Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

The title is sufficiently clear. – In the body he does three things. First, he answers the question with a single negative conclusion, namely: It is impossible to arrive by natural reason at knowledge of the Trinity of divine Persons. – And it is proved thus. Man knows God by natural reason only from creatures: therefore he knows him only according to that by which he is the principle of beings (entia): therefore only according to what pertains to the unity of essence: therefore he does not know those things that pertain to the distinction of Persons. – The first consequence is proved: because creatures lead to knowledge of God only as effects lead to their cause. The second, however: because the creative power is common to the whole Trinity. And all things are manifest.

Second, he shows that bringing natural reasons to bear on the Trinity of Persons harms in two ways: first, with respect to the dignity of the faith; second, with respect to the benefit of human beings. These points are clearly found in the text.

Third, he infers how the things that belong to faith are to be treated, both with believers and with unbelievers, adding the authority of Dionysius. Which things are clear from what was said above in the first question¹.

In the title, note two things. Since the question concerns whether there are, namely whether there are notions in the divine, first, the meaning of the term of "notion" itself. For "notion" in general, properly speaking, signifies a being-made-known or a manifestation, taken passively or formally, as with "reading" and "hearing" and the like. But when applied to divine things, it is taken for a property of one or two persons. And it seems that blessed Augustine first introduced the word "notion" into this subject matter, when in Book V On the Trinity, chapter 6, he says that one is the notion by which the unbegotten is understood, and another that by which the begetter.

Second, for the perfection of the doctrine, know that the notion, as taken by the theologians, is defined in the text of the following article thus: A notion is the proper reason for knowing a divine person. Here note that the term reason for knowing indicates that it is the formal principle of knowing. And from this it follows, strictly speaking, that it is signified in the abstract. For just as the formal principle of being (essendi) must be a form, so the formal principle of knowing, as such, must be conceived and signified as a form: but this is as that by which something is: but this conveys the abstract. And therefore in the present article the dispute with the Prepositine turns on the abstract and the concrete: for the question here is not about things absolutely, but as signified and made known through names. – Now the term proper indicates that it signifies something special: otherwise it would not be a proper reason for knowing. And on this account, as is said¹, being (esse) from another is not a notion. – Now the term divine person indicates three things. First, that it signifies something pertaining to origin: because the divine persons are distinguished by the order of origin. Second, that it pertain to a dignity not essential but personal: because person is a name of dignity. Third, that it be of one in that which is one: that is, that if it signifies something common to several, as is clear in the case of spiration, it belong to them inasmuch as they are one. – And thus the title is clear.

II. In the body he does two things principally: first, he sets forth the opinion of Praepositinus; second, by refuting it, he answers the question².

III. As to the first point, the Master of the Sentences makes three claims: namely, the opinion that properties, or notions, are not to be posited in the abstract in the divine persons; the root of that opinion, namely, on account of the simplicity of the divine persons; and the exposition of the sacred writings in this respect, namely, that what is said in the abstract is to be expounded by way of the concrete.

IV. As to the second³, two things are done in opposition: first, the root of the aforementioned opinion is destroyed; second, the opposite opinion is proved⁴.

First it happens thus. Second, as we understand, so we name: therefore we name the divine in a manner not proper to them, but after the manner of sensible things: therefore we name them, by reason of simplicity, with abstract names; but by reason of subsistence, with concrete names: therefore it does not prejudice the divine simplicity to use abstract and concrete terms of God.

The first consequence is proved: because our intellect does not reach to knowing God as He is in Himself, but knows Him in the manner of sensible things. – The second, however, is proved: because among sensible things the abstract name is taken from simplicity, while the concrete one is taken from complement of standing⁵. – The remaining points are evident in themselves.

V. Against this argument Aureol, as reported by Capreolus, in the twenty-ninth distinction of the First Part⁶, argues, wishing to prove that a notion in the divine is distinguished from that of which it is a notion—for example, paternity from the Father—not only according to the mode of understanding arising from sensible things, as the text says, but also on the side of the thing itself. And he argues thus: Wherever the abstract differs from the concrete only in mode of signifying, whatever is said really of one is said of the other, as is clear of deity and God; but paternity and Father do not stand thus, since paternity is distinguished wholly from the Son, whereas the Father is not; therefore.

