Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

The title manifestly inquires about the real plurality. – In the body there is a single conclusion, responsive to the question affirmatively: In the divine persons are many.

And it is proved thus from what has been said. In the divine there are several real relations: therefore there are several subsistent things in the divine nature: therefore several persons. – And the inference holds: because a divine person signifies a relation as a subsistent thing.

II. In response to the second, where from the fact that wisdom and goodness are not opposed in God it is inferred that they are not really distinct, the foundation of this inference need not be laid in anything other than that only relative opposition distinguishes the divine realities. For he did not infer absolutely, from the negation of opposition, a negation of distinction: but he explicitly added the words in divinis. And therefore this suffices for his purpose.

In the title, note that the intention of the text is not only to discuss whether there are more persons than three, but also whether there are fewer, say only two. And this is clear both from the statement of the questions at the beginning of this question; for the text says there that secondly it must be asked how many there are; and also from the responsive conclusion set forth and adduced in the body of the article; for it is an exclusive proposition, namely, The divine persons are only three; for the truth of which it is evident that it must be verified that they are neither more nor fewer.

II. In the body, a single exclusive conclusion answers the question: It is necessary to posit in the divine only three persons.

And it is proved at once with respect to both exponents, thus. The several divine persons are several subsistent relations, really distinct from one another by relative opposition alone: therefore all opposed relations belong to distinct persons, and relations not opposed belong to the same person: therefore paternity and filiation pertain to two persons, and so paternity is the person of the Father, and filiation is the person of the Son. – Then further: therefore the other two relations, namely spiration and procession, which are opposed neither to either of the foregoing but to each other, do not both pertain to one person: therefore either one of them belongs to both of the said persons, or one belongs to one and the other to the other. But procession cannot belong to both: because the procession of the intellect would proceed from the procession of love. Therefore spiration belongs to both, as being opposed to neither of them. Therefore procession belongs to the other person. Therefore there are only three persons, namely the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit.

III. Concerning this argument, a not insignificant doubt arises about the manner of proceeding: for it clearly appears diminished and truncated. First, because it proposes a disjunctive, namely, that spiration and procession are so related that either one of them belongs to the Father and the Son, or one to the Father and the other to the Son: and yet it does not examine the second part of the disjunctive, upon whose examination depends whether the persons are fewer than three. Second, because it also proposes a negative having two parts, namely, that procession does not belong to the Father and the Son, or to either of them: and yet it proves it only with respect to the first part, as the reasoning of the text clearly shows, and the words subjoined attest, namely, that if the person generating and the person generated were to proceed from the spirating one.

IV. Concerning the same argument there is also a doubt, since it seems to involve contradictions. On the one hand, it is said that only relative opposition really distinguishes in the divine, and that the relations of the second combination, namely spiration and procession, are not opposed to those of the first, namely paternity and filiation; on the other hand, it is proved that procession is really distinct from paternity and filiation. For from these I argue as follows. From the first statement, only relative opposition really distinguishes; but procession is not relatively opposed to paternity or filiation, by the second statement; therefore it is not really distinguished. And conversely: procession is really distinct from paternity and filiation; therefore it is relatively opposed to them. Or else, therefore, not only relative opposition really distinguishes in the divine. All of this is against the text. Therefore.

V. To the first doubt¹ it must be said that it was fitting to propose explicitly for discussion all the members, lest any of them seem to have been consigned to oblivion; and so that it might be shown from the conclusion of the process that all of them had been discussed implicitly. The manner in which, without defect, all are understood to have been discussed in this brief letter is as follows. Once it had been laid down in general that one of them (namely spiration and procession) belongs to both (namely the Father and the Son), or one to one and the other to the other; and once it had been added in particular that procession belongs neither to both nor to either; he began to pursue the first part of both the first and the second proposition: namely, whether one belongs to both (that is, to the Father and the Son). And examining this, he began with procession; and he inferred the negative part, namely that it does not befit both. And proceeding by the same path, he consequently concluded concerning the other, namely spiration, that it befits both. And so, with the first member first proposed having been completed first, as the right order demanded, there was no longer need to discuss the remaining proposed members: since from the affirmation of the first, together with what had been premised in this process, they are manifestly found to be excluded. For it was said that spiration and procession cannot pertain to the same person; and now it was laid down that spiration befits the Father and the Son; therefore it manifestly follows that procession befits neither both nor either, and that it cannot be that one befits one and the other the other, which had been proposed.

