Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title, what "real" (ly reales) signifies is clear. But why it is added will be stated in the body of the text: namely, because not all relations are real. "That they are in God" (ly sint in Deo) signifies the mode of being (essendi) in God formally. And since it is asked in the plural number, it is also intimated that he intends to ask whether there are several real relations in God, and that the question concerns relations ad intra: for relations ad extra and those treated above¹ have already been discussed, and they would belong more to God with respect to other things than to God in himself according to himself, which is the way we now speak of him.

II. In the body he does three things: first, he proposes the responsive conclusion; second, he treats that term real²; third, he proves the conclusion³.

As to the first point, the responsive conclusion to the question is affirmative: Certain relations are really present in the divine persons.

III. As to the second point, the reason is given why "reality" is added above relation; and what a real respect is, and what one of reason⁴. The reason for the first is the difference between relation and the other genera: for all things of the other genera are according to the thing itself; but of relation some are according to reason only, and some according to the thing itself. – And this difference arises from another, namely that the others, by their proper notion, signify something inhering in a subject; whereas relation, by its proper notion, signifies only a respect to another.

IV. Concerning these statements, there are many doubts. First, concerning the first difference, on the side of either extreme. On the side, indeed, of relation, thus. Relation, insofar as it is one genus distinct from the other genera, according to its own formal ratio, is a real being: since it is a part, member, or mode of real being divided into the ten genera. Therefore it is false that this is singular in the genus relation, that some things are found according to reason. – And if it were said that here we are not speaking of relation insofar as it is one genus, but insofar as it is a certain analogate common to all relatives: this response is refuted by the text itself, which distinguishes relation from the other genera. For what is distinct from the genera is evidently one of the genera.

On the side of the remaining genera, however, there is doubt: since in all of them something seems to be found according to the thing, and something according to the concept. For the rose understood is a substance according to the concept; and likewise the abstracted triangle; and so with the others. Therefore it is not proper to relation to have something according to the thing, and something according to the concept. – In the genus of quantity, too, species are found in both ways: real ones indeed, as body; but ones of reason formally, as time, at least according to St. Thomas⁵. Therefore.

V. Concerning the second difference, a doubt likewise arises on both sides. On the side of relation, it is similar to what was said above ⁶: because the genus relation does not signify only the "toward" by its proper account, but toward something real; otherwise a part of real being would not be formally such.

On the part of the other genera, however: since action, according to its proper meaning, does not signify something inhering in a subject, as St. Thomas also attests elsewhere, namely in Questions on the Power of God De Potentia, question VII, article 2. Therefore not every other genus of accident signifies, according to its proper meaning, something inhering in a subject.

VI. To these doubts, answering in reverse order, so that we may begin from the root, it must be said that toward something, or relation, according to its proper concept is nothing other than that by which it is first distinguished from all else. This, however, is neither being an entity, nor being an accident or inherent thing, nor being a real what, since all of these are common: rather it is being toward another, which the simple expression best signifies by the term toward. And therefore, whenever we speak of toward something, or of relation, according to its proper concept, we are speaking of "toward." And since many relations are real, many are of reason only, and each has its own toward; it follows that toward, insofar as it is "toward," need be neither a real entity nor an entity of reason, but may indifferently be either. Nor is it unfitting that something thus abstracted from the real should be modified, in respect of a certain part of itself, toward the difference of real being. And since in that part the term toward is included formally as its distinctive property, though modified, therefore also, when speaking of real relations formally according to that which is proper to them, whereby they are distinguished from the rest of the genus of things, one can understand it of toward insofar as it is "toward." And thus it is clear that it makes no difference sometimes to speak of toward something and of real toward something, namely when we speak of them according to that simple condition which is proper to them: for it must be interpreted in both places as toward; for this alone among simple things is proper to itself, as is evident from the matter itself.

