Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

A clear title. – In the body, a single conclusion: The Father is a principle. – It is proved. A principle is that from which something proceeds, and conversely: the Father is that from which another proceeds, namely the Son and the Holy Spirit; therefore the Father is a principle.

II. In response to the first, note that Aureolus, as cited by Capreolus, in I, dist. XXIX¹, attacks two statements of this text. The first is the difference between the Greek and Latin doctors. For against this he adduces Hilary, in IV On the Trinity², attributing to the Father the name of author; and Augustine, in VII On the Trinity, chapter 1, saying of the Father, that which is the cause of his being is the cause of his being wise.

The second is that we use the name "principle," and not "cause," in divine matters because it is more common, since it extends itself, etc. Against this he objects. A name that befits God by reason of its commonness has this because a less common notion would not befit him. But "principle" is not of this kind, according to your statements: since no notion of principle set down in Book V of the Metaphysics³ befits the Father with respect to the Son, as is clear to one who examines them.

III. To the first of these, a twofold reply is given. First, that it is enough for the letter that the Latin doctors did not have the word cause in use; even granting that it might sometimes be found. – Second, one appeals to what Hilary says, cited by St. Thomas in I Sentences, dist. XXIX, qu. I, art. 1, namely that author does not import causality, but rather a principle not from another: and therefore it is attributed to the Father. But that saying of Augustine is not to the point: for he speaks there of the essential attributes, in which it is agreed that there is no cause except according to reason.

IV. To the second objection it is said that it is false that no account of principle from Book V of the Metaphysics is preserved in the Father. For there it is expressly stated that the most common account of a principle is: that from which something first is or is known. Now it is evident that the Father is the first from which the Son is, according to that passage of the ⁴: begotten of the Father before all ages. In the text, moreover, this greater commonness is made manifest through things more known to us, namely the point, and so on—not because these conceptions have a place in the divine, but so that from them, as from things more known, it may be made clear that there is a greater abstraction in the notion of principle than in that of cause.

In the title, "Pater" Father, as will become clear in the resolution of the doubt¹, is taken in the way it is admitted in the divine Trinity. The word properly is taken both as distinguished from what is said metaphorically, and as distinguished from what is said commonly, and as distinguished from what is said extrinsically. I call extrinsic, however, whatever adjoins in any manner whatsoever: just as we say of someone that Socrates is his proper name, whereas the firstborn son of Plato is not his proper name, because it signifies an accident adjoining Socrates, and not his substance. And it is taken principally and directly in this third sense in this title: but in the other two senses concomitantly. So that the intention of the question is: Whether Father is a name signifying the proper substance, or the proper substantial being of some divine person; or whether it signifies something adjoining that person. Hence the phrase divine person supposits for the hypostasis itself as such.

II. In the body there is a single conclusion, responsive to the question in the affirmative: "Father" is a proper name of the person of the Father. – And it is proved thus. That which signifies that by which any person whatsoever is distinguished from all others is a proper name of that person: but "Father" signifies paternity, by which the person of the Father is distinguished from all others: therefore it is a proper name of the person of the Father.

The major is proven in the text virtually as follows. The proper name of this man signifies this soul and this body; therefore it signifies that by which he is distinguished from all others. The same reasoning holds for the rest. Therefore. – The antecedent is made clear both by reason, because just as flesh and bones belong to the intellect of a man, so etc.; and by the authority of Book VII Metaphysics

III. Concerning this argument a doubt arises. For the middle term, namely to signify that by which this person is distinguished from the others, either imports signifying formally and in act the distinctive feature of the person itself; or materially and in potency, in the manner in which it was said above to signify what is contained under it. If it is taken for formal signification, then the minor is false. For Father does not signify the personal distinctive feature of the divine person: since it signifies formally that by which Father agrees with other fathers, at least by an analogical agreement; but that by which something is distinguished is not the same as that by which it agrees with others, because the latter is common, the former proper. – But if it is taken of signification in potency, then the major is empty, and the whole procedure of the body is empty. For they expressly speak of signifying actually: otherwise "man" would be a proper name of this man, and there would have been no need to bring forward these.

