Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

The title is clear from what was said in question XIX, article 8¹. For the question is whether, given the position of divine providence explained in the manner stated², it follows that all things provided for are necessary.

II. In the body he does two things: first, he sets forth the responsive conclusion, with a recitation of the opposing opinion annexed to it; second, he proves that conclusion itself. – The conclusion is: Divine providence imposes necessity upon some things, and not upon all.

It is proved thus. It belongs to divine providence to order things to an end: therefore, to the perfection of the universe: therefore, to produce all grades of being: therefore, to prepare necessary causes for certain effects, and contingent causes for others. It does not, then, pertain to it to impose necessity upon all things.

The first consequence is proved: because the perfection of the universe is the principal good existing in it. For the divine goodness is a far greater good, but separate from the universe, and its end is separate, as is clear from Metaphysics XII Metaphys.³ – The second is proved: because the perfection of the universe would not be, unless all grades of being were found in things. – The third: because in order that effects come about necessarily or contingently, their proximate causes must be of this kind.

Here there is no need to repeat the discussion of contingency again: it is enough that what was said above⁴ also applies to this passage.

III. In response to the first, a doubt arises that is most difficult, and perhaps insoluble by the human intellect. For the sake of its clarity, so that it may be better perceived in what the doubt consists, it must be noted that it is one thing for A to happen contingently, another for A to happen necessarily, and another for A to happen infallibly or inevitably. For both the first and the second import an order of the effect to a cause posited in act: the former, indeed, in that it has from its cause a potency for either alternative; the latter, however, in that it cannot fail, through its cause, from that causality itself. But the third is more common than both: since both contingent and necessary things follow divine providence posited in act infallibly or inevitably; and with this, the former follow contingently, and the latter necessarily.

IV. For although the intellect rests with these considerations, attending to the response given in the text concerning the preservation of contingency, it nevertheless wavers regarding the connection of the aforesaid infallibility with free will—or rather, to speak more correctly, with the free outcome (eventus) of those operations which we call free; and likewise with the ambiguous outcome of other contingent things. For in a free operation one must consider the will itself, its cause, and its outcome or execution thereof—now in such a way that these are not opposed. And although it is not difficult to preserve the nature of such a cause, namely a free cause, together with the aforesaid infallibility (since infallibility of this kind neither gives to nor takes from the cause anything with respect to being able to be either way ad utrumlibet; rather, it stands together with the fact that the cause has an indifferent power toward that infallible thing and toward its opposite; and for this reason divine providence does not take away contingency from things); yet to preserve the aforesaid infallibility together with the indifference or freedom of execution or outcome—this is the task, this is the labor. For if it is infallible that I shall write at dawn tomorrow, although I have the power either way—that is, to write then or not to write then—nevertheless this power and freedom will not issue into the act of negating my writing, but of affirming it, so that it is inevitable that the affirmation come about. And if this is so, since divine providence has already from eternity been determined in act with respect to all things, and is immutable and infallible, etc., it follows that de facto all things come about inevitably, although some contingently and some necessarily.

V. I said "de facto" advisedly: for, speaking of possibility absolutely, God can refrain from determining his providence to these or those future things. But once it is determined, the avoidability of what comes to pass is repugnant to its immutability, efficacy, universality, and certainty. And if all things come to pass inevitably de facto, why do we deliberate, and strive to pursue these things rather than those, or to avoid them? For nothing seems less destroyed by this than the whole moral part, all the striving of the Church, and exhortation to the good, than by the denial of contingency. For although the denial of avoidability and the denial of contingency are not equivalent, as is already clear from what has been said⁵, yet with respect to the proposed difficulties they seem to be equivalent. For no one deliberates about the inevitable; nor does anyone strive, exhort, or pray concerning inevitable things.

VI. To this doubt I have found nothing written in St. Thomas, since nowhere do I recall that he raised this question; rather, he always strove to safeguard contingency. Nor have I found anything in other doctors up to now concerning this question, except what is commonly said about the composite and divided sense, about the necessity of the consequence and of the consequent, about the freedom of God's election in eternity, and about the nature of contingent causes (causae ad utrumlibet) found throughout the universe.

