Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title, note that here the question concerns divine predestination, not simply, given the manner of asking; but with respect to human beings. Yet both are intended. And therefore in the body he determines the question whether it is simply; but in the responses to the arguments, with respect to human beings.

II. In the body a single conclusion is set forth, answering the question affirmatively, In God there is predestination; with one corollary at the end. – The conclusion is proved thus. Eternal life, consisting in the divine vision, is an end exceeding the proportion and capacity of created nature: therefore the rational creature, capable of it, is led into it as one sent forth by God: therefore the reason of this sending preexists in God: therefore in God there is predestination.

The antecedent is explained by distinguishing a twofold end to which a creature is ordered by divine providence, namely the proportionate and the superexceeding; and it is proved from what was said above in question twelve. – The first consequence is proved: because that which something cannot reach by its own power must be conveyed to it by another, as an arrow by the archer. – The second, however, is proved: because in it lies the reason for the ordering of all things to their end, which is called providence. – The third is proved thus. The reason of a thing to be made preexisting in the mind of its maker is a kind of preexistence: therefore the reason of such a transmission-to-be-made is a preexisting transmission: therefore it is predestination. This last point is proved: because destinare is to send, and praedestinatio is the reason of such a transmission to eternal life.

The corollary, then, is: Predestination, with respect to its objects, is a part of providence. And it is proved: because all things fall under divine providence insofar as they are ordered to an end.

III. Note here that predestination, on the side of the act, is not posited as a part of providence: since the divine act has in itself neither the character of a part nor of a whole. But with respect to its objects, it is posited as a part of providence. For each of the three subjects of predestination is a part of the subjects of providence¹: for the thing is a rational creature, the order is transmission, and the end is eternal life; and it is evident that each of these is a part of the whole of created being, of created order, and of created end, which are the subjects of providence.

IV. On this point, note the difference between the doctrine of St. Thomas and that of others, among whom is Scotus, in the eleventh distinction of the First Part². For they hold that predestination properly signifies election, and consequently an act of the divine will. Here, however, it is expressly stated that it signifies an act of the intellect, just as providence does: since it is a part of prudence.

For its greater clarity, recall that the divine intellect, speaking in our manner, first devised the order of those to be chosen and sent into eternal life, and proposed it to his will for acceptance; then his will freely chose that order to be carried out; and thus, thirdly, the order which previously, that is, in itself, had the character of something devised, now has the character of something decreed. The diversity of opinions, therefore, consists in this: that they say that the very act of election, which decreed that devised and proposed order, is to be understood by the name of predestination; whereas we signify by the name of predestination not the order devised, but the order decreed in the very mind of the author. And since this diversity concerns words rather than things, in that no one doubts that all these are required for predestination, let each abound in his own sense, provided we use the names as do the many.

In the title, whether it posits something: that is, when it is said, Socrates is predestined, whether the term predestined predicates some being in Socrates, substantial or accidental, as when it is said, Socrates is an animal, or, Socrates is white; or whether it posits nothing in him, but denominates him only by extrinsic denomination, as when it is said, the white thing is seen.

II. In the body there is a single conclusion, answering the question in the negative: Predestination is not something in the predestined, but only in the one who predestines. – The conclusion is proved and made evident. It is indeed proved as follows. Providence establishes nothing in the things provided for, but only in the intellect of the provider the reason of order, etc.: therefore predestination establishes in the divine mind alone the reason of order of the elect, etc. And the consequence is proved: because predestination is a part of providence.

It is made manifest, however, by the difference between predestination itself and its execution. For this, taken actively, posits something in the one executing it, namely God; and something in the predestined. And this is declared by a similar difference between providence and governance; which indeed posits something actively in the one governing, but passively in the governed. – And since the execution of predestination lacks any single proper name, therefore it is expressed in the text by two terms, when it is added that it is calling and glorification, from the testimony of the Apostle, etc.

In the title, to reprobate in general signifies the rejection of something as unworthy; in the matter at hand, however, that unworthiness is considered with respect to eternal life.

II. In the body he does two things: first, he answers the question affirmatively, settling the question whether it is; second, there: Therefore thus, he settles the question what it is ¹. And although this was not directly asked, yet since the proper cause of whether it is is what it is, as is said in II Posterior Analytics ², both are rightly settled together.

III. As to the first, this is the conclusion: God reprobates some. - It is proved. It belongs to providence to permit some defect in things subject to it; therefore it belongs to divine providence to permit some to fall short of eternal life; therefore to reprobate some.

The antecedent is clear from what has been said. The first consequence, however, is proved: because it belongs to divine providence to order human beings toward eternal life. The second, moreover: because this is nothing other than to reprobate.

