Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

The order of the present treatise is sufficiently clear from the text. Hence, descending to the first article, note in its title, first, that processio is taken commonly, without descending to this or that procession. Second, that sit is taken properly, as distinguished from esse against intelligi, that is, being in reality against being in reason. Third, that in is taken properly, as denoting the mode of being in something formaliter. Fourth, that divinis is taken most strictly, for those things that are truly God. So that the sense of the question is: Whether in God himself there is formally found, in reality, any procession.

II. In the body he does three things: first, he answers the question as to what is evident; second, he treats of two errors concerning what is hidden¹; third, he answers the question by determining and unfolding what is obscure².

III. As to the first, one thing is said about which there is no doubt, namely: that Divine Scripture uses names signifying procession when it speaks of God. For from this, given the understanding that Scripture does not speak falsely, nor speaks metaphorically in this matter, it is manifestly evident that there must be some procession in the divine and that it must be preserved. But it remains ambiguous what sort of procession that is. Hence, concerning this ambiguity, the remainder of this passage is occupied.

IV. As to the second, first the error of Arius is set forth, who said that this procession is that of an effect from a cause. And it is refuted by the authorities of Scripture. — Then the error of Sabellius is set forth, who explained this procession as that of a cause into an effect. And it is likewise refuted. Indeed, these errors are touched upon briefly here, since they have been refuted and treated more fully elsewhere, as is clear in Book IV of Contra Gentiles³.

V. As to the third, he says three things. First, preparing the way to the two kinds of procession, he lays open the blindness of each error, from the fact that, to one who considers attentively, while each of them strives to save procession in God, neither places procession in Him, but outside Him. And the cause was that each posited procession only toward what is outside.

Second, he says that a twofold kind of procession is found, namely, ad extra and ad intra. This is made clear as follows. Just as action is twofold, namely transient and immanent, so one procession is according to transient action and another according to immanent action, since every procession follows upon an action. Therefore there is some procession according to that action which is understanding. — And this consequence is proved: because procession ad intra, that is, according to immanent action, is most evident in the intellect. That this is proved: because in whatever being understands, from the very fact that it understands, there proceeds a conception of the thing understood, arising from the power of the intellective faculty and its knowledge, called the word of the heart, and signified among us by the vocal word.

Third, and last, he sets down the responsive conclusion: In God there is procession according to intelligible emanation. — And it is proved thus. God is above all things: therefore the things said of God must be understood by way of likeness, not of bodies, but of intellectual substances: therefore procession is not in him according to an action producing an exterior effect, but according to intelligible emanation. And it is confirmed: because thus the Catholic faith posits procession in the divine persons. — The first consequence is proved from the fact that bodies are the lowest of creatures, while intellect is the highest: although even intellectual substances fall short of the divine likeness. The second, however, is left as evident by induction in local motion and alteration.

VI. Concerning the foregoing, several doubts arise. First, concerning that proposition: according to immanent action there is a certain procession ad intra⁴. For, as is clear from Capreolus, at the twenty-seventh distinction of the First Book, question II⁵, Scotus, Aureolus, Durandus, Peter of Palude, and Gerard of Carmel argue against this. And the force of the argument consists in this. Between immanent and transitive action there is this difference, that by the latter something is wrought, by the former nothing: therefore the fundamental proposition collapses in the matter of divine procession. The antecedent is clear from Metaphysics IXMetaphys.⁶, and Ethics IEthic.⁷. But the consequence is self-evident. — And it is confirmed, says Durandus, because from sensing and willing nothing is produced: therefore neither from intellection. – And it is confirmed, Gerard adds, because of whatever operation there is something wrought, that thing is nobler than it: but in the case of an immanent act in the second sense of act, nothing is nobler: therefore.

VII. Concerning the same proposition another doubt arises⁸: whether the immanent act itself is itself the active production of that which is said to proceed according to it. Scotus, indeed, in distinction XXVII of the First Book, question I, holding the negative part, argues against this in three ways. First, from the reason already given⁹: because immanent operation is an ultimate act. — Second, because if intellection were a productive action of its term, it would be impossible to understand it to be, and not to be the term of it, as is clear in the case of heating and heat: but it is not impossible to understand intellection to be without its term: therefore. — Third, because thus the understanding would generate the word, and not memory: which is against Augustine¹⁰.

VIII. Concerning that proposition, namely: whoever understands, by the very fact that he understands, something proceeds within him, a doubt arises¹¹. First, because the blessed, as such, understand God, and yet do not form a word of him: therefore the said proposition is false. The antecedent is clear: because otherwise God, as the object of beatitude, could be represented by some created species; which was censured in XII q.¹² — Second, because, setting faith aside, we know that God understands: and yet from this we cannot prove that procession exists in him. Therefore this proposition is believed, and not known or understood: or it is false.

IX. Concerning the same proposition a doubt arises¹³: whether the concept of the intellect is something other than the actual intellection itself (as the letter wishes), or whether it is the same as the latter. For Scotus, in the twenty-seventh distinction of the First Book¹⁴, holds the opposite, along with many others cited there by Capreolus, qu. II¹⁵. The opponents, moreover, are divided in four ways. For some attack the very distinction from the act of understanding; others attack its true cause; still others its cause not as true but as imposed, namely for representing or knowing more perfectly; and finally others lead it to an impossibility.

And Scotus and Durandus indeed attempt to break down this very distinction by reason and authority. Scotus's reason, in the twenty-seventh distinction of the First Book, proceeds by way of division to infer that the word is an actual intellection. And since the exclusion of our way, adduced in the second doubt, was already treated¹⁶, let us now pass over it.

But Durandus argues there¹⁷ as follows. The word, or concept, consists in the character of manifesting to oneself or to another; therefore, lest there be a process to infinity, the first word, which is the word of the heart, is itself manifestation by essence; but this is the very act of intellection; therefore. — And it is confirmed: because such a thing by extrinsic denomination is reduced to such a thing intrinsically; therefore, since the character of manifesting belongs to the exterior word only extrinsically, a reduction must be made to something that intrinsically manifests by essence; but this is the act of intellection; therefore, as before. — Second, thus: whenever some power needs two forms in order to act, even when one is present it remains in essential potency, because it is in potency not only to operation but also to form. Therefore, if a word is posited, the intellect in first act will still be in essential potency. — Third, he argues in distinction VI of Book I¹⁸: because two forms of the same species would be in the same subject.

As for the other objections brought against the cause of the distinction, or against its possibility, see them, if you wish, treated one by one in Capreolus; for once what is to be said has been set forth, the solution of all of them will easily be clear to the practiced reader.

