Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title, note ly in the name of the Word. For the question is not whether the thing that is the Word has a regard to creatures, but whether that divine thing, as signified by the name "Word," includes some regard to creatures.

II. In the body he does three things. First, there is set forth the conclusion that directly answers the question affirmatively, together with its middle term: and thus he answers with respect to the relation in general. Second, by determining what sort of relation that is, he answers concerning such a relation, though one common to the Father and to creatures. Third, by making a distinction, he answers concerning that relation whereby he is related to creatures only.

III. As to the first, the conclusion concerns relation in general, just as the question was also posed in general. And it is this: In the Word of God there is signified a relation to creatures. – And the middle term is immediately added: because God, in knowing himself, knows creatures.

As for second, the middle term of the argument is expounded by applying it more closely to the conclusion restricted to this respect, namely: The Word of God is expressive of the Father and of creatures. – For it is proved thus. The Word is representative of everything that is actually understood; therefore the Word of God is expressive not only of the Father, but also of creatures. – The antecedent is proved in us, in whom there are diverse words according to diverse things actually understood. But the consequence is proved because God understands Himself and all things by a single act.

As to the third, the conclusion is this: The Word of God, which is in God the Father, is expressive only; but that of creatures is both expressive and operative. – It is proved thus. God's knowledge is merely cognitive of God, whereas of creatures it is cognitive and productive: therefore the Word of God, etc. And it is confirmed by the authority of Scripture: "He spoke, and they were made".

IV. Concerning the foregoing, and this whole matter, note that there are four things here: first, the things spoken by the Word; second, the relation between the Word and the thing spoken; third, the manner in which the Word is referred to the things spoken; fourth, the reason why it is so referred. And as to the things spoken, in the first article of this question, in the reply to 3, we held that they are these three, namely the divine essence, the divine persons, and every creature: for the Father speaks all these things in the Word. The relation of the Word to the things spoken, as such, is a relation of reason: and it is the relation of that which expresses to what is expressed, as is said in the text. And in these two points the others agree with us, compelled perhaps by the authority of Augustine.

In the other two respects, however, namely the mode and the cause, there is a diversity of opinions. For Scotus, in Book II, distinction 1, question 1, article 2, and in his Quodlibets, question 14, article 2, holds that the Word of God, by the force of its production, proceeds not from the knowledge of creatures but from the divine essence. And again, as is gathered from distinction 32 of Book I, question 1, ad ultimum, of the same work, he holds that the Word proceeds from the knowledge of the essence alone in such a way that it does not proceed as the Word of a person except concomitantly. So that he imagines that the Father, precisely because he understands the divine essence, produces the Word: which indeed, by the force of its production, expresses the essence, but expresses the divine persons only concomitantly, as things necessarily joined to the essence; while it has that it represents creatures, the production of the Word itself being already complete.

V. Now the foundation of his position is this: he holds, in distinction XXXV of the First Book, that creatures are produced by God in known being (esse cognitum). And on that account he imagines that the divine essence first, as it were, moves the Father's intellect to the production of the infinite term, that is, the Word; and then to the finite term, that is, the creature in known being. And thus the Word cannot be produced from knowledge of creatures, which exists in the second instant of nature.

He also argues for this in the Second Book, where above, in three ways. First. If the Word were to proceed as Word of the divine essence and of every intelligible, then by equal reason the Holy Spirit would be breathed forth as love of the divine essence and of everything lovable as understood: but this is false; therefore. The falsity is proved: because then either God would necessarily love creatures, or the Holy Spirit would not be produced necessarily; both of which are impossible. – Second. If the Word were to proceed from all things etc., therefore he would proceed from himself, the Word, as known by the Father: which is unfitting. And the inference holds: because one of the things understood formally by the Father is the Word. – Third. No real relation of any divine person is toward a creature: but being begotten of that from which one is begotten, if it is really distinct, is a real relation; therefore the Word is not begotten of a stone as known by the Father.

VI. St. Thomas, however, as is evident here, holds that the Word of God is born from all things that are in the knowledge of the Father, namely, the essence, the persons, and every other simple intelligible (which I say on account of the things known by God in the science of vision). For he imagines, as he expressly says in the first article¹, that the Father, in understanding himself and the Son and the Holy Spirit and every creature (understand this, by a simple act of understanding), conceives the Word: so that, prior in the order of reason, God the Father understands whatever naturally shines forth in the divine essence before he produces the Son.

