Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

The title is sufficiently clear, from the common usage of the terms in the matter of the Trinity. And ly sit denotes what the question is: whether, by reason of its own signification, it is a personal name, or not. For it is not asked whether it can supposit for a person, or whether it is a personal name by accommodation, but simply: in the divine nonetheless, that is, when it is predicated of God.

II. In the body he does three things. First, he proposes the responsive conclusion to the question, namely: The name "Word," taken properly in God, is personal, and in no way essential. – Second, he immediately explains those terms of the conclusion, taken properly in God; third, he proves the conclusion, there: But He Himself is the concept of the heart.¹

III. With respect to second, in order to explain "word" taken properly, he distinguishes the name of the word and orders its modes. He distinguishes, indeed, that it is taken in two ways: namely, properly, and metaphorically. And again, taken properly, it is taken in three ways. And thus, by uniting all the modes, it is said in four ways: in the first three ways properly, and in the fourth by similitude. First, therefore, for the word in vocal utterance; second, in the cogitative power; third, in the intellect; fourth, however, for some deed that has been signified, commanded, or effected by the word. – He then orders, first, the word of the heart, second, of the mouth, third, of the cogitative power, placing them; and proving the order of the first from this, that exterior vocal sound has the character of a word only because it signifies the interior concept of the mind.

But to explain ly in divinis, he says that the Word in God is taken for the word of the intellect. And he confirms this by the authority of Augustine. – On these ways of taking verbum, you will find written at length and clearly in Qq. de Ver., qu. IV, art. 1 and 2; and in I Sent., dist. XXVII, qu. II, art. 1, 2. Therefore see there.

IV. Concerning the order of the words set down in the text, there is doubt as to what kind of order it is—whether with respect to us, or according to itself. That it is not with respect to us is evident from this: that, according to this order, not the word of the heart but the word of the voice must hold the first place, as is also intimated at the beginning of the text. But that it is not according to nature appears from this: that in this order the word of the cogitative power claims for itself the second place, since it is clear that the vocal word depends upon imagination. And so, whatever order may be meant, the word of the mouth seems badly placed second: for by the order of nature it belongs to it to be last, while with respect to us it is first.

V. To this it is said that the order assigned is the order of nature among the intentions signified by the name word. For the evidence of this, know that there are two canons in matters of this kind. The first is: every name is said formally before it is said by extrinsic denomination; as is clear inductively. The other is: every name said formally of several things is said first of that on which another depends than of the thing dependent upon it. And this too is clear inductively.

The Word, therefore, since it is preserved formally only in the word of the heart and of the mouth, but causally in the cogitative power, is accordingly, in accordance with the first rule, said lastly of the word of the cogitative power. And to intimate this, the text said, imagination is called a word, signifying that it is called a word in the cogitative power for the reason that it is an image of the Word, though a causal one.

But since the formal character of the word in the intellect exists without dependence on the spoken word, while in speech it exists with dependence on the word of the heart, therefore the word of the heart is discussed before the spoken word: formally, however, as was said, and not by extrinsic denomination, as Durandus thought. This is evident from the fact that the voice had the name "word" before the concept of the mind did: for in that prior usage, the voice was a word, and the formal character of a word in the concept was unknown. Therefore the voice did not take its appellation "word" from the word of the heart. – Moreover, the voice is an expressive sign not by extrinsic denomination but formally, just as Socrates is white. But the formal character of the word in the voice is to be an expressive or manifestative sign of the concept of one mind to another, as is said in the text: just as the formal character of the word in the concept is to be an expressive sign of habitual knowledge to oneself, as is said in Qq. de Ver.² Therefore the significative voice is formally a word, just as it is formally expressive.

VI. But in response to the objection to the contrary ³, it is said that the order of nature among the intentions of a manifold name is attended neither according to the order of the things in which those intentions are realized, nor according to the order of those intentions in their natural being (esse naturae): for the sun, although prior to what it heats, and the sun's causality naturally prior to the heat caused by it, is nevertheless not said to be hot before the thing heated, but rather the reverse. Rather, it is attended according to the relation of the intentions themselves in that one is included in another and not conversely. Thus do the formal intention and that by extrinsic denomination stand to one another. And therefore, although the causality of the cogitative power, whereby the word is said to be in it, is prior to the vocal word, the latter nevertheless receives its predication later.

VII. As to the third⁴, the conclusion is proved as follows. "Word" in God signifies a concept of the intellect; therefore it signifies something proceeding from another; therefore something personal; therefore it is not taken essentially, but personally only. – The first inference is proved: because it belongs to the very notion of the concept of the heart that it proceed from another, namely from the knowledge of the one conceiving. The second, however, is proved: because the divine persons are distinguished according to origin. The third is self-evident.

