Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title, "power" signifies the principle of operation directed outward, that is, of what passes into something else; the name of operation being extended to passion as well as to action.

II. In the body, the question is answered with a single distinction and two conclusions mixed together, according to the two members of the distinction. The distinction is: Power is twofold, namely active and passive. The first conclusion is: Passive power is in no way in God. The second is: Active power is in God in the highest degree.

This second point is proved. Everything, insofar as it is in act and perfect, is an active principle; therefore to God above all does it belong to be an active principle; therefore in him active power exists most of all. — The first consequence is proved from the fact that God is pure act and universally perfect. The second, however, because the notion of an active principle belongs to active power, as is clear from its definition in Book V and Book IX Metaphysics, etc.

The first, however, is proved in the same way from the negation of opposites. Each thing suffers insofar as it is deficient and imperfect: therefore suffering belongs to God in no way: therefore neither does passive potency. — The consequence is proved in the same way: namely, because in God there is no imperfection, etc.

III. In response to the second and third, very difficult words must be discussed. For three things are said about action, as it is distinguished against effect. The first is that action, if it is distinct from the active power, is nobler than the power itself. The second is that action in creatures proceeds from a power. The third is that action is so related to active power that, if this is transferred to God, the action itself must be the divine essence. For all these things are plainly held in the text.

The reason for this arduous doubt is as follows. Transient action, for instance moving, insofar as it is distinguished from the effect, either signifies only motion away from this, or something else. If it signifies only motion away from this, then what is said here must be verified either of the relation away from this alone, or of the motion alone, or of the whole composite, namely the motion away from this. But the first and third statements are not verified of any of these. For none of these is nobler than the active power of the mover of Saturn. And, what presses more urgently, none of these is what would have to be identified with the divine substance, if we suppose God to move some body without any medium (which is admittedly not impossible). For then anyone can plainly see that the motion need not be identified with the divine substance; and likewise the relation need not be identified with it, although¹ it would have to be not real on the part of God, as is clear from what was said above²; and consequently neither would the motion away from this have to be identified with that same divine essence. — But if it signifies something else, everything collapses into what is taught in III Physics³. The opinion holding that action exists subjectively in the patient also seems to collapse; yet this opinion seems to be drawn from Aristotle, in the same place, and in III On the Soul⁴.

IV. To this, it seems to me, the answer must be that, in St. Thomas, transitive action, over and above motion and relation, signifies something subjectively in the agent. This is proved, and made manifest⁵. It is proved indeed by the single argument already touched upon⁶, which convinces my mind, sustaining either way of taking what was laid down in the reply to the fourth question. Transitive action signifies something existing subjectively in the created agent, but really identified with the substance in the uncreated agent; whereas motion, as distinct from this, since it imports only motion and relation, does not signify anything of this kind: therefore motion, as distinct from this, in the manner explained, is not the whole of transitive action. - The major premise is found also in II Contra Gentiles, chapter IX, in the final argument; and, as regards its second part, it is found in a thousand places where there is talk of creation, governance, and any other divine actions and powers directed ad extra, as is evident here as well. - The minor premise, moreover, is evident by resolution. For it is clear that, whether God or an angel be the mover, in neither case would there be motion. And relation, although it would be in the angel, would in God be in no real way: for neither by inhesion, as is evident; nor by identity, as is manifestly proved in II Contra Gentiles, chapter XII, at the beginning.

V. And if it were said in answer to this argument that the major premise is true not from one root but from several; because, with respect to created agents, it is true by reason of the relation, which must exist subjectively in the agent; but with respect to the uncreated agent, it is true by reason of the immanent act, which alone the transient action posits in God, apart from the fact and the relation: if, I say, it were said thus (especially on account of the authority of St. Thomas in II Contra Gentiles, chapter XXIII, fourth argument), one would indeed escape subtly, yet not sufficiently.