VI. To this it is briefly answered that the distinction between the abstract and the concrete in God arising from the divine reality can be understood in two ways. In one way, that there is something in God by which both the abstract and the concrete are verified: and this is undoubtedly true, since simplicity grounds the abstract, subsistence the concrete. In another way, that there is some real distinction in God from which the distinction between abstract and concrete arises: and this is chimerical. Hence, against the argument to the contrary, the major premise must be denied. And its proof is false: for "to generate" is predicated of God, but not of deity; for the truth of statements, it is required that the predicate belong to the thing signified by the subject in the very manner in which it is signified, as is clear in Extra, On the Trinity and the Catholic Faith⁷.

VII. Secondly⁸, he proposes the opposing opinion. And it is the responsive conclusion answering the question affirmatively: In God there must be signified in the abstract and in the concrete not only the essential names but also the personal ones, namely paternity and Father, etc. – And the conclusion is proved by two arguments: of which the first extends to both the essential and the personal; the second, however, to the personal only⁹.

Therefore the first reason is that we may have proper answers to the objections of the heretics. And the reason is formed thus. From those who confess that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one God and three Persons, those asking by what they are one God, and by what or by which they are three Persons must be answered: therefore one must say that they are one by the divine essence, but many by the properties of relation, namely paternity, filiation, and so on: for thus, and not otherwise, to the three interrogatives, namely what, who, and by what, we give three proper answers.

VIII. Against this argument Gregory of Rimini, in the twenty-ninth distinction of the First Book¹⁰, insists, intending to solve it, saying that on account of the insistence of heretics it is not necessary to distinguish these properties. For Augustine taught how to answer, in the sermon On Faith and the Creed¹¹: We believe that the Trinity is distinct in persons, united in substance. And Jerome, in the Exposition of the Catholic Faith:¹² They are one in substance, but are distinguished by persons and names. Therefore without the properties we have an answer as to why they are one, and why they are many.

IX. To this, it is said in three ways. First, that Gregory seems to mix badly the reasoning of this text into a treatise about things considered absolutely, which he himself seems to intend there. For, as is clear from the title of the whole question, what is treated here is the cognition of the divine Persons, and not their esse. – Second, it is said that he weighed badly the words of the text, which says that one must have a responsive answer to the interrogative quo, not with respect to this term which is "Trinity," but with respect also to this term "person": which is found in neither of those authorities. – Third, that the text, according to its custom, speaks formally: and its force consists in this, that to the interrogative quo there must be rendered a response which, by its proper mode of signifying, signifies as quo: otherwise the insistence of those asking will not come to rest. Now it is clear that "person" does not signify as quo, since it is a concrete noun. Therefore, in order that we may have a proper responsive answer to quo, not with respect to this or that term, but simply with respect to divine concretes, we must admit properties in the abstract in God. And this is what the text directly intends.

X. The second reason¹³ is first proposed; then it is answered by the Prepositine¹⁴; third, the solution is excluded in two ways¹⁵.

Therefore the second argument. The Person of the Father is referred to two Persons, namely of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, not by one relation: therefore it is necessary to distinguish notions in the Father. – The antecedent as regards its second part is proved by leading to an impossibility, thus. If the Father were to regard the Son and the Holy Spirit by one relation, then the Son and the Holy Spirit would also regard the Father by one relation: and if so, therefore the Son and the Holy Spirit would not be two Persons. And this last consequence is proved: because relation alone multiplies the trinity.

XI. The Prepositive, however, denying the second part of the antecedent, also denied the first inference leading to an impossibility. And he brought forward an objection from the fact that God is related to creatures by a single relation, and yet creatures are referred to him by many relations: and in like proportion he held this concerning the Son and the Holy Spirit with respect to the Father.

XII. Against this answer, however, the text argues in two ways. First, thus. The specific character of a relative consists in this, that it is a being ordered toward another: therefore two diverse things according to species cannot correspond to one relation according to species from opposite sides: therefore to the relations of the Son and of the Holy Spirit there cannot correspond one relation of the Father, although to all the relations of creatures there can correspond one relation on the part of God. – The first consequence is made clear in the case of father and lord with respect to son and servant. The second, however: because the relations of the Holy Spirit and of the Son are of different characters, whereas those of creatures toward God are of one character.