VIII. Concerning this argument and conclusion, a doubt arises on three grounds. First, because "to proceed" abstracts from a real procession and a procession according to reason. And likewise ly from another can be understood in both ways, namely from another according to reality, or according to reason. And yet the text infers both procession and real otherness. – Second (and this is a confirmation of the preceding), because of many counterinstances. For "to understand," "to love," and whatever else is similar, signify something proceeding from another, say from the intellect or the will, etc.; and yet it does not follow: Therefore such are personal names in the divine. – Third (and this is an augmentation of the preceding), because of the Author himself, who both in the Questions on Truth⁵, and in I Sentences⁶, where above⁷, on account of what we have adduced, holds that this argument adduced in the text does not conclude; and he maintains the opposite of the conclusion here proven, saying that word is sometimes a personal, sometimes an essential name.

IX. To make this doubt evident, we must first speak of the thing itself, and then⁸ of the Author. As to the thing, know two points. First, that "according to reason" is a diminishing condition, just as "painted" or "dead" (for to be moved according to reason is not to be moved); therefore to proceed according to reason is not to proceed, but is to be understood as proceeding, that is, in the manner of a procession. And for this reason, when procession is the subject of discussion, what is real must be understood; just as when we speak of motion and other things that are diminished by reason. Otherwise all things would be uncertain.

Know secondly, that it is one thing to signify something proceeding from another, and another thing to signify something in the manner of a thing proceeding from another. For in the first, what is signified is said to proceed from another; but in the second, the thing signified is understood and signified as proceeding, or in the manner of a thing proceeding from another. Between these two, moreover, there is a greater distance than between heaven and earth: for it is as great as that between being (esse) and being signified. For in the first, the thing signified is from another; but in the second, it is signified as from another.

X. These points standing, it is answered that the propositions assumed in the text are not to be distinguished: for they expressly signify that procession falls upon the thing signified. The argument therefore stands on this. The name "Word," taken properly in the intellect, signifies a concept proceeding from another, such that the procession determines the concept with respect to the thing: since otherwise there would be no procession. And this is said properly of God. Therefore it is saved there in both respects: otherwise it would not be said properly. Therefore it is a personal name: because there nothing is from another except a person, although many things are understood as being from another.

And by this the answer to the objections is clear. For "to love" does not signify something proceeding from another, but signifies something in the manner of a thing proceeding from another. And the same reasoning applies to the rest of this kind.

XI. As to the Author⁹, it is said that, as appears to one who attentively examines his books, he gradually arrived in this question at the perfection of truth. For in Book I of the Sentences, he followed the opinion of those who, considering the name "Word" just as the name "love," said that it is sometimes essential and sometimes personal. Later, in the Questions On Truth, he inclined to the other side, namely that it is said personally; yet not without fear of the other position, as is clear from the fact that he answers the arguments on both sides, embracing the one that seemed the more reasonable. Finally, in this passage, he asserted the other side, namely that it is said personally, with an express refutation of the other, namely that it is in no way essential. And this because he saw that all those things which had once made the matter doubtful cease on this one account, namely that the name "Word" signifies something proceeding from another; by this he distinguishes it from those terms that signify by way of a principle. For against this no objection militates, and in this no distinction has a place, as is clear from what has been said¹⁰. Nor did he assume this without proof, but proved it from the very account of the thing signified: Itself, he says, the concept of the heart has, from its own account, that it proceeds from another. It is therefore not something essential: since in the account of nothing essential is it contained, whether intrinsically or as a necessary concomitant, that it proceed from another. – Nor does this detract from the dignity of the Doctor: for it is natural for the human intellect to be perfected in the course of time. He therefore retracted the aforesaid, not by mentioning that he had once thought otherwise, but by rejecting the opinion he had held.

XII. In response to the first objection, note that that conditional, if the Word of God is said metaphorically, the Word of God must be posited as said properly, does not hold on account of its form, but on account of its matter. For, as is stated in the text, if the Word of God is posited metaphorically, it is posited either as manifested by the Word of God, or as manifesting the Word of God; for in these two ways it is said metaphorically. In both cases, however, the Word taken properly is implied, and consequently personally, as was shown in the text. For there is nothing in the notion of a word that implies imperfection, but only being from another, etc.

XIII. In reply to the second, note that, when it is said in the text that understanding is related to the intellect in act as esse is to ens in act, this is not a figurative manner of speaking, but rather an expressive one: as if he were saying that, just as esse in common is to ens in act in common, so such esse, that is, understanding, is to such ens in act, that is, intellect in act. For it has been made clear above¹¹ that to cognize something is to be that thing; and that in things cognizing in potency, the cognitive power is first in potency the very thing cognized, then in an intermediate way between potency and act, and finally it is that very thing; and only then is it called actually cognizing. Nor is it an obstacle that understanding is called an action: both because it is immanent, as is said in the text; and because, according to the truth of the matter, it has more of being signified than of being an action.

XIV. In response to the third, it is doubtful whether the divine Word proceeds from all things that are in the Father's knowledge, namely the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and all creatures. But since this is treated more deliberately in the third article of this question, it will be defined there.¹²