Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

The title is clear. - In the body he does three things: first, concerning the certainty of the number of the predestined absolutely; second, concerning the number of the reprobate¹; third, concerning the certainty, as far as we are concerned, of the number of the predestined², he treats.

II. As to the first, the conclusion is this, answering the question affirmatively: The number of the predestined is certain to God; not only formally, but materially; not only as known, but as chosen and preordained.

This conclusion has three principal parts. And the first, namely that it is certain to God, is left standing as constant.

Second, namely, not only formally, but materially, and it is declared as regards the terms, while certain persons denying this are adduced: and it is proved by leading to an absurdity, thus. If the number of the predestined were certain to God formally only, the certainty of order attributed to predestination in the preceding article would be taken away: this is an absurdity: therefore. — The consequence is evident: because it could stand that Peter be predestined, and yet not be saved; and thus predestination would not infallibly attain its effect.

The third, namely, not only as known, but as predefinite, and it is declared with respect to its terms, by the example of the number of drops of rain and of the sand of the sea, with respect to ly known; and the difference between the number of dwellings of a house and the measurements of a wall, etc., and the number of stones, with respect to the builder, with respect to ly predefinite: and it is proved thus. Every agent intends to make something finite; therefore it intends some determinate measure in its effect; therefore it devises some number in the principal parts required per se for the whole; therefore God preordained in what measure the whole universe ought to be; therefore he predefinite what would be the fitting number of the essential parts of the universe, that is, the perpetual ones; therefore he predefinite a certain number of the predestined.

The antecedent is supposed from question seven. - The second consequence, however, is made clear from the difference between the number of things principally required for the work, and the number of those required only on account of something else. For the number of the former is predetermined; while as many of the latter are prescribed as will be needed for the construction of the former. - The third, however, is proved: because the whole universe is the proper effect of God. - The fourth, indeed, with respect to that term, namely the parts of the universe, is made clear from the difference between corruptible and incorruptible things, thus: in this respect, that the latter are for their own sake, but the former are for the sake of the preservation of the species, looking to the universe. And from this a corollary pertaining to the providence of God is inserted: namely, that the number of corruptible individuals outside the human species is certain to God not by predetermination, but by foreknowledge; whereas the number of species is certain to God in both ways, and likewise the number of elements, stars, and spheres. – Finally, the fifth is proved: because rational creatures attaining beatitude are ordered to the good of the universe before other creatures. Which is proved: because insofar as they are rational, they are simply incorruptible as such; but insofar as they attain beatitude, they more immediately reach the ultimate end itself of the whole universe, namely God.

III. Concerning the antecedent, a doubt arises on account of the infinity of motion. For it is agreed that, among the philosophers, the movers of the spheres intend to move always; and consequently they intend to produce an infinite effect. And yet in the text it is assumed that every agent intends to produce a finite effect.

To this there is a twofold reply. First, that this assumption is understood of an effect in act: for of such an effect it was proved in question 7 that it cannot be intensified by any agent. Now the motion of the heavens, it is evident, is not infinite in act: and therefore it does not stand against the proposition.

The philosophers would say, secondly, that the movers of the spheres do not intend infinite circulations per se and in the first place, but rather assimilation to God in causing other things; and because this is preserved by moving, therefore they intend to move always, as it were, per accidens; as if the infinite circulations were not for their own sake, but because so many are required for preserving, or diffusing, the perfection of things moved, up to the glorious God.

IV. Concerning the explanation of the parts of the universe, a doubt arises. For in I Caeli ³, Aristotle and St. Thomas hold that only simple bodies are the parts of the universe according to species; here, however, the species of mixed bodies, and of plants and animals, are added.

This can be said in two ways. First, because in Book I of the De Caelo the discussion concerns the substantial perfection of the universe, whereas here it concerns perfection after the manner of a passion or attribute. For all corporeal species are related to the simple bodies as passions to their subject, since from them they are made and subsist both actively and materially.

Second, it is said that the universe can be taken in two ways. In one way, for the corporeal universe as such: and in this way it is treated in I On the Heavens. And it is constituted from simple bodies alone: since there is no bodily mass in the universe except of simple bodies; for all bodily matter of mixed bodies is from the elements. In another way, for the universe of perfection: and thus it is treated here. And for its completeness all species are required, as is said in the text: for the specific perfections of these bodies are not from simple bodies as such, but from a certain higher nature, as is evident in the case of vital perfection.

V. Concerning the conclusion itself, note that Aureolus, as cited by Capreolus, in distinction XL of Book I ⁴, strives to attack it. But since he does not argue from proper and certain arguments, but from common ones pertaining to the discernment of the predestined from the reprobate, and he equivocates concerning the end of the universe, and these matters are set forth above ⁵, I judged it should be passed over: for from them the solution of all his objections is easily evident.

VI. As to the second ⁶, the conclusion is this: The number of the reprobate is not fixed in so absolute a manner. – And it is proved. For the elect, all things cooperate for good; therefore the reprobate have been preordained by God for the good of the elect; therefore the number of the reprobate is not fixed in so absolute a manner.

Here the word thus entirely comes in. For in the reprobate there are two things: namely, their very nature, and what pertains to their reprobate being. As regards nature, the number of elect and reprobate is predestined in the same way: since both are of the same nature—incorruptible, rational, etc. But as regards what is given by grace, just as the elect are predestined for their own sake, so that they may attain the ultimate end simply through their own acts and felicity, so the reprobate, like irrational creatures, are provided for not toward their own good (since they are deprived of felicity), but toward a good that is another's, namely that of God and the elect: thus the number of the elect is certain on account of themselves, while the number of the reprobate is certain on account of something else, that is, the elect. Hence, considering the reprobate with respect to their subject, we say that their number is certain even predestinatively. But considering them insofar as they are reprobate, we say that they are not fixed in number predestinatively; rather, divine providence makes use of as many reprobates as it sees can contribute to the good of the elect. And this distinction is what the text intends by those words, yet it is not thus entirely. For in saying not thus, it excluded the reprobate from the principal parts of the universe and from those that are per se first; but by adding the word entirely, it exempted them from being parts purely on account of something else; and thus it placed them, as it were, in the middle, on account of the incorruptibility of their subject, etc., as we have said.

VII. As to the third point ⁷, the number of predestined human beings is treated, namely, whether it is certain to us. Three opinions are reported, and none of them is approved; rather a fourth is set forth as better.

Let it be noted here that these opinions are not condemned. First, because in a matter highly doubtful, and hidden from us by certainty, the authors have spoken in an opinative manner. Second, because the authors of these opinions seem to have been illustrious, and even saints: for the second opinion is known to be Gregory's ⁸ The fourth, however, is said to be better than all the others, because it rests upon the authority of the Church, which says in the secret prayer: O God, to whom alone is known the number of the elect to be placed in supernal felicity. And in order to intimate this, the Author used the same words in the text.