Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

The title is explained in the body. - In the body he does three things: first, he explains the title; second, he treats of three opinions concerning the question at issue¹; third, he answers the question².

II. As to the first point, he distinguishes that predestination's being caused from foreknown merits can be understood in two ways. First, on the side of the act: and thus there is no question. Second, on the side of the effect: and thus it becomes a matter of doubt. And he makes this distinction clear, with its members, from the divine will, since the will itself is contained within predestination. For by the same distinction one must proceed when the question concerns the cause why God wills something, as is evident from what was said above. And the text is clear.

III. As to the second, the first opinion is that of Origen, who says that merits acquired by souls before this life are the cause of predestination. — And it is refuted by the authority of the Apostle: when they had not yet done anything good etc.

The second is that of the Pelagians, who say that merits pre-existing in this life are the reason for predestination, because the beginning of doing good comes from us. — But this is refuted by the authority of the Apostle, that we are not sufficient even to think, etc.: for it is evident that thought is the first beginning from us of cooperating well.

The third opinion is that future merits, within this present life, are the cause of predestination. And to this opinion is reduced the opinion retracted by Augustine³, namely, that future faith was the reason for the predestination of Jacob rather than of Esau. — But the Author refutes this opinion in the text as follows. If anything on our part were the cause of predestination, it would not be included under the effect of predestination; but everything found in the good use of grace is an effect of predestination; therefore nothing that is in the good use of grace is a cause of being predestined. — The destruction of the consequent is proved as follows. What is from the second cause is not distinct from what is from the first cause; therefore what is from free choice is not distinct from what is from predestination; therefore what is through free choice is from predestination. The first consequence just drawn is proved: because divine providence produces effects through the operations of secondary causes.

IV. Concerning this part, note that Henry of Ghent, Quodl. IV, art. 19, and Quodl. VIII, art. 5, holds an opinion quite close to this mode of the refuted position, saying that good use, not of grace, as the preceding opinion said, but of free choice, is the cause of predestination. And since the argument made in the text directly militates against such an opinion, he therefore attempts to solve it and to prove his own opinion. And he indeed proves his own opinion by the authority of Augustine: it came from most hidden merits etc.⁴, as you have from the Master, dist. 41⁵ Then by reason, in three ways. First because election presupposes a disparity between choosing and rejecting. Second because justice is always the companion of mercy: and thus some congruence on the part of the one predestining must be found for merciful predestination. Third because there is some cause of reprobation on our part: therefore also of predestination.

But the present argument proceeds by denying that from the indistinction of what comes from free choice and divine grace it follows that what is on the side of free choice is wholly enclosed under predestination, or under its effect. For there can stand as indistinct the good use of free choice, which is from grace and free choice, and yet this very thing be in a certain way from free choice in respect of that by which it is not from grace. And thus, in that manner in which it is ours and not grace's, it can be a cause of predestination. That the good use of free choice is in some way our own, in respect of that by which it is not grace's, is clear from the authority of Augustine, on the text: Help us, O God, our salvation⁶, where he wills that we cooperate with grace.

V. To these points, since this opinion is manifestly of the same difficulty as the one recited in the text, it must now be answered briefly. And to the authority of Augustine the Master responds⁷ by saying that it was retracted in a similar case. And he says well: for Augustine himself expressly handed down this retraction of his rules⁸, so that an opinion retracted in one place is to be considered retracted everywhere in his works.

To the arguments it is said that election presupposes love, from which the disparity arises. But love is not outside predestination. — Justice, too, is to be sought in the first effects, not in relation to creatures, but as the companion of divine goodness and wisdom. — Nor is the judgment the same concerning reprobation and predestination. For in reprobation there is something outside the whole effect of reprobation, namely guilt; but it is not so in the predestined, in whom the whole of that which orders him to eternal life is the effect of predestination.

And from this the error of the solution offered is apparent. For it seems that this same person made one and the same judgment about grace that makes pleasing, of which Augustine speaks, and concerning which it is verified that the good use of free choice is in some way from us, such that it is not from grace; and about the grace of predestination, that is, gratuitous predestination; even though these differ more than heaven and earth. For under the latter fall not only acts of charity, but all their modes, and gratuitous aids, and briefly, as is said in the text, everything ordaining one to eternal life who has been predestined. And thus, since the good use of free choice, insofar as it is from us, is one of those things by which we are ordained to eternal life (for we are ordained so that, freely cooperating well, we may attain it); it follows that not only the good use of free choice itself, but also the mode by which it is from us, falls under predestination; although it does not fall under grace that makes pleasing. And thus, since in the text it is said that what is from free choice and from predestination is not distinguished, this must be understood not only with respect to the act itself, but also with respect to every mode of it: and by this token, it must be interpreted according to every kind of distinction. - And thus let there be an end to the opinions.

