Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

The title in the body of the article is clarified. – In the body he does three things: first, he reports a certain error; second, he treats of the root of the error just recited, and of how truth is to be drawn out¹; third, there, Quidquid autem, he answers the question according to truth².

As to the first, he says three things. First, the error concerning the question at issue, namely: that the relations in God are assisting, or externally affixed. Second, that this error is said to have been that of Gilbert de la Porrée. Third, it is said that he afterwards retracted his error.

II. As to the second point, three things are said. First, relation, like any other genus of accident, is distinguished into two formal rationes. One of these is common to all genera of this kind: and this is the ratio of accident, that is, to inhere in a subject, since the esse of an accident is to inhere. The other is the proper ratio of each of them. And according to this, the genus of relation differs from the other absolute genera, because the proper rationes of the others signify a thing in its order to the subject; but that of relation, not in its order to the subject, but to its term. That is, they differ with respect to the affirmation and negation of this causal proposition, A by its proper ratio places something in a subject: for it is affirmed as true in the other genera, but denied in relation, as is clear from what was said above ³

Second, that relations, even in created things, if they are taken according to what they have from their proper rational character as relations only, are thus assistant; but if according to what they have insofar as they are accidents, they are thus inherent.

Third, the reason for Gilbert's error was that he considered relations only according to that which they have from their own proper notion: for this reason he said they were externally affixed. For if he had considered their inherence, as the text subsequently does, he would have said otherwise.

III. As to the third point,⁴ therefore, a single responsive conclusion is posited, with one corollary. The conclusion is: A relation really existing in God is the same as the essence in reality (secundum rem), and differs from it only according to reason.

And the first part is proved thus. Whatever in created things has accidental esse, when transferred to God has substantial esse: therefore a relation existing in God has the esse of essence. The antecedent is proved: because in God nothing is as an accident in a subject, but whatever is there is his substance. And the consequence holds: because relation in creatures, on the side of the in, has accidental esse. – As for the second part, however, thus. In relation there is imported a respect to its opposite, but not in the name of essence: therefore, etc.

IV. The corollary is: the esse of relation and the esse of essence are in God altogether one and the same. Here note carefully that, because esse in this context signifies the actual existence of an accident, while the actual existence of a relation is not toward something else, as St. Thomas expressly teaches in I, dist. XXXIII, qu. I, art. 1, ad 1; therefore the actual existence of a divine relation is altogether identical with the actual existence of the divine essence itself: for it does not differ from it even by reason, just as the quod quid est of a relation is understood to differ from the quod quid est of the essence, as the relative differs from the absolute. And this is what Augustine said⁵: that what the Father is by which He is God is the same by which He is; but He is not Father by that by which He is God. And thus we have not only the real identity of relation with essence, but the identity in every respect of the existence of both. And hence there is one actual existence of all the divine relations: although the relations themselves are really distinct from one another.

V. In reply to the second, concerning those words, that which is found in a creature beyond what is contained under the signification of the relative name is another thing; but in God it is not another thing, etc., there is a great doubt about the distinction of relation from its foundation, both simply and in the doctrine of St. Thomas. For some, even Thomists, hold that relation is the same thing as its foundation. Others hold that it is really distinct from the foundation. Still others hold that certain relations are identified with their foundations, while others are really distinguished from them. – Which of these is truer, or according to the mind of St. Thomas, must be examined from his reasons and propositions.

VI. The first opinion, therefore, seems consonant with St. Thomas, on the basis of four of his propositions. The first is common to all, namely: the proper esse of every simple form begins and ends with that form⁶. – The second is also common, from V Physics⁷: a relation is generated in something without any change being made in it. – The third is proper to St. Thomas: the inesse of any accidental form is really distinct from the essence of the accident and from the esse of the subject⁸. – The fourth is likewise proper to St. Thomas: the inesse of a relation is not to be related to another⁹.

For from these it follows that, Socrates alone existing white, there is no likeness of the co-whites; but once Plato, being white, is begotten, there is in Socrates a likeness; and he acquired nothing absolute anew (otherwise he would truly have been changed); therefore either the being-in of likeness is the same as the being-in of whiteness, and consequently likeness is the same as whiteness in reality; or the being-in of likeness preceded without likeness, which is against the first proposition.

