Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

The title treats of generation formally: and it will be clearer in the body.

In the body he does two things: first, he distinguishes the predicate of the question, that is, generation; second, he answers the question affirmatively¹.

II. As to the first point, he distinguishes, describes, and compares generation. The distinction is: generation is twofold, namely in a common sense, and properly, in living things. – The description of the members is: Generation in the common sense, which belongs to all things, is a change from non-being to being, as is clear from Physics V²; generation properly so called, in living things, which is properly called birth, is the origin of a living thing from a conjoined living being, according to the likeness of the same nature. – The comparison, finally, concerns the separability and conjunction of the two. For since it is established that the first is separable from the second, and again that in the living things found among us both occur together, for the reason that they pass from potency to act, it follows of necessity that, if any living thing is born without a passage from potency to act, there the second generation is separated from the first.

Regarding the definition of nativity, only that particle coniuncto is somewhat obscure; however, you have its lengthy exposition in Book IV of Contra Gent., chapter XI.

III. As to the second³, the responsive conclusion is: The procession of the word in God has the character of generation, in the second way. – And it is proved by showing point by point that four conditions constituting the character of nativity belong to such a procession. That it is a vital operation is evident from intelligible action. That it proceeds from a conjoined principle is evident from the preceding article, and especially from the reply to objection 2. That it occurs according to the character of similitude is proved: because the conception of the intellect is the likeness of the thing understood. Finally, that it occurs within the same nature is proved: because in God understanding and being (esse) are identical. – And thus not only is the conclusion inferred, but also its corollary: namely, that the word proceeding in God is the Son.

IV. Concerning the reason for the last statement in the text, namely, that the divine Word proceeds as a thing of the same nature with God because there understanding is being (esse), note that this argument, repeated many times in this work, is expounded in Book IV Contra Gentiles, chapter XI. And it is said that it holds insofar as, speaking generally, the being (esse) of a concept, or of a word, is to be understood: and therefore wherever understanding, which is identified with the very act of being understood, is an accident, the word itself also is an accident; but where understanding is substantial being (esse), there too the word is substance. And since this is so in divine things, therefore the divine Word is the divine substance: but the concepts of all intellectual creatures are accidents.

V. But concerning this argument a doubt arises from two heads. First, from the fact that being understood adds nothing to the thing understood: and consequently it cannot be the real esse of the concept itself. – Second, because the act of understanding is really distinct from the concept; and on this way of speaking, it is the very esse of the intellect in perfect act. Therefore it cannot be the very esse of the concept.

VI. For the clarification of these points, it must be known that, because the word, as word, is the very thing understood in act interiorly, it has three features. From the fact that it is a thing understood in act, it follows that its esse, as such, is to be understood; as is evident inductively from the thing seen in act and the rest. – But from the fact that it is the interiorly understood thing, that is, that in which the thing understood is expressed for actual understanding, it follows that its esse is to be so understood, namely interiorly in that in which, etc. Now such being-understood is a certain real esse: since it is the esse of an actually expressed likeness of the object. – But from the fact that it is thus an object in act, it has that it be one of those things concurring to the perfection of the act of understanding: and consequently that intellection, which is the very esse of the intellect in act, and thereby is the esse of all things concurring to the perfection of the intellect in act, be the esse of the word itself.

VII. Hence, in reply to the first objection⁴ it is said that, although being understood adds nothing to the thing understood, being understood in this way—that is, as the proper interior act of understanding—does add something real, not to the thing understood universally, but to the thing understood in this way, that is, according to the esse it has interiorly in the concept.

To the second, however, it is said that intellection is the esse both of the intellect and of the intelligible species and of the word, though in different ways: for it is the esse of the intellect and of the species as understanding, but of the word in⁵ being understood; of the former as of principles, as it were, of the latter as of a term; of the former as of one complete subject, as it were, of the latter as of an object. Hence no incompatibility follows, unless someone should think that distinct things cannot really exist by the same esse: and that is shown to be false in matter, form, and the composite.

VIII. Concerning the notion of generation as applied to the divine procession⁶, a doubt arises from Aureol, cited by Capreolus, in the ninth distinction of the First Book⁷. For he argues thus. If the divine procession in question were called generation by reason of that notion, two impossibilities would follow. The first is that the Son would not be Word insofar as He is Son, and conversely; against Augustine, VII On the Trinity, chapter II. And the inference holds: because neither is the generation of the word within us the generation of a living substance, nor is the generation of a son among us the generation of a word. – The second is that the procession of the Holy Spirit would be a generation. And the inference is proved: because the whole of that definition would belong to it.

But to these points the reply is easy, by denying both consequences. Nor does the proof of the first carry any weight: for in us the son proceeds by a transient action, and the word by an operation which is an accident; but in God none of these has any place. That the property of the Son is expressed also by the name Word is clear in XXXIV q., art. 2, ad 3. – The proof of the second consequence likewise assumes something false: since, as will be treated in art. 4 from what has been proposed, that condition by way of a like is lacking.

IX. In response to the third point, note the golden words at the end of that passage, namely: in the very perfection of the divine esse are contained both essence and word etc. For it is clearly evident here that there is no formal distinction in act between the divine essence and the personal properties and the attributes and the rest of the things that are saved formally in God: for the very perfection of the divine esse, if it were defined in itself, as it were—so it is permitted to speak—would include all these things within itself. And therefore posit every distinction of this kind in God as only virtual; but in the intellect, according to reason.