Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

The title, as is already clear from what has been said¹, asks whether justice is formally in God.

In the body he does two things. First, he distinguishes justice into two species: namely, commutative and distributive. Second, he answers the question with two conclusions, according to the number of the species of justice.

II. The first conclusion is negative: In God there is no commutative justice. – It is proved by the authority of the Apostle: who is prior, etc.

The second is affirmative: In God there is distributive justice. – And it is proved. Distributive justice is that by which each is given what is due according to his dignity: therefore the order of the universe manifests God's justice; therefore in Him there is justice. – The consequence is proved by proportion: for just as the fitting order of a household shows justice in the one governing it, so the order of the universe, etc. And it is confirmed by the authority of Dionysius.

III. Concerning the first conclusion there is a doubt. First, because it seems false that in God there is no commutative justice. For the form of the divine judgment is accomplished according to commutative justice, when He recompenses and rewards merits, and inflicts punishments for sins; as the Author expressly says in IIa IIae, q. 61, art. 4, ad 1. – Second, because the proof does not seem sufficient. For to commutative justice belongs not only retribution, but also the prior act of giving itself: for not only buying, but also selling is regulated by commutative justice. And therefore from the negation of the second act in God, the negation of such justice does not seem sufficiently inferred: since it is preserved also in the first act.

IV. To these objections the answer is given in reverse order, that neither act of commutative justice has a place in God: for just as He cannot give in return for what has been received, so neither can He give in return for what is to be received; for nothing from creatures can accrue to Him. Both acts are likewise excluded from Him on the ground that no one can first give something to God: since, if no one can give first, it follows that no one can render an equivalent; and consequently that God cannot give in return for an equivalent received. And thus commutative justice, which establishes equality between what is given and what is accepted, cannot have a place in Him.

To the first, however, it is said that from this nothing can be gathered except that a certain mode of commutative justice is observed in the divine distribution, when He dispenses punishments for demerits and rewards for merits. But here it is intended that in God there is not commutative justice itself.

V. In response to the third, note the doctrine handed down in II Cont. Gent., chapters XXVIII and XXIX: and you will understand these things better, seeing that this is rather a fitting justice in relation to God than simply just.

The title is clear from what has been said. — In the body, a single conclusion, answering the question in the affirmative: The justice of God is fittingly called truth.

It is proved. The truth of the intellect that rules and measures things consists in the adequation of things to the intellect; but justice consists in the conformity of works to the law with which they accord. Therefore the justice of God is fittingly called truth.

The antecedent, for its first part, is proved from the agreement and difference of truth in the intellect receiving from things and in the intellect causing things: agreement, indeed, because truth always consists in the adequation of intellect and thing; but difference, because in the caused intellect there is an adequation of the intellect to things, while in the causing intellect there is an adequation of things to the intellect. For the second part, because just as artifacts stand to art, so do just works stand to law. — The consequence, moreover, is proved: since God's justice makes an order in things conformable to His wisdom, which is the law of all.

And the whole demonstration is confirmed by the fact that the truth of justice is found even in us in this same way.

The title is already clear from its use¹. – In the body he does two things: first he answers the question; second, he clarifies the answer. The responsive conclusion is: Mercy is in God to the highest degree, not according to the affection of passion, but according to its effect. – It is proved thus. To grieve over another's misery does not befit God; but to repel it befits him most of all. Therefore mercy belongs to God in the highest degree, not with respect to the affection, but with respect to the effect. The antecedent is explained as regards the term misery, namely that it may signify any defect whatsoever. And it is proved as regards the second part, thus. Defects are not removed except through the perfection of some being's goodness: therefore this pertains most of all to God, because he himself is the first origin of goodness. – But the consequence is proved: because the affection of mercy is sadness; while its effect is the driving away of another's misery. But the clarification consists in the differing relation of the perfection diffused by God to his goodness, justice, liberality, and mercy: and this is clear enough in the text itself.

The title is clear. – In the body there is a single conclusion, answering the question affirmatively, namely: In every work of God, mercy and justice must be found.

II. Concerning which he does three things. First, he extends the name of mercy by extending the name of misery to every defect. And he assigns the reason for this extension: because, since misery is opposed to happiness, misery can properly be found only in the rational creature, which alone is capable of happiness.

III. Second, he proves the conclusion with respect to justice, as follows. A debt arising from divine justice occurs in two ways, namely owed to God or to a creature; and neither can be omitted in any work of God. Therefore, in every work of God there must be justice. – The antecedent, as to its first part, is had from what was said in article I, ad 3. As to the second part, it is made clear: because God cannot make anything that would not befit His wisdom and goodness; and likewise, whatever He makes in created things, He disposes according to a fitting order and proportion.

Note here that the proposition set down in the text, neither can be omitted in any work of God, is not intended by the Author as it sounds: since in the work of creation, strictly speaking, no reason of what is owed can be found with respect to any creature, but only with respect to the divine wisdom and will, as you have in the reply to the fourth objection. But it is to be interpreted with regard to the works of providence and governance; and to intimate this, when that proposition is made manifest in the text, it is notably said, whatever God does in created things; as if to say that whatever he does creation being presupposed.

IV. The conclusion is then proved with respect to mercy, as follows. The work of divine justice always presupposes the work of mercy and is founded upon it; therefore in every work of God mercy appears, with respect to its first root. – The antecedent is proved: because the debt is reduced to something bestowed out of the divine goodness alone. This is proved: because otherwise one would proceed to infinity. And it is explained by way of exemplar.

V. Third, because from this argument it seemed that mercy would concur in the works of God as a remote cause, he therefore shows that it concurs more eminently than justice. And this in two ways. First, because a primary cause influences more powerfully than a secondary one: and thus the force of mercy both is preserved and operates more powerfully in all that follows. – Second, from the effect: because God dispenses to some creature what is owed to it more generously than the proportion of the thing requires; and this from the abundance of his goodness. That this is so is evident: for less than what divine goodness in fact bestows would suffice for preserving the order of justice.