IV. Concerning this argument a doubt arises: since its whole force does not infer the intended conclusion. For either it intends to infer that reprobation, or the permission of defect from eternal life, is rightly inferred from the fact that it belongs to the provider to permit; or it intends that from this it is rightly inferred that the permission, if there is one, pertains to providence. And if indeed it intends the latter, it does not answer the question: for from this it is not obtained that God reprobates some; but only that, if He reprobates, reprobating pertains to His providence. – But if it intends the former, then the argument is worthless; indeed, the fallacy of the consequent is committed, while it is argued from providence in general, with respect to an end in general, to providence with respect to this end, namely eternal life. For although the permission of some defect is required for the providence of the universe, and likewise it is not repugnant to providence in general to permit certain defects, nevertheless not every providence requires this, as is evident in the case of the providence over necessary things, thus understood. And yet the text infers as if that proposition—namely, that it pertains to providence to permit—were universal.

V. To this it is briefly answered that the first sense is directly according to the intention of the letter, since it thus answers the question. Nor is it necessary on that account to admit any sophism, nor to use that proposition as a universal simpliciter: but as a universal in defective matter secundum se. So that the sense is: It belongs to providence over things that are in themselves defectible with respect to their end, to permit, etc. And then it follows most excellently: Therefore divine providence has this act, namely, to permit some to fall short of eternal life; since rational creatures are defectible with respect to this end. – And if you ask for the foundation of that premise, know that it is the gentle ordering of the things provided. For from the fact that providence gently orders things, it leaves defectible things to their own powers: and thus defects come about.

VI. As to the second point³, he says three things about reprobation. First, that it is a part of providence. And he proves this from its proportionality to predestination. – Second, that it is not merely foreknowledge. And he proves this from its whole, namely from providence, which manifestly adds something above foreknowledge. – Third, that it includes the will of permitting the fall and of punishing fault. And he proves this again from its proportionality to predestination, in that the latter regards both what belongs to the present life and what belongs to the future life, etc.

From these things, however, it is easily gathered what reprobation is: namely, that it is foreknowledge, together with the will to permit fault, and to condemn on account of fault.

In the title, the word "election" is taken properly, insofar as it signifies an act of the will by which, when a choice is set before it, it prefers one thing to another.

II. In the body there is one conclusion, answered affirmatively: All the predestined are elected and loved by God. – It is proved. Prudence is a reason existing in the intellect, directive of the ordination of certain things to an end; therefore providence is a directive reason, etc.; therefore predestination is a directive reason of the ordination of certain ones to eternal life; therefore the predestination of some presupposes that God wills their salvation; therefore predestination presupposes election, and election love; therefore all the predestined are elected and loved by God. The first consequence is proved: because as it is with prudence, so it is with providence. And note that "as" here is taken more expressively than comparatively: since providence, as was said above ¹, is the principal part of prudence; indeed it is itself the chief act of political prudence. – The second, however, is not found explicitly in the text; but it was added for a clearer context. And it is evident from this, that predestination is a part of providence. – The third is proved: because nothing is directed to an end by command unless the will of the end preexists. And understand this of true interior command. I say this on account of exterior command, which was posited as a sign of the divine will in qu. XIX ²: for taking command in that way, God commands many things which He does not will, as is evident in sinners. – The fourth is proved: because to such divine willing belong election and love. And since in this fourth consequence three things are inferred, namely election, and love, and the order between divine election and love; therefore each is made manifest in the text. First, that from such willing love follows: because He wills this good to them; for to love is to will good to someone. – Second, that election: because He wills this good to them before others, whom He reprobates. – Third, that election presupposes love: and this from the difference between the order of these acts in us and in God; since in God love precedes election, in us conversely. And the reason is, because His will causes the goodness of things; ours, however, is moved by the goodness of things.

III. Concerning the difference now assigned, note that the aforesaid difference must be understood with respect to one and the same object; and again, as concerning the first reason of election. Otherwise, this difference, understood universally, does not appear to be true. For since love is the first act of the will, we cannot choose unless we first love. Yet from love of circumstances we choose this one, that we may love him; as is evident in the choice of a wife. And thus, with respect to this and not simply, in us election precedes dilection. Manifestly also in our beneficent dilection it is evident that, although doing good precedes election of the one to whom good is done, while we would pursue all with equal love; nevertheless it cannot come about that an effect produced in the beloved from our love alone should lead us to elect him; for, with equality of love standing, election cannot follow. But if disparity be made in loving, we are moved by the more loved circumstances of the object to choose this one before others, that he may be loved. And thus our dilection cannot be the first reason of election with respect to the same one; although it can be secondary; as when out of love for someone he himself is chosen, that he may be loved for some other good, as happens daily. In God, however, dilection must precede this election as its first and entire cause on the part of the thing loved: because election supposes a disparity of one from another; and the whole reason of that disparity in the creature is the good willed for it by God. And so dilection is the reason of election in God.

The title is explained in the body. - In the body he does three things: first, he explains the title; second, he treats of three opinions concerning the question at issue¹; third, he answers the question².

II. As to the first point, he distinguishes that predestination's being caused from foreknown merits can be understood in two ways. First, on the side of the act: and thus there is no question. Second, on the side of the effect: and thus it becomes a matter of doubt. And he makes this distinction clear, with its members, from the divine will, since the will itself is contained within predestination. For by the same distinction one must proceed when the question concerns the cause why God wills something, as is evident from what was said above. And the text is clear.

