Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title, note carefully the word generation. For since in the preceding article it was determined that the procession of love is not a procession of the word, and in the second article it was determined that the procession of the word is generation, without question it is clear that the procession of love is not that generation which is the procession of the word: and consequently it is established that the procession of love is really distinct from that generation in the divine persons. And these are not the questions here. Hence nothing else is asked here except whether the formal ratio of generation belongs to the procession of love in the divine persons. And so, examining this carefully, it appears that, just as the preceding title asked about the real distinction of one procession from another, so this one asks about the formal distinction—not according to any ratio whatever, but according to the ratio of generation. And truly this remained to be asked: since the processions of word and love have been established in the divine persons, and that one is generation and its term the Son, it was necessary to inquire and decide whether this one too is a generation, and consequently whether its term also is a Son, or not. And this is what is being asked.

II. In the body there are two conclusions. The first responds directly to the question: The procession of love in the divine is not a generation. – The second responds to the intention: That which proceeds in the divine by way of love proceeds as spirit.

Before, however, the conclusions are proved, note that although only one thing was asked, for the perfection of the doctrine the proof satisfies not only the simple question but also the intended difference as it were constitutive of that procession itself. Thus there is shown at once in the text both why and in what respect the procession of love is not generation, and what its constitutive difference is, by which it differs from generation and is spiration.

III. The first conclusion is therefore proved directly first, from the difference between the intellect and the will, as follows. The intellect has these three features in order: first, that it is brought into act by a likeness of the thing understood; second, that from this, the procession in the intellect is according to the mode of a likeness; third, that this has from this the character of generation, because everything generating generates what is like itself. The will, however, is entirely the opposite: first, it is brought into act not according to a likeness of the thing willed, but according to an inclination toward it; second, from this, the procession in the will is not according to the mode of a likeness, but of one impelling; third, from this, this procession is not a generation, nor is the one proceeding begotten or a son.

And then the proof of the second conclusion is added, namely that it proceeds as spirit, by way of the following syllogism, thus. Spirit signifies a certain vital motion with an impulse, not just any motion, but that by which we are said to be moved or impelled by love: therefore what proceeds in the will by way of impulse proceeds as spirit, which was the intended point. And so both conclusions are proved together.

And the process of emanation is grounded upon that particle placed in the definition of generation, namely according to a likeness: so that, because some procession is or is not according to a likeness by its own formal notion, it is or is not generation. It must be understood, however, with respect to the constructive sense: for it is understood as holding when the other particles that belong to the notion of generation concur. For the destructive sense, the negation of this one particle alone suffices, since formal notions are like numbers, as is said in Book VIII Metaphysics¹

IV. Concerning the first difference between intellect and will assigned above², a doubt arises as to which act it is to be interpreted, whether the first or the second. And if indeed it is interpreted of the first act, it seems false on the side of the will: since it seems a fiction that, in order for the will to will something, there must be pre-required in it some inclination making it formally in first act, just as the intelligible species is proportionally related to the intellect. – But if it is understood of the second act, one must assign how this second difference arises from it: for with this difference it stands that in both there is procession according to similitude, as will be clear in the following doubt.

V. Concerning the second difference a doubt arises: because it also seems false on the side of the will, and not to follow from the first, but rather to contradict it. This is made clear as follows. To proceed according to likeness, in the matter at hand, is for the term of the procession, by the very force of the procession, to be like the producer in act; as is evident in the case of the word with respect to the intellect in first act. But love proceeds as like to the will in first act: because impulse proceeds from impulse, just as in the intellect the expressed similitude proceeds from the impressed similitude. Therefore it is also false that there is no procession according to likeness in the will: and from this very fact that the will comes into act through inclination, it follows that it produces an inclination, and consequently acts upon itself what is like itself, no less than the intellect does, proportion being preserved. Nor does it matter, for the purpose at hand, whether the will is in first act through itself or through an inclination superadded: for of itself it is itself a certain inclination.

VI. Concerning the third difference, or rather concerning its very root as brought forward in the text, namely that everything which generates generates something like itself, a doubt arises: for it is adduced not as a cause but as if it were a cause. For to make something like oneself is not proper to what generates, but is common to every agent: for every agent produces something like itself according to the form by which it acts. And consequently, since the will is an agent, this cause will conclude no less to the procession of the will than to the procession of the intellect. And thus there is here not only the fallacy of taking as a cause what is not the cause of the difference, but, what is worse, the opposite of what is intended is inferred.

VII. Concerning this whole process a doubt occurs to the reader: for this doctrine seems to contradict what is said in the Questions On the Power of God, q. X, art. 2. There, indeed, it is denied that these processions are distinguished by themselves; here, however, it is determined that they are distinguished by their proper formal reasons, which is the same as being distinguished by themselves formally.

VIII. To make these things evident, two points must first be set forth. First, that that greatest maxim, every agent acts in a manner like to itself according to the form by which it acts, is true when the form is the reason for acting in the manner of a thing: it need not, however, be true when the form is as it were the reason for acting in the manner of something known. And the reason for the difference is this: to act in the manner of a thing is to act because it is such; and hence it must act in such a way as it itself is. But to act in the manner of something known is not to act because it is such, but because it is known to be such: yet from the fact that something is known to be such, it does not follow that what follows must be like it, but it can happen that there follows only an inclination toward it, as we experience in ourselves.