Yet it is true that the Word primarily expresses the essence, and secondarily creatures; just as God the Father primarily understands His own essence, and secondarily creatures: so that ly primarily and ly secondarily signify nothing other than in itself and in another; for the creature is in the divine essence, while that essence itself is understood and expressed in itself.

VII. But it is easy to answer the Scotist imaginings. For that the primary foundation² is of no worth is clear from this, that that production of creatures is chimerical, and instills a dangerous doctrine. For it follows that the glorious God cannot be without there being creatures in diminished being: which seems ridiculous in philosophy, but in faith a scandal. But of these elsewhere³. For we, holding that the divine essence comprehends every intelligible both formally and objectively, say from what was determined above⁴ that, because the Word proceeds not from just any cognition of the divine essence, but from the comprehension of the same, it must proceed from the knowledge of all things that are known by comprehending the divine essence. But these are all the things said above⁵, as is clear from qu. XIV⁶. Therefore.

And this was without doubt the foundation of St. Thomas. From which, in answer to Scotus's first objection⁷ it is briefly said that, speaking uniformly—that is, of the creature understood in God, and likewise loved in God—the same reasoning holds for the Word and the Holy Spirit: nor does any inconvenience follow. – Yet one could simply deny both the consequence and the parity of reason: because love regards things lovable in themselves, whereas the word regards things as they are in the intellect.

To the second, it is said that there is nothing unfitting in the Word proceeding from Himself and from the Holy Spirit as known by the Father, that is, from the knowledge which the Father has of them; indeed, this is necessary, on account of the reason adduced. Rather, since Scotus himself expressly holds, in the Sixth Distinction of the First Book, that the Father understands the Son before He produces Him, he is reckoned voluntarily to regard this as unfitting.

The third objection, however, is not worthy of a response: since the Word is not really distinct from those things from which He proceeds as known, but from that from which He proceeds as speaking; as is evident of itself.

VIII. Be cautious, however, in this matter, on account of the conditional truth, namely: If God understood nothing in His essence but that essence alone, there would still be a production of the Word. For from this it seems to follow that the production of the Word is not posterior to the intellection of creatures in God. You have, moreover, another conditional: If God were not productive ad intra by understanding Himself, He would nevertheless understand every intelligible. For from this it follows that God's understanding of creatures in Himself is not posterior to the production ad intra. Therefore, lest you be deceived by these—since it naturally holds in fact by following ⁸—say as above ⁹ I said, however, naturally, because those things which God freely knows in fact, since the natural precedes the free, are far removed from this disputation. – And since within the comprehension of the natural power of the divine science is contained the art of making creatures, although not the volition of them; therefore the Word of God, which is adequate to His natural science, has respect to the creature not only as expressive but also as operative, as is said in the text from Augustine.

IX. In response to the first, note that against it there are the arguments of Aureol, as found in Capreolus, at the twenty-seventh distinction of the First Book, question II, in conclusion 5¹⁰, to prove that the Word has from a personal property that He is referred to creatures. For all these arguments collapse on this ground: they suppose that it is the same thing to say, the Word is referred to creatures according to His proper notion; and to say, the Word has from a personal property that He is referred to creatures: whereas these differ greatly, and the first can be granted while the second cannot. And the reason for this is that the Word contains within His proper notion knowledge, which belongs among the essentials: on account of which, as is said in the text, He is referred to things known and to things to be made.

X. In response to the fourth objection, note that in those words, the name "Word" was principally imposed to signify a relation to the speaker, in my judgment St. Thomas retracts what he had said in the Questions On Truth, question IV, article 5, namely that the name "Word" principally signifies something absolute. And this retraction follows upon the determination he had made in the first article here, namely that "Word" is only a personal name. So that "Word" signifies first the personal property of the Son in the concrete; and since connoted knowledge is as it were its substratum, it is therefore also referred to things said, etc. And this accords with the response to the first objection; and with the words of the preceding article, namely, "Word" signifies a certain emanation of the intellect. For it is clear that that emanation is the personal property of the Son: for unless this were first among its significates, from its own signification it would not signify the personal property of the Son in God, but only through what is connoted; the opposite of which is stated there.