Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

The title is clear, and it will be explained more fully in the body. – In the body he does four things: first, he intimates the reason for the difficulty; second, he recounts certain opinions¹; third, he answers the question raised²; fourth, from the determination given above he somehow preserves the opinions recited earlier³.

II. As to the first point, he assigns the causes of the difficulty from two opposite conditions found in this name: it does not signify a relation to another, and yet it is posited in the plural in God. For this is the condition of relatives, repugnant to absolutes; that one pertains to absolutes.

III. As to the second, he brings forward three opinions. The first says that the name person is equivocal. This seems to be the view of the Master, in distinction 25 of the First Book. But this opinion is refuted on account of the cause and the matter: because a greater occasion for calumny would have been given, etc. – The second says that person signifies essence in the nominative and relation in the oblique case; the third says the opposite. This is set out clearly enough in the text.

IV. As to the third point, the responsive conclusion to the question is: A divine person signifies relation in the manner of substance, that is, a hypostasis, in the divine nature. – This conclusion, on the side of the subject, includes two terms, namely persona, divina; but on the side of the predicate, it includes three terms, namely ly relationem, ly per modum hypostasis, and ly in natura divina: and each of these is explained in the text.

With respect to the subject, it is said first that to inquire and speak about the signification of person is one thing, and about the signification of divine person another. – Second, that person and divine person are related as animal and human being. – From this follows the third point, namely that "divine person" is posited in order to circumlocute the incomplex name, just as if we were to posit rational animal in place of human being. – And thus the title of the question appears clearer. For the question concerns the signification not of person as predicated of God (for thus its distinction has been discussed⁴: for person commonly so called is predicated), but of divine person: whether, namely, this whole signifies relation or essence (esse).

On the side of the predicate, moreover, the conclusion is made manifest point by point. And first, indeed, that it signifies relation, thus: a person in general signifies an individual substance of rational nature; therefore, a person of such a nature signifies what is distinct in that nature; therefore, a divine person signifies a relation of origin. The first consequence is proved: because it belongs to the notion of the individual to be undivided in itself and divided from others; and this is explained in the case of a human person. The second consequence, however, is proved: because distinction in the divine is only through relations of origin. – Next, it is proved that in the manner of substance, that is, hypostasis, thus: relation in the divine is not an accident but the divine essence; therefore it subsists just as that essence does; therefore divine paternity is God the Father, just as deity is God; therefore a divine person signifies a subsistent relation; therefore in the manner of a hypostasis. – Finally, as regards ly in the divine nature, this is clarified by excluding the tacit objection concerning the identity of nature and hypostasis in the divine. And he intends that, although that which subsists in the divine nature is the same as the nature itself, it nevertheless remains consistent with this that person signifies something subsistent, not in the manner of nature, but in the manner of a substance which is a hypostasis in that nature: because they are distinguished by reason.

V. Concerning that clause, relation, note that, as St. Thomas explains in the Questions On the Power of God, question IX, article 4, that a divine person signifies relation can be understood in two ways: in one way formally, in another way materially. And he holds there that materially it signifies only a relation of origin; but formally, a hypostasis of the divine nature. And by means of this distinction many objections are resolved.

It seems to me, however, that in this passage, having examined more deeply the proper account of the subject, namely the divine person, he intends that the divine person includes relation not only materially (that is, as that in which it is necessarily preserved), but also formally; not, however, determinately paternity or filiation. For the formal account of the divine hypostasis, in truth, is a relation of origin, though not this or that one. In sign of this, nothing here is resolved by means of that distinction; rather, the reason for all the difficulties is given as the diversity between the mode of signifying and the thing signified: namely, because the thing signified is relative, yet it is signified absolutely, in the manner of a hypostasis.

VI. Concerning the proof of that particle, in the manner of a hypostasis⁵, note that, although the argument does not hold, A signifies a subsistent relation; therefore it signifies it as subsistent, as seems to be done in the text; nevertheless it would hold, if A signified by its proper notion what it signifies in the manner of a subsistent. And since "person" manifestly signifies in the manner of a subsistent, in order to prove that it would signify a relation in the manner of a subsistent, it was necessary only to prove that a relation is signified, and that it itself subsists: and this is done perspicuously in the text.

