Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

The title is sufficiently clear, from the common usage of the terms in the matter of the Trinity. And ly sit denotes what the question is: whether, by reason of its own signification, it is a personal name, or not. For it is not asked whether it can supposit for a person, or whether it is a personal name by accommodation, but simply: in the divine nonetheless, that is, when it is predicated of God.

II. In the body he does three things. First, he proposes the responsive conclusion to the question, namely: The name "Word," taken properly in God, is personal, and in no way essential. – Second, he immediately explains those terms of the conclusion, taken properly in God; third, he proves the conclusion, there: But He Himself is the concept of the heart.¹

III. With respect to second, in order to explain "word" taken properly, he distinguishes the name of the word and orders its modes. He distinguishes, indeed, that it is taken in two ways: namely, properly, and metaphorically. And again, taken properly, it is taken in three ways. And thus, by uniting all the modes, it is said in four ways: in the first three ways properly, and in the fourth by similitude. First, therefore, for the word in vocal utterance; second, in the cogitative power; third, in the intellect; fourth, however, for some deed that has been signified, commanded, or effected by the word. – He then orders, first, the word of the heart, second, of the mouth, third, of the cogitative power, placing them; and proving the order of the first from this, that exterior vocal sound has the character of a word only because it signifies the interior concept of the mind.

But to explain ly in divinis, he says that the Word in God is taken for the word of the intellect. And he confirms this by the authority of Augustine. – On these ways of taking verbum, you will find written at length and clearly in Qq. de Ver., qu. IV, art. 1 and 2; and in I Sent., dist. XXVII, qu. II, art. 1, 2. Therefore see there.

IV. Concerning the order of the words set down in the text, there is doubt as to what kind of order it is—whether with respect to us, or according to itself. That it is not with respect to us is evident from this: that, according to this order, not the word of the heart but the word of the voice must hold the first place, as is also intimated at the beginning of the text. But that it is not according to nature appears from this: that in this order the word of the cogitative power claims for itself the second place, since it is clear that the vocal word depends upon imagination. And so, whatever order may be meant, the word of the mouth seems badly placed second: for by the order of nature it belongs to it to be last, while with respect to us it is first.

V. To this it is said that the order assigned is the order of nature among the intentions signified by the name word. For the evidence of this, know that there are two canons in matters of this kind. The first is: every name is said formally before it is said by extrinsic denomination; as is clear inductively. The other is: every name said formally of several things is said first of that on which another depends than of the thing dependent upon it. And this too is clear inductively.

The Word, therefore, since it is preserved formally only in the word of the heart and of the mouth, but causally in the cogitative power, is accordingly, in accordance with the first rule, said lastly of the word of the cogitative power. And to intimate this, the text said, imagination is called a word, signifying that it is called a word in the cogitative power for the reason that it is an image of the Word, though a causal one.

But since the formal character of the word in the intellect exists without dependence on the spoken word, while in speech it exists with dependence on the word of the heart, therefore the word of the heart is discussed before the spoken word: formally, however, as was said, and not by extrinsic denomination, as Durandus thought. This is evident from the fact that the voice had the name "word" before the concept of the mind did: for in that prior usage, the voice was a word, and the formal character of a word in the concept was unknown. Therefore the voice did not take its appellation "word" from the word of the heart. – Moreover, the voice is an expressive sign not by extrinsic denomination but formally, just as Socrates is white. But the formal character of the word in the voice is to be an expressive or manifestative sign of the concept of one mind to another, as is said in the text: just as the formal character of the word in the concept is to be an expressive sign of habitual knowledge to oneself, as is said in Qq. de Ver.² Therefore the significative voice is formally a word, just as it is formally expressive.