To make this evident, know that, as the text says in this article, in the reply to the fourth objection, the active power is sustained in God in two ways: in one way, as a kind of executive power of the intellect and will; in the other way, as the will itself deliberated, etc., as efficacious with respect to effects. And if this second way is adopted (which is perhaps the truer one), there would be no constraint in this matter arising from the nature of transient action: since, in truth, no transient action would then be posited in God; but only an immanent one, having the efficacy of transient actions, according to that ⁷: He spoke, and they were made. And St. Thomas seems to have followed this path in the authority cited, and in chapter XXXV, where he expressly denies a mediating action. — But if the first way is held, then the difficulty raised has force. Nor is it adequately answered by the reply given, which recurs to immanent actions, according to the other manner of speaking. For if a power is posited in God as a kind of medium, then a transient action must also be posited in him; and consequently, identified with his substance, as is clear here, and as is expressly said in II Contra Gentiles, chapter IX, where the same account is asserted concerning the identification of intellectual operations and the others with the divine substance. And since, as is clear from the text, St. Thomas sustains both paths, it follows that his mind and doctrine are not sufficiently preserved by recurring to immanent actions. And so it remains that the major premise assumed, from one and the same root in every agent to which transient action truly belongs, is true: otherwise it would not be formal. And since it is verified neither by reason of relation nor by reason of motion, it remains that transient action signifies something else in the agent. — But the words brought forward in opposition from chapter XXIII, and from XXXV, and the like, can be interpreted as proceeding according to that way: for that Work seems to employ all the paths toward its purpose.

VI. It is declared, moreover, that this hidden truth also lay concealed in III Physics and in similar passages, from its counterpart, namely passion, of which it is said proportionally that it is motion in this; just as of action it is said that it is motion from this. For just as it is evident that in passion there are three things—namely, the motion, the relation of inherence of that motion to the subject, and the foundation of that relation, which is essentially passion (whether that be the passive actualization of the subject, or the being of the form flowing forth as actualizing the subject, or whatever else)—so on the side of action, not only the motion and the relation are signified, but the from signifies prior to these the very essence of action, namely the operation in the agent for the sake of perfecting another. But since we lack proper terms, we use the names of relations, namely the prepositions from and in, to signify hidden things, as often happens.

And thus all the texts are in agreement. For with these it stands that in transitive action and passion there is one and the same act: since an action of this kind, as such, exists for the sake of perfecting the thing acted upon. And therefore, by reason of that act, the perfection of the patient, and its being (esse) in the patient, etc., is called the very action itself. — Nor does anything more seem to need saying here, since these suffice for the present purpose.

In the title, ly infinita signifies intensive infinity. – In the body there is a single conclusion, answering the question affirmatively: The power of God is infinite. – It is proved. The esse of God is infinite: therefore the active power of God is infinite. – The antecedent is clear from question VII. – The consequence is proved: because active power belongs to God insofar as He is in act, that is, it is grounded upon His act; and the quantity of power follows the quantity of act. This is proved from that universal principle: The more perfect an agent is in the form by which it acts, the greater its power, as is evident in the case of what heats, etc. – The text of the master is clear.

II. In response to the third, much would need to be said about the infinity of the motive power—things very lengthy indeed—and what we have treated on this point has been discussed in a special question¹ Therefore I think it should be passed over for now.

In the title, omnipotent can be distributed in two ways: namely, as standing for every power, and as standing for everything possible. The question here is not whether God is omnipotent in the first sense, that is, whether He possesses every power; for it was already determined in the first article that in God there is no passive power. Rather, the question is whether He is omnipotent in the second sense, that is, whether He can do all things.

II. In the body, he does two things principally: first, he states what is certain and what is ambiguous here; second, he resolves the ambiguity, there: But if anyone, etc.¹

III. As to the first, he says two things. First, that the affirmative part of the question is confessed by all. Second, that the definition of omnipotence, which ought to be the proper middle term for inferring the confessed conclusion, is difficult: because it is doubted over what the all is distributed, when it is said that God can do all things.

IV. With respect to according to, he makes three points. First, that the term all distributes the possible absolutely. Second, that the possible absolutely denominates whatever has the character of being (ens), in act or in potency, there: But it must be considered. Third, he excludes from this distribution and denomination only what implies a contradiction, there: Nothing, however, is opposed, etc.

The first of these, namely, that the ly all distributes the absolutely possible, is proved by distinguishing possible in two ways, namely, relative to some power, or absolute, from Book V of the Metaphysics; and by refuting the claim that it cannot be understood of the possible in the first way. For neither with respect to a created power, since the divine power would exceed the given object; nor with respect to an uncreated power, since there would be a circle in such an explanation. And he infers, by the argument from division, that it is understood of the possible in the second way, explaining what this kind of possible signifies, namely, that it consists in the relation of terms, etc.