IV. To this it is briefly answered that the discussion here concerns signifying actually. And to the objection to the contrary, the reply is that the term Father can be taken in two ways. First, as an analogous name applying to every father in whatever way: and thus the minor premise would undoubtedly be false; for thus it signifies something common proportionally to every father. In another way, as the first and head of this analogy: and thus it signifies that which is constitutive of and distinctive of the person of the first person of the divine Trinity. For, as was declared in qu. XIII ², a different formal account must be given to one asking, What is the first divine person inasmuch as he is Father? and What is Socrates inasmuch as he is a father? just as with other analogates common to God and creature. Now this otherness of the account arises from the elevation of the relation of paternity to subsistence and personality, etc. And therefore the term Father, so taken, signifies that personality by its own proper account: on which account the Lord handed down without addition that baptism was to be conferred in the name of the Father³, etc.

But the doubt remaining concerning the minor⁴, namely whether paternity is a personal distinctive of the Father, will be treated in qu. XL, art. 2.

V. In response to the fourth, note that two things belong to the notion of generation: namely, the distinction of supposits, and the unity of the form that is communicated. And since the generator, as such, assimilates the generated to itself, while likeness is a species of unity, the greater the unity of form, while the supposital distinction remains, the more perfect is the generation.

In the title, note three things. First, ly Father insofar as personally. For Father is said of God in two ways: namely personally, as when it is said ¹ Father of our Lord Jesus Christ; and essentially, as when it is said ² Father of mercies. And therefore not undeservedly is added ly insofar as personally. – Second, ly be said. For the question is not whether in the divine it is prior to be a Father inwardly or to be a Father outwardly; but whether the formal ratio signified by the name "Father" is said first of God as He is Father within, than of God as He is Father without. – Third, ly prior. For although from the reason made to the contrary in the text it may seem to signify priority indistinctly; yet directly, in the matter at hand, it stands for priority according to the order of nature, which is wont to be found among the intentions of one and the same name, as is clear throughout Book V of the Metaphysics.³ – So that the sense is: Whether the ratio signified by the name "Father," said personally, is an intention of that name prior by the order of nature than its ratio said essentially.

II. In the body there is a single conclusion, answering the question affirmatively: In God, "Father" is said personally before it is said essentially. – It is proved thus. All imperfect things are taken from perfect things: therefore every name is said first of that in which its whole meaning is preserved perfectly, than of that in which it is preserved only according to something: therefore paternity is said first in God according as it signifies the relation of Person to Person, than according as it signifies the relation of God to creatures: therefore.

The first consequence is proved first: because of that of which a name is said according to something, it is said as by way of similitude to that in which it is perfectly saved. This is made manifest in the name "lion." – The second, however, is proved: because in God the Father and God the Son there is found the perfect ratio of paternity and filiation; but not in God and a creature, rather only according to some sort of similitude. And the first part of this assumption is proved: because the divine Persons are one in nature and glory. The second part, however, as regards the negation: because a creature is not of the same nature with God. As regards the affirmation, indeed, it is made manifest by grading the breadth of the filial assimilation of the creature to God, according to the four modes of similitude, namely of vestige, image, grace, and glory. And all these things are confirmed by authorities quite clearly in the text.

III. In response to the first, note carefully three things: namely, the distinction, the comparisons, and the reasons for them. The distinction is this: of the common attributes, that is, the essential ones, some are said absolutely, as good, wise, etc.; others respectively toward what is outside, as Lord, etc. – There are two comparisons. The first is: the absolute common attributes are prior, according to understanding, to the personal properties. The other is: the common attributes respective toward what is outside are posterior to the personal properties. – The reason for the first comparison is, because the absolute common attributes are contained within the personal properties, and not conversely: for it is established that those are prior from which the consequence is not convertible. But the reason of the second comparison is, because the procession of the divine persons is the principle of the procession of creatures; and by this, the personal properties are presupposed by the relations toward what is outside. And note carefully this reason of the second comparison, that it speaks only of the relations toward what is outside consequent upon transitive actions: for these alone pertain to the procession of creatures.