X. Concerning the other proposition, namely: the conception of the thing understood proceeds from the power of the intellect and its knowledge, there is a doubt as to what kind of knowledge is meant, whether habitual or actual¹⁹. That it is not verified of habitual knowledge, Durandus proves, in distinction XXVII of the First Book²⁰: because what is more perfect does not proceed from what is less perfect; but the intellect with only the species is less perfect than the word, or concept. — Nor does it avail to say that, although the species is less perfect than the concept, nevertheless the intellect with the species is more perfect than the concept. This, I say, is nothing. Both because, as the producer is the intellect with the species, so the product is the intellect with the word; and because the question concerns which of them is more perfect, as it were the formal principle and term of the procession, and not the composites, as appears inductively in all cases. Here, however, it is evident that the term, that is, the concept, is nobler than the species: therefore the species is not that knowledge from which it proceeds.

That there is no actual knowledge, Scotus proves in many ways, in Book I, distinction II²¹ I omit his arguments, because, as will become clear²², they are not against us.

XI. To the first doubt²³ it is said that that difference between immanent and transitive action is not to be understood so broadly as it sounds; but either with respect to necessity, or with respect to order. And according to the first gloss, the sense is: a transitive operation necessarily has a product, whereas an immanent one does not necessarily entail any product. And thus all the objections cease, as is evident. And without doubt this was the mind of the Philosopher; and it manifestly contains the truth. For from the fact that habits are generated from repeated immanent acts, it is manifestly clear that it does not conflict with an immanent action to have a work beyond itself. — According to the second gloss, however, the sense is that a transitive action has a work in such a way that it is ordered to that very work; whereas an immanent action does not have a work, because it is not ordered of itself to some work, but if at any time it has a work, that work is ordered to it.

And both of these occur in the matter at hand. For understanding does not necessarily produce a concept; nor, when it forms the concept, is it ordered to the concept, but rather conversely, the concept is ordered to the perfection of understanding itself. — Hence the response to all objections is clear. And also to Gerard's addition: for the operation is nobler when the operation is ordered per se to it the agent; but not when it is rather the other way around, as is manifestly clear in act and habit.

XII. To the second doubt²⁴ it must be said that all seem to agree on this point, that the intellectual production of the Word is to speak intellectually, except Durandus, in distinction XXVII of the First Book²⁵. But the difference of opinions lies in this, whether speaking, in its own nature, includes the act of understanding, or only the production: whether that production is some other second act, or a relation signified in the manner of a second act. For Scotus, as is clear in I, dist. II, qu. ult., and dist. XXVII²⁶, and in the Quodlibets, qu. I²⁷, distinguishes in the intellect two kinds of second act, one which is an operation, and another which is a production: and he holds that understanding is the second act which is an operation, while speaking is the second act which is a production. And he orders these two acts with respect to one another, in relation to the same principle, namely the intellect in first act, such that the intellect is naturally prior in operating than in producing or speaking. And thus, according to him, to speak, or to produce the Word, is not an act of understanding; although it is an act of the intellect.

But that this position is not fitting is urged by a single argument against the man, thus. A cause having two effects ordered to one another in such a way that neither is the cause of the other has this property: that the comparison of each to the cause is more essential than their comparison to one another, so that if—per impossibile—the first were taken away, the relation of the second to the cause would not on that account have to be denied. But the intellect in first act is as a cause having these two effects, namely understanding and speaking, ordered to one another in such a way that neither is the cause of the other. Therefore if—per impossibile—understanding were subtracted, it would not follow on that account that speaking be subtracted. And so that conditional is possible: if the intellect did not understand, it would speak—which manifestly implies a contradiction. For what would it say, if it considered nothing? — The major is Scotus's own, in II, dist. 1, qu. 1, art. 3. The minor, however, is his in the places cited above. The impossibility of the conclusion, moreover, is evident.

XIII. St. Thomas, however, everywhere²⁸ holds that to speak is to understand by expressing, or to express by understanding, in such a way that each of these belongs to its definition. And if the words of this article are considered more carefully, the intellection itself is the production of the concept; leaving aside for now whether every intellection is a production of the word or not. For the text expressly states that through the immanent action which is to understand, the concept or word proceeds: therefore there remains in him no other action distinct from understanding which would be the action or production of the concept: for if he intended a third genus of action, this whole process would collapse.

Objections are now raised against this position in two ways. For some argue that understanding is not a productive action; others, that speaking is not the same as understanding. The former have been adduced by way of raising doubt; the latter, however, since they involve notions proper to the divine persons, will be resolved in question XXXIV²⁹, where the Word will be treated of specifically. Here the discussion is in general terms. And since we are at the beginning, it is fitting that our treatment be lengthy, according to Plato's precept³⁰: so that, once the principles have been well examined, access to what remains may be easier.

XIV. To the first objection of Scotus, then, the response is already clear from what was said³¹. For this is why immanent operation is said to be and is the ultimate act, and because it does not necessarily produce a work; and because, if it does produce it, it is more for its own sake than conversely. But to the second it is said that some operation's being an action productive of its term occurs in two ways: in one way necessarily, in another way permissively. And that the conditional assumed by Scotus is not true in an action productive permissively, such as intellection, as was said in the solution of the first doubt³².

To the third objection it is replied that the term is equivocal. For intelligence, according to Augustine, does not generate the word as the formal or active principle by which, but memory does; yet this stands together with the fact that some intelligence is itself the generation of the word, as we say.

XV. To the third doubt³³ it is said that the term whoever distributes only over wayfaring human beings: for he intends, from those things that appear in us, to raise the mind to the invisible and incomprehensible things of God. For we, in understanding, always form some concept, adequate or inadequate to the first act of being, perfect or imperfect, etc. Hence the objections are not otherwise to be answered; but their conclusion must be conceded, namely that not every intellect in act must utter a word. And not only in God and the blessed, but also in the intelligences, with respect to the intellection of themselves, this seems true. For a blessed spirit can utter a partial word, but not one adequate to its vision: for it sees more than it could say by any created word. An angel, however, having itself through itself even objectively present to itself, would form a word about itself to itself in vain. Hence, speaking universally of every intellect, that proposition, whoever understands etc., is believed, not known.

XVI. To the fourth doubt³⁴, although many, with Scotus, in the twenty-seventh distinction of the First Book, respond by affirming the identity of the concept and a certain actual intellection, that is, the generated, etc., nevertheless St. Thomas, as is expressly stated below, question XXXIV, article 1, ad 2, holds that the concept is something other than the act of understanding, as the term is other than that of which it is the term.