But the second point, namely that the absolutely possible designates whatever can be, is proved as follows. Every agent produces what is like itself; therefore to every active power there corresponds, as its proper object, the possible according to that act which is the reason of its acting; therefore to the active power of God there corresponds the possible according to the reason of being. – The first inference is made evident in the case of the heating power and its object. The second, however, is proved thus: because the being (esse) of God, which is for Him the reason of acting, is a being (esse) that possesses in itself beforehand the whole perfection of being (esse), yet is not being (esse) of such or such a kind, according to any genus whatsoever.

The third, however, closes with two points. The first is: All things that do not imply a contradiction are contained under omnipotence. The second is: All things that imply a contradiction are not contained under omnipotence. – And first he proves both at once, thus. Nothing is opposed to the ratio of being except non-being: therefore nothing is repugnant to the possible absolutely, except what implies in itself to be and not to be at once: therefore only those things that imply a contradiction lack the ratio of possibles: therefore those things that imply it are not contained, and those things that do not imply it are contained under omnipotence. – Next he teaches the proper manner of speaking concerning things excluded from omnipotence. And finally he shows that this exclusion is not against the angelic authority, as is clearly evident in the text.

V. Concerning the aforesaid assignment of the object of the divine power, a doubt arises. For if everything possible absolutely, and every being, and whatever does not involve a contradiction, is included under omnipotence, God himself will be contained under his own omnipotence: since that God exists is of the number of these, as is evident.

To this, and similar things, it must be said that, since the present discussion concerns productive omnipotence, when we say everything possible, every being, everything not involving a contradiction, what is effectively producible is always understood. For thus are excluded both divine things and sins, and whatever belongs to passive and imperfect powers, in this manner.

VI. Concerning the proof of the second point², a doubt arises: for it does not seem to infer what is intended. For from the fact that God's active power is grounded upon infinite and universally perfect being (esse), it should have been inferred, therefore the object of God's active power is possible to be infinitely and universally perfect; just as concerning heating power it is inferred that it is heatable. This is not done in the text: but rather it is inferred, therefore its object is possible to be, without any other proof.

To this it is said that, as is clear from the preceding article³, this is the difference between a univocal and an equivocal cause: to the univocal cause there corresponds some adequate object in the effect, but not to the equivocal cause. And therefore, since God's esse has two conditions relevant to our purpose, namely elevation above the genera, and universality of perfection, nor can anything caused be imagined with these conditions in the singular, it follows that it must be taken in the universal. Such is esse: for it is reduced to no determinate genus, and extends itself to all the modes of perfections. And therefore quite subtly in the text the proportional object, like univocal powers, is assigned as whatever can have the ratio of being (ens).

VII. Concerning the proof of the third statement⁴, a doubt arises: for the non-being seems to have been passed over. For from the fact that nothing is opposed to being except non-being, it should have been inferred: therefore non-being is opposed to the possible absolutely, because it is opposed to being; and it ought not to have been inferred only that therefore whatever implies at once being and non-being is repugnant to the possible. — Nor can it be said in reply that both conclusions were implicitly drawn. For, as is clear from the text, what was drawn was that only those things implying a contradiction are repugnant to the possible: for it is evident that non-beings are found without any implication of contradiction. Hence an ambiguity remains, namely how, with that point omitted, the leap was made to being and non-being together.

To this it is said that, as is clear in Book V of the Metaphysics⁵ and in Book II of the Physics⁶, the active cause of an object and of its opposite is the same; yet in different ways, because by acting it causes its proper object, but by not acting, the opposite; as is evident in the case of the sailor there. And so there was no doubt that non-being falls under God's active power, whose proper object has been assigned as being: for that power must, by acting, regard being, and by not acting, non-being. And since many non-beings are non-beings without involving a contradiction, as is evident in contingent matter, it follows that the non-being passed over was not omitted, but is included among those not involving a contradiction. On account of which no leap was made in the text: but from the fact that only non-being is opposed to being, and it is established that what is opposed to it is not divided but conjoined—in the same thing, about the same thing, toward the same thing, etc.—it was very well inferred, therefore that which contains being and non-being at once is repugnant only to the possible. And it should not have been, nor could it have been inferred, therefore non-being is repugnant to the possible: for neither does it conflict with being except with those conditions constituting a contradiction, as is evident in itself.

