Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title, note that, since each art uses its terms as they have been accustomed to be received in that art—and this is permissible, as is clear ¹, because the signification of names is a matter of convention, and all the more so their transference from one signification to another—since, I say, this is so, it is reasonable that the prince of all sciences, sacred Theology, should also rejoice in its own vocabulary. And therefore the question here concerns the name "person" not in any way whatever, but as it is in use among theologians: for it is evident that "person" is taken one way among the canonists and another way among others. And for this reason Lorenzo Valla ignorantly accuses Boethius of having given a bad definition of person: for it is in fact an excellent definition, as will become clear in this article, if person be understood in this way—which was also what Boethius himself intended.

II. In the body he does three things: first, the dignity of the individual substance is shown; second, the dignity of the individual rational nature²; third, the question raised is answered³.

As to the first, he intends that the individual of substance agrees with the individuals of all the genera in this, that each is a particular or an individual; it differs, however, from the others in two respects, namely as regards the cause of individuation and as regards the special character of its name. For substance is individuated through itself, whereas an accident is individuated through its subject, which is substance: which is made manifest in this whiteness. And therefore the individual of substance has received a special name, and is called hypostasis, or first substance: which is not found in the genera of accidents.

III. Concerning these statements, several doubts arise. First, on the side of substance: how it can be true, in the doctrine of St. Thomas, that substance is individuated through itself; since in him⁴ numerical distinction belongs first to quantity, and through it to material substances and the rest. And thus, since the distinction from others pertains to the notion of an individual substance, it follows that substance is individuated, as regards its intrinsic principle of distinction, by quantity; and not through itself, as the text says.

IV. Second, there is a doubt on the side of the accidents. For quantity is individuated of itself, as is clear from the definition in Book V of the Metaphysics⁵: "A quantum is that which is divided into the things present in it, each of which is by nature this particular one". And in mathematical abstractions it is manifestly evident that this line, etc., exists with no imagined subject.

The letter also gives rise to some doubt in that it expresses the individuating accident as being a substance; since it is manifestly clear that this conditional is true: if whiteness were in this quantity without a substance, it would be this. And consequently that categorical proposition is false.

V. Third, there is a doubt also on the side of the accident: how is it to be understood that it is individuated by the subject—namely, whether intrinsically or extrinsically. That is, whether, when one says this whiteness, the subject is contained intrinsically in the this, or extrinsically, in the way that nose falls within the signification of snubness or of a snub nose. For if it is contained only extrinsically, it follows that the accident is individuated by itself intrinsically. But if it is contained intrinsically, it follows that this whiteness is not a being nor one per se, and consequently belongs to no genus. And on this account it is wrongly said in the text that in every genus there is found both universal and particular.

VI. To the first point⁶ of these, insofar as it concerns this text, it can easily be said that here the discussion is not about substance of a certain kind, say material substance, but about substance absolutely: and hence, about all individuals of substance, not insofar as they are individuals of such or such a substance, but insofar as they are individuals of substance. First, because only thus is the discourse formal. Second, because thus the intended difference between an individual of substance and an individual of accident is properly interpreted. For these differ first, insofar as one is an individual of substance and the other an individual of accident, by the common features shared by all individuals of substance on the one hand, and by the common features shared by all individual accidents on the other: for such are those things that belong to these, insofar as they are individuals of this kind.

VII. And by this the answer to the remaining doubts is clear⁷. For the objections brought forward concerning the individuals of accidents do not concern them insofar as they are individuals as accidents, but insofar as they are individuals of such accidents, namely of quantity, or of a quality that affects substance mediately, as whiteness does, which is adduced in the text by way of example, so that learners may understand. It therefore stands that the truth of the text is unshaken: that the individual of substance, as such, is individual through itself, since it is evident that, as such, it has no dependence upon an accident; and that the individual of an accident, as such—since it must depend on no other subject than substance—is individuated through the subjecting substance.

