Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

The title is clear. - In the body there is a single conclusion, responsive to the question in the affirmative: It is necessary that there be providence in God.

And it is proved. Every good that is in things is created by God; therefore the good of the order of things to their end, and especially to the ultimate end, is created by God; therefore the reason of the order of things to their end preexists in the divine mind; therefore providence is in Him.

The antecedent is evident. - The first consequence is proved: because in created things goodness is found not only according to the substances of things, but also according to their order to an end, and especially the ultimate end. - The second, however, is proved: because God is the cause of things through intellect. - The third, however, is proved from the very definition of providence: namely, that it is the reason of the order of things to an end.

And each part of the definition is explained. First, that it be a reason (ratio): because it is the principal part of prudence. Second, that it be a reason of order toward an end: because it is proper to prudence to order things toward an end. Third, that it be a reason concerning things: from the difference between monastic and economic or political prudence; since the former is the reason ordering one's own acts to the end of one's own life, while the latter is the reason ordering subjects under oneself to their end, as is clear Matthew 24. For from this distinction it follows that divine providence is not a part of monastic prudence: since this latter is impossible for God, because He has nothing orderable to an end. But it is a part of prudence in a quasi-political way, indeed rather monarchic. And consequently it must be a reason ordering things themselves, as subjects, to their ends. — And this definition is confirmed by the authority of Boethius, etc.: and from the difference between providence and disposition.

II. Concerning the definition of providence, a difficult doubt arises: whether, when it is said the order of things to an end, both the order itself to the end and the attainment of the end are understood, or the order only. Now the reason for doubting is that expressly in the Questions on Truth, qu. 6, art. 1, it is said that divine providence is the reason of the order to the end, and not of the event, that is, of the attainment of the end itself. In what follows, however, the opposite is stated many times: in the following article in the reply to objection 1, and in article 4 most openly, and in article 6 of the following question; so that there is no room for denial.

III. To this, briefly, in my judgment, it must be said that the Author changed his opinion for the better; and this must be held as his mind, which is gathered from here and from III Contra Gentiles, chapter 94: namely, that providence is the reason of order toward an end with respect to both, namely, of ordination and of attainment. — And this is the more reasonable view. For providence pertains to the will of God following upon His intellect; and it extends itself to all beings in whatever way they are, as will be made clear in what follows in ¹, as a cause per se. For with these things it cannot stand that providence should regard order only: for then many things would come about outside it; just as in fact they come about outside the order of things, but not outside its order and outcome.

No title is needed for the exposition: for whoever says all excludes nothing. In the body he does two things. First, he reports three opinions concerning the question at issue. The first is that of Democritus and Epicurus, who say that nothing is subject to divine providence. The second is that of Averroes, in Book XII of the Metaphysics, commentaries XXXVII and LII, who says that only incorruptible things are subject to divine providence. The third is that of Rabbi Moses, who says that not only incorruptible things but also singulars—yet those of the human species alone—are subject to divine providence. Now the reasons from which these opinions arose are adduced in the text as arguments.

II. Second, he answers the question according to the truth, with a single conclusion, which he proves in two ways¹. The responsive conclusion is therefore: All things are subject to divine providence, not only universally but also singularly. — And it is proved first as follows. Every agent acts for an end: therefore all things subject to the causality of the first agent are also subject to its ordination toward an end: therefore all things that have being (esse) in any way whatsoever are ordered by God to an end: therefore all things, insofar as they have being (esse) in any way at all, to that extent are subject to divine providence. The first consequence is made manifest from the opposite: namely, that something intervenes in the works of a certain agent that is not subject to that order precisely because that effect is not subject to the causality of that cause, but proceeds from some other cause, beyond the intention of the agent itself. — The second consequence is proved from the fact that the causality of God extends itself to all things, even individual ones, etc. And its consequent is confirmed by the authority of the Apostle. — The third consequence is proved from the very definition of providence: namely, that it is the reason of the order of things toward an end.