To make this evident, it must be known that in the intellectual part, besides the powers, acts, and habits, he posited a term of the act, out of this necessity: that the object of the second act might be held present to the act itself objectively. For the object of the intellect can be present to the intellect in two ways. First, as co-principle of the act of understanding: and this comes about through the intelligible species. Second, as object: for an object, as object, does not signify a cause or principle of the act, but the term of the act. And this must come about through the concept, which is sometimes called the word and the expressed species; otherwise the object of the intellect would not be within actually, with the actuality of the second act. That the intelligible species does not suffice for this office is clear from this, because this is the office of a term, whereas there belongs to it the character of a principle. That the very act of understanding also does not suffice is proved from this, that the office of the object is not the office of the second act itself, except by reflex intellection. Hence the concept or word, in us, is a thing not intelligible but understood in act, in intentional being (esse): and it is posited out of the same necessity by which the object of the intellect is posited as actual within.

But if anyone doubts that this was the mind of St. Thomas, let him read him in I Cont. Gent., chapter LIII, and in IV, chapter XI, and in the Questions On the Power of God, question VIII, article 1, and question IX, article 5. Hence it is clear that those (among whose number Durandus seems to be, in distinction XXVII of Book I³⁵) who charge us with positing the word for the sake of a more perfect knowledge, or a more expressive representation, have spoken less well.

XVII. Note, however, and carefully, that the concept or word can be understood as the object and term of the act of understanding in two ways. In one way, insofar as it is the image of another thing, that is, according to the thing represented: that is, the very thing conceived terminates the act of understanding; and the mode of being thus spiritually within is a condition of the object as a thing and as understood. In the other way, insofar as the thing is such a being, for instance a spiritual quality, etc. And in the first way we intend the concept to be the object of the intellect in act; and not in the second, except with respect to a reflex act. Hence the collapse of all the arguments proceeding against this way is evident, both from the fact that the things themselves, for instance a lion, an ox, etc., are understood in a direct act, and not the species in the soul; and from the fact that the same what-it-is is the object of all acts of understanding; and from other considerations of this kind. For failing to distinguish between the object as a thing and the object as the image of a thing is, in this way, the cause of error. But those who distinguish these, and attend to the two aforementioned conditions of the concept, namely that it is a thing and that it is an image, using that proposition of Aristotle in On Memory and Recollection³⁶: the motion toward the image is the same as that toward the thing of which it is the image, easily resolve everything, and explain in what sense it is said that the word is the object, etc. And since the act of understanding and the concept are and are not together, so too together they are and are not the principle of something: so that, just as the act of understanding can happen to be the cause of another act of understanding or of willing, so also the concept: for they are reckoned as one with respect to acting.

XVIII. To Scotus's argument to the contrary, however, there is no need to respond otherwise: for it has been answered in the second doubt³⁷.

But against Durandus it is said that the first argument errs in four ways. First, in its foundation. For manifestative esse, although it belongs to the notion of the word, does not do so as a constitutive difference of it, since it belongs also to what is not a word; as is clear if we consider God with respect to the absolute attributes only, as the philosophers do; for we would understand all things to be manifested by simple intellection, without a concept. – Second, because the notion of the manifestative, since it is ordered to what is manifested, signifies only a relation of reason. Hence it will be said below³⁸ that the Father manifests himself, and the Holy Spirit, and all things, by his word. – Third, because manifestative esse does not belong to the word in just any way whatever; but as a manifestative esse expressed by another, as will become clear below³⁹. Hence the reduction must not be made to manifestation simply, through the essence, but to manifestation expressed by another. Now such is not intellection, which, as is shown in question XXXIV,⁴⁰ is acknowledged not to include being from another. – Fourth, because, unless we abuse words, if the word is manifestative of the thing spoken, then manifestation is consequently nothing other than the very utterance of the word. But it is clear that the word ought not to be reduced to utterance in that order of reduction by which the participant is reduced to that which is such through its essence, of which the objector speaks. The external word, therefore, must be reduced to the internal, as the dependent to that on which it depends: and among the words of the heart, every created word is reduced to the divine word, which alone is such through its essence, according to that saying: and the Word was God⁴¹.

To the second it is answered that the major premise is not true, unless the form of the water is prior to the act; but the concept is a form, not prior to, but terminating the act, as is clear from what has been said⁴².

To the third, it is said that the concept, the act, and the species are not forms of the same species in their being; rather, the species is the completing element of the subject, the act is the esse, and the concept is the object: although in representing or attaining—that is, objectively—all are of the same account, as partial elements concurring toward one complete being in act of such a kind, etc.

XIX. To the fifth doubt⁴³ it must be said that there are three opinions here. The first is that the knowledge which concurs in the production of the concept, or word, as the form by which an agent acts, is a second act, namely understanding itself. And Henry seems to follow this way⁴⁴. – The second is that such knowledge is only like a first act. And Scotus seems to follow this way, in I, dist. II, q. VII. – The third is that knowledge is necessarily in the manner of a first act, yet contingently it is sometimes actual understanding. And this is the way of St. Thomas.

For the evidence of this, know from Qq. de Ver., qu. IV, art. 2, that the knowledge from which a concept proceeds can be threefold, according to the threefold mode in which actual knowledge is caused in us. The first is quasi-habitual, that is, by way of first act: for understanding comes about from first act. The second is complex knowledge of the principles: for knowing itself comes about from it. The third is simple understanding of the prior quiddity: for it comes about from the very knowledge of the posterior. And since these latter modes regard such a concept, and not a concept absolutely, therefore, speaking absolutely and per se, a concept proceeds only from knowledge by way of first act. Yet such a concept can proceed from elsewhere. Hence one need not be much concerned here.

XX. To Durandus's argument, however, it must be said that species or habit and act can be compared in two ways: in one way, with respect to their mode of being; in another way, with respect to specification. For each of these is found in either of them. If they are compared in the first way, then act is nobler than habit or species, as is said in I Ethic.⁴⁵ And the reason is that act is simply an act, whereas those things have a mode of being intermediate between act and potency. And this is nothing other than saying that the thing known is present to the soul in a nobler way when it is present in second act than when it is present by a habit or first act; and the soul stands in a nobler relation when it reaches the thing through act than through habit. Nor, with respect to the aforementioned mode of being, is act produced by the species, but by the intellect. — But if they are compared in the second way, then, speaking with respect to the same object, they are of equal nobility. And thus an act adequate to its species flows from it as an effect from a univocal cause: for the act has what makes it such from the formal principle, which is the species, as happens also in other cases. — And so the solution to Durandus's argument is clear: an argument which fought not only against us but against Aristotle himself.

