Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

The title intends to treat of the number five adequately, in such a way that there are neither more nor fewer notions than five.

II. In the body he does two things: first, he answers the question raised; second, he sets out the difference between notions, relations, properties, and personal notions, with respect to their number¹.

III. As to the first point, the responsive conclusion answers the question affirmatively: The notions are five, namely innascibility, paternity, common spiration, filiation, and procession. - And it is proved thus. A notion is the proper means of knowing a divine person; therefore it is considered according to origin; therefore according to these two, namely that from which another is, and that which is from another; therefore there are five.

The antecedent is the description of the notion set forth above ² – The first consequence is proved: because the divine persons are multiplied according to origin. – The second, however: because these two pertain to origin, and by means of them the divine persons are made known. – The third is manifested by applying each mode of origin to each person individually. And as to the person of the Father indeed: from that mode "from another" there is had, not positively but negatively, innascibility; from that one, however, "from whom another", paternity and spiration. As to the person of the Son, however: from the term "from another" there is had filiation; from the term "from whom another", however, there is had the same spiration. As to the person of the Holy Spirit, however: from the term "from another" there is had procession; from the term "from whom another", however, nothing is posited, either positively or negatively, for the reason given below in the reply to the fourth objection.

IV. As to the second³, the number is determined together with the things numbered themselves, namely those four: notion, relation, property, and personality; so that the discourse may be interpreted formally, and one may not be taken confusedly for another. And this is sufficiently clear in the text. – If, however, there are any doubts concerning these matters, concerning the [constitutive] principles, or concerning innascibility, they will be clarified below in their proper places⁴.

V. Concerning the discussion made in the text, after the responses to the arguments, a doubt arises, one moved by Scotus in the twenty-eighth distinction of the First Book, question 1, argument 3, and here untouched: namely, why a sixth notion should not be posited, namely inspirability, common to the Father and the Son. For just as the Father is made known positively in two ways, and negatively by the negation of both origins, or of the first of them, so too the Son, since there belongs to him the negation of one of them, ought to be made known by it.

VI. On this doubt I find nothing said by St. Thomas in particular with respect to the person of the Son. For below, qu. XXXIII, art. 4⁵, and in Book I Sent., dist. XXVIII, qu. I, art. 1⁶, he gave a solution to this doubt, insofar as it touches the person of the Father, saying that innascibility imports the negation of both origins: for from this it is clearly evident that in the Father there is no need of inspirability. But the present doubt concerns the person of the Son. – Those things also which he says about the sufficiency of the notions at the twenty-sixth distinction of Book I⁷ could be badly applied to this point. First because inspirability too says something special: for it is a negation in a genus, etc. Then because innascibility is likewise conceded by St. Thomas to be a notion as it is the negation of nativity, as is clear below⁸.

Scotus, however, in the place cited above, seems almost to wish to introduce a sixth notion; yet he does not dare to set himself against the torrent of the doctors, who approve only five notions. Hence, he says, unless some reason is assigned concerning this matter, the sixth notion will have to be conceded. – It seems to me, however, that a sufficient reason is already at hand why inspirability should not be posited among the notions.

VII. For the evidence of this, know that, since the notion is to be posited for the sake of making something known, as its very name shows; and since privation is naturally known through habit, and negation through affirmation, and not the reverse: it follows that negations of the modes of origin should not regularly be reckoned among the notions. In sign of this, the person of the Holy Spirit has only one notion, and yet there belongs to him fittingly the negation of nativity proper to the Son. And since inspirability is a kind of negation, therefore it ought not to have a place among the notions.

VIII. That innateness, however, is a negative notion is, beyond the rule, the case for three singular reasons, which have no place in other negations.

The first is because the person of the Father alone holds the role of first principle in the Trinity: for the Father alone there is a principle not from a principle. And therefore, both because the notion of "first" is best made known through negation, and in order to commend so great an authority of the Father (on account of which, according to Hilary⁹, he is said to be greater than the Son, and the Son in the Gospel is accustomed to refer all things to the Father, and the Church directs almost all prayers to the Father), this negation was rightly posited as a notion. – And this reason is touched upon in the text, in the reply to the fourth objection at the end, and in I Sent., where above¹⁰.