VII. And by this the answer is clear both to the first and to the second doubt concerning the ad aliquid⁷. And the reason is evident why it is said that relations, according to their proper intelligible content, posit nothing in the relative, etc. For all these things, insofar as they proceed from the reason of the ad ut sic, are true; although from such an ad, say a real one, they would be false. And therefore one must speak cautiously. For one must speak in one way of the species, and universally of relations that are necessarily real by their proper intelligible contents, such as paternity and filiation, and others of this kind; and in another way of relations absolutely: for these signify only an ad aliquid, whereas those signify an ad aliquid that is real.

VIII. To the objection from the side of the other genera in the second doubt⁸, it is said that the text does not compare ad aliquid to all the other genera in the second division, but to the absolute genera, namely quantity and quality, which alone are expressed in the text. That this is the mind of St. Thomas is attested by his words in I, dist. XXVI, qu. II, art. 1, where he expressly explains all the other absolute forms in this division. And therefore, if action is an absolute form (whatever may be said about its mode of signifying, of which the Author speaks in the Quaestiones de Potentia), on the part of the thing it exists and has that it be signified as inhering. But if it is a respective form, nothing stands in the way of our proposal.

It could nevertheless be said, if the extension to other genera is granted, that by ly inhaerens is understood, not what the word inhaerens formally signifies, but every mode of being which, by its formal account, signifies having esse in the order of real things. And in this way all the other genera besides ad aliquid are included, even substance; indeed also the remaining beings, whether within a genus or outside any genus. That this is the meaning of the text can be gathered from the fact that neither the proper account of quality nor that of quantity consists in inesse, since inesse is common to all the genera of accident; rather it consists in a certain mode of inessing, yet such a one that it posits something in the order of real things by what is proper and peculiar to it alone. The opposite of this the text was intending to show in the case of relation.

IX. To the first doubt concerning the other genera⁹, it is said that it proceeds from a bad understanding of the assigned difference. For relation is, so to speak, a certain essence, to whose subjective parts it is repugnant to have being in the nature of things, and they claim for themselves being of reason only; but to certain others it belongs to have being in the nature of things. And again, relation is such a being that the addition of being in reason is not a diminishing condition, as in other things. For a rose according to reason is not a rose; nor is Homer in opinion Homer; but a relation in reason is a true relation. And again, relation is not a being of nature in one respect and of reason in another, say completively: but sometimes it is simply a being of reason.

And by this the response to the objections is clear. For time, and things like it, depend on reason only in a completive way. Nor is the rose or the triangle, according to its esse of reason, a true rose or a true triangle. Nor is the distinction of the rose in its esse of nature and its esse of reason a distinction of different quiddities, one of which would be a real being and the other a being of reason, as we said could happen in the case of relation; rather, it is a distinction of one and the same thing according to diverse modes of being, namely simply or in a certain respect.

X. What, however, a real relation is, and what a relation of reason¹⁰ is explained by distinguishing that a relation sometimes exists in the natures of things themselves, and sometimes only in the apprehension of the mind. The former indeed occurs when two things have an inclination or order toward one another, as is clear in the case of a heavy body and the place below; the latter, however, when the mind confers one upon the other, as is shown in species and genus.

XI. Note two things here. First, the text is to be interpreted as concerning real mutual relations (since it is of these that we are speaking), and of the fundamental order or inclination fundamentali, as was explained at qu. XIII¹¹ – Second, by the name rationis conferentis is to be understood the intellect understanding one thing in comparison with another in any way whatever, so that the doctrine may be universal. In how many ways this can happen, you have in I Sent., dist. XXVI, qu. II, art. 1, and Qq. de Potentia, qu. VII, art. 11.

XII. Concerning this part a doubt arises from distinction XLV of the First Book¹² of Scotus himself, who held that not every relation of reason is from the intellect, but that some are from the will, and some from the imagination. And he proves this by the following argument. Every power capable of having an act concerning an object existing not as existing, and of comparing that object to another to which it is not compared by the nature of the thing, can cause in the object, as it is an object, a relation of it to the other; but the will is of this kind, since it can use God with respect to a creature, and similarly in other cases: therefore it can cause such a relation. Then further: such a relation, it is agreed, is not real; therefore it is a relation of reason, yet not through the work of the intellect.