XXI. Concerning the second consequence leading to the principal conclusion⁴⁶, a doubt arises: because it is false that procession according to action toward something outside is proper to the lowest creatures, namely bodies. For it is evident that the intellectual substances themselves proceed from God according to action toward something outside. And thus the course of the argument seems falsely to rest upon its foundation.

To this doubt it is briefly answered that proceeding according to an action directed outward seems to be counted in the text among bodily processions, not on the ground that it is found only in bodily things, but because it is so common as to be found even in bodies, and in these bodily things it shines forth more manifestly. For the procession must be of very little worth which befits every being whatsoever, however lowly. Wherefore in the matter at hand, where processions are graded, it was rightly counted among the bodily ones, as the lowest; and, once excluded from the proper mode of procession found in intellectual substances, which hold the highest place in the universe.

XXII. In response to the third objection, take care not to be hasty in concluding from those words that a real procession is contained in the notion of the first principle: a procession which the faith posits absolutely. But how this is to be understood will be made clear below, question XLV, article 6.

The title treats of generation formally: and it will be clearer in the body.

In the body he does two things: first, he distinguishes the predicate of the question, that is, generation; second, he answers the question affirmatively¹.

II. As to the first point, he distinguishes, describes, and compares generation. The distinction is: generation is twofold, namely in a common sense, and properly, in living things. – The description of the members is: Generation in the common sense, which belongs to all things, is a change from non-being to being, as is clear from Physics V²; generation properly so called, in living things, which is properly called birth, is the origin of a living thing from a conjoined living being, according to the likeness of the same nature. – The comparison, finally, concerns the separability and conjunction of the two. For since it is established that the first is separable from the second, and again that in the living things found among us both occur together, for the reason that they pass from potency to act, it follows of necessity that, if any living thing is born without a passage from potency to act, there the second generation is separated from the first.

Regarding the definition of nativity, only that particle coniuncto is somewhat obscure; however, you have its lengthy exposition in Book IV of Contra Gent., chapter XI.

III. As to the second³, the responsive conclusion is: The procession of the word in God has the character of generation, in the second way. – And it is proved by showing point by point that four conditions constituting the character of nativity belong to such a procession. That it is a vital operation is evident from intelligible action. That it proceeds from a conjoined principle is evident from the preceding article, and especially from the reply to objection 2. That it occurs according to the character of similitude is proved: because the conception of the intellect is the likeness of the thing understood. Finally, that it occurs within the same nature is proved: because in God understanding and being (esse) are identical. – And thus not only is the conclusion inferred, but also its corollary: namely, that the word proceeding in God is the Son.

IV. Concerning the reason for the last statement in the text, namely, that the divine Word proceeds as a thing of the same nature with God because there understanding is being (esse), note that this argument, repeated many times in this work, is expounded in Book IV Contra Gentiles, chapter XI. And it is said that it holds insofar as, speaking generally, the being (esse) of a concept, or of a word, is to be understood: and therefore wherever understanding, which is identified with the very act of being understood, is an accident, the word itself also is an accident; but where understanding is substantial being (esse), there too the word is substance. And since this is so in divine things, therefore the divine Word is the divine substance: but the concepts of all intellectual creatures are accidents.

V. But concerning this argument a doubt arises from two heads. First, from the fact that being understood adds nothing to the thing understood: and consequently it cannot be the real esse of the concept itself. – Second, because the act of understanding is really distinct from the concept; and on this way of speaking, it is the very esse of the intellect in perfect act. Therefore it cannot be the very esse of the concept.

VI. For the clarification of these points, it must be known that, because the word, as word, is the very thing understood in act interiorly, it has three features. From the fact that it is a thing understood in act, it follows that its esse, as such, is to be understood; as is evident inductively from the thing seen in act and the rest. – But from the fact that it is the interiorly understood thing, that is, that in which the thing understood is expressed for actual understanding, it follows that its esse is to be so understood, namely interiorly in that in which, etc. Now such being-understood is a certain real esse: since it is the esse of an actually expressed likeness of the object. – But from the fact that it is thus an object in act, it has that it be one of those things concurring to the perfection of the act of understanding: and consequently that intellection, which is the very esse of the intellect in act, and thereby is the esse of all things concurring to the perfection of the intellect in act, be the esse of the word itself.

VII. Hence, in reply to the first objection⁴ it is said that, although being understood adds nothing to the thing understood, being understood in this way—that is, as the proper interior act of understanding—does add something real, not to the thing understood universally, but to the thing understood in this way, that is, according to the esse it has interiorly in the concept.

To the second, however, it is said that intellection is the esse both of the intellect and of the intelligible species and of the word, though in different ways: for it is the esse of the intellect and of the species as understanding, but of the word in⁵ being understood; of the former as of principles, as it were, of the latter as of a term; of the former as of one complete subject, as it were, of the latter as of an object. Hence no incompatibility follows, unless someone should think that distinct things cannot really exist by the same esse: and that is shown to be false in matter, form, and the composite.

VIII. Concerning the notion of generation as applied to the divine procession⁶, a doubt arises from Aureol, cited by Capreolus, in the ninth distinction of the First Book⁷. For he argues thus. If the divine procession in question were called generation by reason of that notion, two impossibilities would follow. The first is that the Son would not be Word insofar as He is Son, and conversely; against Augustine, VII On the Trinity, chapter II. And the inference holds: because neither is the generation of the word within us the generation of a living substance, nor is the generation of a son among us the generation of a word. – The second is that the procession of the Holy Spirit would be a generation. And the inference is proved: because the whole of that definition would belong to it.

But to these points the reply is easy, by denying both consequences. Nor does the proof of the first carry any weight: for in us the son proceeds by a transient action, and the word by an operation which is an accident; but in God none of these has any place. That the property of the Son is expressed also by the name Word is clear in XXXIV q., art. 2, ad 3. – The proof of the second consequence likewise assumes something false: since, as will be treated in art. 4 from what has been proposed, that condition by way of a like is lacking.

IX. In response to the third point, note the golden words at the end of that passage, namely: in the very perfection of the divine esse are contained both essence and word etc. For it is clearly evident here that there is no formal distinction in act between the divine essence and the personal properties and the attributes and the rest of the things that are saved formally in God: for the very perfection of the divine esse, if it were defined in itself, as it were—so it is permitted to speak—would include all these things within itself. And therefore posit every distinction of this kind in God as only virtual; but in the intellect, according to reason.

In the title, the word other signifies true otherness; and because of the word is, it must signify real otherness: for otherness is not true among real processions unless it is real. The phrase in the divine is taken as was declared in article 1, Comment., n. I.¹ And in the same way it is to be understood in each of the articles of this question, lest the same thing need be repeated many times.