III. As to the second, the first opinion is that of Origen, who says that merits acquired by souls before this life are the cause of predestination. — And it is refuted by the authority of the Apostle: when they had not yet done anything good etc.

The second is that of the Pelagians, who say that merits pre-existing in this life are the reason for predestination, because the beginning of doing good comes from us. — But this is refuted by the authority of the Apostle, that we are not sufficient even to think, etc.: for it is evident that thought is the first beginning from us of cooperating well.

The third opinion is that future merits, within this present life, are the cause of predestination. And to this opinion is reduced the opinion retracted by Augustine³, namely, that future faith was the reason for the predestination of Jacob rather than of Esau. — But the Author refutes this opinion in the text as follows. If anything on our part were the cause of predestination, it would not be included under the effect of predestination; but everything found in the good use of grace is an effect of predestination; therefore nothing that is in the good use of grace is a cause of being predestined. — The destruction of the consequent is proved as follows. What is from the second cause is not distinct from what is from the first cause; therefore what is from free choice is not distinct from what is from predestination; therefore what is through free choice is from predestination. The first consequence just drawn is proved: because divine providence produces effects through the operations of secondary causes.

IV. Concerning this part, note that Henry of Ghent, Quodl. IV, art. 19, and Quodl. VIII, art. 5, holds an opinion quite close to this mode of the refuted position, saying that good use, not of grace, as the preceding opinion said, but of free choice, is the cause of predestination. And since the argument made in the text directly militates against such an opinion, he therefore attempts to solve it and to prove his own opinion. And he indeed proves his own opinion by the authority of Augustine: it came from most hidden merits etc.⁴, as you have from the Master, dist. 41⁵ Then by reason, in three ways. First because election presupposes a disparity between choosing and rejecting. Second because justice is always the companion of mercy: and thus some congruence on the part of the one predestining must be found for merciful predestination. Third because there is some cause of reprobation on our part: therefore also of predestination.

But the present argument proceeds by denying that from the indistinction of what comes from free choice and divine grace it follows that what is on the side of free choice is wholly enclosed under predestination, or under its effect. For there can stand as indistinct the good use of free choice, which is from grace and free choice, and yet this very thing be in a certain way from free choice in respect of that by which it is not from grace. And thus, in that manner in which it is ours and not grace's, it can be a cause of predestination. That the good use of free choice is in some way our own, in respect of that by which it is not grace's, is clear from the authority of Augustine, on the text: Help us, O God, our salvation⁶, where he wills that we cooperate with grace.

V. To these points, since this opinion is manifestly of the same difficulty as the one recited in the text, it must now be answered briefly. And to the authority of Augustine the Master responds⁷ by saying that it was retracted in a similar case. And he says well: for Augustine himself expressly handed down this retraction of his rules⁸, so that an opinion retracted in one place is to be considered retracted everywhere in his works.

To the arguments it is said that election presupposes love, from which the disparity arises. But love is not outside predestination. — Justice, too, is to be sought in the first effects, not in relation to creatures, but as the companion of divine goodness and wisdom. — Nor is the judgment the same concerning reprobation and predestination. For in reprobation there is something outside the whole effect of reprobation, namely guilt; but it is not so in the predestined, in whom the whole of that which orders him to eternal life is the effect of predestination.

And from this the error of the solution offered is apparent. For it seems that this same person made one and the same judgment about grace that makes pleasing, of which Augustine speaks, and concerning which it is verified that the good use of free choice is in some way from us, such that it is not from grace; and about the grace of predestination, that is, gratuitous predestination; even though these differ more than heaven and earth. For under the latter fall not only acts of charity, but all their modes, and gratuitous aids, and briefly, as is said in the text, everything ordaining one to eternal life who has been predestined. And thus, since the good use of free choice, insofar as it is from us, is one of those things by which we are ordained to eternal life (for we are ordained so that, freely cooperating well, we may attain it); it follows that not only the good use of free choice itself, but also the mode by which it is from us, falls under predestination; although it does not fall under grace that makes pleasing. And thus, since in the text it is said that what is from free choice and from predestination is not distinguished, this must be understood not only with respect to the act itself, but also with respect to every mode of it: and by this token, it must be interpreted according to every kind of distinction. - And thus let there be an end to the opinions.

VI. As to the third point ⁹, he answers the question with a distinction, in three conclusions. The distinction is: The effect of predestination can be taken in two ways: namely, in general or in particular. And he is not concerned with universality and singularity according to predication, but according to totality and partition: so that by general he means the whole effect of predestination, whether in all, or in some one predestined person; whereas by particular he means some part of the whole effect of predestination, whether in some one particular predestined person, or even in all in general; for this makes no difference to the matter at hand.

