Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title, note, from Qu. de Veritate, qu. VI, art. 3, that "certain" can be understood in two ways: namely, with the certainty of knowledge, or with the certainty of order. For since predestination contains within itself two things, namely foreknowledge and pre-causality, its certainty can be considered both with respect to knowledge, namely insofar as it has certain knowledge of the predestined effects and events; and again its certainty can be considered with respect to causality, namely insofar as it has an infallible order in attaining and leading to the predestined effects. And since the first certainty does not go beyond the limits of divine science, concerning which there has been ample treatment ¹, whereas the certainty of order has its own difficulties in this matter, therefore the title here is to be understood as concerning the certainty of order. So that the sense is: whether predestination, inasmuch as it is a cause, has an infallible order toward the intended effects.

II. In the body there is one responsive conclusion, having, however, two parts: Predestination is certain; yet it imposes no necessity. – This is proved, with respect to both parts at once, in two ways. First, on the side of providence, thus. The order of providence is infallible, and yet certain things subject to providence come about contingently, according to the conditions of proximate causes: therefore the order of predestination is also certain, and yet the effects of predestination come about contingently, in accordance with the freedom of the will. – The antecedent is clear from the preceding question. The consequence, however, is proved: because predestination is a part of providence.

Second, it is manifest, as a conclusion from what was said above under similar conditions concerning the divine science and the divine will, with respect to contingent things.

III. Note here that the text plainly equates the certainty of providence with the certainty of predestination; indeed, from the certainty of the order of the former it proves a priori the certain order of the latter, so that, just as everything predestined, so too everything provided for comes about infallibly. But the words of St. Thomas in Question On Truth, q. 6, art. 3, where a difference is posited between predestination and providence on the ground that providence is not certain with respect to the event of a particular end in contingent matter, whereas predestination is certain, are not to be interpreted as they sound, as is clear from this text and from what was said above ² For he does not mean that such events are not subject to divine providence, nor that the opposite of an event that has been provided for occurs; but rather that many orders of such contingent causes toward certain future things fall under divine providence, and yet those future things will never come to be—as is clear from many preparations of causes of this kind which nonetheless do not bring about their intended outcomes. Under predestination, however, no particular order of anything toward some future thing falls without the event of that future thing also falling under the same. And this difference arises from the breadth of the scope of providence, namely because under it every order is included, whether or not with the event of the future thing; under predestination, however, only those orders having an event tending to the intended end, even in particular; for no order falling short of its own intended object, as such, falls under it.

IV. Nevertheless, those words are not to be extended, nor to be used, since an order that falls short of its proper outcome is not provided for by God with respect to the outcome, but with respect to the order itself, and not its proper outcome; and therefore the non-occurrence of such an event takes nothing away from the certainty of providence. For this reason we said ³, and we say, that the Author changed the words for the better, treating here simply of the certainty of providence, by equating it with predestination. Nor does he mention those things, since what has now been said can, by a pious interpretation, be sustained in some measure on the side of things.

The other matters that would need to be discussed concerning the certainty of predestination have already been treated in the preceding question on Providence. Hence there is no need to repeat them here.