VIII. To the final doubt, however⁸ it must be said, on account of the reason touched upon in the objection, that this accident does not include its subject intrinsically, but by way of an addition: so that, just as in the definition of an accident the subject is included, not as something intrinsic to its essence, but by way of an addition, so in the definition of this accident, were it to be defined, this subject would be included by way of an addition, and not intrinsically. Nor does this conflict with the text in the assigned difference. For just as an accident cannot be understood without a dependence upon a subject, so neither can this one be understood without a dependence upon this subject. But substance as such includes no dependence upon anything extrinsic. And therefore substance is individuated of itself, whereas an accident is individuated through substance.

IX. But concerning material substance, and how such accidents are individuated, that is another matter: there will be a special question about this. Now know, however, that in my view material substance is individuated through matter under determinate dimensions, as through its proper and intrinsic principle—not only constitutive but distinctive; for it is chimerical to separate these acts in reality. By matter under determinate dimensions I do not mean, as I once explained in my commentaries on Being and Essence⁹, matter with a potency toward quantity; since that potency, as is clear in Book XII of the Metaphysics¹⁰, in the treatise on the principles of the Categories, is in the genus of quantity; and thus Socrates would not be one per se. Rather, I understand matter distinct in number, not as the subject of quantity, but as prior by nature to it, its foundation, root, and cause; so that matter itself is prior in itself to being thus distinct than to being quantified, so that the effect may be proportioned to its cause. For the numerical distinction by which Socrates is distinguished from Plato, insofar as they are these men, is not a quantitative distinction, but the foundation of quantitative distinction. And likewise the distinctive principle of this man from that one, as such, is the root and foundation of quantity, and consequently of the distinction following upon it. This, however, is matter, which is the other part of the composite first terminating substantial generation in the nature of things, at the first instant of nature, before the adherence of accidents. For then there must be something singular, distinct from the universal, and an ens and one per se—which cannot be understood without a constitutive principle in this esse: for by the same thing each thing is this, and is distinguished from the rest.

X. Nor do I therefore deny that greatest doctrine, held from the senses of Aristotle and St. Thomas, namely that numerical material distinction belongs first to quantity, and consequently through it to the rest, according to the teaching of Posterior Analytics¹¹. For participating in the nature of that to which something first belongs can occur in many ways; nor is it necessary for that nature to be saved formally in all its participants, as we showed in I Poster.¹². Now matter, which is the root and foundation of quantity, is not, even in that prior respect, outside the participants in the nature of quantity: indeed, to speak more accurately, it is as if pre-possessing the nature of quantity. And since pre-possessing is more than participating, if participants in some nature can in any way bring about its effect, how much more will those who pre-possess that nature be able to do so? For every effect belonging first to something must be brought about by that thing in itself, or by its participants, or by those who pre-possess it; as appears inductively also in formal effects, in the vegetative and the sensitive and the like. Although the distinction of which we speak is not a formal effect of quantity, nor does matter of this kind thus contain quantity: yet these things have been said so that readers may understand. The remaining matters concerning this subject are treated there.

XI. That, according to¹³, the dignity of the individuals of rational nature among all the individuals of substance is shown, likewise with respect to two things. First, with respect to the mode of being (esse) as the principle of operations: namely, that the individual of rational nature alone has dominion over its own act. And that this pertains to the dignity of the individual, the text proves from this, that actions belong to singulars, I Metaphysics¹⁴ — Second, with respect to the specialness of the name: because the others, insofar as they are individuals of such a nature, for instance an irrational one, did not merit a proper name; but this has received a special name, which is "person," on account of the aforementioned dignity. — And thus we have both the proposed dignities and the answer to the question about the name of person, in what is said, that it is the name of the individual of rational nature. There remains therefore the third.

XII. As to the third point, therefore, the question is answered with a single affirmative responsive conclusion, though implicitly: The definition of person is adequate. – And it is shown thus. The aforesaid definition explains both properties of an individual of rational nature; therefore it is adequate. ¹⁵

The antecedent is explained. For that which belongs to it insofar as it is a singular substance, he explains by ly an individual substance; but that which belongs to it insofar as it is a singular of rational nature, he explains by ly of rational nature. For since the individual of the lower is also the individual of the higher, it must possess the conditions of both. And again, since two things are attributed to the individual, namely to be (esse) and to act (for universals have neither), he signified individuals by means of both: first, namely, by being (esse), second, by acting.

