Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

The title contains two questions: one formally, namely, whether God can improve what has been made; the other virtually, namely, whether God can make other things, better than those made. For this second question is contained within the first, by reason of the first thing made, which is the universe: since the improvement of the universe depends on other things, as is said in the reply to the third objection.

II. In the body, the question is answered by means of two distinctions and three conclusions. The first distinction is explicit concerning goodness: namely, whether it is substantial or accidental. – The second is implicit, concerning whether it is the same thing or a different one. – The first conclusion is: A thing that is the same cannot be made better substantially. And it is proved: because substantial difference stands to things as unity does to numbers, etc. – The second is: A thing that is the same can be made better accidentally. – The third is: God, from any thing made by Him, can make another thing better.

Nor are these conclusions proven otherwise here, since they follow from what was said above¹ For if the object of the divine power is that which is possible in itself (absolute), and these things belong to the number of possibles—which can be perceived from the fact that no contradiction appears in them—it follows that God can do these things.

III. Concerning the third conclusion a doubt is raised, from Scotus and from Aureol. Scotus indeed holds the opposite implicitly, in III Sent., dist. XIII, qu. I, with the following argument. Taking some determinate creature on the lower side, which may be A, the question is posed by ascending: either there is a terminus at some supreme being, and the opposite is obtained; or there is not, but one may proceed to infinity. And then thus: the more any creature exceeds A, the more perfect it is; and consequently, a creature that exceeds A infinitely is infinitely more perfect; and thus it will be infinite in itself intensively, which is impossible.

IV. But Aureol, in Capreolus, at distinction XLIII of the First Book², attacks this conclusion with six arguments, very lengthy ones, of which I shall present only their force.

First, therefore, he argues. If one were to proceed to infinity in specific perfections, the superior would be a certain total perfectional with respect to the inferior; and consequently it would contain the perfections of all other creatures; and consequently it would be of infinite perfection: which is impossible. – The first consequence holds: because the superior contains the perfection of the inferior, and still more. The last, however, holds: because perfections of this kind, in your view, are infinite.

Secondly, thus. The process toward a measure is finite: therefore the process toward what is higher in specific perfections is finite. – The consequence is clear from Book X Metaphysics³

Third, thus. The totality of creatable species differs from the divine perfection, as the finite from the infinite: therefore it is of finite perfection: therefore it is impossible for it to proceed to infinity by ascending. — The consequence is evident: because a process to infinity according to perfection exceeds every finite perfection.

Fourth. The process toward unity and totality is finite: therefore this process is finite. – The inference is proved: because it is toward the unity and totality of the universe.

The fifth argument is as follows. That into which one first descends, beginning from God, must be given; therefore one does not proceed to infinity in ascending. – The consequence is evident. And the antecedent is proved from that great maxim of Dionysius⁴, the lowest things are joined to the highest through intermediaries, such that the highest of the lowest reaches the lowest of the highest etc.

In the sixth way, thus. God and the lowest creature are two extremes, not separated by an infinite distance in the manner of an intervening middle, but by the infinity of one of the extremes: therefore between them there cannot be infinite middles.

V. To make these things evident, know that, since we are speaking here only of the power of God and of the possible absolutely, when we say that any creature once made can be made another more perfect, no power in the creature toward some further creature is signified, as happens with numbers. Rather, the possibility of being consumed without end is signified absolutely: for it is infinite as material infinity is infinite, such that whatever is posited or taken, there always remains something else to be taken. The inexhaustibility of the divine power is also signified: since it is of infinite actuality simply, so that it is not exhausted by any participated act, but there always remains a further act to be exhausted.

VI. Hence to Scotus's argument⁵ it is easily answered, by granting a process to infinity while denying that some creature exceeding the lowest one to infinity would follow: for between the lowest and any other signate one there is always a finite distance, as is clear in numbers. For all these objections brought forward, or many of them, fail in this, that they do not distinguish between a process to infinity, that is to some one thing infinite in number; and a process to infinity, that is never to a last, but always to something such that another further remains. And if we attend well, according to the first sense, "infinite" is the term to which the process tends, and has the force of a noun: in the second, however, it has the force of an adverb, and is the mode of the process itself. For we use a process to infinity according to the second sense: since names are to be used as the many use them, and it is clearly evident from III Physics⁶ that it is so taken. Those arguing, however, take it, implicitly or explicitly, that there is a proceeding to infinity according to the first sense: which we have not even dreamed of, nor does it follow from the process to infinity that we posit.

VII. To the first objection of Aureol, however,⁷ it is said that that argument errs in three ways. First, in what we said above.⁸ – Second, in that he badly interprets that proposition, the higher perfection includes the lower, and something beyond, for this is not true of the perfections of ultimate differences: for in no intelligence is contained virtually whatever positive perfection the ultimate difference of an ox posits; for this belongs to God alone, as must be seen elsewhere.⁹ – Third, in that he does not distinguish between the being of infinite perfection simply and the being of infinite perfection in a genus; in which the third argument also erred. For if the whole universe of creatable things existed, there would indeed be infinite perfections specifically, yet they would not constitute an infinite ens: since each singly, and all together, would be beings by participation. And likewise, if there were some one creature equivalent to all of them, it would not be of infinite perfection simply, but in a genus. Just as, if there were infinite animals, or one animal equivalent to them, there would follow only infinite perfection in the genus of animal; and thus even the least of the intelligences, since it is a form of a higher order, would be more perfect than all of them, as being under the genus of animal.

To the second objection it is said that it errs in three ways. First, because this process is not to a measure, since it is not toward any terminus. - Second, because it does not distinguish between the total process, which is nevertheless what the whole question concerns; and the individual partial processes, which the question does not concern; for it is evident that each of these is finite and materialiter to a measure, that is, to a thing which, if it were, would be a measure. - And this is the third error, namely that it does not distinguish between a process to a measure materialiter and in potency—not natural potency, but logical and divine—and the measure in act, and as such.

The third reason also errs in three ways. First, because it supposes that the totality of creatable things can be received more in act than the totality of numbers. - Second, in what we said, namely that it equivocates concerning infinite perfection. - Third, in that it does not see that below the infinite in a genus, though finite simply, one can proceed to infinity simply. This is what was intended.

The fourth errs, however, as does the second. First, because this whole process is not ordered to the unity and totality of the universe: for it has no terminus, as has already been said. - Second, because the individual partial processes are ordered to the unity and totality of the universe only in logical and divine potency. - Third, because they are ordered to such a unity and totality materially, and not formally: for there is no contradiction in the supposition that many creatures might be made without any universe resulting from them per se.

To the fifth, the answer is clear: that saying of Dionysius is understood of creatures among themselves, and not of the connection between a creature and God. Hence there is no first possible being in descending from God, nor any last in ascending to him. And thus the question whether it be finite or infinite is vain. In fact, however, there is always a first thing made, which is of finite perfection.

Finally, the sixth objection destroys itself. For an infinite distance from the infinity of one extreme necessarily entails an infinite number of intervening media, if not in act, at least in potency; as is manifestly clear in continuous quantity, for it cannot be understood that between an infinite line and a line of one foot there could not intervene infinitely many intermediate lines, namely of two feet, three feet, and so on to infinity. Hence the inference adduced is worthless.