Simply and in relation to men, however, this opinion is founded upon a very weak foundation, namely generation without change: - upon composition, since clearly white similar is no more composite than white; and expressly in question VII of The Power of God, article 8, it is said that a relation does not compose with that of which it is: - and upon its minimal entity among the other categories, as Averroes says in book XII of the Metaphysics, commentary 19; for by this it must be of lesser entity than time, which is in some way a being without the soul, as is said in book IV of the Physics¹⁰

VII. But the opinion distinguishing certain relations from their foundations and others not¹¹ is Scotus's, in II, dist. I, qu. V, and in III, dist. VIII, and in the Quodlibets, qu. III¹², who holds these two universal propositions: A relation whose foundation can remain without its term is really distinct from the foundation. The other is: A relation whose foundation cannot be without its term is really identical with the foundation. – And he proves both propositions from the same root. The first, indeed, because since it involves no contradiction for the foundation to remain without the relation, it follows that they are two things: for it involves one and the same thing being and not being at once. The second, on the contrary: because since it involves a contradiction for the foundation to be without the relation, it follows that they are one thing.

VIII. But the opinion holding that every real relation is really distinguished from its foundation¹³ is without doubt that of St. Thomas, although many Thomists have not understood him; and it is had manifestly both from his authorities and follows from his propositions. Manifestly, indeed, in this letter he posits a difference between relation in creatures and in God with respect to this, that in creatures that which is found beyond the content contained under the signification of the relative name is another thing, whereas in God it is the same thing; but it is established that the foundation is not contained under the signification of the relative name.

There are also held by him three indubitated propositions. The first is that no substance in a genus can be really the same as a relation, as is clear in the Questions on the Power of God, question VIII, article 2, ad 1. – The second is: Some real relation is founded immediately in the thing that is a substance; as is clear in the preceding article¹⁴ on the relations of similitude or of specific identity; so that it cannot be denied. It is also clear from the relation of passive creation, of which there will be discussion in its proper place¹⁵: for it is evident that it is founded above substance. – The third, however, which manifestly follows from these, is that in the real relations of creatures, the relations are present in the substances and constitute a composition of accident to subject; as is clear in Book I of the Sentences, distinction XXXIII, question I, article 1, at the end of the body of the text. – For from these it manifestly follows that every real relation founded immediately in substance is really distinct from its foundation, according to St. Thomas.

IX. From these, and from the root of the first proposition, another universal proposition simpliciter is deduced: namely, that every real relation in creatures is really distinct from its foundation. For it is had from these that a real relation founded in substance has its own esse in and its own esse ad: and since it is established that esse in is its actual existence, it follows that the most general genus of relation is a form having its own existence: and since it is not by accident that a thing is owed inesse (because "accident" is essentially predicated of it), it follows that this belongs to each of its inferiors. – And it is confirmed: because otherwise accident would not be predicated in the first mode of per se predication of every relation contained under the genus ad aliquid. And the inference holds: because the thing from which inesse would flow would not be itself formally, but only from the form of the foundation.

The root of the first proposition, however, is that it is defined to one genus, and consequently is excluded from another genus, as is said there ¹⁶. For this argument, if it is sound and sufficient, also entails the real distinction of relation from quantity and quality. For one must form the major or antecedent thus: A thing defined to one genus is really excluded from another genus; but created substance, etc. And likewise the subsumption is equally true: but quantity and¹⁷ quality is defined to one genus: therefore. — It is therefore St. Thomas's mind that every real relation of a category to something else is really distinguished from its foundation.

X. That this position accords better with the truth can be perceived from the doctrine of Aristotle, in Book XII of the¹⁸, where he holds that the principles of relation are other than those of quality and of the other genera; and from the argument adduced above¹⁹, namely, that relation is essentially an accident, and consequently has its own in, inasmuch as it is according to its own essence; and from the solution of the objections to the contrary.

XI. To Scotus's argument, therefore,²⁰ it is replied that it falsely rests upon its foundation. For many things are really distinct, one of which involves a contradiction to be without the other; as is evident in Scotus himself²¹ concerning the essential parts taken together, and the third entity of being (ens), and universally concerning those things between which there is an essential dependence. Nor does it help to say that Scotus himself made this exception. For it is sufficient for our purpose that not being able to exist without another does not infer real indistinction: and just as you make an exception for essential dependence, so will it be permitted to others to make exceptions for necessary connection, etc. Nor is it even universally true that what remains is really distinguished from what has perished; as is manifestly clear in heat that has been remitted; for it is not really distinguished from itself previously intensified. Hence that root, taken thus absolutely, does not prove real distinction universally, although it persuades. – How Aristotle uses that argument in the Topics²², and how we may use it, is a matter for another occasion: for these points suffice for our purpose.