XIII. In response to the first and third, you have that something real, namely a mode of subsisting, beyond the specific nature, belongs to the individuals of substance, as we declared more fully in The Categories¹⁶.

In response to the second, you have that individual substance is not taken here as distinguished against universal substance, but as distinguished against the essence of substance, both universal and particular. For only this is called first substance, supposit, person, etc. – But what first substance or supposit adds above this humanity, when the union of the Word with human nature is treated of, will be discussed ¹⁷. For the purpose, however, it suffices to know that it adds every kind of incommunicability, so that it can neither be common nor be assumed: for on account of the former, deity is not a supposit; and on account of the latter, this humanity is not a supposit.

XIV. In response to the fifth objection, note that from this you have that it does not follow from this definition of Boethius that the soul is a person, as Scotus wished, in I, dist. XXIII¹⁸, not penetrating what first substance, which is here called individual, imports.

In the title, the word "ly" sit shows that the question concerns true identity.

In the body there is one responsive conclusion: Persona signifies in the genus of rational substances that these three names—namely subsistentia, res naturae and substantia or rather hypostasis—signify commonly throughout the whole genus of substances.

And this is made clear by two distinctions. The first is that of substance into essence and first substance. The second is that of first substance itself into three names of the thing, and one of the intention, as is clearly evident in the text. For from these it is made clear both how person is not the same as essence, and how it is the same as hypostasis and subsistence.

In the title, it is asked whether it is so formally. – In the body there is a single conclusion, having two parts: Person is said of God in a more excellent manner than of creatures.

It is proved with respect to the first part. The essence of God contains in itself every perfection; therefore everything that pertains to perfection is to be attributed to God; therefore that which is most perfect in the whole of nature; therefore person. And this last consequence is explained: because it signifies a subsistent in rational nature. – With respect to the second part, however: because other names common to God and creatures are said of Him in a more excellent way, as is clear from what was said above¹.

II. Concerning this process, there is a doubt as to how it is true that "person" signifies the most perfect thing in the whole of nature. First, because a specific nature seems more perfect than an individual. Second, because it would follow that in God there would be the most imperfect distinction².

III. For the clarification of these points, it must be known that "person," speaking generally, signifies the most perfect being in the whole of nature—not because personality is the most perfect of all things, but because the intellectual nature, which is the most perfect of all natures, in its complete esse is the most perfect being of all. Now it is evident that unless it subsists of itself in the order of reality (however this may come about), it is not perfect. And therefore, because "person" signifies the dignity of such a subsisting nature, it rightly signifies the most perfect being in the whole of nature. – Hence it is no objection that material individuals exist for the sake of their nature. First, because no comparison is here being made of person to nature; rather, nature is contained within the person. Second, because the present discussion concerns person in general, and not in material natures.

The second objection, however, is resolved by this: that in the notion of person in general, even though something most perfect is included with respect to the whole of nature, something nevertheless is included that abstracts from both perfection and imperfection. For it signifies a thing of intellectual nature subsisting incommunicably: for incommunicability signifies neither perfection nor imperfection. And it is with respect to this that the divine persons are distinguished, but not with respect to those things that pertain to perfection. And thus the consequent must be denied; or else one must make the distinction, as we have said.

IV. But a doubt still remains. For, if person abstracts from perfection in some respect, it would follow that, by the force of the process of reasoning made in the text, the complete notion of person would not be concluded to exist in God: since from the perfection of the divine essence, the text infers the notion of person as being found in God as the most perfect thing.

To this it is said that from the perfection of the divine essence there proceeds not only that God is every perfection, but also whatever necessarily belongs to those things which are called perfections; among these is incommunicability. And therefore it is from the perfection of the divine essence that He is a person with respect to all things contained within the notion of person. Indeed, as was established above³, it belongs to the notion of the divine perfection that God Himself is triune according to such incommunicable realities which we call persons.