VI. As to the third point ⁹, he answers the question with a distinction, in three conclusions. The distinction is: The effect of predestination can be taken in two ways: namely, in general or in particular. And he is not concerned with universality and singularity according to predication, but according to totality and partition: so that by general he means the whole effect of predestination, whether in all, or in some one predestined person; whereas by particular he means some part of the whole effect of predestination, whether in some one particular predestined person, or even in all in general; for this makes no difference to the matter at hand.

The first conclusion, therefore, is: The particular effects of predestination are in no way prevented from having a cause, such that one is the cause of the other, and conversely. — It is explained: because the latter is the end of the former; and the former is as the matter of the latter, as merit for the sake of reward, etc.

The second conclusion is: The whole effect of predestination has no cause on our part. — It is proved: because the whole in us that orders us to eternal life is an effect of predestination; because also our very preparation, according to that saying: Turn us to you, O Lord, and we shall be turned.

The third conclusion is: The whole effect of predestination has divine goodness as its cause. — It is proved: because it is both the ultimate end of that effect and its first reason, as the first mover of the divine will to predestine.

VII. Reply to the third, since it contains many points, and almost every word has been attacked by Henry ¹⁰ and Aureolus ¹¹; it must be treated and examined point by point. This reply therefore does three things: first, it assigns the cause of reprobation and predestination in general; second, the cause of each of them in particular, there: But why he chose these ¹²; third, it directly answers the argument, there: Nor yet etc. ¹³

VIII. As to the first, he intends this conclusion: God reprobates certain men and predestines others, so that his goodness may be represented both by the mode of pardoning mercy and by the mode of punitive justice. And he proves this in two ways: first, by reason; second, by the authority of the Apostle, Romans IX, and 2 Timothy II.

The argument is drawn from the proportional likeness of the universe and of the human race in their order to eternal life. And it consists in this: that, just as the divine goodness is the final cause of the perfection of the universe, and thus from it is derived the reason for the diversity of grades of things according to highest and lowest, and for the permission of evils; so from that same goodness is derived the reason for the diverse grades within the human race, according to mercy in sparing, and according to justice in punishing. — And the assumption is made clear. For the divine goodness is the end of all things as representable through them; and since it is one and simple, and no creature can attain to its simplicity, it must be represented by diverse things. And consequently, if the universe ought to represent it perfectly, yet within the breadth of a creature, it must consist of all the grades from the lowest up to the highest. And if these must be preserved, many evils must be permitted, as was declared above.

IX. Concerning this argument, four objections arise. First is the proportion between the human race and the universe. Henry argues this, saying that a proportion ought to have been established between the whole of rational creation and the universe. For the divine goodness is represented in punitive justice with respect to the demons; and thus the argument from men amounts to nothing.

According to there is a proportion between the degrees of the universe and the degrees of man. There is not, says Henry, the same account of them: since all the species of the universe pertain to the perfection of the universe per se; but not all the species of moral acts. — This is proved: because no defect, whether of fault or of punishment, pertains per se to the perfection of the universe; yet it is evident that many moral acts, such as lying, theft, and things similar to these, are species of evil of fault.

Third is the application of justice to the reprobate. For justice is saved, says Aureolus, in the predestined; according to that saying of the Apostle ¹⁴: which the Lord, the just judge, will render to me on that day.

Fourth is the final causality attributed to punitive justice, with respect to reprobation in general. Against this both argue. Henry indeed, because it does not seem reasonable that God should permit sins to come about, so that he may afterwards punish them. Indeed, among men we see that one who permits another to sin, when he could forbid or prevent him, sins himself. Therefore this must not be attributed to God. — And Aureol confirms this, because evils are not to be done that goods may come of them: but reprobation without any demerit is an evil; therefore it is not to be brought about by God for this reason alone, that his goodness might appear in his justice. — Moreover, says Aureol, punitive justice is not intended for its own sake, but only on the supposition of a punishable fault. Therefore it is not itself the principal cause of reprobation, but sin precedes it. And again: therefore there is no necessity that anything be done in the universe in order that punitive justice may shine forth.

X. To the first of these it must be said that, although the whole of rational creation could have been posited as the universe, the Author nevertheless rationally posited the human race: not because men and angels constitute two universes; but since it is in fact established that some men are reprobate and some predestined, as though the very race of man had the character of a certain universe consisting of so many grades. And that this is the meaning of the text, those words intimate: If therefore we consider the whole human race, as the whole universe of things. For from the known conditional he implies that it was not so much by force of reason as by fact that he exercised this proportionality.