The second reason is because of the varied connection of these terms in the common order, namely Father and unbegotten. For these two are found separated among us: for every father is begotten, that is, from another; or at least begotten properly speaking, except Adam, who was a father and unbegotten. Yet they can be joined by their proper notions, and in the Father's Person they are joined. But it is not so with Son and spiratable: for these are everywhere connected. And therefore that negation is rightly reckoned among the notions. – And this reason is taken from Augustine, Book V On the Trinity, chapter 8.

The third argument is from Hilary, in book On the Synods¹¹, for commending the unity of the divine nature: since by positing one unbegotten person, one principle and head is posited in the divine nature. For Hilary says that to posit two unbegotten ones is to posit several gods and several divine natures; and therefore, to posit one unbegotten one commends the unity of the divine nature. On account of which, the sacred doctors do not posit innascibility as a notion in just any way whatever, but as it is proper to the Father, so that it belongs neither to the essence nor to the Holy Spirit.

It may be added to these points that we lack proper names for the processions of the Holy Spirit. – Since, therefore, we have a reason why innascibility is a notion by a singular privilege, and, as a rule, negations are excluded from the notions, it was reasonably omitted by the sacred doctors that the Holy Spirit is spirated.

IX. In response to the second, note that to be signified as a certain thing is to be signified as a singular thing in the order of reality. And since the names of the persons in the act of exercise, such as Father and Son and Holy Spirit, and likewise the name of the essence, such as God, signify the persons and the nature in God as singular things; whereas the names of notions, properties, and relations as such—that is, abstract names—signify rather the rational accounts of things: therefore God is not said to be five or four from among these, etc.

X. In response to the third, there is a doubt, because of Scotus's objection in Quodlibet, q. V, at the end of art. 2. If, he says, a distinction of reason between paternity and spiration sufficed to prevent predication in the abstract, then this too would be prevented: wisdom is goodness, since they are formally distinct; but this consequence is false according to you here: therefore. – The example also adduced concerning an attribute is not to the point: rather, it is against the point. Outside the point indeed: because attribute is a name of second intention, whereas the question concerns names of first intention. Against the point, however: because from that example it follows that, just as the attribute of power is not the attribute of knowledge, and yet power is knowledge; so the notion of paternity is not the notion of spiration, and yet paternity is spiration; which is opposed to the intended conclusion.

XI. To this it is said that the objection proceeds from a poor understanding of the text: indeed, from a diminished inspection of it. For the text does not say that these are not predicated of one another because they are distinguished by reason; but because they are signified as diverse reasons of persons, that is, as diverse relative reasons (for the divine persons are subsistent relations, as was said above¹²). And it intends diversity in act exercised, not under the term of a notion, but under the reason of relation. For this response is founded upon the doctrine in Book V Metaphysics, in the chapter on the One¹³: namely, that those things are properly multiplied under something by whose differences they are distinguished. So that it intends that, because paternity and spiration are under diverse differences of divine relation (for the former is toward the Son, the latter toward the Holy Spirit), therefore there are two real divine relations. And because paternity and spiration import this distinction in act exercised, from the fact that they are signified as diverse reasons of persons, that is, of personal relatives; therefore they are not predicated of one another.

XII. Whence, in answer to the objection, the antecedent must be denied. And as for the example, it must be said that it is very much to the point, if rightly understood. For it was adduced only to make manifest that foundation from Book V of the Metaphysics, namely, that under that are retained some plurality those things which are comprehended under its several differences. And because under the intention of an attribute, and not of a thing, the knowledge and power of God are distinguished, therefore several attributes are spoken of, nor is one said to be another: although one is other than another, because they are not distinguished by real difference. So also in the matter at hand, not only with respect to the ratio imported by ly notio, but even with respect to the formal ratio underlying it, that is, the divine relation. For just as the attribute is numbered in power and knowledge, so the ratio of relation, and not only the intention of the notion, is numbered in paternity and spiration. And therefore, just as this attribute is not that one, so too this notion is not that one (which is passed over in silence in the text), and paternity is not spiration: for they are names of relation. – That this is St. Thomas's intention can be perceived from I Sentences, dist. XXVII, qu. I, art. 1, in the body and ad 3.

XIII. Against this response as well¹⁴, insofar as it says that paternity and spiration are really the same, the arguments of Durandus are extant, in Capreolus, distinction XIII of the First Book, article 2, against the first conclusion. But they did not seem to me worth reciting.