Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

The title is clear: for it asks whether being-in is had formally; since¹ it is already established that all things are in God virtually.

II. In the body there is a single conclusion, answering the question in the affirmative: In God there is love. – It is proved. The motion of the will, and of any appetitive power, tends toward good in itself, but toward evil through something else: therefore the first motion of the will, and of any appetitive power, is toward good in common: therefore the first act of the will and of appetite is love: therefore in whatever there is will or appetite, there must be love: therefore it is necessary to posit love in God.

The antecedent is explained: because evil does not fall under appetite except insofar as it is opposed to good. – The first consequence, as regards its first part, namely that the first act tends toward good, is proved from the fact that what is per se is prior to what is per aliud. As regards the second part, namely in common: because what is more common is naturally prior. A sign of this relevant to our purpose is that the intellect regards common truth before particular truths. – The second consequence is proved from the difference between the object of love and the objects of the other acts of will and appetite: because love is with respect to good in common, whereas desire, hope, and delight are with respect to a particular good, say one present or future. And it is confirmed by this, that all other appetitive movements arise from love: which is shown inductively in the acts of desire, joy, hatred, sadness, etc. – The third consequence is proved: because when the first is removed, the others are removed. – The fourth is proved: because in God there is will.

III. Concerning the foregoing, two things must be noted. First, that when the text says that love regards the good in common, the expression in common does not signify the same thing as universal: rather, it signifies the same thing as absolutely. For every love is of the good, without any further limitation: but delight is of a good conjoined, etc. I say this, however, because the text, up to the final inference, speaks also of love which is in the sensitive appetite, which, as is evident, does not attain to the good according to a universal sense, but absolutely. Nor, however, is anything conceded by this to the force of that proof, that what is more common is naturally prior: since the good absolutely is related to the good with a certain condition proportionally, as the common to the proper, or as the more common to the less common.

Second, that when the text says that love is the first act of the will and of appetite, by the name "appetite" he understands the whole breadth of the appetitive power in any nature, and not each appetitive power. And by this the objection concerning the first act of the irascible is excluded. For although its first act is not love but hope, nevertheless the first act of the whole sensitive appetite, divided into concupiscible and irascible, is love.

The title is clear. - In the body, there is a single conclusion: God loves all existing things; yet not in the way we do. This conclusion, as regards its first part, is proved thus. All existing things, insofar as they are, are good; and thus, what they have insofar as they are is willed by God: therefore to every existing thing God wills some good: therefore God loves all things that are. - The antecedent, as regards its first part, is proved: because esse itself, and every perfection of a thing, is a certain goodness. As regards the second part, however: because the will of God is the cause of things. The first inference needs no proof. The second, however, is proved from this, that to love is nothing other than to will some good to someone. As regards the second part, however, the conclusion is made manifest. Because we love, moved by the goodness of the thing loved: but God loves by creating and infusing the goodness that He loves.

The title is clear. — In the body he does two things. First, he distinguishes that loving unequally happens in two ways. And he proves the distinction, from the fact that to love is to will the good to someone. — Second, he answers the question with two conclusions, according to the aforementioned members of the distinction.

The first conclusion is: God, on the side of the act of loving, loves all things equally. — It is proved. He loves with one simple act, and the act of the will always remaining the same: therefore equally.

The second conclusion is: God, on the side of the good willed and loved, loves some things more than others. — It is proved. If God did not will a greater good for one thing than for another, there would be nothing better than anything else: this is manifestly false: therefore. — The consequence is proved: because the love of God is the cause of the goodness of things.

The title is clear. – In the body, one conclusion, answering the question affirmatively: God loves the better things more. It is proved. The will of God is the cause of goodness in things: therefore for God to love something more is nothing other than to will it a greater good: therefore things are better from this, that God wills them a greater good: therefore He loves the better ones more. II. In response to the fifth, the words placed at the end raise a doubt, namely that the predestined sinner, for some time, is neither good nor evil. For this opinion seems both false and contrary to the doctrine of the Author. Since both angel and man, according to him, were created in grace¹; and every man contracts original sin². And even granted that they were not created in grace, they would have been neither good nor evil for only an instant, and not for any time. Therefore these words appear altogether false. III. To this there are three replies. First, that these words are true of the possible, whatever may be the case de facto. And by the name time is understood every measure of duration, even instantaneous. For both angel and man could at some time, namely in the first instant, be neither morally good nor morally evil. Second, that they are verified of personal moral goodness and malice, that is, through one's own act. For an infant, though he is evil by the sin of nature, is nevertheless neither good nor evil by his own work. Third, that these words are simply true, and to be understood absolutely, without any restriction. And although the predestined sinner, after he had being (esse), was always good or evil; yet at some time, namely throughout the infinite time during which he did not exist, he was neither good nor evil. – And this exposition is more formal, consonant with the purpose, and beyond question. For the letter intends to teach that it is not surprising that the predestined sinner should be for some time worse and less loved, from the fact that for some time he was not loved in any way, namely when he did not exist: since then he was neither good nor evil, speaking universally of good and evil, as is evident.