VI. But in response to the objection to the contrary ³, it is said that the order of nature among the intentions of a manifold name is attended neither according to the order of the things in which those intentions are realized, nor according to the order of those intentions in their natural being (esse naturae): for the sun, although prior to what it heats, and the sun's causality naturally prior to the heat caused by it, is nevertheless not said to be hot before the thing heated, but rather the reverse. Rather, it is attended according to the relation of the intentions themselves in that one is included in another and not conversely. Thus do the formal intention and that by extrinsic denomination stand to one another. And therefore, although the causality of the cogitative power, whereby the word is said to be in it, is prior to the vocal word, the latter nevertheless receives its predication later.

VII. As to the third⁴, the conclusion is proved as follows. "Word" in God signifies a concept of the intellect; therefore it signifies something proceeding from another; therefore something personal; therefore it is not taken essentially, but personally only. – The first inference is proved: because it belongs to the very notion of the concept of the heart that it proceed from another, namely from the knowledge of the one conceiving. The second, however, is proved: because the divine persons are distinguished according to origin. The third is self-evident.

VIII. Concerning this argument and conclusion, a doubt arises on three grounds. First, because "to proceed" abstracts from a real procession and a procession according to reason. And likewise ly from another can be understood in both ways, namely from another according to reality, or according to reason. And yet the text infers both procession and real otherness. – Second (and this is a confirmation of the preceding), because of many counterinstances. For "to understand," "to love," and whatever else is similar, signify something proceeding from another, say from the intellect or the will, etc.; and yet it does not follow: Therefore such are personal names in the divine. – Third (and this is an augmentation of the preceding), because of the Author himself, who both in the Questions on Truth⁵, and in I Sentences⁶, where above⁷, on account of what we have adduced, holds that this argument adduced in the text does not conclude; and he maintains the opposite of the conclusion here proven, saying that word is sometimes a personal, sometimes an essential name.

IX. To make this doubt evident, we must first speak of the thing itself, and then⁸ of the Author. As to the thing, know two points. First, that "according to reason" is a diminishing condition, just as "painted" or "dead" (for to be moved according to reason is not to be moved); therefore to proceed according to reason is not to proceed, but is to be understood as proceeding, that is, in the manner of a procession. And for this reason, when procession is the subject of discussion, what is real must be understood; just as when we speak of motion and other things that are diminished by reason. Otherwise all things would be uncertain.

Know secondly, that it is one thing to signify something proceeding from another, and another thing to signify something in the manner of a thing proceeding from another. For in the first, what is signified is said to proceed from another; but in the second, the thing signified is understood and signified as proceeding, or in the manner of a thing proceeding from another. Between these two, moreover, there is a greater distance than between heaven and earth: for it is as great as that between being (esse) and being signified. For in the first, the thing signified is from another; but in the second, it is signified as from another.

X. These points standing, it is answered that the propositions assumed in the text are not to be distinguished: for they expressly signify that procession falls upon the thing signified. The argument therefore stands on this. The name "Word," taken properly in the intellect, signifies a concept proceeding from another, such that the procession determines the concept with respect to the thing: since otherwise there would be no procession. And this is said properly of God. Therefore it is saved there in both respects: otherwise it would not be said properly. Therefore it is a personal name: because there nothing is from another except a person, although many things are understood as being from another.

And by this the answer to the objections is clear. For "to love" does not signify something proceeding from another, but signifies something in the manner of a thing proceeding from another. And the same reasoning applies to the rest of this kind.