IV. And therefore from this passage we do not have the mind of the Author concerning the common things that are referred to creatures and pertain to immanent acts—namely, whether they are posterior to the personal acts; for instance, whether, according to the order of understanding, it is prior for God to understand creatures than to produce the Son, or conversely. And the doubt concerns the simple understanding, which is in God naturally, not the knowledge of vision, which is in him freely. And since this difficulty is irrelevant to the matter at hand, because God is not called Father on account of such things, there will be a special question on this point, in accordance with this article.

Another difficulty, however—namely, whether the procession of the persons is the principle of the procession of creatures—will be treated below, question 45, article 6, as planned.

In the title, "proper" is distinguished against common. And it excludes, as is shown in the response to the second objection¹, not only the other divine persons, but also the nature itself.

II. In the body there is a single conclusion, responsive to what was asked and posited only implicitly: To be unbegotten is proper to the Father. – It is proved thus. The Father and the Son in God are principle not from a principle, and principle from a principle, just as among creatures this one is the first principle, that one the second principle: therefore the Father is made known in two ways, namely insofar as he is principle, by paternity and common spiration; and insofar as he is not from a principle, by not being from another: therefore by the esse of being unbegotten. And if you should understand tacitly that to be a principle not from a principle, or not to be from another, is proper to the Father, you conclude not only that being unbegotten belongs to the Father, which is explained in the text; but also that it is proper to the Father, which was what was asked, and which the text intended to determine.

The antecedent is made clear: because in the divine persons there is no prior and posterior, as will become clear below² – The first consequence, however, is proved thus: because a first principle in creatures becomes known in two ways, namely by relation to those things which are from itself, and by the negation of its being from another. – The second consequence, moreover, is proved thus: because not to be from another pertains to innascibility signified by the name unbegotten.

III. In response to the second, note that unbegotten, since it is composed of in- and begotten, is itself twofold. For the term in- is taken in two ways: purely negatively, or privatively; and the latter in several ways: either in a being (ens), or in a genus, or in itself—and only in this last way does it signify imperfection. Here, however, it is taken privatively with respect to a genus or principle, either personally or of the divine reality. – Likewise, begotten is taken in two ways: namely, properly, that is, from another by generation; and commonly, that is, from another in any manner whatever.

Hence in the text five claims are made. First, that ingenerate taken in a purely negative sense is not proper to the Father. Second, that ingenerate taken privatively in itself does not belong to the Father. Third, that ingenerate taken privatively within the genus of a divine supposit is not proper to the Father: because it belongs to the Holy Spirit. Fourth, that ingenerate within the genus of principle taken personally is proper to the Father. And in these four acceptations the term generated is taken properly. Fifth, that within the genus of a divine thing, taking the term generated commonly, ingenerate is proper to the Father: since he alone is in no way from another; for the essence, although not simply so, yet as it is in the Son and the Holy Spirit, is from the Father.

IV. In response to the fourth, note that the text assigns two reasons why there cannot be two unbegotten persons in God; in keeping with that saying of Hilary, since there is one God, there cannot be two who are unbegotten, assigning the unity of the divine nature as the cause of the unity of the unbegotten person. The first inference of the text is this: because in every nature one must posit a single first principle; and consequently, if there were several first principles, there would be several natures. – The second is because, if there were two unbegotten ones, they would be distinguished by a diversity of natures: for they would not be distinguished by opposed relations of origin; neither would be from the other, or from another.

V. Yet Scotus, in I, dist. II, qu. V, censured this second argument, on the ground that the middle term is not better known than the conclusion: for one who posited several unbegotten persons would not grant that they are distinguished by relations of origin. And Hilary, he says, indeed says this, but does not prove it.

But in truth the reasoning of Hilary, as well as that deduction drawn from the text, is not only reasonable but necessary. For either there is no distinction of persons in God, as the philosophers say: and thus there is only one ungenerated person. Or there are three persons, as the Catholic faith teaches: and thus, since a distinction through absolutes is unintelligible, it remains that it can be only through an order of origin. Hence the middle term is better known than the conclusion: just as it is better known that there cannot be a real distinction of persons in the absolutes without diversity of perfection. But Scotus, having conceived the act under a passion, which he was to expound in dist. XXVI of the same, seems to have said this: on which matter there will be discussion below³.