The first conclusion, therefore, is: The particular effects of predestination are in no way prevented from having a cause, such that one is the cause of the other, and conversely. — It is explained: because the latter is the end of the former; and the former is as the matter of the latter, as merit for the sake of reward, etc.

The second conclusion is: The whole effect of predestination has no cause on our part. — It is proved: because the whole in us that orders us to eternal life is an effect of predestination; because also our very preparation, according to that saying: Turn us to you, O Lord, and we shall be turned.

The third conclusion is: The whole effect of predestination has divine goodness as its cause. — It is proved: because it is both the ultimate end of that effect and its first reason, as the first mover of the divine will to predestine.

VII. Reply to the third, since it contains many points, and almost every word has been attacked by Henry ¹⁰ and Aureolus ¹¹; it must be treated and examined point by point. This reply therefore does three things: first, it assigns the cause of reprobation and predestination in general; second, the cause of each of them in particular, there: But why he chose these ¹²; third, it directly answers the argument, there: Nor yet etc. ¹³

VIII. As to the first, he intends this conclusion: God reprobates certain men and predestines others, so that his goodness may be represented both by the mode of pardoning mercy and by the mode of punitive justice. And he proves this in two ways: first, by reason; second, by the authority of the Apostle, Romans IX, and 2 Timothy II.

The argument is drawn from the proportional likeness of the universe and of the human race in their order to eternal life. And it consists in this: that, just as the divine goodness is the final cause of the perfection of the universe, and thus from it is derived the reason for the diversity of grades of things according to highest and lowest, and for the permission of evils; so from that same goodness is derived the reason for the diverse grades within the human race, according to mercy in sparing, and according to justice in punishing. — And the assumption is made clear. For the divine goodness is the end of all things as representable through them; and since it is one and simple, and no creature can attain to its simplicity, it must be represented by diverse things. And consequently, if the universe ought to represent it perfectly, yet within the breadth of a creature, it must consist of all the grades from the lowest up to the highest. And if these must be preserved, many evils must be permitted, as was declared above.

IX. Concerning this argument, four objections arise. First is the proportion between the human race and the universe. Henry argues this, saying that a proportion ought to have been established between the whole of rational creation and the universe. For the divine goodness is represented in punitive justice with respect to the demons; and thus the argument from men amounts to nothing.

According to there is a proportion between the degrees of the universe and the degrees of man. There is not, says Henry, the same account of them: since all the species of the universe pertain to the perfection of the universe per se; but not all the species of moral acts. — This is proved: because no defect, whether of fault or of punishment, pertains per se to the perfection of the universe; yet it is evident that many moral acts, such as lying, theft, and things similar to these, are species of evil of fault.

Third is the application of justice to the reprobate. For justice is saved, says Aureolus, in the predestined; according to that saying of the Apostle ¹⁴: which the Lord, the just judge, will render to me on that day.

Fourth is the final causality attributed to punitive justice, with respect to reprobation in general. Against this both argue. Henry indeed, because it does not seem reasonable that God should permit sins to come about, so that he may afterwards punish them. Indeed, among men we see that one who permits another to sin, when he could forbid or prevent him, sins himself. Therefore this must not be attributed to God. — And Aureol confirms this, because evils are not to be done that goods may come of them: but reprobation without any demerit is an evil; therefore it is not to be brought about by God for this reason alone, that his goodness might appear in his justice. — Moreover, says Aureol, punitive justice is not intended for its own sake, but only on the supposition of a punishable fault. Therefore it is not itself the principal cause of reprobation, but sin precedes it. And again: therefore there is no necessity that anything be done in the universe in order that punitive justice may shine forth.

X. To the first of these it must be said that, although the whole of rational creation could have been posited as the universe, the Author nevertheless rationally posited the human race: not because men and angels constitute two universes; but since it is in fact established that some men are reprobate and some predestined, as though the very race of man had the character of a certain universe consisting of so many grades. And that this is the meaning of the text, those words intimate: If therefore we consider the whole human race, as the whole universe of things. For from the known conditional he implies that it was not so much by force of reason as by fact that he exercised this proportionality.

To the second it is said that the arguer, perhaps dreaming, raised this objection against this text: for nowhere is such a proportion found to be made.

To the third, it is said in two ways. First, that the text infers reprobation not from the shining forth of justice simply, but of such a justice. But such a justice is not preserved in the predestined. — Second, it is said that reprobation can be inferred even from the very notion of justice. For justice is properly said to be the work in which justice itself shines forth most fully, and mercy less so; just as conversely mercy is said absolutely where it is as it were the whole of it, leaving little room for justice. And thus, although something of justice is preserved in the predestined, reprobation occurs so that its abundance may shine forth.