XI. As to the Author⁹, it is said that, as appears to one who attentively examines his books, he gradually arrived in this question at the perfection of truth. For in Book I of the Sentences, he followed the opinion of those who, considering the name "Word" just as the name "love," said that it is sometimes essential and sometimes personal. Later, in the Questions On Truth, he inclined to the other side, namely that it is said personally; yet not without fear of the other position, as is clear from the fact that he answers the arguments on both sides, embracing the one that seemed the more reasonable. Finally, in this passage, he asserted the other side, namely that it is said personally, with an express refutation of the other, namely that it is in no way essential. And this because he saw that all those things which had once made the matter doubtful cease on this one account, namely that the name "Word" signifies something proceeding from another; by this he distinguishes it from those terms that signify by way of a principle. For against this no objection militates, and in this no distinction has a place, as is clear from what has been said¹⁰. Nor did he assume this without proof, but proved it from the very account of the thing signified: Itself, he says, the concept of the heart has, from its own account, that it proceeds from another. It is therefore not something essential: since in the account of nothing essential is it contained, whether intrinsically or as a necessary concomitant, that it proceed from another. – Nor does this detract from the dignity of the Doctor: for it is natural for the human intellect to be perfected in the course of time. He therefore retracted the aforesaid, not by mentioning that he had once thought otherwise, but by rejecting the opinion he had held.

XII. In response to the first objection, note that that conditional, if the Word of God is said metaphorically, the Word of God must be posited as said properly, does not hold on account of its form, but on account of its matter. For, as is stated in the text, if the Word of God is posited metaphorically, it is posited either as manifested by the Word of God, or as manifesting the Word of God; for in these two ways it is said metaphorically. In both cases, however, the Word taken properly is implied, and consequently personally, as was shown in the text. For there is nothing in the notion of a word that implies imperfection, but only being from another, etc.

XIII. In reply to the second, note that, when it is said in the text that understanding is related to the intellect in act as esse is to ens in act, this is not a figurative manner of speaking, but rather an expressive one: as if he were saying that, just as esse in common is to ens in act in common, so such esse, that is, understanding, is to such ens in act, that is, intellect in act. For it has been made clear above¹¹ that to cognize something is to be that thing; and that in things cognizing in potency, the cognitive power is first in potency the very thing cognized, then in an intermediate way between potency and act, and finally it is that very thing; and only then is it called actually cognizing. Nor is it an obstacle that understanding is called an action: both because it is immanent, as is said in the text; and because, according to the truth of the matter, it has more of being signified than of being an action.

XIV. In response to the third, it is doubtful whether the divine Word proceeds from all things that are in the Father's knowledge, namely the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and all creatures. But since this is treated more deliberately in the third article of this question, it will be defined there.¹²

In the title, proprium is distinguished both from what is common and from what is extraneous, that is, accidental, as was said of the name of the Father¹. Thus the sense of the question is: Whether the name "Word" in God befits the Son alone, as His personal property; as is clear from the arguments.

II. In the body there is a single conclusion, answering the question affirmatively: The name "Word," properly speaking in God, is the proper name of the person of the Son. – And it is proved thus. "Word" signifies an emanation of the intellect, that is, what proceeds according to the emanation of the intellect: therefore it signifies the Son; therefore only the Son is properly Word. – The first inference is proved: because the person proceeding according to such an emanation is the Son, and a procession of this kind is generation.

Note here that, if the force of this argument is examined clearly, the second consequence is rightly posited without proof. For from the fact that the person proceeding according to the emanation of the intellect is the Son, it follows that the name Word befits the Son. But from the fact that such procession is itself generation, which is known to terminate in the Son, it follows that to be the Son and to be the Word are one and the same being. And hence, to be the Word is proper to the Son himself, just as to be the Son is. And thus it properly belongs to him alone.

In the title, note ly in the name of the Word. For the question is not whether the thing that is the Word has a regard to creatures, but whether that divine thing, as signified by the name "Word," includes some regard to creatures.

II. In the body he does three things. First, there is set forth the conclusion that directly answers the question affirmatively, together with its middle term: and thus he answers with respect to the relation in general. Second, by determining what sort of relation that is, he answers concerning such a relation, though one common to the Father and to creatures. Third, by making a distinction, he answers concerning that relation whereby he is related to creatures only.

III. As to the first, the conclusion concerns relation in general, just as the question was also posed in general. And it is this: In the Word of God there is signified a relation to creatures. – And the middle term is immediately added: because God, in knowing himself, knows creatures.