The title is clear, and it will be explained more fully in the body. – In the body he does four things: first, he intimates the reason for the difficulty; second, he recounts certain opinions¹; third, he answers the question raised²; fourth, from the determination given above he somehow preserves the opinions recited earlier³.

II. As to the first point, he assigns the causes of the difficulty from two opposite conditions found in this name: it does not signify a relation to another, and yet it is posited in the plural in God. For this is the condition of relatives, repugnant to absolutes; that one pertains to absolutes.

III. As to the second, he brings forward three opinions. The first says that the name person is equivocal. This seems to be the view of the Master, in distinction 25 of the First Book. But this opinion is refuted on account of the cause and the matter: because a greater occasion for calumny would have been given, etc. – The second says that person signifies essence in the nominative and relation in the oblique case; the third says the opposite. This is set out clearly enough in the text.

IV. As to the third point, the responsive conclusion to the question is: A divine person signifies relation in the manner of substance, that is, a hypostasis, in the divine nature. – This conclusion, on the side of the subject, includes two terms, namely persona, divina; but on the side of the predicate, it includes three terms, namely ly relationem, ly per modum hypostasis, and ly in natura divina: and each of these is explained in the text.

With respect to the subject, it is said first that to inquire and speak about the signification of person is one thing, and about the signification of divine person another. – Second, that person and divine person are related as animal and human being. – From this follows the third point, namely that "divine person" is posited in order to circumlocute the incomplex name, just as if we were to posit rational animal in place of human being. – And thus the title of the question appears clearer. For the question concerns the signification not of person as predicated of God (for thus its distinction has been discussed⁴: for person commonly so called is predicated), but of divine person: whether, namely, this whole signifies relation or essence (esse).

On the side of the predicate, moreover, the conclusion is made manifest point by point. And first, indeed, that it signifies relation, thus: a person in general signifies an individual substance of rational nature; therefore, a person of such a nature signifies what is distinct in that nature; therefore, a divine person signifies a relation of origin. The first consequence is proved: because it belongs to the notion of the individual to be undivided in itself and divided from others; and this is explained in the case of a human person. The second consequence, however, is proved: because distinction in the divine is only through relations of origin. – Next, it is proved that in the manner of substance, that is, hypostasis, thus: relation in the divine is not an accident but the divine essence; therefore it subsists just as that essence does; therefore divine paternity is God the Father, just as deity is God; therefore a divine person signifies a subsistent relation; therefore in the manner of a hypostasis. – Finally, as regards ly in the divine nature, this is clarified by excluding the tacit objection concerning the identity of nature and hypostasis in the divine. And he intends that, although that which subsists in the divine nature is the same as the nature itself, it nevertheless remains consistent with this that person signifies something subsistent, not in the manner of nature, but in the manner of a substance which is a hypostasis in that nature: because they are distinguished by reason.

V. Concerning that clause, relation, note that, as St. Thomas explains in the Questions On the Power of God, question IX, article 4, that a divine person signifies relation can be understood in two ways: in one way formally, in another way materially. And he holds there that materially it signifies only a relation of origin; but formally, a hypostasis of the divine nature. And by means of this distinction many objections are resolved.

It seems to me, however, that in this passage, having examined more deeply the proper account of the subject, namely the divine person, he intends that the divine person includes relation not only materially (that is, as that in which it is necessarily preserved), but also formally; not, however, determinately paternity or filiation. For the formal account of the divine hypostasis, in truth, is a relation of origin, though not this or that one. In sign of this, nothing here is resolved by means of that distinction; rather, the reason for all the difficulties is given as the diversity between the mode of signifying and the thing signified: namely, because the thing signified is relative, yet it is signified absolutely, in the manner of a hypostasis.

VI. Concerning the proof of that particle, in the manner of a hypostasis⁵, note that, although the argument does not hold, A signifies a subsistent relation; therefore it signifies it as subsistent, as seems to be done in the text; nevertheless it would hold, if A signified by its proper notion what it signifies in the manner of a subsistent. And since "person" manifestly signifies in the manner of a subsistent, in order to prove that it would signify a relation in the manner of a subsistent, it was necessary only to prove that a relation is signified, and that it itself subsists: and this is done perspicuously in the text.