III. Concerning this argument, note three things. First, that the first inference was proven a posteriori because it holds of itself in virtue of the antecedent. For when I say, every agent acts for an end, I signify the causality of the agent in what I say, acts; but the ordination of the effect to the end is signified by the word for an end. Therefore the causality is no broader than the ordination, unless it act not for an end. And for this reason it follows most fittingly, and without any other middle term, that if action is for an end, the ordination to an end extends just as far as the causality: because the word for matches the word acts. Second, that the term "causality" placed in the text must be weighed with respect to the present matter, and taken with sufficient propriety. For it is not taken for any manner whatsoever of making something; but for making something in such a way that by its very action it makes that which is called the effect by itself; so that the thing truly has from that causality the condition that has been made. As a sign of this, in the text the effect per accidens of some cause is said to be through the causality of another cause; and not of that cause of which it is said to be the effect per accidens. Causality thus understood is nothing other than causality per se. Yet it was not necessary to express the words per se in the text: since in scientific discourse all things are to be interpreted per se. Third, that when it is said here that God's causality extends itself to all things, etc., this is to be understood as was said and expounded in question VIII², namely through essence and power. Otherwise, this reasoning would be worth nothing, as can easily be seen by one who considers it.

IV. The second argument³ for the conclusion is: God knows all things, even in their particularity, as their craftsman; therefore it is necessary that all things be subordinated to His order. — And the inference is proved: because all things made by art are subject to the order of the art. Note here that the intention of the text is not to posit an identity between art and providence, since their difference is manifest, in that art regards the very substance of the things made, whereas providence regards their order to an end. Rather, it intends that art and providence are related proportionally; and therefore, etc. In sign of this, the text, in proving the inference, uses the term as, which is a mark not of identity but of likeness, doubtless proportional in this context.

V. In response to the first objection, note that both the fortuitous and the accidental are relative: and therefore it is not necessary that what is fortuitous in itself and absolutely be fortuitous with respect to every agent. For this is the difference between absolute and relative things, that when something is in itself simply such according to some absolute predicate, it does not cease to be or to be called such by comparison with anything whatsoever; but when something is such in itself and absolutely according to some relative predicate, not only does it not have such a predicate in relation to anything whatsoever, but only in relation to its correlative; rather, it can even acquire the opposite relative predicate, though in relation to another correlative, as is clear in the case of white, which, though absolutely similar to another white thing, when compared to black, is dissimilar. Therefore, since things are called fortuitous or accidental in relation to created nature and intention, it is not unfitting that in relation to the divine intention they be not fortuitous, but intended per se and so called. Yet in such a way that, taken in themselves, they both are and are called simply accidental or fortuitous: for the reason that each thing is and is judged according to its own and proximate causes.

And by this it is clear that this doctrine concerning divine providence does not contradict the doctrine handed down in natural philosophy ⁴, and VI Metaphysics ⁵ For in both places things are examined and judged according as they depend on proximate causes, or at least particular causes, such as all created causes are; and the mode in which an effect is caused—namely, necessarily or contingently—is subject neither to their intentions nor to their causalities. For this is proper to the first cause, which regards being (ens) precisely as being (ens).

VI. In response to the second, a difficulty arises as to how the evils of fault are permitted by God on account of the perfection of the universe. First, because if God had cooperated with His grace with both the angels and men who fell, unto perseverance in good forever, as was possible, the universe would be much better: since nothing would have fallen away from order in respect of the divine will according to itself, which is the supreme order in the universe; for in such a falling away the evil of fault consists, as was said above ⁶ Second, because the virtues which are occasioned by the evil of fault, such as the patience of martyrs and penitence, etc., would not be lacking to the universe: for they would be found according to the preparation of the mind.

VII. To this it is said that the integrity of the universe is a greater good than any particular created good, as is clear from Genesis I ⁷. Now the integrity of the universe requires the virtues, and whatever other goods occasionally arise from evil—not only in the imperfect state, but in the perfect state. And it is evident that the perfect state of virtue consists in second act, and not in habit, as is clear from I Ethics ⁸ and XII Metaphysics ⁹ Many perfections would therefore be lacking to the universe: for instance, punitive justice, the patience of the martyrs, and similar things. – Indeed—and this must be weighed most of all—the universe would lack that sacrifice of the divine supposit which He offered on the cross; and this was and is so great a good that it exceeds in goodness every evil of fault, not only of men but also of demons. Hence even the order toward the divine goodness in itself, though wounded by the evil of fault, was so enriched with good by God out of that same evil of fault—good belonging to that very order—that we may rightly say that God acted felicitously with respect to the universe when He permitted the evils of fault; in accordance with that saying of Gregory ¹⁰: O happy fault, etc.