VIII. Concerning this position, note that for the present purpose it suffices that whatever involves a contradiction, as such, be excluded from omnipotence; nor should this be turned into a matter of doubt. Whether this or that thing involves a contradiction, however, is a question belonging to another inquiry. And likewise, whether a contradiction is involved in one way or in several ways makes no difference. For all things that in themselves involve a contradiction are truly impossible even to be brought about by God. And by this the response to the arguments of Aureol, found in Capreolus, I, dist. XLII, q. 1⁷ is clear.

IX. In response to the fourth, note that by the wisdom of this world we do not understand philosophy in itself, since it does not judge what is false; rather, philosophy is understood as it is used by men of this world, from whose defective light there has issued a rash judgment, whereby things impossible with respect to secondary causes were judged absolutely impossible, such as the Incarnation of God, etc.

In the title, note that the past is taken in two ways, namely formally and denominatively; that is, for the very act of being past, and for the thing that has passed. In the matter at hand, although it can be taken in both ways, it is nevertheless taken directly, and per se first, for the thing that has passed. So that the sense of the question is: Can God strip a thing that has passed of its having passed? For this is to make it not to have been. Just as we ask whether God can strip substance of quantity; and to do this would be to make a substance which is quantified not quantified.

II. In the body there is a single conclusion, answering the question in the negative: That past things have not been, is not subject to the divine power. – It is proved first by reason. Under God's omnipotence does not fall what implies a contradiction: that past things have not been implies a contradiction: therefore. The minor is proved. To say that Socrates sat and did not sit implies a contradiction, just as to say that he sits and does not sit; but this is to say that the past has not been: therefore. – Next it is confirmed by the authority of Augustine and Aristotle.

III. Note here that the past is signified in act signate by the term past; and in act exercite, by words of past tense, such as was, ran, sat, etc. And therefore in the text, the act signate is explained by the act exercite. And if this reasoning has been carefully examined, all the arguments brought from Gregory against Capreolus, at distinction XLII of the First Book¹, cease. For from this the reason is clear why God cannot strip Adam of his having been past. For this would be to strip him of his having been: and since one of two contradictories must always be verified of anything whatsoever, if Adam were now stripped of having been, it would be verified of him that he had not been. And thus he would have been and not have been: he would have been, indeed, because since he was once clothed with having been, he truly was; but he would not have been, because he would have been stripped of that very having been. And thus two contradictories would be true at once: which is unintelligible.

IV. From this it is also evident that nothing stands in the way of the claim that what happened to Adam was, just as it is and will be. For Socrates is a man and he is not a man contradict no more than Socrates runs and he does not run, and than he will run and he will not run, and than he ran and he did not run: for whether the matter is necessary or contingent makes no difference to contradiction. And therefore in the reply to the first objection, both points are touched upon: namely, the accidentalness, and the absolute impossibility that accompanies an implication of contradiction.

The title is clear. – In the body he does three things: first, he treats a certain opinion; second, he treats another¹; third, he answers the question raised².

II. As to the first, a certain erroneous opinion holds the negative part: because it holds that God acts from the necessity of nature. And it is explained from the action of natural things, proportionally. And finally it is reproved: because it falsely rests upon a foundation, as is clear from what was said in qu. XIX, where both modes of natural necessity, namely that which regards nature and that which regards the will, are removed from the divine action.

III. As to the second³, he does three things in order. First, he states the opinion itself, which also holds the negative part; but for a different reason, which is as follows: God can do nothing apart from the order of His wisdom and justice; but the order of His wisdom and justice does not extend beyond those things that are done at some time; therefore...

Second, this argument is examined with respect to the first proposition, approving it: because the divine power is equal to its wisdom, and conversely, on account of their mutual identity.