VII. Concerning the foregoing together, the objections of Scotus arise, from I, dist. XXIII and XXV. For he argues that neither relation, nor substance primary or secondary, nor anything positive quidditative, is signified by the name of person in the divine persons.

And that it is not indeed a relation, he proves: because to whatever inferior a relative is said, to the same the superior relative is said, though not first; therefore, if person were said of relation, just as the Father is father of the Son first, so person would be said of the Son not first, which is false.

That, however, there is nothing positive and quidditative in the persons, he proves: because from the ultimate distinctive and constitutive features of the persons nothing common can be abstracted and predicated of them in quid, since they are primarily diverse; otherwise one could ask of them in what they agree and in what they differ.

But that not even primary substance is such, he proves: because that which subsists is indifferent to the absolute and the relative.

VIII. To these objections, speaking of the divine person, of which Scotus also seems to speak, as is clear from the second argument adduced, it must be briefly said, on account of the reason given in the text, that it signifies the relation of origin in common, not in the manner of a relation, but of a hypostasis. And because the relation of origin constitutive of a divine person, not only in particular, as paternity, but also according to the rational character of a hypostatic relation, is contained quidditatively within the intelligible content of the divine person, for instance that of the Father, in the same way in which it was said above to be contained within the intelligible content of what is inferior; and because this same relation is the first substance, or hypostasis, of the divine nature; therefore we hold the opposite of all three objections brought by Scotus.

IX. And to the first objection the response is clear from the text itself. For that major premise is not true when the relative is signified in the manner of an absolute, as happens in the case at hand; and therefore the inference is invalid.

To the second objection it is said that it is one thing to speak of things, and another to speak of concepts. For although from things as grasped under their ultimately distinctive concepts nothing common predicated in quid of those concepts can be abstracted, apart from the transcendentals; nevertheless, from the things themselves taken absolutely, however simple they may be, some common univocal predicate can be abstracted, quasi-generic or quasi-specific in character, and not merely quasi-proper. Now there is no reason in the case at hand why, if a divine person signifies some common predicate in quid of the divine persons, that predicate must be common to the constitutives of the persons with respect to their ultimate concepts, taken abstractly and precisely. For that motive presupposes this conditional, which need not be true, nor has it been proved by him.

To the third objection, it is denied that the notion of a subsistent (taking "subsistent" in the manner of a hypostasis, as expressed both in Boethius's definition and in Richard's definition), when applied to the divine, abstracts from the absolute and the relative. On the contrary, it is relative; although it can be conceived by us absolutely, as is in fact signified by the name of a divine person. And since first substance in the divine is nothing other than such a subsisting relative reality, etc., therefore divine person, by signifying such a relative reality, signifies the first substance of the divine nature; and by signifying the first substance of the divine nature, signifies the subsistent relation of origin, etc.

X. As to the fourth point⁶, he returns to the opinions stated above⁷. And first to the third opinion, concerning relation in the direct case and nature in the oblique. And he says that this is verified of relation not as relation, but as subsistent. For relation can be taken in two ways: namely, as relation, for example paternity, or that by which something is referred to another; and as hypostasis, or that which⁸ is understood as the relative thing denominated, as ly Father taken substantively.

Next, to the second opinion, concerning essence in the nominative case and relation in the oblique. And it says this is verified of essence not formally, but identically, that is, as it is identified with the hypostasis; and of relation as relation is a relation.

Finally, as to the first opinion, concerning equivocation and accommodation. And it says three things: first, that the signification was once hidden; second, it affirms accommodation; third, that the cause of accommodation is not use, as the first opinion said, but the very true and proper signification of the name.

And so the solution to the knot proposed at the beginning of this body is clear⁹: for the name "person," by reason of the thing signified, is multiplied really in the divine; but by reason of its mode of signifying, it is not said of something relative.