II. In the body there is one conclusion, responsive to the question in the affirmative: In God, besides the procession of the Word, there is another procession, which is the procession of love. — And it is proved thus. In intellectual nature among us, besides the procession of the word according to intelligible action, there is another procession, namely of love, according to the operation of the will; therefore in God, besides the procession of the Word, there is another procession, etc.

The antecedent is proved by proportion: for just as by the conception of the word the understood is in the one understanding, so by the procession of love the beloved is in the one loving. — The consequence, however, is proved thus: because in the divine there is no procession except according to the immanent action of the intellectual nature, which is known to be twofold, that of the intellect and that of the will.

III. On this point there first arises a doubt similar to the doubt raised concerning the procession of the word²: namely, whether by an act of the will something proceeds within it as the term of that same act. And besides the common arguments drawn from the side of immanent action, there are others drawn from what is proper to the will. For it seems, in the first place, to contradict St. Thomas himself in the Questions On Truth, q. IV, art. 2, ad 7, where he says that in the will nothing proceeds except by way of operation, and that it is otherwise in the intellect. – Second, against this both Scotus argues³ and others who hold that produced love is an act of loving as spirated, just as they hold the word to be a generated act of understanding. They argue more from authorities than from reasons. But all the authorities and reasons tend toward this: that the Holy Spirit is love, and love is an act of loving.

IV. Concerning those words, according to which the beloved is in the lover, a doubt arises from Aureol, as reported by Capreolus, at the First Distinction⁴ For he strives with many arguments to attack this, both simply and ad hominem. Nevertheless all his motives consist in this: Love, or the impulse of the will, consists in a tending toward the thing loved, and not in a likeness of it; therefore through the procession of love the beloved is not made to be in the lover, but rather the converse—the lover is drawn, transformed, and is in the thing loved—according to that saying of Matthew VI⁵: where your treasure is, there is your heart.

V. To make these things clear, it must be known that, because the things of the will are less known and less named, the Author defined those things that are in the will proportionally from those things that appear in the intellect: so that, just as by understanding we form a concept, so by loving we produce a certain inclination within ourselves toward the beloved; and because this lacks a name, it is called love, impulse, inclination, and affection. Yet between intellect and will there is a difference not only in this, that the term of the former is a likeness, while that of the latter is an affection; but also in this, that the thing which is the term in the intellect has both the mode and the name of a term, as is clear in the case of the word and the concept; whereas the thing terminating in the will, although in reality it is a term, nevertheless has neither the mode nor the name of a term. For it both is, and is signified as, tending toward something else; but it is evident that tending toward something else is the condition not of a term, but of a way.

And for this reason those words were written in the Questions On Truth⁶, as is evident to one who carefully compares and penetrates the whole of the reply. Hence they do nothing against our thesis. – And from the same root the answer to the remaining objections in the first doubt is clear: for, owing to the poverty of words, the name of love extends to its terminus.

VI. To the second doubt, however⁷ it is said that the arguments err in two respects. First in this, that they do not see a third mode of being in, besides through essence and through likeness, namely through inclination or affection, the way being-down is in the heavy thing, and being-up in the light. For this, as is explained in IV Contra Gentiles, chapter XIX, is a third mode: and according to this mode, the beloved is in the lover, as is evident of itself. – Second in this, that, without weighing what it is for the beloved to be in the lover, they think this consequence holds: the beloved comes to be from the will in the lover; therefore the beloved is drawn to the lover; whereas it holds not at all. Because the beloved does not come to be in the lover otherwise than according to the affection of the lover toward the beloved: and consequently, by the very fact that it so comes to be, the lover is drawn, transformed, impelled toward the beloved objectively; and thus it is in him. And this could easily have been apparent from the very notion of the beloved. For to be loved is not to be drawn, but to draw the lover: and consequently, to come to be as beloved is not to come to be as drawn, but as drawing: and therefore, if something comes to be in the will as beloved, it does not come to be as drawn toward it, but on the contrary as drawing it. And in this way we grant that a likeness proportional to that of the letter runs between intellect and will, namely with respect to this, that just as there the thing understood comes to be, so here the thing loved: but differently, as has been said, and as will be said further below⁸.

VII. In response to the second, note that the reply consists in this, that that major premise does not hold in the infinite nature, which identifies all things to itself: although it is found to be true in other things, because they are finite, and for that reason it was assumed from them as though it were a maxim.

VIII. In response to the third, note two things. First is that the third argument intended to conclude that there is not a greater distinction between these processions than there is between the intellect and the will: and consequently, just as between the intellect and the will in God there is no true otherness, so neither between the processions. The reply, however, intends to show that the distinction between the processions is greater: indeed, that there is otherness between them, while the identity of intellect and will stands; and this on account of the order of origin between them—an order which nevertheless arises from the formal characters of the principles, namely the intellect and the will, between which there is no such order. Thus there is a distinction in what is principiated, but not in the principles themselves; and from the very character of those principles there is an order of origin—not within the principles themselves, but in the processions according to them. And thus the otherness of the processions sought for, determined only implicitly in the body of the article, is here made manifest explicitly from the order of origin.

Second, it must be noted here that in the text it is said that it belongs to the nature of love to proceed from a conception of the intellect; and consequently, in the divine, that procession be from a procession. Now the first doubt here is whether this belongs to the nature of the procession of love per se in the first way of speaking, or in the second. And again there is doubt whether it belongs to the nature of love to proceed from the Word insofar as it is Word, or only insofar as the Word is the thing understood. There is also a third doubt: whether the aforementioned order of origin is precisely that by which the processions themselves are really distinguished, so that if it were set aside there would be no real distinction between them. But since these matters are to be discussed in q. 36, art. 2⁹, where they will also be better understood, after the treatise on the divine Persons, therefore let us pass over them here.

IX. Yet I judged that five points must by no means be passed over. First is this: it is established that, taking "concept" for the thing conceived or known as such, the procession of love must be from the concept; for we can in no way love what is unknown. And therefore the text speaks of it as if self-evident, that it belongs to the nature of love to arise from a concept.

X. Second is that the thing known is the cause of love in the genus of efficient cause. This is evident from the fact that in the text it is said that love has an order of origin to the concept. For it is clear that the order of origin, in the case at hand, is an order according to the mode of efficiency. And there accords with this opinion that saying of Averroes in Book XII of the Metaphysics, comm. XXXVI: the bath in the soul is the agent of desire, etc.