Second, that the appetitive part, since it is necessarily moved by something known, has this singular feature: that it acts in some way in the manner of a thing, and in some way in the manner of the known. For love, which holds first place in appetite, necessarily arises from appetite and from a known object of appetite; if we consider love as proceeding from appetite, it proceeds as from a thing; but if from the appetible object, then as from what is known; and if as from both together, as it were from an agent and as it were from the reason for acting (though under different aspects, as we said above³), no better term occurs for expressing this mixed mode of becoming and proceeding than by way of vital appetite. – And according to this, the answer to the three doubts first raised is easy.

IX. And so that a reply may be given point by point in reverse order, beginning from the root, to the third doubt⁴ it is said that, although it is not proper to the generator, as distinguished against the agent, to act in a manner like itself; yet it is proper to it, as distinguished against the agent by way of impulse or of an inner vital appetite, as is understood in the text. For here it is distinguished against the agent in itself by reason of the known object, such as the appetitive power is: and thus it is proper to itself. And thus the cause assigned is truly a cause or difference, and it infers what was intended.

X. To the second⁵ it is said that, when love is compared to the quasi-partial causes, it is thus found to arise from the like and from the unlike: from the like, indeed, insofar as it arises from appetite; but from the unlike, insofar as it arises from the appetible. But when love itself is compared to its total productive principle, namely, the will as quasi-agent, and the known good as quasi-the reason for acting, it thus proceeds from the unlike: for love is not a likeness of the thing loved, but an inclination toward it. And thus it is plainly treated in the text. For he places the difference in this, that a concept is a likeness of the thing understood: but love, as such, is not a likeness of that same thing which is loved. Hence the answer to the objections is clear.

XI. To the first doubt, then⁶ it is said that the text can be understood of either act. And as to the first, it is not to be understood as the objection imagines: but that the will in first act is made actual in itself through an inclination, without concern whether that inclination be a thing superadded to the will or be one and the same with it. For both seem true with respect to different things in our will: for the will is inclined naturally toward beatitude; and it is inclined again, by an affection superadded, toward these or those goods with which it is affected through habit, passion, or reason. — As to the second act there is no doubt.

As for the inference of the consequent differences, and the context of the text, it must be interpreted with respect to second act. For from this very fact that the term of the intellect in act is a likeness of the thing understood, while the term of the will in act is not a likeness of the thing willed but rather an impulse toward it, it manifestly follows that the total producer of the concept makes something like itself according to the form which is for it the ratio of acting; whereas the total producer of love does not make something like itself according to that form which is for it as it were the ratio of acting, namely the thing loved. And thus the objections are sufficiently answered.

XII. To make evident the resolution of the fourth doubt⁷, it must first be known that it is one thing for certain things to be distinguished by themselves formally, and another for certain things to be distinguished by themselves formally in the first instance. For the first it suffices that the distinction be made through something essential to them, whether that be a part of the definition or the whole definition; but for the second this does not suffice; rather it is required that they be primarily diverse, such that they are distinguished not through some other distinguishing principle.

Second, know that just as there are beings of different orders, so too are their formal reasons. And therefore it is necessary that the definitions of certain beings include something outside the essence defined—not for the better, but from absolute necessity, as is clear in the case of relations. Wherefore, when we speak of such beings and say that they are distinguished from themselves or are not distinguished from themselves, or have something else, one must attend to the fact that this can be understood in two ways. In one way, so that the term "from themselves" signifies their proper essences; in another way, so that it signifies their proper essences together with a precision, not only of those things which are closed within their definitions by way of addition, but also of the transcendent order toward those things. And if indeed this is understood in the second way, for the most part it stems from ignorance of the proper meaning of the word: since essences of this kind intrinsically enclose such an order within themselves, nor can they be abstracted from it. But in the first way, the interpretation is best: since each thing must have something intrinsic that constitutes it, and consequently distinguishes it. And because these intrinsic constituents have a certain order to extrinsic things, therefore both by philosophers and by St. Thomas these are frequently said to agree through extrinsics, namely through a term, object, subject, etc.: for the sense of these is the same as the first way, among those who understand soundly. - These things must be noted very carefully in the matter concerning powers, operations, motions, and other things of this kind: for from them the truth of all things easily appears.

XIII. These points having been set forth, to the doubt it must be said that, with St. Thomas, these processions are not distinguished by themselves in the first instance. Indeed, if "by themselves" is expounded with a precision that sets aside the transcendent order to principles, terms, and the like, to say that they are distinguished by themselves in the first instance is to say nothing. And this twofold point he intended in the passage cited, as is clear there: for he speaks of ultimate distinctives and examines principles and terms. But they are distinguished in him formally through those particles, or differences, contained intrinsically within their definitions, namely after the manner of a likeness and after the manner of an impulse, as is expressly clear from the text. And preserving this meaning, it can be granted that they are distinguished by themselves; just as it can likewise be granted in the same way of an ox and a man. Yet we are not accustomed to use discourse of this kind except concerning ultimate distinctives and distinct things. But no question should be made about words.

Hence it is clear that in this Scotus, in the thirteenth distinction of the First Part⁸, dissents from St. Thomas: for he holds that these processions are distinguished by themselves first, such that they agree in nothing. Yet he proves this by no argument. And there was and is an objection ready at hand against him, namely, that these processions agree in many quidditative predicates; for instance, that a procession of a divine person is immaterial.