XIII. To this, from Books V and VI of the Metaphysics, it must be said that since being (ens) is not found as distinct and treated except in being in itself, divided into the ten genera, and being by accident, discussed in Book VI of the Metaphysics¹³, and true being, begun in Book V¹⁴ and determined in Book VI¹⁵; fiction seems to posit another mode of being. Aristotle himself thought that being was sufficiently determined in the soul, when he determined concerning true being. Hence such relations have no other actual being (esse) than because the proposition about them is true.

It must be distinguished, however, that a relation of reason can be considered in two ways. In one way, according to its being: and thus it has being only in being understood. In another way, according to its proximate cause, or foundation: and thus it is caused both by the will and by the imagination. Indeed, even by exterior sight: for sight, by attaining color, causes in it the relation of the seen to the seer. And likewise the right side of an animal causes the relation of rightness in the column. And yet these relations are not actual except when they are understood. Hence, since the will of itself, considered as distinct from reason, and likewise any other power, cause a relation in the object in this way—because they do not cause otherwise than if they were natural causes which, acting upon a disposed patient, etc., would bring it about that a real relation resulted—they also, in this way, bring it about that a relation of reason results, whenever an ens rationis is capable of being. But this, since it consists in being understood, is never actual unless it is understood: for with the aforementioned foundations preexisting, it exists as it were habitually. Therefore Scotus's major premise, understood concerning causality and relation of reason according to actual being, is false; but true according to fundamental being. And on this account the text says that a respect of this kind is in the mere apprehension of reason.

XIV. That the third¹⁶, the proposed conclusion is proved as follows. Whenever something proceeds from a principle of the same nature, both are of the same order, and consequently they have real respects toward one another: but the processions in God are in the identity of nature: therefore the relations according to the divine processions are real, which was the point intended. – All things are clear from what has been said.

XV. In response to the first, note, newly, that, because predication is founded upon being-in (inesse), by the same reason by which a relation, from its proper notion, does not inhere, and yet according to the reality of things sometimes does inhere, it is also said that it is not predicated, and yet it is predicated in this way, namely, in the manner of an ordering toward another.

XVI. In response to the second, you have it that the relation of specific or generic identity is a mutual real relation, from that word, "It is otherwise, however" etc. And even if this were not said, it could be proven by reason. For two humanities are no less alike in nature than two whitenesses: but the relation of specific similarity between two white things is real: therefore also between two men, etc. And this is very much to be noted and attended to, when one treats of the foundation of a relation, or of the distinction of a relation from its foundation. For you have from this both that a relation is founded immediately in substance, and that it is really distinct from its foundation: since it is established, according to St. Thomas¹⁷, that relations of this kind are accidents, placed in the category of Relation.

Nor does the first statement meet any objection from the fact that elsewhere¹⁸ it is said that a relation must be founded in substance through the mediation of the other genera, on account of its weakness. For this is to be understood not really, but formally. For similarity is a relation said to be founded upon quantity, because one founds it, as is clear in V Metaphysics¹⁹; and yet it is evident that, in reality, qualities, and universally forms of the same character, found it—under the aspect, however, of one, insofar as one makes the same in substance, equal in quantity, similar in quality. – But how the remaining statements are consonant with what was said must be examined later²⁰.

The title in the body of the article is clarified. – In the body he does three things: first, he reports a certain error; second, he treats of the root of the error just recited, and of how truth is to be drawn out¹; third, there, Quidquid autem, he answers the question according to truth².

As to the first, he says three things. First, the error concerning the question at issue, namely: that the relations in God are assisting, or externally affixed. Second, that this error is said to have been that of Gilbert de la Porrée. Third, it is said that he afterwards retracted his error.