XII. To the arguments for the first opinion, however,²³ it is said, and first to the first argument (which has the greatest force), that the inexistence of likeness, when Socrates alone exists as white, neither wholly is nor wholly is not; but is in a certain way, and is not in a certain way; for it is incompletely, not completely. And since to be actualiter signifies to be completely, therefore this negative proposition is true, the inexistence of the relation is not; yet with it stands the truth of the affirmative with a qualification secundum quid, namely, that the inexistence of the relation is in a certain way, that is, incompletely. And on account of the weakness of its being, it is completed by the mere apposition of the term: for if the ad results, there results also the complement of the in itself. For the likeness did not have incomplete being from any defect of the foundation, but from the defect of the term: and hence it follows that, once the term which was lacking is posited, the foundation completes it as its offspring or fruit or effect. A similar example, suited to this purpose, is adduced by St. Thomas in question VII of On the Power of God, article 9, reply to 7, concerning the being of action. For if the heat were heating, once the heatable was removed, active heating would not be actualiter, nor would it inhere in the agent as an accident in a subject; and yet, with the heatable posited, the action would at once be and inhere in the agent, for the same reason; namely, because both relation and action are removed in act when the extrinsic term or patient is removed, yet remain radically or causally.

And from this, as is said in the same place, the argument concerning change is resolved. For that which thus remains need not be generated by a new change: since on the side of the causes sufficiency already exists in act, but it is, as it were, impeded by the removal of something extrinsic. And likewise in corruption there is not properly a change, since that sufficiency of causes remains in act. For change, properly speaking, is the terminus of alteration: but here there intervenes only a certain natural resolution, or a cessation of it.

To compose the relation with its foundation, and for white-similar to be more composite than white, not only is not unfitting, but is indeed necessary: because real similarity is essentially an accident. But the imagination is sometimes deceived, because the names of relations do not explicitly present in their signification that they inhere. – Nor do the Author's words in the cited place stand in the way: since the cause there assigned shows that he is speaking of relation formally, that is, of the ad, when he says, because it does not signify something in a subject, etc., as he expressly made clear in the following article, ad 7.

Finally, the relation of least entity among the other categories both is and is called such, because from what is proper to itself, that is, the "toward" (ad), it does not have that it be real; rather, insofar as this goes, it can be found only in reason. And therefore some have thought it to be among the second intentions. Time, however, and the rest must, as has been said²⁴, be real beings in some way.

XIII. Concerning the foregoing, note that, although Scotus agrees with St. Thomas on certain relations being really distinct from their foundations, as is clear from what has been said²⁵; they do not agree in this: that the esse of a relation is really distinct from its essence; just as neither do they agree universally that esse and essence are really distinct in creatures²⁶. Yet do not understand that the esse of a relation is distinguished from the relation itself as another relation, or as an altogether absolute thing. For both of these are false: for the esse of a relation is in the genus of relation, though reductively, as its actuality; just as the esse of substance is in the genus of substance, and the esse of quality in the genus of quality, and so on.

Scotus, however, cannot avoid one impossibility: namely, that the same relative is said twice, that is, toward terms on both sides. For if, for example, similarity refers really to the term and to the foundation by itself, it is evident that "similar" is said twice. But the actual inherence of similarity in the foundation, according to Scotus²⁷, is itself the relation of similarity: because the very relation of similarity, as it were grounding the relation of inherence, cannot without contradiction be without a foundation, as he himself says²⁸. Therefore "similar" is said twice.

XIV. In response to the third, a doubt arises concerning these words: it would follow that its esse would be imperfect, inasmuch as it is ordered toward something else. For from this it seems that relation signifies imperfection: which, however, is clearly false, because relation signifies neither perfection nor imperfection; otherwise either imperfection would be in God, or one Person would have some perfection which another does not have. – That this follows from those words is made manifest thus. If esse toward another did not signify imperfection, then from the fact that someone's esse was an ordering toward another, it would not follow that it was imperfect, as is evident: but according to the letter it follows that that esse is imperfect: therefore esse toward another signifies imperfection.

XV. To this it is said that the text did not take as its antecedent being toward another, but being only toward another, excluding everything absolute, not merely formally but really, as is clear from that phrase, in the divine perfection, not only in the abstraction of the concept, but in the nature of things, as is clear from the text. From this antecedent, however, it clearly follows that therefore it would be imperfect: because everything that is nothing else in the order of things, according to its reality, than a relation is either a being of reason or an accident; and each of these is imperfect. The words of the text, therefore, do not stand against that truth, namely, that a relation formally signifies neither imperfection nor perfection.