As for second, the middle term of the argument is expounded by applying it more closely to the conclusion restricted to this respect, namely: The Word of God is expressive of the Father and of creatures. – For it is proved thus. The Word is representative of everything that is actually understood; therefore the Word of God is expressive not only of the Father, but also of creatures. – The antecedent is proved in us, in whom there are diverse words according to diverse things actually understood. But the consequence is proved because God understands Himself and all things by a single act.

As to the third, the conclusion is this: The Word of God, which is in God the Father, is expressive only; but that of creatures is both expressive and operative. – It is proved thus. God's knowledge is merely cognitive of God, whereas of creatures it is cognitive and productive: therefore the Word of God, etc. And it is confirmed by the authority of Scripture: "He spoke, and they were made".

IV. Concerning the foregoing, and this whole matter, note that there are four things here: first, the things spoken by the Word; second, the relation between the Word and the thing spoken; third, the manner in which the Word is referred to the things spoken; fourth, the reason why it is so referred. And as to the things spoken, in the first article of this question, in the reply to 3, we held that they are these three, namely the divine essence, the divine persons, and every creature: for the Father speaks all these things in the Word. The relation of the Word to the things spoken, as such, is a relation of reason: and it is the relation of that which expresses to what is expressed, as is said in the text. And in these two points the others agree with us, compelled perhaps by the authority of Augustine.

In the other two respects, however, namely the mode and the cause, there is a diversity of opinions. For Scotus, in Book II, distinction 1, question 1, article 2, and in his Quodlibets, question 14, article 2, holds that the Word of God, by the force of its production, proceeds not from the knowledge of creatures but from the divine essence. And again, as is gathered from distinction 32 of Book I, question 1, ad ultimum, of the same work, he holds that the Word proceeds from the knowledge of the essence alone in such a way that it does not proceed as the Word of a person except concomitantly. So that he imagines that the Father, precisely because he understands the divine essence, produces the Word: which indeed, by the force of its production, expresses the essence, but expresses the divine persons only concomitantly, as things necessarily joined to the essence; while it has that it represents creatures, the production of the Word itself being already complete.

V. Now the foundation of his position is this: he holds, in distinction XXXV of the First Book, that creatures are produced by God in known being (esse cognitum). And on that account he imagines that the divine essence first, as it were, moves the Father's intellect to the production of the infinite term, that is, the Word; and then to the finite term, that is, the creature in known being. And thus the Word cannot be produced from knowledge of creatures, which exists in the second instant of nature.

He also argues for this in the Second Book, where above, in three ways. First. If the Word were to proceed as Word of the divine essence and of every intelligible, then by equal reason the Holy Spirit would be breathed forth as love of the divine essence and of everything lovable as understood: but this is false; therefore. The falsity is proved: because then either God would necessarily love creatures, or the Holy Spirit would not be produced necessarily; both of which are impossible. – Second. If the Word were to proceed from all things etc., therefore he would proceed from himself, the Word, as known by the Father: which is unfitting. And the inference holds: because one of the things understood formally by the Father is the Word. – Third. No real relation of any divine person is toward a creature: but being begotten of that from which one is begotten, if it is really distinct, is a real relation; therefore the Word is not begotten of a stone as known by the Father.

VI. St. Thomas, however, as is evident here, holds that the Word of God is born from all things that are in the knowledge of the Father, namely, the essence, the persons, and every other simple intelligible (which I say on account of the things known by God in the science of vision). For he imagines, as he expressly says in the first article¹, that the Father, in understanding himself and the Son and the Holy Spirit and every creature (understand this, by a simple act of understanding), conceives the Word: so that, prior in the order of reason, God the Father understands whatever naturally shines forth in the divine essence before he produces the Son.

Yet it is true that the Word primarily expresses the essence, and secondarily creatures; just as God the Father primarily understands His own essence, and secondarily creatures: so that ly primarily and ly secondarily signify nothing other than in itself and in another; for the creature is in the divine essence, while that essence itself is understood and expressed in itself.