II. As to the second point, three things are said. First, relation, like any other genus of accident, is distinguished into two formal rationes. One of these is common to all genera of this kind: and this is the ratio of accident, that is, to inhere in a subject, since the esse of an accident is to inhere. The other is the proper ratio of each of them. And according to this, the genus of relation differs from the other absolute genera, because the proper rationes of the others signify a thing in its order to the subject; but that of relation, not in its order to the subject, but to its term. That is, they differ with respect to the affirmation and negation of this causal proposition, A by its proper ratio places something in a subject: for it is affirmed as true in the other genera, but denied in relation, as is clear from what was said above ³

Second, that relations, even in created things, if they are taken according to what they have from their proper rational character as relations only, are thus assistant; but if according to what they have insofar as they are accidents, they are thus inherent.

Third, the reason for Gilbert's error was that he considered relations only according to that which they have from their own proper notion: for this reason he said they were externally affixed. For if he had considered their inherence, as the text subsequently does, he would have said otherwise.

III. As to the third point,⁴ therefore, a single responsive conclusion is posited, with one corollary. The conclusion is: A relation really existing in God is the same as the essence in reality (secundum rem), and differs from it only according to reason.

And the first part is proved thus. Whatever in created things has accidental esse, when transferred to God has substantial esse: therefore a relation existing in God has the esse of essence. The antecedent is proved: because in God nothing is as an accident in a subject, but whatever is there is his substance. And the consequence holds: because relation in creatures, on the side of the in, has accidental esse. – As for the second part, however, thus. In relation there is imported a respect to its opposite, but not in the name of essence: therefore, etc.

IV. The corollary is: the esse of relation and the esse of essence are in God altogether one and the same. Here note carefully that, because esse in this context signifies the actual existence of an accident, while the actual existence of a relation is not toward something else, as St. Thomas expressly teaches in I, dist. XXXIII, qu. I, art. 1, ad 1; therefore the actual existence of a divine relation is altogether identical with the actual existence of the divine essence itself: for it does not differ from it even by reason, just as the quod quid est of a relation is understood to differ from the quod quid est of the essence, as the relative differs from the absolute. And this is what Augustine said⁵: that what the Father is by which He is God is the same by which He is; but He is not Father by that by which He is God. And thus we have not only the real identity of relation with essence, but the identity in every respect of the existence of both. And hence there is one actual existence of all the divine relations: although the relations themselves are really distinct from one another.

V. In reply to the second, concerning those words, that which is found in a creature beyond what is contained under the signification of the relative name is another thing; but in God it is not another thing, etc., there is a great doubt about the distinction of relation from its foundation, both simply and in the doctrine of St. Thomas. For some, even Thomists, hold that relation is the same thing as its foundation. Others hold that it is really distinct from the foundation. Still others hold that certain relations are identified with their foundations, while others are really distinguished from them. – Which of these is truer, or according to the mind of St. Thomas, must be examined from his reasons and propositions.

VI. The first opinion, therefore, seems consonant with St. Thomas, on the basis of four of his propositions. The first is common to all, namely: the proper esse of every simple form begins and ends with that form⁶. – The second is also common, from V Physics⁷: a relation is generated in something without any change being made in it. – The third is proper to St. Thomas: the inesse of any accidental form is really distinct from the essence of the accident and from the esse of the subject⁸. – The fourth is likewise proper to St. Thomas: the inesse of a relation is not to be related to another⁹.

For from these it follows that, Socrates alone existing white, there is no likeness of the co-whites; but once Plato, being white, is begotten, there is in Socrates a likeness; and he acquired nothing absolute anew (otherwise he would truly have been changed); therefore either the being-in of likeness is the same as the being-in of whiteness, and consequently likeness is the same as whiteness in reality; or the being-in of likeness preceded without likeness, which is against the first proposition.