VIII. There is also a natural reason why evil of fault was permitted, namely the gentle ordering of things. For the power of sinning could not be withdrawn from the universe without its greatest loss, namely the loss of all intellectual creatures, as is clear elsewhere ¹¹ Now the act of sin, proceeding from such a power, could indeed have been prevented, that is, not permitted; yet the gentle ordering of created free will does not require this, but rather that it act of its own power. And since it belongs to divine providence to order all things gently, God most wisely chose the permission of evils of fault.

IX. Nor let you be deceived, when you read in the text that evils are intended by universal nature; and accordingly that evils of fault are intended by the first and most universal agent. For these are not to be understood as if those evils themselves were willed or intended, either per se or per accidens (since this is impossible in the case of evil of fault, as was shown above at ¹²): but that those evils themselves are not unwilled, that is, excluded, by the intention or volition of the first cause; and that the permission of evils of fault is intended, on account of the integrity and perfection of the universe. And according to this permission, there holds a proportional likeness between the intention of universal nature with respect to natural evils and the intention of God in glory with respect to evils of fault.

In the title, "ly" immediate signifies the negation of an intermediate provider, to the completion of divine providence. And the sense is: whether for the act of providing for all things, which befits God, there is required—or indeed also concurs—some intermediate provider, in such a way.

II. In the body he makes three points. First, he distinguishes the act of providence into two: namely, into ordering, and the execution of the decree of order. The first is properly called to provide; the second, however, to govern.

III. Second, he answers the question with two conclusions, according to these two acts. The first is: God provides immediately for all things, as regards the reason of order. — The second, however, is: God provides through certain means, as regards execution. The first is proved. God has in his intellect the reason of all things, even the least; and he gave to the causes which he set over their effects the power to produce those effects: therefore in his reason he prepossesses the order of those effects to an end: therefore God provides through himself for all things, as regards the reason of order. The second, however, is proved: because God governs lower things through higher ones. — And immediately there is excluded a tacit objection against it, when it is said that to govern through means befits God not on account of a defect of power, etc.; as is clear from the text.

IV. Attend, novice, to the fact that between providing and governing there is this difference: that providing is an immanent operation, whereas governing is a transient one. And for this reason providing does not of itself posit an imperfection in the one who provides: since it imports that he does not establish in his mind the whole order of all things to every end, but only a part. Governing through means, however, does not posit an imperfection in the governor unless it proceeds from some defect in him; rather it posits that his action is carried out through many things as it were instruments—which is not unfitting for God, as is evident.

V. Third, from what has been said the opinion of Plato is excluded quite clearly. Concerning which, however, if you wish to see at length how it is refuted, read book III Cont. Gent., chapter LXXVI. For there you will also notice that it is not the intention of the present discussion to exclude intermediate providers as executors of the divine order extending down to the smallest things (for this would be to abolish human prudence as well): but to exclude intermediate providers insofar as they are merely providers; that is, to exclude them as providers in such a way that they are not executors of the aforesaid order, but of another, otherwise not comprehended within the divine act. And if you wish to perceive more fully the conclusions laid down here, read book III Cont. Gent., chapter XCIV, where the distinction just made is set forth and made manifest at greater length, together with these same conclusions, at the beginning of the solution.

The title is clear from what was said in question XIX, article 8¹. For the question is whether, given the position of divine providence explained in the manner stated², it follows that all things provided for are necessary.

II. In the body he does two things: first, he sets forth the responsive conclusion, with a recitation of the opposing opinion annexed to it; second, he proves that conclusion itself. – The conclusion is: Divine providence imposes necessity upon some things, and not upon all.

It is proved thus. It belongs to divine providence to order things to an end: therefore, to the perfection of the universe: therefore, to produce all grades of being: therefore, to prepare necessary causes for certain effects, and contingent causes for others. It does not, then, pertain to it to impose necessity upon all things.