VII. But it is easy to answer the Scotist imaginings. For that the primary foundation² is of no worth is clear from this, that that production of creatures is chimerical, and instills a dangerous doctrine. For it follows that the glorious God cannot be without there being creatures in diminished being: which seems ridiculous in philosophy, but in faith a scandal. But of these elsewhere³. For we, holding that the divine essence comprehends every intelligible both formally and objectively, say from what was determined above⁴ that, because the Word proceeds not from just any cognition of the divine essence, but from the comprehension of the same, it must proceed from the knowledge of all things that are known by comprehending the divine essence. But these are all the things said above⁵, as is clear from qu. XIV⁶. Therefore.

And this was without doubt the foundation of St. Thomas. From which, in answer to Scotus's first objection⁷ it is briefly said that, speaking uniformly—that is, of the creature understood in God, and likewise loved in God—the same reasoning holds for the Word and the Holy Spirit: nor does any inconvenience follow. – Yet one could simply deny both the consequence and the parity of reason: because love regards things lovable in themselves, whereas the word regards things as they are in the intellect.

To the second, it is said that there is nothing unfitting in the Word proceeding from Himself and from the Holy Spirit as known by the Father, that is, from the knowledge which the Father has of them; indeed, this is necessary, on account of the reason adduced. Rather, since Scotus himself expressly holds, in the Sixth Distinction of the First Book, that the Father understands the Son before He produces Him, he is reckoned voluntarily to regard this as unfitting.

The third objection, however, is not worthy of a response: since the Word is not really distinct from those things from which He proceeds as known, but from that from which He proceeds as speaking; as is evident of itself.

VIII. Be cautious, however, in this matter, on account of the conditional truth, namely: If God understood nothing in His essence but that essence alone, there would still be a production of the Word. For from this it seems to follow that the production of the Word is not posterior to the intellection of creatures in God. You have, moreover, another conditional: If God were not productive ad intra by understanding Himself, He would nevertheless understand every intelligible. For from this it follows that God's understanding of creatures in Himself is not posterior to the production ad intra. Therefore, lest you be deceived by these—since it naturally holds in fact by following ⁸—say as above ⁹ I said, however, naturally, because those things which God freely knows in fact, since the natural precedes the free, are far removed from this disputation. – And since within the comprehension of the natural power of the divine science is contained the art of making creatures, although not the volition of them; therefore the Word of God, which is adequate to His natural science, has respect to the creature not only as expressive but also as operative, as is said in the text from Augustine.

IX. In response to the first, note that against it there are the arguments of Aureol, as found in Capreolus, at the twenty-seventh distinction of the First Book, question II, in conclusion 5¹⁰, to prove that the Word has from a personal property that He is referred to creatures. For all these arguments collapse on this ground: they suppose that it is the same thing to say, the Word is referred to creatures according to His proper notion; and to say, the Word has from a personal property that He is referred to creatures: whereas these differ greatly, and the first can be granted while the second cannot. And the reason for this is that the Word contains within His proper notion knowledge, which belongs among the essentials: on account of which, as is said in the text, He is referred to things known and to things to be made.

X. In response to the fourth objection, note that in those words, the name "Word" was principally imposed to signify a relation to the speaker, in my judgment St. Thomas retracts what he had said in the Questions On Truth, question IV, article 5, namely that the name "Word" principally signifies something absolute. And this retraction follows upon the determination he had made in the first article here, namely that "Word" is only a personal name. So that "Word" signifies first the personal property of the Son in the concrete; and since connoted knowledge is as it were its substratum, it is therefore also referred to things said, etc. And this accords with the response to the first objection; and with the words of the preceding article, namely, "Word" signifies a certain emanation of the intellect. For it is clear that that emanation is the personal property of the Son: for unless this were first among its significates, from its own signification it would not signify the personal property of the Son in God, but only through what is connoted; the opposite of which is stated there.