Simply and in relation to men, however, this opinion is founded upon a very weak foundation, namely generation without change: - upon composition, since clearly white similar is no more composite than white; and expressly in question VII of The Power of God, article 8, it is said that a relation does not compose with that of which it is: - and upon its minimal entity among the other categories, as Averroes says in book XII of the Metaphysics, commentary 19; for by this it must be of lesser entity than time, which is in some way a being without the soul, as is said in book IV of the Physics¹⁰

VII. But the opinion distinguishing certain relations from their foundations and others not¹¹ is Scotus's, in II, dist. I, qu. V, and in III, dist. VIII, and in the Quodlibets, qu. III¹², who holds these two universal propositions: A relation whose foundation can remain without its term is really distinct from the foundation. The other is: A relation whose foundation cannot be without its term is really identical with the foundation. – And he proves both propositions from the same root. The first, indeed, because since it involves no contradiction for the foundation to remain without the relation, it follows that they are two things: for it involves one and the same thing being and not being at once. The second, on the contrary: because since it involves a contradiction for the foundation to be without the relation, it follows that they are one thing.

VIII. But the opinion holding that every real relation is really distinguished from its foundation¹³ is without doubt that of St. Thomas, although many Thomists have not understood him; and it is had manifestly both from his authorities and follows from his propositions. Manifestly, indeed, in this letter he posits a difference between relation in creatures and in God with respect to this, that in creatures that which is found beyond the content contained under the signification of the relative name is another thing, whereas in God it is the same thing; but it is established that the foundation is not contained under the signification of the relative name.

There are also held by him three indubitated propositions. The first is that no substance in a genus can be really the same as a relation, as is clear in the Questions on the Power of God, question VIII, article 2, ad 1. – The second is: Some real relation is founded immediately in the thing that is a substance; as is clear in the preceding article¹⁴ on the relations of similitude or of specific identity; so that it cannot be denied. It is also clear from the relation of passive creation, of which there will be discussion in its proper place¹⁵: for it is evident that it is founded above substance. – The third, however, which manifestly follows from these, is that in the real relations of creatures, the relations are present in the substances and constitute a composition of accident to subject; as is clear in Book I of the Sentences, distinction XXXIII, question I, article 1, at the end of the body of the text. – For from these it manifestly follows that every real relation founded immediately in substance is really distinct from its foundation, according to St. Thomas.

IX. From these, and from the root of the first proposition, another universal proposition simpliciter is deduced: namely, that every real relation in creatures is really distinct from its foundation. For it is had from these that a real relation founded in substance has its own esse in and its own esse ad: and since it is established that esse in is its actual existence, it follows that the most general genus of relation is a form having its own existence: and since it is not by accident that a thing is owed inesse (because "accident" is essentially predicated of it), it follows that this belongs to each of its inferiors. – And it is confirmed: because otherwise accident would not be predicated in the first mode of per se predication of every relation contained under the genus ad aliquid. And the inference holds: because the thing from which inesse would flow would not be itself formally, but only from the form of the foundation.

The root of the first proposition, however, is that it is defined to one genus, and consequently is excluded from another genus, as is said there ¹⁶. For this argument, if it is sound and sufficient, also entails the real distinction of relation from quantity and quality. For one must form the major or antecedent thus: A thing defined to one genus is really excluded from another genus; but created substance, etc. And likewise the subsumption is equally true: but quantity and¹⁷ quality is defined to one genus: therefore. — It is therefore St. Thomas's mind that every real relation of a category to something else is really distinguished from its foundation.

X. That this position accords better with the truth can be perceived from the doctrine of Aristotle, in Book XII of the¹⁸, where he holds that the principles of relation are other than those of quality and of the other genera; and from the argument adduced above¹⁹, namely, that relation is essentially an accident, and consequently has its own in, inasmuch as it is according to its own essence; and from the solution of the objections to the contrary.

