since the usage of the Latins is confirmed by the authority of Sacred Scripture, various opinions are brought forward concerning the reason why the Son alone is called Image. The first opinion, indeed, is excluded on account of a certain agreement in notion with the Father: because according to the notional relations equality is not considered; therefore neither likeness; therefore neither image. – The second, however, which runs through each one and finds none of whom the Holy Spirit could be said to be the image, is excluded: because he could be said to be the image of the Father and of the Son inasmuch as they are one. And it is confirmed: because man is one image of the whole Trinity.

IV. As to the third point, the reason for the aforementioned usage of the Latins and of Scripture is given. And because, as is said in II Posteriorum³, to know the cause of a conclusion and the conclusion itself is one and the same thing, the question is answered at once with an affirmative conclusion, namely: Image is a proper name of the Son. And its proof is nothing other than the reason why the Holy Spirit is not called image, while the Son is so called.

And the argument stands as follows. The Son proceeds as Word, whose notion involves a specific likeness to that from which he proceeds; but the Holy Spirit proceeds as love, whose notion does not involve such a likeness: therefore the Son alone is the image. – The antecedent, from question XXVII⁴, is evident on both counts. The consequence, moreover, holds by the nature of an image.

And the force of this argument, which assigns as its cause the manner of proceeding, is made manifest and confirmed by a similar difference, on account of the similar cause found there, between the Son and the Holy Spirit, in what pertains to being born. For although each receives the nature of the Father through his own procession, yet only the Son is said to be born, because of the different manner of proceeding of each, as was shown above ⁵: namely, that he proceeds as like, etc. – And lest anyone, troubled, should wonder whence the Holy Spirit has it that he is like the Father and the Son, or should believe that he has this from his mode of proceeding, he added that likeness belongs to the Holy Spirit not insofar as he is love, but insofar as he is divine love.

V. Concerning these matters a doubt arises from Aureol, as reported by Capreolus, in the twenty-seventh distinction of Book I, question II, conclusion 6⁶. And it is a doubt arising from the present text, and undermining it as follows. The Holy Spirit proceeds as divine love: therefore as like: therefore the argument adduced is worthless. – The first inference holds on the basis of the text, which says that the Holy Spirit, insofar as he is divine love, has what it takes to be like. But the second, and the antecedent, are evident in themselves.

VI. To make this difficulty evident, the terms placed in the antecedent must be distinguished, namely ly divine love, and ly proceeds as⁷. As to the first, know that a common form can be contracted in two ways, and be denominated from that which contracts it: first, by some difference proper to it; second, by something outside its formal extension. An example of the first is white color; an example of the second is natural color: for the difference of whiteness is a difference proper to color, diversifying it; but nature, like art, lies outside the genus of color. Love, therefore, can be contracted in two ways: first, by the proper differences of love, such as friendship or concupiscence; second, by the natures of those loving, such as the angelic or the human. And if love is contracted by all the differences proper to its extension, you will never find any one from which it would have the character of likeness to that from which it proceeds. First, because all its proper differences are contained within the scope of appetite, in which nothing has the character of likeness. Second, because, as will be shown below⁸, it is a kind of impulse; and for this reason, all its proper differences must be differences proper to impulse, diversifying it; which is formally, though not causally, remote from the character of likeness. – But if it is contracted by something extrinsic, nothing prevents it from sometimes having the character of likeness: yet this is accidental, natural and identical, as is evident of itself.

Therefore, when it is said divine love, if the term "divine" does not draw love outside the breadth of the per se differentiae of love, but, remaining within the breadth of the will insofar as it is will, denotes whose it is as object and as lover, namely God: then it must be denied that, insofar as it is of this kind, it is similar. Nor should the proposition subjoined at the end of the text be understood in this sense. The reason, however, is clear from what has been said. – But if the term "divine" is a denomination taken as it were from something extrinsic, for example from a nature with which it is identified, then it must be conceded that, by reason of the identity between the love and the nature, divine love, as such, is similar to that from which it proceeds. And in this sense you are to understand the present text.

VII. As to the other term⁹, note that when it is said, the Holy Spirit proceeds as divine love, and in other similar expressions, a twofold sense can be made. First properly, so that only what is formal and proper to that mode of proceeding is denoted; second, extensively, so that what is common as well is denoted, together with what accompanies the mode of proceeding or its term. For example, in the case at hand, when it is said, the Holy Spirit proceeds as divine love, if ly "as" is taken properly, the proposition is not true if divine love is taken identically: for from what is proper to the procession of love, even divine love, remaining within the extension of will alone, the Holy Spirit does not have that he is God, but that he is the love of God as loving and loved. But it is true of divine love taken formally. Yet then, granting the antecedent, the first consequence is worthless, as is clear from what has been said. Nor is the opposite found in the text, when it speaks of divine love identically. – But if ly "as" denotes also what is common, then it is true of divine love both formally and identically: and thus it has the character of a likeness.

But since the discussion among theologians properly and formally concerns modes of proceeding, therefore that antecedent concerning divine love must be understood and admitted in the first way: but the first consequence is to be denied, namely, therefore he proceeds as like. And in proof of this it must be said that it commits a fallacy of equivocation, as is clear from what has been said: because the term "divine" is equivocal when it is taken objectively and effectively, as it is taken in the antecedent; and when it is taken identically, as happens in the proof of the consequence.