Second, the objection errs in its instance, because the present discussion concerns real relations on both sides. But the relation of God to the creature is not real: and therefore it need not be one; for there is no inconvenience in multiplying relations of reason in God.

XIII. Concerning the antecedent assumption, namely, that the specific character of a relative consists in being toward another¹⁶, note that he does not intend by this that the specific character of a relative is taken from the correlative toward which it is (although the surface of the deduction suggests this sense); as if he wished to argue that, because the species of a relative is taken from its term, it is impossible for terms of different species to correspond to a relation of one species. For this is false: since, according to him¹⁷, the species of a relation arises from the cause or foundation. Rather, he intends that the specific character of a relative consists in being toward another proportional to itself. For just as the relative in general consists in being toward another in general, so the species of a relative consists in an order toward another according to species; and hence a relative unique in species consists in being toward another unique in species as its correlative. For thus it descends per se into something proper through its own differences into its species.

XIV. Concerning the foregoing, several doubts arise. The first doubt concerns that proposition: The Father is referred to the Son and the Holy Spirit not by one, but by two relations¹⁸. For either the meaning is that there are two relations in reality (secundum rem): and this is most false, since spiration and paternity in the Father are one being (ens) in number. Or the meaning is that they are two according to reason (secundum rationem): and this, although true, is nevertheless not to the point. First, because the discussion here is of things in reality, which follows from the nature of relations. Second, because from the premises of the aforesaid argument¹⁹ it manifestly follows, if the argument is valid, that to relations diverse in species there must correspond relations diverse in species: but it is evident that for specific diversity in the nature of things, a distinction of reason does not suffice.

XV. The second doubt concerns that proposition assumed against the Prepositinate, namely: to one relation according to species, there cannot correspond two according to species²⁰. For we clearly hold the opposite: since to one filiation of Socrates there correspond relations of different species, namely the paternity and maternity of his parents, as is expressly stated in the Third Part, q. XXXV, art. 5²¹.

XVI. To the first doubt²² it must be said that there are two things here: namely, the plurality of relation, and the mode of that plurality. As to the plurality, the text asserts the affirmative part, holding that paternity and spiration are two real relations, because they are distinguished by the differences of relation. But as to the mode in which they are two, a real distinction was denied above²³ because they are not relatively opposed to one another, and thus they are not two in reality, since they are not distinguished by the differences of a thing.

But to affirm that they are two formally according to reason only does not settle the minds of many: for to be two according to reason is not to be two, but to be understood as two; just as to be a quantity according to reason is not to be a quantity, but to be understood as a quantity. Hence, since there is no actual distinction other than real or of reason, it remains that they are two virtually: that is, they stand in relation to one another just as if they were two. – And this accords with the excellence of the divine reality, and exists in the nature of things without any work of the intellect, and suffices for our purpose and for resolving the remaining difficulties. For the specific diversity of two relations entails the specific diversity of the relations corresponding to them, formally or virtually: that is, either those corresponding relations have a specific distinction in the nature of things actually, or they stand as if they had that distinction actually. And so, since the person of the Father has two relations, such that each claims its own properties, as if they were two actually distinct things; therefore we must posit two relations in the abstract, as two notions of the Father. Otherwise one could not answer one who asks, by what the Father, and by what the Spirator: since it is established that the Father is related to the Son, and the Spirator to the Holy Spirit. – Nevertheless, for our purpose it seems sufficient to affirm that they are distinguished formally: since this treatise is not about things absolutely, but about things as understood and signified, as is clear from the text²⁴.

XVII. But to the second doubt²⁵ it is said that, since the root of St. Thomas’s proposition is that proposition of Aristotle, V Metaphys., chap. on relation²⁶, namely, no relative is said twice, for the same reason²⁷, because a relative, in that very which it is, is of its first term, which is plainly one, the consequences must be limited in accordance with the limitation of that foundation. Therefore, that a relative is not said twice can be understood in two ways. First, it is not said twice, that is, with respect to two correlatives distinct only in number. And thus we believe this to be false: because white Socrates is similar, by the same similarity, to all white things. – Second, it is not said twice, that is, with respect to two correlatives of different intelligible accounts. And this can be understood in two ways: namely, either of different partial accounts; and thus this too is not true, as is clear from that article of the Third Part. Or not partial; and thus it is true. Hence St. Thomas there, notably, in the last argument, from this same foundation does not infer, therefore it is impossible for one relative to be said of two; but, therefore it is impossible that one relation be terminated at utterly diverse extremes, by the ly utterly not partial being indicated. – Now by partial relatives, in the present case, I mean those whose foundations concur partially toward one numerically one effect, as is clear in the case of father and mother with respect to the child.