XI. To Scotus's argument, therefore,²⁰ it is replied that it falsely rests upon its foundation. For many things are really distinct, one of which involves a contradiction to be without the other; as is evident in Scotus himself²¹ concerning the essential parts taken together, and the third entity of being (ens), and universally concerning those things between which there is an essential dependence. Nor does it help to say that Scotus himself made this exception. For it is sufficient for our purpose that not being able to exist without another does not infer real indistinction: and just as you make an exception for essential dependence, so will it be permitted to others to make exceptions for necessary connection, etc. Nor is it even universally true that what remains is really distinguished from what has perished; as is manifestly clear in heat that has been remitted; for it is not really distinguished from itself previously intensified. Hence that root, taken thus absolutely, does not prove real distinction universally, although it persuades. – How Aristotle uses that argument in the Topics²², and how we may use it, is a matter for another occasion: for these points suffice for our purpose.

XII. To the arguments for the first opinion, however,²³ it is said, and first to the first argument (which has the greatest force), that the inexistence of likeness, when Socrates alone exists as white, neither wholly is nor wholly is not; but is in a certain way, and is not in a certain way; for it is incompletely, not completely. And since to be actualiter signifies to be completely, therefore this negative proposition is true, the inexistence of the relation is not; yet with it stands the truth of the affirmative with a qualification secundum quid, namely, that the inexistence of the relation is in a certain way, that is, incompletely. And on account of the weakness of its being, it is completed by the mere apposition of the term: for if the ad results, there results also the complement of the in itself. For the likeness did not have incomplete being from any defect of the foundation, but from the defect of the term: and hence it follows that, once the term which was lacking is posited, the foundation completes it as its offspring or fruit or effect. A similar example, suited to this purpose, is adduced by St. Thomas in question VII of On the Power of God, article 9, reply to 7, concerning the being of action. For if the heat were heating, once the heatable was removed, active heating would not be actualiter, nor would it inhere in the agent as an accident in a subject; and yet, with the heatable posited, the action would at once be and inhere in the agent, for the same reason; namely, because both relation and action are removed in act when the extrinsic term or patient is removed, yet remain radically or causally.

And from this, as is said in the same place, the argument concerning change is resolved. For that which thus remains need not be generated by a new change: since on the side of the causes sufficiency already exists in act, but it is, as it were, impeded by the removal of something extrinsic. And likewise in corruption there is not properly a change, since that sufficiency of causes remains in act. For change, properly speaking, is the terminus of alteration: but here there intervenes only a certain natural resolution, or a cessation of it.

To compose the relation with its foundation, and for white-similar to be more composite than white, not only is not unfitting, but is indeed necessary: because real similarity is essentially an accident. But the imagination is sometimes deceived, because the names of relations do not explicitly present in their signification that they inhere. – Nor do the Author's words in the cited place stand in the way: since the cause there assigned shows that he is speaking of relation formally, that is, of the ad, when he says, because it does not signify something in a subject, etc., as he expressly made clear in the following article, ad 7.

Finally, the relation of least entity among the other categories both is and is called such, because from what is proper to itself, that is, the "toward" (ad), it does not have that it be real; rather, insofar as this goes, it can be found only in reason. And therefore some have thought it to be among the second intentions. Time, however, and the rest must, as has been said²⁴, be real beings in some way.

XIII. Concerning the foregoing, note that, although Scotus agrees with St. Thomas on certain relations being really distinct from their foundations, as is clear from what has been said²⁵; they do not agree in this: that the esse of a relation is really distinct from its essence; just as neither do they agree universally that esse and essence are really distinct in creatures²⁶. Yet do not understand that the esse of a relation is distinguished from the relation itself as another relation, or as an altogether absolute thing. For both of these are false: for the esse of a relation is in the genus of relation, though reductively, as its actuality; just as the esse of substance is in the genus of substance, and the esse of quality in the genus of quality, and so on.

Scotus, however, cannot avoid one impossibility: namely, that the same relative is said twice, that is, toward terms on both sides. For if, for example, similarity refers really to the term and to the foundation by itself, it is evident that "similar" is said twice. But the actual inherence of similarity in the foundation, according to Scotus²⁷, is itself the relation of similarity: because the very relation of similarity, as it were grounding the relation of inherence, cannot without contradiction be without a foundation, as he himself says²⁸. Therefore "similar" is said twice.