XI. To the fourth objection, so that the response and the doctrine of St. Thomas may be well understood, it is first necessary to state that in reprobation there are three things: the permission of sin, sin itself, and eternal punishment. Nor are these three effects of divine reprobation, just as everything ordaining to eternal life was an effect of predestination ¹⁵. Therefore we cannot rightly say here, of the whole effect of reprobation or a part of it, as we distinguished ¹⁶ concerning the effect of predestination; but speaking more cautiously, we must say: the whole of what is in reprobation, or what is in it by the power of the one reprobating. And then know that, according to St. Thomas, as is clear on chapter IX of the Epistle to the Romans ¹⁷, the opinion concerning the cause of predestination differs from that concerning reprobation. For the last effect of reprobation, namely punishment, has its cause on the part of the reprobate, namely guilt, of which God is in no way the author; but although the last effect of predestination, namely beatitude, has some cause in us, namely merit, yet all of it is from the one predestining. And thus, if the discussion concerns the whole effect of each, namely of reprobation and predestination, no question about sin should be inserted; but only about those things which are from the one reprobating and predestining, which must be good. And of these it is said that divine goodness is their cause. But if the discussion concerns the whole of what is found in the reprobate, then something is from God and from divine goodness, while something is neither from God nor on account of divine goodness, but rather is an aversion from it, as is clear in the case of mortal sin. And therefore, although foreknowledge of merits is not granted to be the cause of predestination, nevertheless the foreknowledge of demerits is in a certain special way the cause of reprobation. For on account of demerits foreseen, not prepared by themselves, God decrees of Himself that certain ones be punished forever, so that His goodness may be participated even in such justice, and thus the modes of participating it, decreed by His wisdom, may be fulfilled.

Since, therefore, the shining forth of the divine goodness in punitive justice is said in the text to be the end and reason of reprobation, this must be referred to the very effects of reprobation, namely the permission of sins and the punishments of fault prepared or rendered; and not with respect to sin itself. For its end is not any good, as is clear from what has been said above. Nor must it be referred to those very effects in such a way that other causes of each individual effect are excluded; as the adversaries seem to have understood, and were therefore deceived. For, as is expressly stated in the text, the permission of evils is for the sake of the preservation of the diverse. And, applying this to the evils of fault, the sweet ordering of rational creatures and of men is manifestly the cause of the permission of sins, while certain men are left to the hand of their own counsel. Punishment of fault also, which is in no way from God, is a demeritorious cause. Hence all the arguments of both Henry and Aureol proceed from a false interpretation of this text; for they understood that the shining forth of the divine justice was posited by St. Thomas as the end of reprobation with respect to its effects, excluding the other causes and especially fault. The opposite of which we have already made manifest.

XII. Responding therefore point by point, to the first ¹⁸ it is said that the order among the effects of predestination is different from that of the effects of reprobation. For the end of the former is not posterior to it in the way that reward is the end of merit; for we do not say that God permits sins in order to punish them, but rather that He permits and punishes them on account of the shining forth of His justice. And since this constitutes the whole effect of reprobation, the reason of reprobation is rightly said to be divine justice. Nor is it true that whoever has the power to hinder another's sin sins if he permits it. For this holds only in one who is bound to hinder it, as even human governance teaches by experience: much of the sweetness of governance would perish if permission were not lawful.

For the confirmation of Aureol, however, it is said that reprobation with respect to its ultimate effect, namely punishment, even granted that it would be evil without any demerit whatsoever; yet with respect to its first effect, namely the permission of demerit, is not evil even if no other cause underlay it than the shining forth of divine justice. For permission itself takes nothing away from one who falls of those things which are owed to him; it only denies him the gratuitous love of God, whereby he might be kept from falling. Hence, since permission in itself is not evil, and the shining forth of divine goodness in punitive justice is a great good, if permission were ordered to nothing else, it would still be good. It must therefore be denied both that reprobation, with respect to its first effect, all other causes set aside, would be evil; and that we posit reprobation, with respect to all its effects, without any other cause, as is now clear from what has been said¹⁹.

At the end it is said, denying the assumption: namely, punitive justice is not intended per se. For "intended per se" is not said in only one way: something is intended per se first, and something per se not first. That is intended per se first which, being good, in itself matches the intention of all things that in any way tend toward it; that is, both it itself and all things converging toward it in any way are intended by it with respect to that for which it is intended per se first. But that is said to be intended per se not first which is indeed good and intended in itself, yet arises from something in no way intended. And punitive justice is of this number, for it takes its occasion from sins to be punished. — That perfections of this kind, presupposing the evil of fault, are intended per se and are to be so called, is attested by the shining forth of divine goodness in the Passion of Christ. For it is evident that it was intended per se by God, since through it was intended the whole breadth of the happiness of all purely human predestined persons, and the glory of His body, together with the other things He merited for Himself and for others. And yet it had to arise from the evil of fault of those who put Him to death.

Therefore neither consequence has any force. As for the first, this is sufficiently evident. Nor need one be concerned about the second: for it is plainly clear that, on account of these goods occasioned by evil of fault, many things are fittingly and rationally brought about in the universe, as is apparent in the examples adduced.

XIII. As to the second point²⁰, he intends this conclusion: The cause why God predestines these and reprobates those is the will of God alone. And he proves it by the authority of Augustine; as well as by a proportional similitude to the parts and positions of matter, both in natural things and in things made by art, as is clearly evident in the text.