This gloss is shown to accord with the truth from the fact that, strictly speaking, a relative is not said twice when it refers to several things on the same side, as if they were parts equal to the extreme: but it would be said twice if one referred to one side and the other to the other, as species would be said to genus and to the individual, and knowledge to the knowable and to the knower, etc.

St. Thomas, therefore, here intends, against Praepositivus, that it is impossible for one relation of a single species to have as its extremes rationes that are diverse and not partial. For procession and filiation do not have partial foundations, but foundations of entirely diverse rationes, each perfect in itself: since the Son perfectly terminates the procession of the intellect, and likewise the Holy Spirit is the perfect terminus of the procession of the will. In the Third Part, however, he made the extremes of diverse rationes partial with respect to filiation, as is evident.

XVIII. In response to the second argument, a doubt arises: what is it to signify as a thing, and what to signify as a concept. For if this is the same as signifying in the concrete and in the abstract, the text contradicts itself ²⁸: since wisdom is an abstract noun, and yet of it it is said ²⁹ that she orders all things sweetly, etc., notwithstanding such a mode of signifying. But if a difference is intended between a real thing and a thing of reason, something manifestly false is said: for paternity signifies a real thing, just as wisdom does.

XIX. To this it is said that, because ly ut imports some condition; and the condition of a thing is to exist or to subsist (for no thing, as a thing, is unless it be; and likewise no thing is signified as a thing unless it is signified as a being or an existing thing); but the reason, because it is said to have been discovered for the sake of making known VI Topics³⁰ and because the act and form are the principle of knowledge, according to IX Metaphysics³¹; the condition of the reason is that it be formally informative, and proportionally that it be signified as the formal principle in knowing: for thus the mode of signifying corresponds to the condition of the reason as reason. And since these exercise the abstract and the concrete, therefore it is granted that to be signified as a thing coincides with the concrete, and as a reason with the abstract.

And to the objection on the other side it is said that, although all abstract terms, by their mode of signifying, have in common that they do not accord with operations; yet among abstract terms there is a great latitude on the side of the formal ratio itself signified. For the formal ratio of some things has in itself no order to work, as is clear in relations: but the formal ratio of others has in itself an order to work, as wisdom to order, justice to render to each his right, etc. Those abstract terms which, from the thing formally signified, regard a work admit a congruent proposition, as is said in the text concerning wisdom and understanding³². But the rest, such as paternity and the remaining notions, because neither from their mode of signifying nor from their own formal ratio are they principles of a work, cannot have congruent enunciations about operations, as is said in the text. Hence there is no contradiction.

The title intends to treat of the number five adequately, in such a way that there are neither more nor fewer notions than five.

II. In the body he does two things: first, he answers the question raised; second, he sets out the difference between notions, relations, properties, and personal notions, with respect to their number¹.

III. As to the first point, the responsive conclusion answers the question affirmatively: The notions are five, namely innascibility, paternity, common spiration, filiation, and procession. - And it is proved thus. A notion is the proper means of knowing a divine person; therefore it is considered according to origin; therefore according to these two, namely that from which another is, and that which is from another; therefore there are five.

The antecedent is the description of the notion set forth above ² – The first consequence is proved: because the divine persons are multiplied according to origin. – The second, however: because these two pertain to origin, and by means of them the divine persons are made known. – The third is manifested by applying each mode of origin to each person individually. And as to the person of the Father indeed: from that mode "from another" there is had, not positively but negatively, innascibility; from that one, however, "from whom another", paternity and spiration. As to the person of the Son, however: from the term "from another" there is had filiation; from the term "from whom another", however, there is had the same spiration. As to the person of the Holy Spirit, however: from the term "from another" there is had procession; from the term "from whom another", however, nothing is posited, either positively or negatively, for the reason given below in the reply to the fourth objection.

IV. As to the second³, the number is determined together with the things numbered themselves, namely those four: notion, relation, property, and personality; so that the discourse may be interpreted formally, and one may not be taken confusedly for another. And this is sufficiently clear in the text. – If, however, there are any doubts concerning these matters, concerning the [constitutive] principles, or concerning innascibility, they will be clarified below in their proper places⁴.