XIV. In response to the third, a doubt arises concerning these words: it would follow that its esse would be imperfect, inasmuch as it is ordered toward something else. For from this it seems that relation signifies imperfection: which, however, is clearly false, because relation signifies neither perfection nor imperfection; otherwise either imperfection would be in God, or one Person would have some perfection which another does not have. – That this follows from those words is made manifest thus. If esse toward another did not signify imperfection, then from the fact that someone's esse was an ordering toward another, it would not follow that it was imperfect, as is evident: but according to the letter it follows that that esse is imperfect: therefore esse toward another signifies imperfection.

XV. To this it is said that the text did not take as its antecedent being toward another, but being only toward another, excluding everything absolute, not merely formally but really, as is clear from that phrase, in the divine perfection, not only in the abstraction of the concept, but in the nature of things, as is clear from the text. From this antecedent, however, it clearly follows that therefore it would be imperfect: because everything that is nothing else in the order of things, according to its reality, than a relation is either a being of reason or an accident; and each of these is imperfect. The words of the text, therefore, do not stand against that truth, namely, that a relation formally signifies neither imperfection nor perfection.

In the title, ly relations is held indefinitely, not universally: for it is not our present intention to examine whether all divine relations are really distinguished from one another, as is clear in the case of paternity and active spiration; but whether there are any real relations in God which are really distinguished from one another.

II. In the body there is a single conclusion, answering the question in the affirmative: In God there is a real distinction according to the thing, not absolute, but relative. – It is proved thus. In God there is a real relation: therefore in him there is a respect relatively opposed to another: therefore relative opposition: therefore real distinction: therefore not according to the absolute thing, for in it there is supreme unity and simplicity: therefore according to the relative thing.

The first consequence, along with the others, is proved from that maxim: when something is attributed to a thing, all things belonging to its intelligible content must also be attributed (for this is evident inductively in the case of man and the rest); subsuming under it that an opposed respect is of the intelligible content of a relation, and opposition is of the intelligible content of such a respect, and distinction is of the intelligible content of opposition, etc., as is clearly apparent in the text.

III. Concerning the foregoing, a twofold doubt may occur to the novice. First, concerning that maxim. For it does not seem true, since many things are attributed to God without being contained in the definition of what they are, as is evident in the case of wisdom and justice, and other things of this kind.

Second, concerning that inference: therefore in it there is relative opposition. For it does not hold, in white Socrates there is a real respect of relative similitude relatively opposed, therefore in him there is relative opposition: but, therefore in him is one extreme of relative opposition. And consequently the further inference of the text does not hold, therefore in him there is a relative distinction: but, therefore in him is one extreme of relative distinction. And thus the whole process of the text collapses.

IV. To the first of these, the answer is most easily clear from what was said above ¹: namely, that that maxim is understood concerning the formal ratio with respect to what is proper to it, not excluding the common transcendentals; for whatever is contained in such a formal ratio of a thing attributed to God is preserved in God. The objections to the contrary, however, always assume something false, for instance, that such a ratio of justice or wisdom is a quality or habit, etc.

To the second objection it is said that in the first antecedent ², from what has been said and made manifest above ³, there is included ly ad intra; so that the whole antecedent is: in God there is really a relation ad intra. And then the inferences hold most excellently: since it follows that both extremes must be in God Himself. And by this the objections touched to the contrary cease: for they proceed concerning relations ad extra.

V. In response to the first, note Aureol's objection, as reported by Capreolus, in I, dist. II, qu. III, art. 1. Such is the identity of the extremes with each other as is their identity in the third: but in the case at hand this is real: therefore so is the other. The major is proved: because otherwise the foundation of syllogisms would collapse, which infers the extremes to be conjoined or divided from the unity of the middle.