XI. Third is that, although love arises effectively from two things, namely from the will and from the lovable thing as known, just as the word arises from the intellect and the intelligible together with the intellect; yet a great difference must be perceived here. For the concept is produced by both in the power of one complete efficient cause, and in the character of a thing: but love is produced by the will and by the lovable thing as known, not as integrating one agent, but from different sources, with different characters concurring. For love arises from the will in the character of a thing, and from the lovable thing in the character of something known: for the lovable, as known, begets love, while the will does so as such a thing. And these may suffice for now as foundations for what is to be said concerning love and the Holy Spirit.

XII. Fourth is that Scotus, in Book I, distinction XIII, understood from that word order that this passage concerns the distinction of processions according to prior and posterior: and he attacked it in three ways. First, because this is not the primary distinction of the processions: for the reason that one is prior and the other posterior is that the one is of such a kind and the other of such a kind. – Second, because the divine processions are relations: but relations are not distinguished primarily by other relations. – Third, because these relations of order are other than the relations of origin. This is proved: because they are between different extremes; for the relation of origin is between the produced and the producing, whereas the relation of order is between origin and origin. The text, therefore, has been badly expounded.

But to these points the reply is easy. For from the very course of this treatise the sense of the text is apparent, together with the reason why the Author spoke here in this seemingly diminished way. For it will be shown below¹⁰ that in the divine there is no order except of origin, and that this does not include relations of prior and posterior. And therefore the distinction of order posited here has been badly expounded as a distinction according to prior and posterior: since it is a distinction of the order of origin. – And if it be objected against this that this distinction is not the first, speaking of real distinction, the assumption is denied: for, as will be clear below¹¹, only the relations of origin really distinguish in the divine. – As for the formal distinction, the reply is already evident from the body of the article, and from the following article: namely, that they are distinguished, one by the intellect, the other by the will. Hence this order does not add other relations over and above the origins themselves, as the second objection wishes. – Nor is it true that, according to the thing, the extremes of the relations of origin and of order are other. For the product and its passive origin in the divine are one and the same relation: and in the same order in which the product, namely the Holy Spirit, is from the producer, namely the Son, the procession of the former is from the procession of the latter; which is to arise from it. – The Author, however, passed over these points here in silence, because, according to his custom, he proceeds from the more universal to the less universal, to be treated in their proper place: here the order, and then below¹² he will specify the order of origin.

XIII. The fifth point is that Scotus's arguments, in the same place, against those who hold that these processions are distinguished by principles distinct according to reason, namely intellect and will, are not opposed to our way. For they fight only against those who hold that the real distinction of the processions depends on the distinction of reason of the principles; which is foreign to the doctrine of St. Thomas. For although, as is said in the text, from the account of intellect and will there arises the distinction of these processions, nevertheless the distinction of these does not arise from the distinction of those. It is one thing to say from intellect and will, or from their accounts, and another thing to say from their distinction: for the first signifies God himself, or a real thing, while the second signifies an ens rationis.

In the title, note carefully the word generation. For since in the preceding article it was determined that the procession of love is not a procession of the word, and in the second article it was determined that the procession of the word is generation, without question it is clear that the procession of love is not that generation which is the procession of the word: and consequently it is established that the procession of love is really distinct from that generation in the divine persons. And these are not the questions here. Hence nothing else is asked here except whether the formal ratio of generation belongs to the procession of love in the divine persons. And so, examining this carefully, it appears that, just as the preceding title asked about the real distinction of one procession from another, so this one asks about the formal distinction—not according to any ratio whatever, but according to the ratio of generation. And truly this remained to be asked: since the processions of word and love have been established in the divine persons, and that one is generation and its term the Son, it was necessary to inquire and decide whether this one too is a generation, and consequently whether its term also is a Son, or not. And this is what is being asked.

II. In the body there are two conclusions. The first responds directly to the question: The procession of love in the divine is not a generation. – The second responds to the intention: That which proceeds in the divine by way of love proceeds as spirit.

Before, however, the conclusions are proved, note that although only one thing was asked, for the perfection of the doctrine the proof satisfies not only the simple question but also the intended difference as it were constitutive of that procession itself. Thus there is shown at once in the text both why and in what respect the procession of love is not generation, and what its constitutive difference is, by which it differs from generation and is spiration.

III. The first conclusion is therefore proved directly first, from the difference between the intellect and the will, as follows. The intellect has these three features in order: first, that it is brought into act by a likeness of the thing understood; second, that from this, the procession in the intellect is according to the mode of a likeness; third, that this has from this the character of generation, because everything generating generates what is like itself. The will, however, is entirely the opposite: first, it is brought into act not according to a likeness of the thing willed, but according to an inclination toward it; second, from this, the procession in the will is not according to the mode of a likeness, but of one impelling; third, from this, this procession is not a generation, nor is the one proceeding begotten or a son.

And then the proof of the second conclusion is added, namely that it proceeds as spirit, by way of the following syllogism, thus. Spirit signifies a certain vital motion with an impulse, not just any motion, but that by which we are said to be moved or impelled by love: therefore what proceeds in the will by way of impulse proceeds as spirit, which was the intended point. And so both conclusions are proved together.

And the process of emanation is grounded upon that particle placed in the definition of generation, namely according to a likeness: so that, because some procession is or is not according to a likeness by its own formal notion, it is or is not generation. It must be understood, however, with respect to the constructive sense: for it is understood as holding when the other particles that belong to the notion of generation concur. For the destructive sense, the negation of this one particle alone suffices, since formal notions are like numbers, as is said in Book VIII Metaphysics¹

IV. Concerning the first difference between intellect and will assigned above², a doubt arises as to which act it is to be interpreted, whether the first or the second. And if indeed it is interpreted of the first act, it seems false on the side of the will: since it seems a fiction that, in order for the will to will something, there must be pre-required in it some inclination making it formally in first act, just as the intelligible species is proportionally related to the intellect. – But if it is understood of the second act, one must assign how this second difference arises from it: for with this difference it stands that in both there is procession according to similitude, as will be clear in the following doubt.

V. Concerning the second difference a doubt arises: because it also seems false on the side of the will, and not to follow from the first, but rather to contradict it. This is made clear as follows. To proceed according to likeness, in the matter at hand, is for the term of the procession, by the very force of the procession, to be like the producer in act; as is evident in the case of the word with respect to the intellect in first act. But love proceeds as like to the will in first act: because impulse proceeds from impulse, just as in the intellect the expressed similitude proceeds from the impressed similitude. Therefore it is also false that there is no procession according to likeness in the will: and from this very fact that the will comes into act through inclination, it follows that it produces an inclination, and consequently acts upon itself what is like itself, no less than the intellect does, proportion being preserved. Nor does it matter, for the purpose at hand, whether the will is in first act through itself or through an inclination superadded: for of itself it is itself a certain inclination.