V. Concerning the discussion made in the text, after the responses to the arguments, a doubt arises, one moved by Scotus in the twenty-eighth distinction of the First Book, question 1, argument 3, and here untouched: namely, why a sixth notion should not be posited, namely inspirability, common to the Father and the Son. For just as the Father is made known positively in two ways, and negatively by the negation of both origins, or of the first of them, so too the Son, since there belongs to him the negation of one of them, ought to be made known by it.

VI. On this doubt I find nothing said by St. Thomas in particular with respect to the person of the Son. For below, qu. XXXIII, art. 4⁵, and in Book I Sent., dist. XXVIII, qu. I, art. 1⁶, he gave a solution to this doubt, insofar as it touches the person of the Father, saying that innascibility imports the negation of both origins: for from this it is clearly evident that in the Father there is no need of inspirability. But the present doubt concerns the person of the Son. – Those things also which he says about the sufficiency of the notions at the twenty-sixth distinction of Book I⁷ could be badly applied to this point. First because inspirability too says something special: for it is a negation in a genus, etc. Then because innascibility is likewise conceded by St. Thomas to be a notion as it is the negation of nativity, as is clear below⁸.

Scotus, however, in the place cited above, seems almost to wish to introduce a sixth notion; yet he does not dare to set himself against the torrent of the doctors, who approve only five notions. Hence, he says, unless some reason is assigned concerning this matter, the sixth notion will have to be conceded. – It seems to me, however, that a sufficient reason is already at hand why inspirability should not be posited among the notions.

VII. For the evidence of this, know that, since the notion is to be posited for the sake of making something known, as its very name shows; and since privation is naturally known through habit, and negation through affirmation, and not the reverse: it follows that negations of the modes of origin should not regularly be reckoned among the notions. In sign of this, the person of the Holy Spirit has only one notion, and yet there belongs to him fittingly the negation of nativity proper to the Son. And since inspirability is a kind of negation, therefore it ought not to have a place among the notions.

VIII. That innateness, however, is a negative notion is, beyond the rule, the case for three singular reasons, which have no place in other negations.

The first is because the person of the Father alone holds the role of first principle in the Trinity: for the Father alone there is a principle not from a principle. And therefore, both because the notion of "first" is best made known through negation, and in order to commend so great an authority of the Father (on account of which, according to Hilary⁹, he is said to be greater than the Son, and the Son in the Gospel is accustomed to refer all things to the Father, and the Church directs almost all prayers to the Father), this negation was rightly posited as a notion. – And this reason is touched upon in the text, in the reply to the fourth objection at the end, and in I Sent., where above¹⁰.

The second reason is because of the varied connection of these terms in the common order, namely Father and unbegotten. For these two are found separated among us: for every father is begotten, that is, from another; or at least begotten properly speaking, except Adam, who was a father and unbegotten. Yet they can be joined by their proper notions, and in the Father's Person they are joined. But it is not so with Son and spiratable: for these are everywhere connected. And therefore that negation is rightly reckoned among the notions. – And this reason is taken from Augustine, Book V On the Trinity, chapter 8.

The third argument is from Hilary, in book On the Synods¹¹, for commending the unity of the divine nature: since by positing one unbegotten person, one principle and head is posited in the divine nature. For Hilary says that to posit two unbegotten ones is to posit several gods and several divine natures; and therefore, to posit one unbegotten one commends the unity of the divine nature. On account of which, the sacred doctors do not posit innascibility as a notion in just any way whatever, but as it is proper to the Father, so that it belongs neither to the essence nor to the Holy Spirit.

It may be added to these points that we lack proper names for the processions of the Holy Spirit. – Since, therefore, we have a reason why innascibility is a notion by a singular privilege, and, as a rule, negations are excluded from the notions, it was reasonably omitted by the sacred doctors that the Holy Spirit is spirated.

IX. In response to the second, note that to be signified as a certain thing is to be signified as a singular thing in the order of reality. And since the names of the persons in the act of exercise, such as Father and Son and Holy Spirit, and likewise the name of the essence, such as God, signify the persons and the nature in God as singular things; whereas the names of notions, properties, and relations as such—that is, abstract names—signify rather the rational accounts of things: therefore God is not said to be five or four from among these, etc.