VI. To this, briefly, the major is simply denied. Nor are the syllogisms of Book I of the Prior Analytics founded upon it, but rather upon this one: things that are the same through a middle are the same with each other; for it is one thing to speak of identity, and another to speak of the quality of the identity. Now this proposition, as far as our present concern goes, is glossed in two ways. First, as the letter says, which is absolutely true, when things are altogether the same in a third way, that is, really and formally; otherwise the fallacy of Accident would not be committed in syllogisms by means of such variation. – Second, that it is true with respect to that according to which they are identified through the middle, or with respect to the account of identification in the middle: for according to this, things that are the same through the middle are also the same with each other. And this is directly Aristotle's meaning, I think; and it comprehends under itself the first gloss; and thus it seems universally true. But things identified through the middle need not be identified with each other according to that in which they are not identified through the middle, that is, what is not the account of identification for the middle itself. And on account of this many fallacies occur in things that are in some way united and in some way not. And so it is in our present case, as is clear from the preceding article.

A famous title. – In the body, a single conclusion, responsive to the question in the affirmative: In God there are only four real relations, namely paternity, filiation, spiration, and procession. – It is proved thus. In God there are real relations, and not consequent upon quantity, nor upon action toward what is outside: therefore they are consequent upon actions within: therefore in Him there are only relations consequent upon two processions within: therefore there are only four real relations: therefore these are the ones, paternity, filiation, spiration, and procession.

The antecedent, as regards quantity, is proved: because in it there is no quantity, as is clear from Augustine. As regards action ad extra, it is proved from what was said above in question XIII. – The first consequent, however, is proved from Book V of the Metaphysics: namely, because every relation is founded upon quantity, or upon action and passion. – The second, however, is proved from what has been said: namely, because according to immanent actions there are only two processions, one according to intellect, and the other according to will; the former of the word, the latter of love. – The third, however: because according to each procession there must be two opposite relations, that of the one proceeding and that of the one from whom it proceeds. – The fourth finally is proved, as regards the names of the first two relations, thus. The procession of the word is called generation, according to the proper notion of the nativity of living things: and the relation of the principle of this nativity is called paternity, while that of the one born is called filiation: therefore. As for the two remaining ones, it is made clear thus. The procession of love lacks a proper name: therefore also the relations according to it. And again, it is called procession or spiration: therefore fittingly the relation of the principle here is called spiration; while the relation of the one spirated is called, by borrowed usage of the name, procession. And so the whole is clear.

II. Concerning that proposition from V Metaphysics, note again¹, from the Questions On the Power of God, q. VII, art. 9, that it is understood according to mode, not according to the thing: that is, every real relation is founded upon quantity etc., that is, upon a thing which is quantity, or upon another thing as it takes on the character of quantity: hence unity in substance makes identity, and unity in quality makes likeness. For unity pertains to quantity modally.

But then a twofold doubt arises here. First, how much weight the argument from the letter carries, proceeding from the fact that in God there is no quantity according to reality, as is clear from the authority of Augustine cited above. – Second, because the authority seems to be brought in falsely from V Metaphysics: since there a third mode of relatives is posited, as St. Thomas also explains there, namely that of measure and measurable not quantitatively.

III. To the first of these it is said that, because according to the truth the Author holds that no real relation in God follows upon quantity, both as to the thing itself and as to its mode; and because he promises to treat below, in his response to the fourth, of such relations as follow upon quantity as to their mode, namely equality and likeness; therefore here he passed over the matter summarily, content with an argument concerning quantity as to the thing itself. – And if you press further, "Therefore from this article what was intended is not sufficiently concluded," it is answered that it was sufficient for the present place, since by this place those relations are deferred to be treated below; although not sufficient absolutely, if all things were to be examined here. On account of which, lest this limited treatise become an occasion of error to anyone, he protests in his response to the fourth that he will complete this matter below in its proper place, where the relations common to the divine Persons will be discussed: for thus the order as instituted required.

To the second doubt it is said that, since the discussion here concerns real relations between things of the same order, indeed of the same nature, or at least mutual ones; but relatives of the third mode, as is clear in the same place², differ from the others in that they are not mutual; therefore no falsity was committed in the citation. For that universal is true concerning mutual real relations, of which the discussion is had.