XIV. Concerning this part, three things are brought forward in objection²¹. The first is the conclusion itself; the second is the natural example; the third is the artificial example.

Henry objects against both examples, first, because in the parts of matter, whether subjected to art or to the agent of nature, the reason is equal: but in these men and those men the reason is unequal, differently disposed in this one than in that. — Aureol, secondly, because parts of matter of this kind lack sense and experience of good and evil: but these men and those men experience both goods and evils of punishment. And therefore the reason is not equal: since in examples will alone suffices, because no injury is done to anyone; in the case at hand it does not suffice, because injury is done to those who suffer and are afflicted.

XV. Against this conclusion, although Aureolus and Henry argue, yet no other difficulty is touched than the one already discussed and made manifest²², and it is expedient to pass over it. For this conclusion intends nothing other than that, given the foregoing, namely the causes of reprobation and predestination in general, there is no cause why those causes, together with their effects, are applied to this man rather than to that one, except the divine will. Why he permits this one to fall, but holds that one so that he does not fall, depends on his will alone. But why he punishes this one does not depend on God's will alone, but on this one's demerit, as we said concerning the punishment of the reprobate in general. Hence, in concluding why the first effect of reprobation is in this one and not in that one, the will of God alone is the cause. For neither from the divine goodness, nor from an unequal disposition (since there is none before the first effect, as was proved in the body of the article, against Henry's position²³), is there a reason why the effect is placed in this one rather than in that one.

XVI. From these things, moreover, the solution to the objections of Aureol is first evident²⁴. For he attacks what we have never dreamed, namely, that God, according to the pleasure of His will, punishes and afflicts this man more than that one; thinking that this text intended this, and the examples adduced; when nevertheless all of them look to the first effects, namely, permission and love. - The response to Henry is also clear. For before the aforesaid first effects, these men and those are equally disposed; just as the parts of prime matter, and stones with respect to a house, etc.

XVII. As to the third point²⁵, the answer to the argument is that it is not an injustice to prepare unequal things for equals in matters of gratuitous gift, but only in matters of what is owed. And this is confirmed by the authority of the Father of the household, Matthew 20.

XVIII. Note here that both Henry and Aureol²⁶ attempt to criticize this passage, because reprobation is not among the number of gratuitous things. For to punish is an act not of grace but of justice; and in matters of justice the word of the Father of the family has no place. But the answer to this is most easy. Reprobation, as was already said ²⁷, with respect to its ultimate effect, namely punishment, exercises an act of justice, in which, as the text expressly says, it is not permitted to each one to do what he wills. With respect to its first effect, however, namely the permission of sin, etc., it exercises a negation of the act of mercy or of grace. And since not only is it gratuitous to give a greater or lesser grace, but simply giving and not giving it are also comprehended within the breadth of gratuitous things; therefore reprobating and predestining are rightly reckoned among the gratuitous things, though in different ways, as is clear from what was said ²⁸. And for this reason the saying of the Father of the family is applied to them most fittingly.

In the title, note, from Qu. de Veritate, qu. VI, art. 3, that "certain" can be understood in two ways: namely, with the certainty of knowledge, or with the certainty of order. For since predestination contains within itself two things, namely foreknowledge and pre-causality, its certainty can be considered both with respect to knowledge, namely insofar as it has certain knowledge of the predestined effects and events; and again its certainty can be considered with respect to causality, namely insofar as it has an infallible order in attaining and leading to the predestined effects. And since the first certainty does not go beyond the limits of divine science, concerning which there has been ample treatment ¹, whereas the certainty of order has its own difficulties in this matter, therefore the title here is to be understood as concerning the certainty of order. So that the sense is: whether predestination, inasmuch as it is a cause, has an infallible order toward the intended effects.

II. In the body there is one responsive conclusion, having, however, two parts: Predestination is certain; yet it imposes no necessity. – This is proved, with respect to both parts at once, in two ways. First, on the side of providence, thus. The order of providence is infallible, and yet certain things subject to providence come about contingently, according to the conditions of proximate causes: therefore the order of predestination is also certain, and yet the effects of predestination come about contingently, in accordance with the freedom of the will. – The antecedent is clear from the preceding question. The consequence, however, is proved: because predestination is a part of providence.

Second, it is manifest, as a conclusion from what was said above under similar conditions concerning the divine science and the divine will, with respect to contingent things.