Nor does it stand in the way of this argument as thus expounded, that with the letter of inference it concludes, saying: It remains therefore that spiration. For that inference does not regard all the things said before, but the common canons premised here, and the force of the duality of relations, namely procession and spiration. And it intended that, because, if no opposition stands in the way, one of these is identified with each (namely the Father and the Son), and procession cannot be identified with each, it remains that spiration is identified with each, since it has no opposition to either. Thus indeed the letter infers, and not absolutely, without the addition of the aforesaid middle term, as is evident to one attending.

VI. To the second doubt, however² it is briefly answered that, since the relative opposition distinguishing the divine persons is according to the order of origin, things can be said to be relatively opposed there in two ways: namely by reason of relation or by reason of origin. Things opposed by reason of relation are only correlatives, such as Father and Son with respect to each other, and spirating and proceeding with respect to each other; but things are opposed by reason of origin whenever they are so related that one must be from the other, and not conversely. I say therefore, first, that the second combination is not opposed to the first by reason of relation: and this is what the text intends, saying that neither of these oppositions has opposition to any of those. Second, that procession is opposed to both by reason of origin: because the origin of love is from the intellect, and not conversely. And this the text intended when it excluded procession from the Father and the Son: for this opposition is a relative opposition of origin. Spiration, however, has no opposition either by reason of relation or by reason of the order of origin with respect to paternity and filiation: and therefore it rightly coincides with both. And thus, interpreting relative opposition under different aspects, there is no implication in this process, as is clear from what has been said: and it has been effectively proven that the divine persons are three only.

VII. In response to the second objection, note that, if you wish to see completely why the procession of intellect and nature coincide, but not that of the will, you should consider the three differences set out in Qq. de Potentia q. X, art. 2, ad 11.

In the title, numerical terms are one, two, three, etc. To posit something is to signify something positive. Thus the sense of the question is: when we say that the Father and the Son are two, does the term two predicate something positive, like wise or Father; or only a negation, like the term incorporeal.

II. In the body he does four things. First, he reports two opposing opinions: one of the Master, in distinction XXIV of the First Book, who holds that only a negation is signified by these terms; the other, the opposite one. Second, he sets forth a certain distinction concerning plurality, as the foundation both for finding the truth and for avoiding error¹. Third, he shows the roots of the aforementioned opinions². Fourth, he responds by giving his determination³.

III. As to the second point (since the first is evident), the distinction is this: Plurality is twofold, namely material and transcendental. And it is proved thus. Division is twofold, namely of a continuum and of opposed or diverse forms: therefore also plurality, since it follows upon division.

And the members of the distinction are made manifest by two other differences, besides the aforementioned radical one: namely, that the material is a species of quantity, whereas the transcendent is in no genus. And again, that one exists only in things having quantity, while this one exists in things separate from matter.

IV. With respect to the third⁴, both opinions considered only material multitude, which is called number; but they proceeded by different paths, in that one regarded the imperfection, while the other regarded the ultimate difference as though it were without imperfection. And thus the former said that numerical terms are assumed for negation, the latter for affirmation.

V. As to the fourth⁵, the responsive conclusion to the question is: Numerical terms in the divine signify those things of which they are said, adding only a negation. – And it is proved and explained. It is proved indeed thus. Numerical terms in the divine are not taken from number, which is a species of quantity, but from transcendent multitude: therefore they signify those things of which they are said, with only a negation added.

The antecedent, as to its negative part, which is directly opposed to the root of both of the aforementioned opinions, is proved: because otherwise it would follow that they would be said of God only metaphorically. And the consequence is proved: because bodily properties are said of God only metaphorically, as is clear in the case of breadth and length, etc. — As to the affirmative part, although it is not proved explicitly, it nevertheless follows from the difference between the two multitudes, and especially from that which holds on the side of the subject⁶: for it is evident that the divine ones belong to the order of immaterial things.

The consequence, however, is proved from the difference between each multitude and the principle of each, unity, with respect to signifying something positive or negative, as follows. The transcendent one signifies the thing that is called one, with only the negation of division added: therefore the transcendent many signify the things that are called many, with only the negation of division added regarding each one: for multitude consists of unities. But the one that is the principle of number, and number itself, number, signifies a certain accident and something positive: otherwise there would be no species of quantity, etc. Therefore, if numerical terms are taken in divine matters from transcendent multitude, they signify those things to which they are added by the addition of a mere negation: which was to be proved.