VI. Concerning the third difference, or rather concerning its very root as brought forward in the text, namely that everything which generates generates something like itself, a doubt arises: for it is adduced not as a cause but as if it were a cause. For to make something like oneself is not proper to what generates, but is common to every agent: for every agent produces something like itself according to the form by which it acts. And consequently, since the will is an agent, this cause will conclude no less to the procession of the will than to the procession of the intellect. And thus there is here not only the fallacy of taking as a cause what is not the cause of the difference, but, what is worse, the opposite of what is intended is inferred.

VII. Concerning this whole process a doubt occurs to the reader: for this doctrine seems to contradict what is said in the Questions On the Power of God, q. X, art. 2. There, indeed, it is denied that these processions are distinguished by themselves; here, however, it is determined that they are distinguished by their proper formal reasons, which is the same as being distinguished by themselves formally.

VIII. To make these things evident, two points must first be set forth. First, that that greatest maxim, every agent acts in a manner like to itself according to the form by which it acts, is true when the form is the reason for acting in the manner of a thing: it need not, however, be true when the form is as it were the reason for acting in the manner of something known. And the reason for the difference is this: to act in the manner of a thing is to act because it is such; and hence it must act in such a way as it itself is. But to act in the manner of something known is not to act because it is such, but because it is known to be such: yet from the fact that something is known to be such, it does not follow that what follows must be like it, but it can happen that there follows only an inclination toward it, as we experience in ourselves.

Second, that the appetitive part, since it is necessarily moved by something known, has this singular feature: that it acts in some way in the manner of a thing, and in some way in the manner of the known. For love, which holds first place in appetite, necessarily arises from appetite and from a known object of appetite; if we consider love as proceeding from appetite, it proceeds as from a thing; but if from the appetible object, then as from what is known; and if as from both together, as it were from an agent and as it were from the reason for acting (though under different aspects, as we said above³), no better term occurs for expressing this mixed mode of becoming and proceeding than by way of vital appetite. – And according to this, the answer to the three doubts first raised is easy.

IX. And so that a reply may be given point by point in reverse order, beginning from the root, to the third doubt⁴ it is said that, although it is not proper to the generator, as distinguished against the agent, to act in a manner like itself; yet it is proper to it, as distinguished against the agent by way of impulse or of an inner vital appetite, as is understood in the text. For here it is distinguished against the agent in itself by reason of the known object, such as the appetitive power is: and thus it is proper to itself. And thus the cause assigned is truly a cause or difference, and it infers what was intended.

X. To the second⁵ it is said that, when love is compared to the quasi-partial causes, it is thus found to arise from the like and from the unlike: from the like, indeed, insofar as it arises from appetite; but from the unlike, insofar as it arises from the appetible. But when love itself is compared to its total productive principle, namely, the will as quasi-agent, and the known good as quasi-the reason for acting, it thus proceeds from the unlike: for love is not a likeness of the thing loved, but an inclination toward it. And thus it is plainly treated in the text. For he places the difference in this, that a concept is a likeness of the thing understood: but love, as such, is not a likeness of that same thing which is loved. Hence the answer to the objections is clear.

XI. To the first doubt, then⁶ it is said that the text can be understood of either act. And as to the first, it is not to be understood as the objection imagines: but that the will in first act is made actual in itself through an inclination, without concern whether that inclination be a thing superadded to the will or be one and the same with it. For both seem true with respect to different things in our will: for the will is inclined naturally toward beatitude; and it is inclined again, by an affection superadded, toward these or those goods with which it is affected through habit, passion, or reason. — As to the second act there is no doubt.

As for the inference of the consequent differences, and the context of the text, it must be interpreted with respect to second act. For from this very fact that the term of the intellect in act is a likeness of the thing understood, while the term of the will in act is not a likeness of the thing willed but rather an impulse toward it, it manifestly follows that the total producer of the concept makes something like itself according to the form which is for it the ratio of acting; whereas the total producer of love does not make something like itself according to that form which is for it as it were the ratio of acting, namely the thing loved. And thus the objections are sufficiently answered.

XII. To make evident the resolution of the fourth doubt⁷, it must first be known that it is one thing for certain things to be distinguished by themselves formally, and another for certain things to be distinguished by themselves formally in the first instance. For the first it suffices that the distinction be made through something essential to them, whether that be a part of the definition or the whole definition; but for the second this does not suffice; rather it is required that they be primarily diverse, such that they are distinguished not through some other distinguishing principle.

Second, know that just as there are beings of different orders, so too are their formal reasons. And therefore it is necessary that the definitions of certain beings include something outside the essence defined—not for the better, but from absolute necessity, as is clear in the case of relations. Wherefore, when we speak of such beings and say that they are distinguished from themselves or are not distinguished from themselves, or have something else, one must attend to the fact that this can be understood in two ways. In one way, so that the term "from themselves" signifies their proper essences; in another way, so that it signifies their proper essences together with a precision, not only of those things which are closed within their definitions by way of addition, but also of the transcendent order toward those things. And if indeed this is understood in the second way, for the most part it stems from ignorance of the proper meaning of the word: since essences of this kind intrinsically enclose such an order within themselves, nor can they be abstracted from it. But in the first way, the interpretation is best: since each thing must have something intrinsic that constitutes it, and consequently distinguishes it. And because these intrinsic constituents have a certain order to extrinsic things, therefore both by philosophers and by St. Thomas these are frequently said to agree through extrinsics, namely through a term, object, subject, etc.: for the sense of these is the same as the first way, among those who understand soundly. - These things must be noted very carefully in the matter concerning powers, operations, motions, and other things of this kind: for from them the truth of all things easily appears.

XIII. These points having been set forth, to the doubt it must be said that, with St. Thomas, these processions are not distinguished by themselves in the first instance. Indeed, if "by themselves" is expounded with a precision that sets aside the transcendent order to principles, terms, and the like, to say that they are distinguished by themselves in the first instance is to say nothing. And this twofold point he intended in the passage cited, as is clear there: for he speaks of ultimate distinctives and examines principles and terms. But they are distinguished in him formally through those particles, or differences, contained intrinsically within their definitions, namely after the manner of a likeness and after the manner of an impulse, as is expressly clear from the text. And preserving this meaning, it can be granted that they are distinguished by themselves; just as it can likewise be granted in the same way of an ox and a man. Yet we are not accustomed to use discourse of this kind except concerning ultimate distinctives and distinct things. But no question should be made about words.

