Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title, note that here the question concerns divine predestination, not simply, given the manner of asking; but with respect to human beings. Yet both are intended. And therefore in the body he determines the question whether it is simply; but in the responses to the arguments, with respect to human beings.

II. In the body a single conclusion is set forth, answering the question affirmatively, In God there is predestination; with one corollary at the end. – The conclusion is proved thus. Eternal life, consisting in the divine vision, is an end exceeding the proportion and capacity of created nature: therefore the rational creature, capable of it, is led into it as one sent forth by God: therefore the reason of this sending preexists in God: therefore in God there is predestination.

The antecedent is explained by distinguishing a twofold end to which a creature is ordered by divine providence, namely the proportionate and the superexceeding; and it is proved from what was said above in question twelve. – The first consequence is proved: because that which something cannot reach by its own power must be conveyed to it by another, as an arrow by the archer. – The second, however, is proved: because in it lies the reason for the ordering of all things to their end, which is called providence. – The third is proved thus. The reason of a thing to be made preexisting in the mind of its maker is a kind of preexistence: therefore the reason of such a transmission-to-be-made is a preexisting transmission: therefore it is predestination. This last point is proved: because destinare is to send, and praedestinatio is the reason of such a transmission to eternal life.

The corollary, then, is: Predestination, with respect to its objects, is a part of providence. And it is proved: because all things fall under divine providence insofar as they are ordered to an end.

III. Note here that predestination, on the side of the act, is not posited as a part of providence: since the divine act has in itself neither the character of a part nor of a whole. But with respect to its objects, it is posited as a part of providence. For each of the three subjects of predestination is a part of the subjects of providence¹: for the thing is a rational creature, the order is transmission, and the end is eternal life; and it is evident that each of these is a part of the whole of created being, of created order, and of created end, which are the subjects of providence.

IV. On this point, note the difference between the doctrine of St. Thomas and that of others, among whom is Scotus, in the eleventh distinction of the First Part². For they hold that predestination properly signifies election, and consequently an act of the divine will. Here, however, it is expressly stated that it signifies an act of the intellect, just as providence does: since it is a part of prudence.

For its greater clarity, recall that the divine intellect, speaking in our manner, first devised the order of those to be chosen and sent into eternal life, and proposed it to his will for acceptance; then his will freely chose that order to be carried out; and thus, thirdly, the order which previously, that is, in itself, had the character of something devised, now has the character of something decreed. The diversity of opinions, therefore, consists in this: that they say that the very act of election, which decreed that devised and proposed order, is to be understood by the name of predestination; whereas we signify by the name of predestination not the order devised, but the order decreed in the very mind of the author. And since this diversity concerns words rather than things, in that no one doubts that all these are required for predestination, let each abound in his own sense, provided we use the names as do the many.