Third, it is examined and refuted with respect to the second proposition, by proving its contradictory, namely, Divine wisdom is not restricted to the established order that now exists, by the following argument. The whole rationale of the order which the wise man imposes upon things made by him is taken from the end: therefore, from an end proportionate to the things made for the sake of that end, the wisdom of the maker is limited to a certain order; and from an end exceeding them disproportionately, it is not limited: therefore divine wisdom is not determined to any order of things in such a way that another could not flow forth. — The antecedent is evident, along with the first consequence. I have supplied the second part of the consequent, since it is contained only implicitly in the text, and yet the force of the argument depends upon it. That it was meant to be understood is clear from the posterioristic rule, if affirmation is the cause of affirmation etc.⁴ For if the commensuration of the end is the reason for limitation to a certain order, because the whole rationale of order comes from the end, then the incommensuration of the end by excess must be the reason for non-limitation, from the same cause. — But the second consequence is proved: because the divine goodness, which is the end of all things, exceeds every established order of things disproportionately.

IV. As to the third point⁵, the responsive conclusion to the question is: God can do things other than those which He does. Nor is this conclusion proved otherwise: because, upon examining the proposed opinions, all causes restricting the divine power to those things which it does have been excluded. For since its object, as was said⁶, is the absolutely possible, if it were restricted to the possible which it does, this would be either by reason of the nature of the agent, or by reason of quasi-powers, or by reason of quasi-habits; since impediments and indispositions, etc., do not occur in God. But all these have been excluded in the text: in the first opinion indeed, nature and will, and thereby intellect implicitly; in the second, however, habits, namely wisdom and justice. Hence, with all restrictive causes excluded, there remains the scope of the divine power in its full breadth toward the absolutely possible.

The title contains two questions: one formally, namely, whether God can improve what has been made; the other virtually, namely, whether God can make other things, better than those made. For this second question is contained within the first, by reason of the first thing made, which is the universe: since the improvement of the universe depends on other things, as is said in the reply to the third objection.

II. In the body, the question is answered by means of two distinctions and three conclusions. The first distinction is explicit concerning goodness: namely, whether it is substantial or accidental. – The second is implicit, concerning whether it is the same thing or a different one. – The first conclusion is: A thing that is the same cannot be made better substantially. And it is proved: because substantial difference stands to things as unity does to numbers, etc. – The second is: A thing that is the same can be made better accidentally. – The third is: God, from any thing made by Him, can make another thing better.

Nor are these conclusions proven otherwise here, since they follow from what was said above¹ For if the object of the divine power is that which is possible in itself (absolute), and these things belong to the number of possibles—which can be perceived from the fact that no contradiction appears in them—it follows that God can do these things.

III. Concerning the third conclusion a doubt is raised, from Scotus and from Aureol. Scotus indeed holds the opposite implicitly, in III Sent., dist. XIII, qu. I, with the following argument. Taking some determinate creature on the lower side, which may be A, the question is posed by ascending: either there is a terminus at some supreme being, and the opposite is obtained; or there is not, but one may proceed to infinity. And then thus: the more any creature exceeds A, the more perfect it is; and consequently, a creature that exceeds A infinitely is infinitely more perfect; and thus it will be infinite in itself intensively, which is impossible.

IV. But Aureol, in Capreolus, at distinction XLIII of the First Book², attacks this conclusion with six arguments, very lengthy ones, of which I shall present only their force.

First, therefore, he argues. If one were to proceed to infinity in specific perfections, the superior would be a certain total perfectional with respect to the inferior; and consequently it would contain the perfections of all other creatures; and consequently it would be of infinite perfection: which is impossible. – The first consequence holds: because the superior contains the perfection of the inferior, and still more. The last, however, holds: because perfections of this kind, in your view, are infinite.

Secondly, thus. The process toward a measure is finite: therefore the process toward what is higher in specific perfections is finite. – The consequence is clear from Book X Metaphysics³

Third, thus. The totality of creatable species differs from the divine perfection, as the finite from the infinite: therefore it is of finite perfection: therefore it is impossible for it to proceed to infinity by ascending. — The consequence is evident: because a process to infinity according to perfection exceeds every finite perfection.

Fourth. The process toward unity and totality is finite: therefore this process is finite. – The inference is proved: because it is toward the unity and totality of the universe.

The fifth argument is as follows. That into which one first descends, beginning from God, must be given; therefore one does not proceed to infinity in ascending. – The consequence is evident. And the antecedent is proved from that great maxim of Dionysius⁴, the lowest things are joined to the highest through intermediaries, such that the highest of the lowest reaches the lowest of the highest etc.

In the sixth way, thus. God and the lowest creature are two extremes, not separated by an infinite distance in the manner of an intervening middle, but by the infinity of one of the extremes: therefore between them there cannot be infinite middles.