It is made manifest, however, by applying it to the essence and the persons, as is clearly evident in the text.

VI. Concerning the foregoing, note first that from the text you have it that the opinion of the Author differs, in its root, from both of the opinions set out above⁷. As to the conclusion, however, it simply differs from the second: which nevertheless Scotus seems to approve without any reason in the Quodlibets, q. XIV, at the beginning of art. 1, when he abstracts the trine name said of God from the species of discrete quantity. From the first, however, it differs in some respect, namely because he says it signifies not purely negatively; although he concedes that it imports a negation, with the Master himself.

VII. Note secondly that there are many disputable propositions here: namely, that number is a certain species of quantity; and that it is found only in quantified things; and that one principle of number is some positive material accident. But since these are not the concern of the present work, there will be, if time permits, a special question on these matters.

VIII. Note thirdly that, since the text says that multitude adds nothing over and above things except indivision with respect to each one, this can be understood in two ways. First, that the word "nothing" stands for something positive. For the present discussion is undertaken in order to know whether some positive entity is added, or only a negation, without regard to whether one or several. For it is certain that multitude includes several negations: namely, that which unity encloses, which is indivision in itself; and that which multitude adds, which is the distinction of one unity from another. — Second, that attention be paid to the word "things" in the plural number. For it signifies in exercised act the division of one from another: and thus, over and above divided things, multitude adds nothing except the negation of division with respect to each one. And in this way the word "nothing" stands for the positive as much as for the negative.

The title is clear. – In the body he does three things: first, he shows what is clear and what is ambiguous here; second, he reports the opinions of others concerning that ambiguity¹; third, he answers the question by determining it².

II. As to the first, he makes three points. First, concerning the community of this name, which is manifest. And he proves it from the very manner of speaking: for we say three persons. – Second, concerning the mode of community, which is also manifest negatively as to that mode in which the divine essence is common: because it is not one person common to the three persons. – Third, concerning the mode of community, which remains ambiguous, namely, how a person is common to the three.

III. As to the second³, two opinions are brought forward: one, that it is a community of negation; the other, that it is a community of intention. The former rests on Richard's definition, the latter on Boethius's definition. – Yet each is censured on the basis of what was determined in the preceding question⁴ concerning the signification of person: namely, that it is a name signifying in God a relation by way of hypostasis, and in common the first substance of rational nature; and hence it is neither a name of intention nor of negation. And since community is considered according to the thing signified, it follows that it is not a community of intention or of negation, but of the thing signified.

IV. As to the third⁵, the responsive conclusion to the question is: The name "person" is common to the three divine persons according to reason, not as a genus or a species, but as a vague individual. – This conclusion is first explained; secondly, it is proved.

It is indeed declared from the difference between the significations of the generic or specific name, the name of the vague individual, and the singular name; and again from the difference between the various names of the vague individual. For man, or animal, signifies the nature itself; some man, or human person, signifies the nature with a determinate mode of being (esse); but Socrates signifies this mode, namely that of subsistence; whereas some man signifies on the side of the nature, with the mode of particularization adjoined.

It is proved, however, thus. Subsistent being, distinct from all else, is common to the three divine persons; therefore person as a name is common to them in this way. And if you add to the antecedent that this esse does not stand to the divine persons as a species or a genus, but as an indeterminate individual, the whole conclusion will follow as proposed.

V. Concerning the foregoing, note that when in divine matters we say, the Father is God, and again, the Father is a divine person, although the predicate of the second, with respect to the predicate of the first, signifies the mode of that one, and is therefore said to be common as an indeterminate individual; yet with respect to the subject, it is an essential predicate. This follows from the general reason: because the essential mode of subsisting belongs to singulars of substance. And from the special reason: because a divine person signifies a relation, which is admittedly predicated essentially of paternity or filiation. And it would be similar with color with respect to whiteness and blackness, if whiteness and blackness constituted singulars of substance. Hence it is clear that Scotus, treating in those places the signification and community of person in what was said above⁶, and positing a community of negation, or of something positive by way of a proper attribute, has departed from the doctrine at hand and proved nothing of the opposite.