Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

No title is needed for the exposition: for whoever says all excludes nothing. In the body he does two things. First, he reports three opinions concerning the question at issue. The first is that of Democritus and Epicurus, who say that nothing is subject to divine providence. The second is that of Averroes, in Book XII of the Metaphysics, commentaries XXXVII and LII, who says that only incorruptible things are subject to divine providence. The third is that of Rabbi Moses, who says that not only incorruptible things but also singulars—yet those of the human species alone—are subject to divine providence. Now the reasons from which these opinions arose are adduced in the text as arguments.

II. Second, he answers the question according to the truth, with a single conclusion, which he proves in two ways¹. The responsive conclusion is therefore: All things are subject to divine providence, not only universally but also singularly. — And it is proved first as follows. Every agent acts for an end: therefore all things subject to the causality of the first agent are also subject to its ordination toward an end: therefore all things that have being (esse) in any way whatsoever are ordered by God to an end: therefore all things, insofar as they have being (esse) in any way at all, to that extent are subject to divine providence. The first consequence is made manifest from the opposite: namely, that something intervenes in the works of a certain agent that is not subject to that order precisely because that effect is not subject to the causality of that cause, but proceeds from some other cause, beyond the intention of the agent itself. — The second consequence is proved from the fact that the causality of God extends itself to all things, even individual ones, etc. And its consequent is confirmed by the authority of the Apostle. — The third consequence is proved from the very definition of providence: namely, that it is the reason of the order of things toward an end.

III. Concerning this argument, note three things. First, that the first inference was proven a posteriori because it holds of itself in virtue of the antecedent. For when I say, every agent acts for an end, I signify the causality of the agent in what I say, acts; but the ordination of the effect to the end is signified by the word for an end. Therefore the causality is no broader than the ordination, unless it act not for an end. And for this reason it follows most fittingly, and without any other middle term, that if action is for an end, the ordination to an end extends just as far as the causality: because the word for matches the word acts. Second, that the term "causality" placed in the text must be weighed with respect to the present matter, and taken with sufficient propriety. For it is not taken for any manner whatsoever of making something; but for making something in such a way that by its very action it makes that which is called the effect by itself; so that the thing truly has from that causality the condition that has been made. As a sign of this, in the text the effect per accidens of some cause is said to be through the causality of another cause; and not of that cause of which it is said to be the effect per accidens. Causality thus understood is nothing other than causality per se. Yet it was not necessary to express the words per se in the text: since in scientific discourse all things are to be interpreted per se. Third, that when it is said here that God's causality extends itself to all things, etc., this is to be understood as was said and expounded in question VIII², namely through essence and power. Otherwise, this reasoning would be worth nothing, as can easily be seen by one who considers it.

IV. The second argument³ for the conclusion is: God knows all things, even in their particularity, as their craftsman; therefore it is necessary that all things be subordinated to His order. — And the inference is proved: because all things made by art are subject to the order of the art. Note here that the intention of the text is not to posit an identity between art and providence, since their difference is manifest, in that art regards the very substance of the things made, whereas providence regards their order to an end. Rather, it intends that art and providence are related proportionally; and therefore, etc. In sign of this, the text, in proving the inference, uses the term as, which is a mark not of identity but of likeness, doubtless proportional in this context.

V. In response to the first objection, note that both the fortuitous and the accidental are relative: and therefore it is not necessary that what is fortuitous in itself and absolutely be fortuitous with respect to every agent. For this is the difference between absolute and relative things, that when something is in itself simply such according to some absolute predicate, it does not cease to be or to be called such by comparison with anything whatsoever; but when something is such in itself and absolutely according to some relative predicate, not only does it not have such a predicate in relation to anything whatsoever, but only in relation to its correlative; rather, it can even acquire the opposite relative predicate, though in relation to another correlative, as is clear in the case of white, which, though absolutely similar to another white thing, when compared to black, is dissimilar. Therefore, since things are called fortuitous or accidental in relation to created nature and intention, it is not unfitting that in relation to the divine intention they be not fortuitous, but intended per se and so called. Yet in such a way that, taken in themselves, they both are and are called simply accidental or fortuitous: for the reason that each thing is and is judged according to its own and proximate causes.

And by this it is clear that this doctrine concerning divine providence does not contradict the doctrine handed down in natural philosophy ⁴, and VI Metaphysics ⁵ For in both places things are examined and judged according as they depend on proximate causes, or at least particular causes, such as all created causes are; and the mode in which an effect is caused—namely, necessarily or contingently—is subject neither to their intentions nor to their causalities. For this is proper to the first cause, which regards being (ens) precisely as being (ens).

VI. In response to the second, a difficulty arises as to how the evils of fault are permitted by God on account of the perfection of the universe. First, because if God had cooperated with His grace with both the angels and men who fell, unto perseverance in good forever, as was possible, the universe would be much better: since nothing would have fallen away from order in respect of the divine will according to itself, which is the supreme order in the universe; for in such a falling away the evil of fault consists, as was said above ⁶ Second, because the virtues which are occasioned by the evil of fault, such as the patience of martyrs and penitence, etc., would not be lacking to the universe: for they would be found according to the preparation of the mind.

VII. To this it is said that the integrity of the universe is a greater good than any particular created good, as is clear from Genesis I ⁷. Now the integrity of the universe requires the virtues, and whatever other goods occasionally arise from evil—not only in the imperfect state, but in the perfect state. And it is evident that the perfect state of virtue consists in second act, and not in habit, as is clear from I Ethics ⁸ and XII Metaphysics ⁹ Many perfections would therefore be lacking to the universe: for instance, punitive justice, the patience of the martyrs, and similar things. – Indeed—and this must be weighed most of all—the universe would lack that sacrifice of the divine supposit which He offered on the cross; and this was and is so great a good that it exceeds in goodness every evil of fault, not only of men but also of demons. Hence even the order toward the divine goodness in itself, though wounded by the evil of fault, was so enriched with good by God out of that same evil of fault—good belonging to that very order—that we may rightly say that God acted felicitously with respect to the universe when He permitted the evils of fault; in accordance with that saying of Gregory ¹⁰: O happy fault, etc.

VIII. There is also a natural reason why evil of fault was permitted, namely the gentle ordering of things. For the power of sinning could not be withdrawn from the universe without its greatest loss, namely the loss of all intellectual creatures, as is clear elsewhere ¹¹ Now the act of sin, proceeding from such a power, could indeed have been prevented, that is, not permitted; yet the gentle ordering of created free will does not require this, but rather that it act of its own power. And since it belongs to divine providence to order all things gently, God most wisely chose the permission of evils of fault.

IX. Nor let you be deceived, when you read in the text that evils are intended by universal nature; and accordingly that evils of fault are intended by the first and most universal agent. For these are not to be understood as if those evils themselves were willed or intended, either per se or per accidens (since this is impossible in the case of evil of fault, as was shown above at ¹²): but that those evils themselves are not unwilled, that is, excluded, by the intention or volition of the first cause; and that the permission of evils of fault is intended, on account of the integrity and perfection of the universe. And according to this permission, there holds a proportional likeness between the intention of universal nature with respect to natural evils and the intention of God in glory with respect to evils of fault.