The first consequence is proved: because the perfection of the universe is the principal good existing in it. For the divine goodness is a far greater good, but separate from the universe, and its end is separate, as is clear from Metaphysics XII Metaphys.³ – The second is proved: because the perfection of the universe would not be, unless all grades of being were found in things. – The third: because in order that effects come about necessarily or contingently, their proximate causes must be of this kind.

Here there is no need to repeat the discussion of contingency again: it is enough that what was said above⁴ also applies to this passage.

III. In response to the first, a doubt arises that is most difficult, and perhaps insoluble by the human intellect. For the sake of its clarity, so that it may be better perceived in what the doubt consists, it must be noted that it is one thing for A to happen contingently, another for A to happen necessarily, and another for A to happen infallibly or inevitably. For both the first and the second import an order of the effect to a cause posited in act: the former, indeed, in that it has from its cause a potency for either alternative; the latter, however, in that it cannot fail, through its cause, from that causality itself. But the third is more common than both: since both contingent and necessary things follow divine providence posited in act infallibly or inevitably; and with this, the former follow contingently, and the latter necessarily.

IV. For although the intellect rests with these considerations, attending to the response given in the text concerning the preservation of contingency, it nevertheless wavers regarding the connection of the aforesaid infallibility with free will—or rather, to speak more correctly, with the free outcome (eventus) of those operations which we call free; and likewise with the ambiguous outcome of other contingent things. For in a free operation one must consider the will itself, its cause, and its outcome or execution thereof—now in such a way that these are not opposed. And although it is not difficult to preserve the nature of such a cause, namely a free cause, together with the aforesaid infallibility (since infallibility of this kind neither gives to nor takes from the cause anything with respect to being able to be either way ad utrumlibet; rather, it stands together with the fact that the cause has an indifferent power toward that infallible thing and toward its opposite; and for this reason divine providence does not take away contingency from things); yet to preserve the aforesaid infallibility together with the indifference or freedom of execution or outcome—this is the task, this is the labor. For if it is infallible that I shall write at dawn tomorrow, although I have the power either way—that is, to write then or not to write then—nevertheless this power and freedom will not issue into the act of negating my writing, but of affirming it, so that it is inevitable that the affirmation come about. And if this is so, since divine providence has already from eternity been determined in act with respect to all things, and is immutable and infallible, etc., it follows that de facto all things come about inevitably, although some contingently and some necessarily.

V. I said "de facto" advisedly: for, speaking of possibility absolutely, God can refrain from determining his providence to these or those future things. But once it is determined, the avoidability of what comes to pass is repugnant to its immutability, efficacy, universality, and certainty. And if all things come to pass inevitably de facto, why do we deliberate, and strive to pursue these things rather than those, or to avoid them? For nothing seems less destroyed by this than the whole moral part, all the striving of the Church, and exhortation to the good, than by the denial of contingency. For although the denial of avoidability and the denial of contingency are not equivalent, as is already clear from what has been said⁵, yet with respect to the proposed difficulties they seem to be equivalent. For no one deliberates about the inevitable; nor does anyone strive, exhort, or pray concerning inevitable things.

VI. To this doubt I have found nothing written in St. Thomas, since nowhere do I recall that he raised this question; rather, he always strove to safeguard contingency. Nor have I found anything in other doctors up to now concerning this question, except what is commonly said about the composite and divided sense, about the necessity of the consequence and of the consequent, about the freedom of God's election in eternity, and about the nature of contingent causes (causae ad utrumlibet) found throughout the universe.

VII. But all these things, as is clear from what has been said, do not quiet the intellect: since, as was already said at ⁶ the question concerns not God considered in himself, but God as he in fact exists; and likewise not the natures of the causes or of things themselves, nor necessity or contingency; but rather the compossibility of inevitable events with the contingency and freedom of those same events. For the question is not satisfied by saying that an occurring act is avoidable and unavoidable: avoidable indeed in itself; but unavoidable insofar as it is foreseen. For although this is true, it does not untie the knot. Since the act that occurs de facto has already been foreseen from eternity, and being foreseen overcomes its conditions considered in themselves: and consequently the occurring act is simply, that is, all things considered, unavoidable; and in a certain respect, that is, taken in isolation, avoidable. Just as the throwing of merchandise during a shipwreck is simply willed, because it is willed when all things are considered; and in a certain respect it is unwilled, because the throwing itself, considered in itself, is displeasing.