To the second it is said that the arguer, perhaps dreaming, raised this objection against this text: for nowhere is such a proportion found to be made.

To the third, it is said in two ways. First, that the text infers reprobation not from the shining forth of justice simply, but of such a justice. But such a justice is not preserved in the predestined. — Second, it is said that reprobation can be inferred even from the very notion of justice. For justice is properly said to be the work in which justice itself shines forth most fully, and mercy less so; just as conversely mercy is said absolutely where it is as it were the whole of it, leaving little room for justice. And thus, although something of justice is preserved in the predestined, reprobation occurs so that its abundance may shine forth.

XI. To the fourth objection, so that the response and the doctrine of St. Thomas may be well understood, it is first necessary to state that in reprobation there are three things: the permission of sin, sin itself, and eternal punishment. Nor are these three effects of divine reprobation, just as everything ordaining to eternal life was an effect of predestination ¹⁵. Therefore we cannot rightly say here, of the whole effect of reprobation or a part of it, as we distinguished ¹⁶ concerning the effect of predestination; but speaking more cautiously, we must say: the whole of what is in reprobation, or what is in it by the power of the one reprobating. And then know that, according to St. Thomas, as is clear on chapter IX of the Epistle to the Romans ¹⁷, the opinion concerning the cause of predestination differs from that concerning reprobation. For the last effect of reprobation, namely punishment, has its cause on the part of the reprobate, namely guilt, of which God is in no way the author; but although the last effect of predestination, namely beatitude, has some cause in us, namely merit, yet all of it is from the one predestining. And thus, if the discussion concerns the whole effect of each, namely of reprobation and predestination, no question about sin should be inserted; but only about those things which are from the one reprobating and predestining, which must be good. And of these it is said that divine goodness is their cause. But if the discussion concerns the whole of what is found in the reprobate, then something is from God and from divine goodness, while something is neither from God nor on account of divine goodness, but rather is an aversion from it, as is clear in the case of mortal sin. And therefore, although foreknowledge of merits is not granted to be the cause of predestination, nevertheless the foreknowledge of demerits is in a certain special way the cause of reprobation. For on account of demerits foreseen, not prepared by themselves, God decrees of Himself that certain ones be punished forever, so that His goodness may be participated even in such justice, and thus the modes of participating it, decreed by His wisdom, may be fulfilled.

Since, therefore, the shining forth of the divine goodness in punitive justice is said in the text to be the end and reason of reprobation, this must be referred to the very effects of reprobation, namely the permission of sins and the punishments of fault prepared or rendered; and not with respect to sin itself. For its end is not any good, as is clear from what has been said above. Nor must it be referred to those very effects in such a way that other causes of each individual effect are excluded; as the adversaries seem to have understood, and were therefore deceived. For, as is expressly stated in the text, the permission of evils is for the sake of the preservation of the diverse. And, applying this to the evils of fault, the sweet ordering of rational creatures and of men is manifestly the cause of the permission of sins, while certain men are left to the hand of their own counsel. Punishment of fault also, which is in no way from God, is a demeritorious cause. Hence all the arguments of both Henry and Aureol proceed from a false interpretation of this text; for they understood that the shining forth of the divine justice was posited by St. Thomas as the end of reprobation with respect to its effects, excluding the other causes and especially fault. The opposite of which we have already made manifest.

XII. Responding therefore point by point, to the first ¹⁸ it is said that the order among the effects of predestination is different from that of the effects of reprobation. For the end of the former is not posterior to it in the way that reward is the end of merit; for we do not say that God permits sins in order to punish them, but rather that He permits and punishes them on account of the shining forth of His justice. And since this constitutes the whole effect of reprobation, the reason of reprobation is rightly said to be divine justice. Nor is it true that whoever has the power to hinder another's sin sins if he permits it. For this holds only in one who is bound to hinder it, as even human governance teaches by experience: much of the sweetness of governance would perish if permission were not lawful.

For the confirmation of Aureol, however, it is said that reprobation with respect to its ultimate effect, namely punishment, even granted that it would be evil without any demerit whatsoever; yet with respect to its first effect, namely the permission of demerit, is not evil even if no other cause underlay it than the shining forth of divine justice. For permission itself takes nothing away from one who falls of those things which are owed to him; it only denies him the gratuitous love of God, whereby he might be kept from falling. Hence, since permission in itself is not evil, and the shining forth of divine goodness in punitive justice is a great good, if permission were ordered to nothing else, it would still be good. It must therefore be denied both that reprobation, with respect to its first effect, all other causes set aside, would be evil; and that we posit reprobation, with respect to all its effects, without any other cause, as is now clear from what has been said¹⁹.