III. Note here that the text plainly equates the certainty of providence with the certainty of predestination; indeed, from the certainty of the order of the former it proves a priori the certain order of the latter, so that, just as everything predestined, so too everything provided for comes about infallibly. But the words of St. Thomas in Question On Truth, q. 6, art. 3, where a difference is posited between predestination and providence on the ground that providence is not certain with respect to the event of a particular end in contingent matter, whereas predestination is certain, are not to be interpreted as they sound, as is clear from this text and from what was said above ² For he does not mean that such events are not subject to divine providence, nor that the opposite of an event that has been provided for occurs; but rather that many orders of such contingent causes toward certain future things fall under divine providence, and yet those future things will never come to be—as is clear from many preparations of causes of this kind which nonetheless do not bring about their intended outcomes. Under predestination, however, no particular order of anything toward some future thing falls without the event of that future thing also falling under the same. And this difference arises from the breadth of the scope of providence, namely because under it every order is included, whether or not with the event of the future thing; under predestination, however, only those orders having an event tending to the intended end, even in particular; for no order falling short of its own intended object, as such, falls under it.

IV. Nevertheless, those words are not to be extended, nor to be used, since an order that falls short of its proper outcome is not provided for by God with respect to the outcome, but with respect to the order itself, and not its proper outcome; and therefore the non-occurrence of such an event takes nothing away from the certainty of providence. For this reason we said ³, and we say, that the Author changed the words for the better, treating here simply of the certainty of providence, by equating it with predestination. Nor does he mention those things, since what has now been said can, by a pious interpretation, be sustained in some measure on the side of things.

The other matters that would need to be discussed concerning the certainty of predestination have already been treated in the preceding question on Providence. Hence there is no need to repeat them here.

The title is clear. - In the body he does three things: first, concerning the certainty of the number of the predestined absolutely; second, concerning the number of the reprobate¹; third, concerning the certainty, as far as we are concerned, of the number of the predestined², he treats.

II. As to the first, the conclusion is this, answering the question affirmatively: The number of the predestined is certain to God; not only formally, but materially; not only as known, but as chosen and preordained.

This conclusion has three principal parts. And the first, namely that it is certain to God, is left standing as constant.

Second, namely, not only formally, but materially, and it is declared as regards the terms, while certain persons denying this are adduced: and it is proved by leading to an absurdity, thus. If the number of the predestined were certain to God formally only, the certainty of order attributed to predestination in the preceding article would be taken away: this is an absurdity: therefore. — The consequence is evident: because it could stand that Peter be predestined, and yet not be saved; and thus predestination would not infallibly attain its effect.

The third, namely, not only as known, but as predefinite, and it is declared with respect to its terms, by the example of the number of drops of rain and of the sand of the sea, with respect to ly known; and the difference between the number of dwellings of a house and the measurements of a wall, etc., and the number of stones, with respect to the builder, with respect to ly predefinite: and it is proved thus. Every agent intends to make something finite; therefore it intends some determinate measure in its effect; therefore it devises some number in the principal parts required per se for the whole; therefore God preordained in what measure the whole universe ought to be; therefore he predefinite what would be the fitting number of the essential parts of the universe, that is, the perpetual ones; therefore he predefinite a certain number of the predestined.

The antecedent is supposed from question seven. - The second consequence, however, is made clear from the difference between the number of things principally required for the work, and the number of those required only on account of something else. For the number of the former is predetermined; while as many of the latter are prescribed as will be needed for the construction of the former. - The third, however, is proved: because the whole universe is the proper effect of God. - The fourth, indeed, with respect to that term, namely the parts of the universe, is made clear from the difference between corruptible and incorruptible things, thus: in this respect, that the latter are for their own sake, but the former are for the sake of the preservation of the species, looking to the universe. And from this a corollary pertaining to the providence of God is inserted: namely, that the number of corruptible individuals outside the human species is certain to God not by predetermination, but by foreknowledge; whereas the number of species is certain to God in both ways, and likewise the number of elements, stars, and spheres. – Finally, the fifth is proved: because rational creatures attaining beatitude are ordered to the good of the universe before other creatures. Which is proved: because insofar as they are rational, they are simply incorruptible as such; but insofar as they attain beatitude, they more immediately reach the ultimate end itself of the whole universe, namely God.

III. Concerning the antecedent, a doubt arises on account of the infinity of motion. For it is agreed that, among the philosophers, the movers of the spheres intend to move always; and consequently they intend to produce an infinite effect. And yet in the text it is assumed that every agent intends to produce a finite effect.

To this there is a twofold reply. First, that this assumption is understood of an effect in act: for of such an effect it was proved in question 7 that it cannot be intensified by any agent. Now the motion of the heavens, it is evident, is not infinite in act: and therefore it does not stand against the proposition.

The philosophers would say, secondly, that the movers of the spheres do not intend infinite circulations per se and in the first place, but rather assimilation to God in causing other things; and because this is preserved by moving, therefore they intend to move always, as it were, per accidens; as if the infinite circulations were not for their own sake, but because so many are required for preserving, or diffusing, the perfection of things moved, up to the glorious God.

IV. Concerning the explanation of the parts of the universe, a doubt arises. For in I Caeli ³, Aristotle and St. Thomas hold that only simple bodies are the parts of the universe according to species; here, however, the species of mixed bodies, and of plants and animals, are added.