VII. Concerning the foregoing together, the objections of Scotus arise, from I, dist. XXIII and XXV. For he argues that neither relation, nor substance primary or secondary, nor anything positive quidditative, is signified by the name of person in the divine persons.

And that it is not indeed a relation, he proves: because to whatever inferior a relative is said, to the same the superior relative is said, though not first; therefore, if person were said of relation, just as the Father is father of the Son first, so person would be said of the Son not first, which is false.

That, however, there is nothing positive and quidditative in the persons, he proves: because from the ultimate distinctive and constitutive features of the persons nothing common can be abstracted and predicated of them in quid, since they are primarily diverse; otherwise one could ask of them in what they agree and in what they differ.

But that not even primary substance is such, he proves: because that which subsists is indifferent to the absolute and the relative.

VIII. To these objections, speaking of the divine person, of which Scotus also seems to speak, as is clear from the second argument adduced, it must be briefly said, on account of the reason given in the text, that it signifies the relation of origin in common, not in the manner of a relation, but of a hypostasis. And because the relation of origin constitutive of a divine person, not only in particular, as paternity, but also according to the rational character of a hypostatic relation, is contained quidditatively within the intelligible content of the divine person, for instance that of the Father, in the same way in which it was said above to be contained within the intelligible content of what is inferior; and because this same relation is the first substance, or hypostasis, of the divine nature; therefore we hold the opposite of all three objections brought by Scotus.

IX. And to the first objection the response is clear from the text itself. For that major premise is not true when the relative is signified in the manner of an absolute, as happens in the case at hand; and therefore the inference is invalid.

To the second objection it is said that it is one thing to speak of things, and another to speak of concepts. For although from things as grasped under their ultimately distinctive concepts nothing common predicated in quid of those concepts can be abstracted, apart from the transcendentals; nevertheless, from the things themselves taken absolutely, however simple they may be, some common univocal predicate can be abstracted, quasi-generic or quasi-specific in character, and not merely quasi-proper. Now there is no reason in the case at hand why, if a divine person signifies some common predicate in quid of the divine persons, that predicate must be common to the constitutives of the persons with respect to their ultimate concepts, taken abstractly and precisely. For that motive presupposes this conditional, which need not be true, nor has it been proved by him.

To the third objection, it is denied that the notion of a subsistent (taking "subsistent" in the manner of a hypostasis, as expressed both in Boethius's definition and in Richard's definition), when applied to the divine, abstracts from the absolute and the relative. On the contrary, it is relative; although it can be conceived by us absolutely, as is in fact signified by the name of a divine person. And since first substance in the divine is nothing other than such a subsisting relative reality, etc., therefore divine person, by signifying such a relative reality, signifies the first substance of the divine nature; and by signifying the first substance of the divine nature, signifies the subsistent relation of origin, etc.

X. As to the fourth point⁶, he returns to the opinions stated above⁷. And first to the third opinion, concerning relation in the direct case and nature in the oblique. And he says that this is verified of relation not as relation, but as subsistent. For relation can be taken in two ways: namely, as relation, for example paternity, or that by which something is referred to another; and as hypostasis, or that which⁸ is understood as the relative thing denominated, as ly Father taken substantively.

Next, to the second opinion, concerning essence in the nominative case and relation in the oblique. And it says this is verified of essence not formally, but identically, that is, as it is identified with the hypostasis; and of relation as relation is a relation.

Finally, as to the first opinion, concerning equivocation and accommodation. And it says three things: first, that the signification was once hidden; second, it affirms accommodation; third, that the cause of accommodation is not use, as the first opinion said, but the very true and proper signification of the name.

And so the solution to the knot proposed at the beginning of this body is clear⁹: for the name "person," by reason of the thing signified, is multiplied really in the divine; but by reason of its mode of signifying, it is not said of something relative.