Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title, omnipotent can be distributed in two ways: namely, as standing for every power, and as standing for everything possible. The question here is not whether God is omnipotent in the first sense, that is, whether He possesses every power; for it was already determined in the first article that in God there is no passive power. Rather, the question is whether He is omnipotent in the second sense, that is, whether He can do all things.

II. In the body, he does two things principally: first, he states what is certain and what is ambiguous here; second, he resolves the ambiguity, there: But if anyone, etc.¹

III. As to the first, he says two things. First, that the affirmative part of the question is confessed by all. Second, that the definition of omnipotence, which ought to be the proper middle term for inferring the confessed conclusion, is difficult: because it is doubted over what the all is distributed, when it is said that God can do all things.

IV. With respect to according to, he makes three points. First, that the term all distributes the possible absolutely. Second, that the possible absolutely denominates whatever has the character of being (ens), in act or in potency, there: But it must be considered. Third, he excludes from this distribution and denomination only what implies a contradiction, there: Nothing, however, is opposed, etc.

The first of these, namely, that the ly all distributes the absolutely possible, is proved by distinguishing possible in two ways, namely, relative to some power, or absolute, from Book V of the Metaphysics; and by refuting the claim that it cannot be understood of the possible in the first way. For neither with respect to a created power, since the divine power would exceed the given object; nor with respect to an uncreated power, since there would be a circle in such an explanation. And he infers, by the argument from division, that it is understood of the possible in the second way, explaining what this kind of possible signifies, namely, that it consists in the relation of terms, etc.

But the second point, namely that the absolutely possible designates whatever can be, is proved as follows. Every agent produces what is like itself; therefore to every active power there corresponds, as its proper object, the possible according to that act which is the reason of its acting; therefore to the active power of God there corresponds the possible according to the reason of being. – The first inference is made evident in the case of the heating power and its object. The second, however, is proved thus: because the being (esse) of God, which is for Him the reason of acting, is a being (esse) that possesses in itself beforehand the whole perfection of being (esse), yet is not being (esse) of such or such a kind, according to any genus whatsoever.

The third, however, closes with two points. The first is: All things that do not imply a contradiction are contained under omnipotence. The second is: All things that imply a contradiction are not contained under omnipotence. – And first he proves both at once, thus. Nothing is opposed to the ratio of being except non-being: therefore nothing is repugnant to the possible absolutely, except what implies in itself to be and not to be at once: therefore only those things that imply a contradiction lack the ratio of possibles: therefore those things that imply it are not contained, and those things that do not imply it are contained under omnipotence. – Next he teaches the proper manner of speaking concerning things excluded from omnipotence. And finally he shows that this exclusion is not against the angelic authority, as is clearly evident in the text.

V. Concerning the aforesaid assignment of the object of the divine power, a doubt arises. For if everything possible absolutely, and every being, and whatever does not involve a contradiction, is included under omnipotence, God himself will be contained under his own omnipotence: since that God exists is of the number of these, as is evident.

To this, and similar things, it must be said that, since the present discussion concerns productive omnipotence, when we say everything possible, every being, everything not involving a contradiction, what is effectively producible is always understood. For thus are excluded both divine things and sins, and whatever belongs to passive and imperfect powers, in this manner.

VI. Concerning the proof of the second point², a doubt arises: for it does not seem to infer what is intended. For from the fact that God's active power is grounded upon infinite and universally perfect being (esse), it should have been inferred, therefore the object of God's active power is possible to be infinitely and universally perfect; just as concerning heating power it is inferred that it is heatable. This is not done in the text: but rather it is inferred, therefore its object is possible to be, without any other proof.

To this it is said that, as is clear from the preceding article³, this is the difference between a univocal and an equivocal cause: to the univocal cause there corresponds some adequate object in the effect, but not to the equivocal cause. And therefore, since God's esse has two conditions relevant to our purpose, namely elevation above the genera, and universality of perfection, nor can anything caused be imagined with these conditions in the singular, it follows that it must be taken in the universal. Such is esse: for it is reduced to no determinate genus, and extends itself to all the modes of perfections. And therefore quite subtly in the text the proportional object, like univocal powers, is assigned as whatever can have the ratio of being (ens).

VII. Concerning the proof of the third statement⁴, a doubt arises: for the non-being seems to have been passed over. For from the fact that nothing is opposed to being except non-being, it should have been inferred: therefore non-being is opposed to the possible absolutely, because it is opposed to being; and it ought not to have been inferred only that therefore whatever implies at once being and non-being is repugnant to the possible. — Nor can it be said in reply that both conclusions were implicitly drawn. For, as is clear from the text, what was drawn was that only those things implying a contradiction are repugnant to the possible: for it is evident that non-beings are found without any implication of contradiction. Hence an ambiguity remains, namely how, with that point omitted, the leap was made to being and non-being together.

To this it is said that, as is clear in Book V of the Metaphysics⁵ and in Book II of the Physics⁶, the active cause of an object and of its opposite is the same; yet in different ways, because by acting it causes its proper object, but by not acting, the opposite; as is evident in the case of the sailor there. And so there was no doubt that non-being falls under God's active power, whose proper object has been assigned as being: for that power must, by acting, regard being, and by not acting, non-being. And since many non-beings are non-beings without involving a contradiction, as is evident in contingent matter, it follows that the non-being passed over was not omitted, but is included among those not involving a contradiction. On account of which no leap was made in the text: but from the fact that only non-being is opposed to being, and it is established that what is opposed to it is not divided but conjoined—in the same thing, about the same thing, toward the same thing, etc.—it was very well inferred, therefore that which contains being and non-being at once is repugnant only to the possible. And it should not have been, nor could it have been inferred, therefore non-being is repugnant to the possible: for neither does it conflict with being except with those conditions constituting a contradiction, as is evident in itself.

VIII. Concerning this position, note that for the present purpose it suffices that whatever involves a contradiction, as such, be excluded from omnipotence; nor should this be turned into a matter of doubt. Whether this or that thing involves a contradiction, however, is a question belonging to another inquiry. And likewise, whether a contradiction is involved in one way or in several ways makes no difference. For all things that in themselves involve a contradiction are truly impossible even to be brought about by God. And by this the response to the arguments of Aureol, found in Capreolus, I, dist. XLII, q. 1⁷ is clear.

IX. In response to the fourth, note that by the wisdom of this world we do not understand philosophy in itself, since it does not judge what is false; rather, philosophy is understood as it is used by men of this world, from whose defective light there has issued a rash judgment, whereby things impossible with respect to secondary causes were judged absolutely impossible, such as the Incarnation of God, etc.