Hence it is clear that in this Scotus, in the thirteenth distinction of the First Part⁸, dissents from St. Thomas: for he holds that these processions are distinguished by themselves first, such that they agree in nothing. Yet he proves this by no argument. And there was and is an objection ready at hand against him, namely, that these processions agree in many quidditative predicates; for instance, that a procession of a divine person is immaterial.

The title from what has been said is clear. – In the body there is a single conclusion answering the question: No procession can exist in the divine, except that of the word and of love.

It is proved thus. The divine processions cannot be understood except according to immanent acts: therefore not except according to understanding and willing: therefore not except as word and love.

The first consequence is proved in two ways. First, because in the intellectual nature there is no other genus of immanent action: for it is evident that God, who is of a purely intellectual nature, has no other. – Second, because sensing, which is the third genus of immanent operations, is not entirely outside the transitive operations, insofar as it is brought about by an extrinsic object.

II. Concerning the antecedent, which is the foundation of what has been said and of what remains to be said on the matter of the Trinity, note that it can be attacked in two ways. First, by those who deny that the processions in God are themselves immanent acts. In this negative position Scotus and Durandus agree, as was alleged above¹. And against Scotus indeed an argument has been made, after his opinion was recited². Hence what now remains is to refute the claims of Durandus.

III. For he himself, in the tenth distinction of the First Book³, not assenting to this argument, refers himself to the sixth distinction⁴, in which he both attacked this text and grounded his own opinion. He argues, therefore, that the divine processions are not attended to in respect of understanding and willing: because these are essential attributes common to all the Persons and really identical with one another; but the processions are, according to all, notional acts, do not belong to all the Persons, and are really distinct from one another.

IV. But he himself holds that the divine processions are to be understood according to the acts of nature, with intellect and will and all their acts set aside. And in this he also disagrees with Scotus, who holds⁵ that they are to be understood according to the acts of intellect and will, although he distinguishes those acts from understanding and willing. And Durandus grounds his opinion as follows. The communication of nature proceeds from the fecundity of nature itself; therefore it does not proceed from intellect and will: with these, then, set aside, just as nature remains, so too fecundity remains, and the communicative act of nature; therefore, etc. – The antecedent is evident inductively; and it is known through itself; and it is confirmed by the authority of Hilary⁶: to all creatures will brought substance, etc. – The consequence, however, is proved from the fact that, as the order is between certain things when they are distinguished really, so a similar order is between them when they are distinguished by reason: but it is evident that nature is prior to intellect and will, and likewise the act of nature to their acts. – And it is confirmed: because if heat were intelligent and willing, it would not give warmth insofar as it is intelligent or willing, but from its nature, just as now. Therefore, of itself and first, to communicate nature is an act of nature, with everything else set aside. This is the force of Durandus's position.

V. To make this difficulty evident, note first that a nature can have no act unless it be an immanent or transient action. For it is impossible to find a third kind of operation, or of production, even if license to imagine were granted: since every act, according to its being as perfective (esse perfectivum), must be⁷ either of an agent or of what is acted upon. And by enumerating each of the natures in the universe, sufficient testimony is borne to this proposition, even if the argument adduced were lacking.

Note second, that fecundity is not a condition of every nature: for not every nature can communicate itself according to the same ratio, or univocally; thus we are speaking here. For it is clear that the sun cannot generate another sun; and likewise, far be it from the intelligences to have an act of communicating their own nature (the reason for which is given below, q. XLV, art. 5, ad 1).

Note third, that in that nature to which fecundity belongs, it is found to communicate itself in the very manner in which it is found to act toward the communication of itself. Now, since in the definition of nature, in II Physics⁸, there is posited a first, not proximate, principle, it is not required of every nature that it be, with every power set aside, the proximate and immediate principle of operation; but it suffices that it be the first principle of that operation by means of its natural power, as is evident in the elements and in animals.

VI. From these things, however, evident inductively and consonant with reason, it is deduced first that, if there is any fruitful nature communicable through a transient action, that nature—not insofar as it is understanding, willing, or sensing, but with all these set aside—has a communicative act of itself through its power, which is a transient action. If, however, some nature is fruitful to which it is repugnant to be communicated through a transient action, as is every purely intellectual nature, that nature has, through its power or powers, a communicative act of itself of the genus of immanent actions. And since such actions in an intellectual nature are none other than the acts of intellect and will (for these alone are the natural powers proper to a purely intellectual nature), it follows that if any purely intellectual nature is fruitful, its communicative act is an act of intellect or of will, or both. And this is the meaning of the text here, already begun from the first article of this question, against Arius, etc.

VII. To the objections on the opposite side, therefore, it is said, and first to the first ⁹, that from all of those arguments nothing else is obtained except that the processions or productions are not immanent actions precisely: which is what we teach, holding that they are understanding by expressing the word, and likewise willing by spirating, and so with the others, as will be shown more fully below ¹⁰

VIII. But as to the root of the opinion ¹¹, once the antecedent proposition is granted, the inference must be denied. For it stands that the communicative act of nature arises from its fecundity, and yet it need not precede, in any order, the act of intellect or will, since it is repugnant to that nature to be communicated by any act other than intellect or will. — As to the proof of the inference, where it is said such is the order etc., the major premise being granted, the minor is denied as regards what it supposes, namely, that a fecund nature is owed an act of its own communication with all else set aside: for this is false, as we have shown ¹².

And if it is insisted that the intellect presupposes a fecund nature, and therefore the act of the intellect presupposes the act of the fecund nature: the causal inference must be denied, even though the antecedent of that inference is true. And the reason for the denial is that arguments of this kind do not hold among subordinates whose operation is the same, such that the first can operate only through the second, as happens in the case at hand. — And if it is asked why nature cannot operate with the power excluded: there is no other reason than that it is a nature. For it is owed to it on this account that it be the first, not the proximate, principle of the work: for it is repugnant to a nature to be communicated through such a prior act, as we have said.

The imagination, however, seems to err from this: that one imagines nature and intellect to be as it were two natures; when nevertheless, for the matter at hand, one must imagine that intellectuality is the constitutive difference of a nature in such an order or genus of things that either is infertile, or its fecundity is through intelligible acts. And so it is in the truth of the thing.

And from this it is clear that nothing stands in the way of the truth of that conditional about heat, and similar cases. For these are true of forms communicable through outward action; and we imagine them to stand toward intellectuality as a property does, and not as a determining difference toward the mode of the communication of itself, as happens in the case at hand.

Hence the divine processions must be thought to precontain eminently within themselves the perfections of all processions: and because they proceed from the fecundity of nature, they are communicative of that nature itself; and because they occur in a purely intellectual nature, they are acts of intellect and will; and because they are perfect simply, neither is multiplied, etc.