V. To make these things evident, know that, since we are speaking here only of the power of God and of the possible absolutely, when we say that any creature once made can be made another more perfect, no power in the creature toward some further creature is signified, as happens with numbers. Rather, the possibility of being consumed without end is signified absolutely: for it is infinite as material infinity is infinite, such that whatever is posited or taken, there always remains something else to be taken. The inexhaustibility of the divine power is also signified: since it is of infinite actuality simply, so that it is not exhausted by any participated act, but there always remains a further act to be exhausted.

VI. Hence to Scotus's argument⁵ it is easily answered, by granting a process to infinity while denying that some creature exceeding the lowest one to infinity would follow: for between the lowest and any other signate one there is always a finite distance, as is clear in numbers. For all these objections brought forward, or many of them, fail in this, that they do not distinguish between a process to infinity, that is to some one thing infinite in number; and a process to infinity, that is never to a last, but always to something such that another further remains. And if we attend well, according to the first sense, "infinite" is the term to which the process tends, and has the force of a noun: in the second, however, it has the force of an adverb, and is the mode of the process itself. For we use a process to infinity according to the second sense: since names are to be used as the many use them, and it is clearly evident from III Physics⁶ that it is so taken. Those arguing, however, take it, implicitly or explicitly, that there is a proceeding to infinity according to the first sense: which we have not even dreamed of, nor does it follow from the process to infinity that we posit.

VII. To the first objection of Aureol, however,⁷ it is said that that argument errs in three ways. First, in what we said above.⁸ – Second, in that he badly interprets that proposition, the higher perfection includes the lower, and something beyond, for this is not true of the perfections of ultimate differences: for in no intelligence is contained virtually whatever positive perfection the ultimate difference of an ox posits; for this belongs to God alone, as must be seen elsewhere.⁹ – Third, in that he does not distinguish between the being of infinite perfection simply and the being of infinite perfection in a genus; in which the third argument also erred. For if the whole universe of creatable things existed, there would indeed be infinite perfections specifically, yet they would not constitute an infinite ens: since each singly, and all together, would be beings by participation. And likewise, if there were some one creature equivalent to all of them, it would not be of infinite perfection simply, but in a genus. Just as, if there were infinite animals, or one animal equivalent to them, there would follow only infinite perfection in the genus of animal; and thus even the least of the intelligences, since it is a form of a higher order, would be more perfect than all of them, as being under the genus of animal.

To the second objection it is said that it errs in three ways. First, because this process is not to a measure, since it is not toward any terminus. - Second, because it does not distinguish between the total process, which is nevertheless what the whole question concerns; and the individual partial processes, which the question does not concern; for it is evident that each of these is finite and materialiter to a measure, that is, to a thing which, if it were, would be a measure. - And this is the third error, namely that it does not distinguish between a process to a measure materialiter and in potency—not natural potency, but logical and divine—and the measure in act, and as such.

The third reason also errs in three ways. First, because it supposes that the totality of creatable things can be received more in act than the totality of numbers. - Second, in what we said, namely that it equivocates concerning infinite perfection. - Third, in that it does not see that below the infinite in a genus, though finite simply, one can proceed to infinity simply. This is what was intended.

The fourth errs, however, as does the second. First, because this whole process is not ordered to the unity and totality of the universe: for it has no terminus, as has already been said. - Second, because the individual partial processes are ordered to the unity and totality of the universe only in logical and divine potency. - Third, because they are ordered to such a unity and totality materially, and not formally: for there is no contradiction in the supposition that many creatures might be made without any universe resulting from them per se.

To the fifth, the answer is clear: that saying of Dionysius is understood of creatures among themselves, and not of the connection between a creature and God. Hence there is no first possible being in descending from God, nor any last in ascending to him. And thus the question whether it be finite or infinite is vain. In fact, however, there is always a first thing made, which is of finite perfection.

Finally, the sixth objection destroys itself. For an infinite distance from the infinity of one extreme necessarily entails an infinite number of intervening media, if not in act, at least in potency; as is manifestly clear in continuous quantity, for it cannot be understood that between an infinite line and a line of one foot there could not intervene infinitely many intermediate lines, namely of two feet, three feet, and so on to infinity. Hence the inference adduced is worthless.