At the end it is said, denying the assumption: namely, punitive justice is not intended per se. For "intended per se" is not said in only one way: something is intended per se first, and something per se not first. That is intended per se first which, being good, in itself matches the intention of all things that in any way tend toward it; that is, both it itself and all things converging toward it in any way are intended by it with respect to that for which it is intended per se first. But that is said to be intended per se not first which is indeed good and intended in itself, yet arises from something in no way intended. And punitive justice is of this number, for it takes its occasion from sins to be punished. — That perfections of this kind, presupposing the evil of fault, are intended per se and are to be so called, is attested by the shining forth of divine goodness in the Passion of Christ. For it is evident that it was intended per se by God, since through it was intended the whole breadth of the happiness of all purely human predestined persons, and the glory of His body, together with the other things He merited for Himself and for others. And yet it had to arise from the evil of fault of those who put Him to death.

Therefore neither consequence has any force. As for the first, this is sufficiently evident. Nor need one be concerned about the second: for it is plainly clear that, on account of these goods occasioned by evil of fault, many things are fittingly and rationally brought about in the universe, as is apparent in the examples adduced.

XIII. As to the second point²⁰, he intends this conclusion: The cause why God predestines these and reprobates those is the will of God alone. And he proves it by the authority of Augustine; as well as by a proportional similitude to the parts and positions of matter, both in natural things and in things made by art, as is clearly evident in the text.

XIV. Concerning this part, three things are brought forward in objection²¹. The first is the conclusion itself; the second is the natural example; the third is the artificial example.

Henry objects against both examples, first, because in the parts of matter, whether subjected to art or to the agent of nature, the reason is equal: but in these men and those men the reason is unequal, differently disposed in this one than in that. — Aureol, secondly, because parts of matter of this kind lack sense and experience of good and evil: but these men and those men experience both goods and evils of punishment. And therefore the reason is not equal: since in examples will alone suffices, because no injury is done to anyone; in the case at hand it does not suffice, because injury is done to those who suffer and are afflicted.

XV. Against this conclusion, although Aureolus and Henry argue, yet no other difficulty is touched than the one already discussed and made manifest²², and it is expedient to pass over it. For this conclusion intends nothing other than that, given the foregoing, namely the causes of reprobation and predestination in general, there is no cause why those causes, together with their effects, are applied to this man rather than to that one, except the divine will. Why he permits this one to fall, but holds that one so that he does not fall, depends on his will alone. But why he punishes this one does not depend on God's will alone, but on this one's demerit, as we said concerning the punishment of the reprobate in general. Hence, in concluding why the first effect of reprobation is in this one and not in that one, the will of God alone is the cause. For neither from the divine goodness, nor from an unequal disposition (since there is none before the first effect, as was proved in the body of the article, against Henry's position²³), is there a reason why the effect is placed in this one rather than in that one.

XVI. From these things, moreover, the solution to the objections of Aureol is first evident²⁴. For he attacks what we have never dreamed, namely, that God, according to the pleasure of His will, punishes and afflicts this man more than that one; thinking that this text intended this, and the examples adduced; when nevertheless all of them look to the first effects, namely, permission and love. - The response to Henry is also clear. For before the aforesaid first effects, these men and those are equally disposed; just as the parts of prime matter, and stones with respect to a house, etc.

XVII. As to the third point²⁵, the answer to the argument is that it is not an injustice to prepare unequal things for equals in matters of gratuitous gift, but only in matters of what is owed. And this is confirmed by the authority of the Father of the household, Matthew 20.

XVIII. Note here that both Henry and Aureol²⁶ attempt to criticize this passage, because reprobation is not among the number of gratuitous things. For to punish is an act not of grace but of justice; and in matters of justice the word of the Father of the family has no place. But the answer to this is most easy. Reprobation, as was already said ²⁷, with respect to its ultimate effect, namely punishment, exercises an act of justice, in which, as the text expressly says, it is not permitted to each one to do what he wills. With respect to its first effect, however, namely the permission of sin, etc., it exercises a negation of the act of mercy or of grace. And since not only is it gratuitous to give a greater or lesser grace, but simply giving and not giving it are also comprehended within the breadth of gratuitous things; therefore reprobating and predestining are rightly reckoned among the gratuitous things, though in different ways, as is clear from what was said ²⁸. And for this reason the saying of the Father of the family is applied to them most fittingly.