VII. But all these things, as is clear from what has been said, do not quiet the intellect: since, as was already said at ⁶ the question concerns not God considered in himself, but God as he in fact exists; and likewise not the natures of the causes or of things themselves, nor necessity or contingency; but rather the compossibility of inevitable events with the contingency and freedom of those same events. For the question is not satisfied by saying that an occurring act is avoidable and unavoidable: avoidable indeed in itself; but unavoidable insofar as it is foreseen. For although this is true, it does not untie the knot. Since the act that occurs de facto has already been foreseen from eternity, and being foreseen overcomes its conditions considered in themselves: and consequently the occurring act is simply, that is, all things considered, unavoidable; and in a certain respect, that is, taken in isolation, avoidable. Just as the throwing of merchandise during a shipwreck is simply willed, because it is willed when all things are considered; and in a certain respect it is unwilled, because the throwing itself, considered in itself, is displeasing.

Nor does it serve the purpose to say that the esse provided puts nothing into the act that occurs. For in this example it is clearly apparent that it makes no difference to the matter whether it puts something or not: for the esse willed puts nothing into the projected commodity, and yet, etc.

Nor is it avoided by saying that, because a contingent act is foreseen by God, and its inevitability follows from being foreseen as a thing related to God, the contingent act is in fact inevitable with respect to God, but not with respect to us. For this amounts to nothing. Since, if it is in fact inevitable from God, then it is also in fact inevitable and simply inevitable, and from us: for it is impossible for anything to be avoided by anyone that cannot in fact be avoided by God, on account of His supreme efficacy.

VIII. Therefore, if the truth of this question is to quiet our intellect, we must say one of two things: either that being foreseen does not entail inevitability; or that the inevitability of the foreseen event does not detract from the avoidability of those same events. And this second option, because of the reason adduced above ⁷, I do not see how it can be verified: for it is clear that avoidability appears to be preserved only in a qualified sense. — As for the first, although it is commonly rejected by the doctors, who say that being foreseen, or willed, or predestined (for I take all of these as equivalent with respect to this difficulty) entails inevitability; yet I, not so as to set myself against the current, nor asserting this, but always holding my intellect captive in obedience to Christ, suspect that just as being foreseen establishes neither contingency nor necessity in the event foreseen, as is said in the text, because God is a superexceeding cause, eminently possessing beforehand both necessary and contingent things (for by this St. Thomas escapes that argument of Metaphysics VI Metaphys. cited here: he intends that Aristotle's propositions are verified in particular causes, some of which are necessary, others contingent, others per se, and others per accidens; but not in the most universal cause exceeding the necessary and contingent, the per se and the per accidens; since it belongs to that cause to produce, as effects chosen by itself, not only things but all the modes of things and events); so too, raising the eyes of the mind higher, God himself, out of an excellence higher than we can conceive, so provides for things and events that being foreseen by him entails something higher than avoidability or inevitability; so that from the passive foreseeing of the event, neither member of that combination need follow. And if this is so, the intellect will rest, not on the evidence of a truth inspected, but on the inaccessible height of a hidden truth. And this seems sufficiently reasonable to my little mind: both because of the reason given above; and because, as Gregory says ⁸, he thinks less of God who believes about him only what his own ingenuity can measure.

IX. Nor on that account do I suspect that anything of what we know or hold by faith to pertain to the divine immutability, actuality, certainty, and universality, and the like, is to be denied; but I judge that something hidden lies concealed, either on the side of the order that exists between God and the event foreseen, or in the bond between the very event and its foreseen being. And thus, considering that the understanding of our soul is the eye of an owl, I find rest for it only in ignorance. For it is better, both for the Catholic faith and for philosophy, to confess our blindness than to assert as evident things that do not give rest to the intellect: for evidence is what gives rest. Nor therefore do I accuse all teachers of presumption: since, stammering as best they could, all of them intended to intimate the immobility and supreme and eternal efficacy of the divine intellect, will, and power through the infallibility of the order of divine election with respect to all events: none of which stands against the aforesaid suspicion, which believes that something deeper lies hidden in them. And truly, if it were so preached, perhaps no Christian would err concerning predestination; just as no one errs in the matter of the Trinity, because it is said, and written, and is indeed so, that it is hidden from human understanding, and faith alone suffices.

The best and most wholesome counsel in this matter is to begin from those things which we know with certainty and experience within ourselves, namely, that all things contained under our free will are avoidable by us; and for this reason we are worthy of punishment or reward. How, however, with this preserved, divine providence and predestination may be preserved, etc., we must believe as Holy Mother Church believes. For it is written ⁹: Seek not the things that are too high for thee; for many things are revealed to thee above the understanding of men. And this is one of them.