Nor does it serve the purpose to say that the esse provided puts nothing into the act that occurs. For in this example it is clearly apparent that it makes no difference to the matter whether it puts something or not: for the esse willed puts nothing into the projected commodity, and yet, etc.

Nor is it avoided by saying that, because a contingent act is foreseen by God, and its inevitability follows from being foreseen as a thing related to God, the contingent act is in fact inevitable with respect to God, but not with respect to us. For this amounts to nothing. Since, if it is in fact inevitable from God, then it is also in fact inevitable and simply inevitable, and from us: for it is impossible for anything to be avoided by anyone that cannot in fact be avoided by God, on account of His supreme efficacy.

VIII. Therefore, if the truth of this question is to quiet our intellect, we must say one of two things: either that being foreseen does not entail inevitability; or that the inevitability of the foreseen event does not detract from the avoidability of those same events. And this second option, because of the reason adduced above ⁷, I do not see how it can be verified: for it is clear that avoidability appears to be preserved only in a qualified sense. — As for the first, although it is commonly rejected by the doctors, who say that being foreseen, or willed, or predestined (for I take all of these as equivalent with respect to this difficulty) entails inevitability; yet I, not so as to set myself against the current, nor asserting this, but always holding my intellect captive in obedience to Christ, suspect that just as being foreseen establishes neither contingency nor necessity in the event foreseen, as is said in the text, because God is a superexceeding cause, eminently possessing beforehand both necessary and contingent things (for by this St. Thomas escapes that argument of Metaphysics VI Metaphys. cited here: he intends that Aristotle's propositions are verified in particular causes, some of which are necessary, others contingent, others per se, and others per accidens; but not in the most universal cause exceeding the necessary and contingent, the per se and the per accidens; since it belongs to that cause to produce, as effects chosen by itself, not only things but all the modes of things and events); so too, raising the eyes of the mind higher, God himself, out of an excellence higher than we can conceive, so provides for things and events that being foreseen by him entails something higher than avoidability or inevitability; so that from the passive foreseeing of the event, neither member of that combination need follow. And if this is so, the intellect will rest, not on the evidence of a truth inspected, but on the inaccessible height of a hidden truth. And this seems sufficiently reasonable to my little mind: both because of the reason given above; and because, as Gregory says ⁸, he thinks less of God who believes about him only what his own ingenuity can measure.

IX. Nor on that account do I suspect that anything of what we know or hold by faith to pertain to the divine immutability, actuality, certainty, and universality, and the like, is to be denied; but I judge that something hidden lies concealed, either on the side of the order that exists between God and the event foreseen, or in the bond between the very event and its foreseen being. And thus, considering that the understanding of our soul is the eye of an owl, I find rest for it only in ignorance. For it is better, both for the Catholic faith and for philosophy, to confess our blindness than to assert as evident things that do not give rest to the intellect: for evidence is what gives rest. Nor therefore do I accuse all teachers of presumption: since, stammering as best they could, all of them intended to intimate the immobility and supreme and eternal efficacy of the divine intellect, will, and power through the infallibility of the order of divine election with respect to all events: none of which stands against the aforesaid suspicion, which believes that something deeper lies hidden in them. And truly, if it were so preached, perhaps no Christian would err concerning predestination; just as no one errs in the matter of the Trinity, because it is said, and written, and is indeed so, that it is hidden from human understanding, and faith alone suffices.

The best and most wholesome counsel in this matter is to begin from those things which we know with certainty and experience within ourselves, namely, that all things contained under our free will are avoidable by us; and for this reason we are worthy of punishment or reward. How, however, with this preserved, divine providence and predestination may be preserved, etc., we must believe as Holy Mother Church believes. For it is written ⁹: Seek not the things that are too high for thee; for many things are revealed to thee above the understanding of men. And this is one of them.