This can be said in two ways. First, because in Book I of the De Caelo the discussion concerns the substantial perfection of the universe, whereas here it concerns perfection after the manner of a passion or attribute. For all corporeal species are related to the simple bodies as passions to their subject, since from them they are made and subsist both actively and materially.

Second, it is said that the universe can be taken in two ways. In one way, for the corporeal universe as such: and in this way it is treated in I On the Heavens. And it is constituted from simple bodies alone: since there is no bodily mass in the universe except of simple bodies; for all bodily matter of mixed bodies is from the elements. In another way, for the universe of perfection: and thus it is treated here. And for its completeness all species are required, as is said in the text: for the specific perfections of these bodies are not from simple bodies as such, but from a certain higher nature, as is evident in the case of vital perfection.

V. Concerning the conclusion itself, note that Aureolus, as cited by Capreolus, in distinction XL of Book I ⁴, strives to attack it. But since he does not argue from proper and certain arguments, but from common ones pertaining to the discernment of the predestined from the reprobate, and he equivocates concerning the end of the universe, and these matters are set forth above ⁵, I judged it should be passed over: for from them the solution of all his objections is easily evident.

VI. As to the second ⁶, the conclusion is this: The number of the reprobate is not fixed in so absolute a manner. – And it is proved. For the elect, all things cooperate for good; therefore the reprobate have been preordained by God for the good of the elect; therefore the number of the reprobate is not fixed in so absolute a manner.

Here the word thus entirely comes in. For in the reprobate there are two things: namely, their very nature, and what pertains to their reprobate being. As regards nature, the number of elect and reprobate is predestined in the same way: since both are of the same nature—incorruptible, rational, etc. But as regards what is given by grace, just as the elect are predestined for their own sake, so that they may attain the ultimate end simply through their own acts and felicity, so the reprobate, like irrational creatures, are provided for not toward their own good (since they are deprived of felicity), but toward a good that is another's, namely that of God and the elect: thus the number of the elect is certain on account of themselves, while the number of the reprobate is certain on account of something else, that is, the elect. Hence, considering the reprobate with respect to their subject, we say that their number is certain even predestinatively. But considering them insofar as they are reprobate, we say that they are not fixed in number predestinatively; rather, divine providence makes use of as many reprobates as it sees can contribute to the good of the elect. And this distinction is what the text intends by those words, yet it is not thus entirely. For in saying not thus, it excluded the reprobate from the principal parts of the universe and from those that are per se first; but by adding the word entirely, it exempted them from being parts purely on account of something else; and thus it placed them, as it were, in the middle, on account of the incorruptibility of their subject, etc., as we have said.

VII. As to the third point ⁷, the number of predestined human beings is treated, namely, whether it is certain to us. Three opinions are reported, and none of them is approved; rather a fourth is set forth as better.

Let it be noted here that these opinions are not condemned. First, because in a matter highly doubtful, and hidden from us by certainty, the authors have spoken in an opinative manner. Second, because the authors of these opinions seem to have been illustrious, and even saints: for the second opinion is known to be Gregory's ⁸ The fourth, however, is said to be better than all the others, because it rests upon the authority of the Church, which says in the secret prayer: O God, to whom alone is known the number of the elect to be placed in supernal felicity. And in order to intimate this, the Author used the same words in the text.

The title is clear. – In the body he does two things: first, he treats two opinions; second, he answers the question¹.

II. As to the first point, the opinions and their refutations are sufficiently clear in the text. And know that, as is stated in article 6 of Question 6 On Truth, the first opinion seems to have arisen from the Epicureans, the second from the Stoics, or rather from the Egyptians, whence it was handed down to the Stoics. And Avicenna² also seems to have fallen into it. And since these opinions are extremes—the first holding that our acts contribute nothing, the second that they accomplish everything, so that they even change the one who predestines—reasonably the middle opinion is confirmed as true, namely, that in some way yes, and in some way no, as is added in the text.

III. As to the second, therefore, he answers the question with two conclusions, according to the two members of the distinction. The distinction is: In predestination there are two things, namely the preordination and its effect.

The first conclusion is: Predestination, insofar as it is a preordination, is in no way helped by the prayers of the saints. – And it is proved: because it is not by the prayers of the saints that anyone is predestined by God to eternal life.

The second is: Predestination, as to its effect, is aided by the prayers of the saints and by other good works. – And it is proved. Providence does not do away with secondary causes, but makes use of them in such a way that, without them, the effects provided for would not come about: therefore the predestination of someone's salvation contains within its order whatever advances that person toward salvation, whatever those things may be, such that without them he would not attain salvation: therefore the effect of predestination is fulfilled with certainty by prayers of this kind and works: which was the point intended. – The antecedent is clear from what has been said³; and it is made manifest in natural things. The first consequence, however, which alone is stated explicitly in the text, is proved: because predestination is a part of providence. The rest are evident in themselves.

A corollary is also appended in the text, or rather inserted by way of exhortation, because this matter greatly benefits moral conduct. And it is confirmed by the authority of the Apostle Peter, as is sufficiently clear in the text.