X. In response to the third, there is a doubt, because of Scotus's objection in Quodlibet, q. V, at the end of art. 2. If, he says, a distinction of reason between paternity and spiration sufficed to prevent predication in the abstract, then this too would be prevented: wisdom is goodness, since they are formally distinct; but this consequence is false according to you here: therefore. – The example also adduced concerning an attribute is not to the point: rather, it is against the point. Outside the point indeed: because attribute is a name of second intention, whereas the question concerns names of first intention. Against the point, however: because from that example it follows that, just as the attribute of power is not the attribute of knowledge, and yet power is knowledge; so the notion of paternity is not the notion of spiration, and yet paternity is spiration; which is opposed to the intended conclusion.

XI. To this it is said that the objection proceeds from a poor understanding of the text: indeed, from a diminished inspection of it. For the text does not say that these are not predicated of one another because they are distinguished by reason; but because they are signified as diverse reasons of persons, that is, as diverse relative reasons (for the divine persons are subsistent relations, as was said above¹²). And it intends diversity in act exercised, not under the term of a notion, but under the reason of relation. For this response is founded upon the doctrine in Book V Metaphysics, in the chapter on the One¹³: namely, that those things are properly multiplied under something by whose differences they are distinguished. So that it intends that, because paternity and spiration are under diverse differences of divine relation (for the former is toward the Son, the latter toward the Holy Spirit), therefore there are two real divine relations. And because paternity and spiration import this distinction in act exercised, from the fact that they are signified as diverse reasons of persons, that is, of personal relatives; therefore they are not predicated of one another.

XII. Whence, in answer to the objection, the antecedent must be denied. And as for the example, it must be said that it is very much to the point, if rightly understood. For it was adduced only to make manifest that foundation from Book V of the Metaphysics, namely, that under that are retained some plurality those things which are comprehended under its several differences. And because under the intention of an attribute, and not of a thing, the knowledge and power of God are distinguished, therefore several attributes are spoken of, nor is one said to be another: although one is other than another, because they are not distinguished by real difference. So also in the matter at hand, not only with respect to the ratio imported by ly notio, but even with respect to the formal ratio underlying it, that is, the divine relation. For just as the attribute is numbered in power and knowledge, so the ratio of relation, and not only the intention of the notion, is numbered in paternity and spiration. And therefore, just as this attribute is not that one, so too this notion is not that one (which is passed over in silence in the text), and paternity is not spiration: for they are names of relation. – That this is St. Thomas's intention can be perceived from I Sentences, dist. XXVII, qu. I, art. 1, in the body and ad 3.

XIII. Against this response as well¹⁴, insofar as it says that paternity and spiration are really the same, the arguments of Durandus are extant, in Capreolus, distinction XIII of the First Book, article 2, against the first conclusion. But they did not seem to me worth reciting.

The title is clear. – In the body he does two things: first, he teaches in general in what matter of faith it is permissible or not permissible to hold contrary opinions; second, he answers the question¹.

II. As to the first point, he posits a twofold class of things pertaining to the faith: namely, directly and indirectly. Concerning the first class he says that to hold a false opinion is heresy, especially when joined with pertinacity. – Concerning the second class, however, he says two things. First, that before something contrary to the faith is considered, or determined, holding a false opinion about it is not heresy, especially without pertinacity. The second is that an error of this kind after its manifestation, or the Church's determination, is heresy. – And from these it is deduced as a corollary that many things today are reckoned heretical, etc.

III. Note here that for the notion of heresy in itself, it suffices that there be error in matters of faith; but for the formal notion of a heretic, something further is required beyond this, namely pertinacity. And therefore in the text, by way of addition, there is appended, whether pertinacity be present or absent.

Again, in the second kind of case, when a determination of the Church is lacking, it is not held to be manifest that something contrary to the faith follows from some position, on the ground that many doctors believe thus, while others hold the opposite. Hence in cases of this kind, those who hold a false opinion are excused not only from heresy but also from sin, since, according to their own degree, as far as they know, they judge themselves to be following the more reasonable way, with reverence for the Church preserved.

IV. As to the second point², the responsive conclusion is that, although to hold contrary opinions about the notions would be contrary to the faith if there were nothing in them, or if they were not considered. – And it is proved: because the notions are of the second kind³.