Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title, "power" signifies the principle of operation directed outward, that is, of what passes into something else; the name of operation being extended to passion as well as to action.

II. In the body, the question is answered with a single distinction and two conclusions mixed together, according to the two members of the distinction. The distinction is: Power is twofold, namely active and passive. The first conclusion is: Passive power is in no way in God. The second is: Active power is in God in the highest degree.

This second point is proved. Everything, insofar as it is in act and perfect, is an active principle; therefore to God above all does it belong to be an active principle; therefore in him active power exists most of all. — The first consequence is proved from the fact that God is pure act and universally perfect. The second, however, because the notion of an active principle belongs to active power, as is clear from its definition in Book V and Book IX Metaphysics, etc.

The first, however, is proved in the same way from the negation of opposites. Each thing suffers insofar as it is deficient and imperfect: therefore suffering belongs to God in no way: therefore neither does passive potency. — The consequence is proved in the same way: namely, because in God there is no imperfection, etc.

III. In response to the second and third, very difficult words must be discussed. For three things are said about action, as it is distinguished against effect. The first is that action, if it is distinct from the active power, is nobler than the power itself. The second is that action in creatures proceeds from a power. The third is that action is so related to active power that, if this is transferred to God, the action itself must be the divine essence. For all these things are plainly held in the text.

The reason for this arduous doubt is as follows. Transient action, for instance moving, insofar as it is distinguished from the effect, either signifies only motion away from this, or something else. If it signifies only motion away from this, then what is said here must be verified either of the relation away from this alone, or of the motion alone, or of the whole composite, namely the motion away from this. But the first and third statements are not verified of any of these. For none of these is nobler than the active power of the mover of Saturn. And, what presses more urgently, none of these is what would have to be identified with the divine substance, if we suppose God to move some body without any medium (which is admittedly not impossible). For then anyone can plainly see that the motion need not be identified with the divine substance; and likewise the relation need not be identified with it, although¹ it would have to be not real on the part of God, as is clear from what was said above²; and consequently neither would the motion away from this have to be identified with that same divine essence. — But if it signifies something else, everything collapses into what is taught in III Physics³. The opinion holding that action exists subjectively in the patient also seems to collapse; yet this opinion seems to be drawn from Aristotle, in the same place, and in III On the Soul⁴.

IV. To this, it seems to me, the answer must be that, in St. Thomas, transitive action, over and above motion and relation, signifies something subjectively in the agent. This is proved, and made manifest⁵. It is proved indeed by the single argument already touched upon⁶, which convinces my mind, sustaining either way of taking what was laid down in the reply to the fourth question. Transitive action signifies something existing subjectively in the created agent, but really identified with the substance in the uncreated agent; whereas motion, as distinct from this, since it imports only motion and relation, does not signify anything of this kind: therefore motion, as distinct from this, in the manner explained, is not the whole of transitive action. - The major premise is found also in II Contra Gentiles, chapter IX, in the final argument; and, as regards its second part, it is found in a thousand places where there is talk of creation, governance, and any other divine actions and powers directed ad extra, as is evident here as well. - The minor premise, moreover, is evident by resolution. For it is clear that, whether God or an angel be the mover, in neither case would there be motion. And relation, although it would be in the angel, would in God be in no real way: for neither by inhesion, as is evident; nor by identity, as is manifestly proved in II Contra Gentiles, chapter XII, at the beginning.

V. And if it were said in answer to this argument that the major premise is true not from one root but from several; because, with respect to created agents, it is true by reason of the relation, which must exist subjectively in the agent; but with respect to the uncreated agent, it is true by reason of the immanent act, which alone the transient action posits in God, apart from the fact and the relation: if, I say, it were said thus (especially on account of the authority of St. Thomas in II Contra Gentiles, chapter XXIII, fourth argument), one would indeed escape subtly, yet not sufficiently.

To make this evident, know that, as the text says in this article, in the reply to the fourth objection, the active power is sustained in God in two ways: in one way, as a kind of executive power of the intellect and will; in the other way, as the will itself deliberated, etc., as efficacious with respect to effects. And if this second way is adopted (which is perhaps the truer one), there would be no constraint in this matter arising from the nature of transient action: since, in truth, no transient action would then be posited in God; but only an immanent one, having the efficacy of transient actions, according to that ⁷: He spoke, and they were made. And St. Thomas seems to have followed this path in the authority cited, and in chapter XXXV, where he expressly denies a mediating action. — But if the first way is held, then the difficulty raised has force. Nor is it adequately answered by the reply given, which recurs to immanent actions, according to the other manner of speaking. For if a power is posited in God as a kind of medium, then a transient action must also be posited in him; and consequently, identified with his substance, as is clear here, and as is expressly said in II Contra Gentiles, chapter IX, where the same account is asserted concerning the identification of intellectual operations and the others with the divine substance. And since, as is clear from the text, St. Thomas sustains both paths, it follows that his mind and doctrine are not sufficiently preserved by recurring to immanent actions. And so it remains that the major premise assumed, from one and the same root in every agent to which transient action truly belongs, is true: otherwise it would not be formal. And since it is verified neither by reason of relation nor by reason of motion, it remains that transient action signifies something else in the agent. — But the words brought forward in opposition from chapter XXIII, and from XXXV, and the like, can be interpreted as proceeding according to that way: for that Work seems to employ all the paths toward its purpose.

VI. It is declared, moreover, that this hidden truth also lay concealed in III Physics and in similar passages, from its counterpart, namely passion, of which it is said proportionally that it is motion in this; just as of action it is said that it is motion from this. For just as it is evident that in passion there are three things—namely, the motion, the relation of inherence of that motion to the subject, and the foundation of that relation, which is essentially passion (whether that be the passive actualization of the subject, or the being of the form flowing forth as actualizing the subject, or whatever else)—so on the side of action, not only the motion and the relation are signified, but the from signifies prior to these the very essence of action, namely the operation in the agent for the sake of perfecting another. But since we lack proper terms, we use the names of relations, namely the prepositions from and in, to signify hidden things, as often happens.

And thus all the texts are in agreement. For with these it stands that in transitive action and passion there is one and the same act: since an action of this kind, as such, exists for the sake of perfecting the thing acted upon. And therefore, by reason of that act, the perfection of the patient, and its being (esse) in the patient, etc., is called the very action itself. — Nor does anything more seem to need saying here, since these suffice for the present purpose.