Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title, note two things. First, that the will is not taken here as it extends to willing and not willing, in the way that seeing extends to seeing and not seeing, when by sight we perceive darkness: for it is clear that good and evil are opposed, and that they pertain to the will by willing or not willing. Nor again is willing taken as it extends to willing and nilling: since it is clear that God nils many evils, namely all those that he does not permit his elect to incur. Rather, willing is taken properly for a positive act in the manner of one accepting: for nilling signifies a positive act, but in the manner of one repelling. And that the will is taken in this way here is evident from the argument set down in the text to prove the responsive conclusion: for it is proved only in this sense. – Second, that evil is the privation of a due good: for all these conditions must belong to a negation, if it has the character of evil. But the evil of punishment, beyond this, includes the character of the involuntary, while that of fault includes the voluntary. Here, however, the question concerns evil in general: and it will be answered distinctly.

II. In the body, there is a single responsive conclusion answering the question, though it has several parts: God in no way wills the evil of fault; yet he wills per accidens the evil of natural defect and the evil of punishment. – It is proved. Evil is opposed to good: therefore it is impossible for evil to be desired, unless joined to a good more desired than the other good deprived through the evil. Therefore it is impossible for the evil of fault to be willed by God; yet it is possible for evil, both of natural defect and of punishment, to be willed by God.

The first consequence is proved: because the ratio of the good is the ratio of the appetible. And as to the first part, it is declared and made manifest in every genus of appetite, namely natural, animal, and intellectual: in natural action, and in the appetite of the lion, and in the will of the fornicator. As to the second part, however, it is proved: because every evil joined to some good is the privation of another. – The second consequence, as to its first part, is proved: because nothing is more willed by God than His own good, to which the evil of fault is opposed. As to the second, it is made manifest: because God wills one good more than another. And indeed in penal matters, He wills justice more than the good deprived by punishment; likewise in natural things, He wills the order of nature more than the life of this lamb eaten by the wolf.

III. Concerning the proof of the second consequence, note that in the text it is not said that the evil of fault deprives the divine good, but that it deprives the order to it. And on account of this, a doubt arises: because that argument seems to be of no force. For every evil deprives some order to the divine goodness, since every order to it is an order as to the ultimate end and first source, etc. Therefore, from the fact that the evil of fault deprives the order to the divine good, it does not follow that it cannot be willed by God per accidens. And if it follows concerning it, then also concerning any other evil whatsoever.

IV. To this it is briefly said that the evil of fault differs from other evils in this, that it, insofar as it is from itself, is privative of the divine good in itself, if it were capable of being privated: just as the love of friendship toward God is positive of the divine good in itself, if it were capable of being posited. Other evils, however, regard the divine goodness in some particular effect. And therefore both points are indicated with caution in the text: namely, both that it would privatively deprive of the divine good in itself, in what was said when he said that God wills nothing more than His own goodness; and that in fact it does not privatively deprive of it, but only in relation to it; which understand in itself, so that from this you may have the difference from the other evils. – And by this the answer to the doubt is clear. For the account is not the same concerning the order to the divine goodness in itself, and concerning the order to it according to some determinate participation of it.

V. In response to the first, two things must be noted. First, that in the text the judgment concerning the evil of fault in itself is made from the intention of the sinner, because the evil of fault is not an effect reducible to higher causes; rather, it has the very sinner as such for its proper cause. Now judgment concerning anything must be rendered according to its proper cause.

Second, that to the authorities of Augustine adduced in argument nothing is answered in the text: and (unless there be a defect in the codex) what is omitted does not seem omitted, because from what is said here the gloss on those words of Augustine appears, namely that they are to be understood per accidens: for evils to be, is a good coming-to-be not per se, but per accidens.