Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

Title is clear. – In the body there is a single conclusion, responsive to the question in the affirmative: The Will of God is altogether immutable.

It is proved. The will is of the good: therefore it can begin to will in only two ways, namely, because it begins either to be, or to have the good known to it: therefore it cannot begin to will without a presupposed change in the intellect, or in the disposition of its own substance: therefore it is not changeable without one of these changes: therefore the will of God is altogether immutable.

The first consequence is not otherwise proved; yet the consequent itself is declared, on both sides, from being heated and from counsel. – The second is self-evident. – The third, however, is made manifest from the difference between changing the will and willing a change. – Finally, the fourth is proved: because both the substance and the knowledge of God are altogether immutable.

II. Concerning these consequences, two things are to be noted. First, that the antecedent, as a commonly accepted proposition, is written in abbreviated form: for the term "understood" must be supplied. And then it is clearly evident that the first consequence needs no proof: since, if willing is only with respect to a good understood, a new act of willing must arise either from the newness of the good or from the newness of its being understood. – Second, that the third consequence is not found in itself in the text, but only in its proof: yet we have stated it explicitly for greater clarity.

III. Concerning the first consequence ¹ a doubt arises, on account of the term sibi placed in the consequent. For it seems that that particle falsifies the consequent, so that it does not follow from the antecedent. It indeed renders the consequent false: because someone can begin to will because the good begins to be or to be known as good for another, as is clearly evident in the love of friendship. That it does not follow from the antecedent is clearly apparent: since the good of another is contained under the good understood in itself.

IV. To this it is said that, as is clear from Book VIII Ethic. ², the good is indeed lovable, but each one's own good is proper to him. And therefore the will is first of the good that is one's own, secondarily of the good of another. Hence it is also said there ³ that the friendly relations we have toward others have come from the friendly relations we have toward ourselves. On account of which this consequence, if it be understood of the good willed per se first, or willable, is excellent formally. But if it be understood universally of the good, as the antecedent sounds, the consequence holds also formally: and it is founded on this, that the mutability or newness of volition regarding what belongs to another arises from the mutability of love for one's own; and immutability regarding what belongs to another, from immutability regarding one's own goods. And this reasonably: because love of others arises from love of self. For from this it is clear that in the consequent the love of another, even if not formally, yet virtually is included: and consequently to begin to will because it begins to be or to be known as good for another is not a different reason or a different mode of beginning to will from those expressed in the consequent.

And thus both the objection of falsity and the objection of consequence cease. The objection of falsity ceases, because those other modes are not counted in the number with these, nor are they excluded, but are contained in these virtually; and the objection of consequence ceases, because, as was said, novelty of volition is inferred with respect to the good universally, though non-uniformly; for it is with respect to one's own good formally, and with respect to another's good virtually.

But the Author did this not only for the sake of brevity; rather, he was moved by this reason: because he was speaking of the divine will, concerning which it was clear from what had been said that it wills nothing other than its own goodness by willing, in such a way that it alone is for him the cause of willing. And so, in the matter at issue in the question, it sufficed to assume the universal major premise concerning his own goodness, most true formally; for the minor has already been proved ⁴, namely, Whatever God wills, he wills by willing his own goodness.

V. In response to the fourth, note carefully that his intention is to deny in God's will a power with respect to opposites: since in it there is no power at all, but his willing is either necessary simply, as willing himself; or necessary immutably, as willing other things. And the words of the text in the response clearly tend toward this, from the negation of the necessary absolutely, choosing the necessary immutably: as if he had said that from the negation of the necessary absolutely there does not follow a power, or a possibility according to some power; but it remains that it be posited as necessary immutably. For when it is said, God can will this or its opposite, the "can" does not denote a possibility according to some power; but a possibility from the habitude of the terms, as you have expressly in I Contra Gentiles, chapter 82. And therefore the Scotist imagination, in I, distinction 39, question 1, concerning a prior power naturally of the act without mutability, which he feigns in the divine will, is arbitrary: for every power is in contradiction with some mutability, as is held in IX Metaphysics⁵, and this argument made in the text proves it.