Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

The title is to be understood as it sounds: on the true cause. - In the body there is a single conclusion, answering the question in the negative: The divine will has no cause. - This conclusion is proved and made manifest; and at the same time that which creates difficulty in this matter is preserved, namely: God wills other things for the sake of an end. The proof is as follows. The will, willing by one and the same act both the end and the things ordered to the end, does not have its act of willing caused; therefore the divine will has no cause. - The antecedent is proved: because the same thing is not the cause of itself. And it is made manifest from the opposite case, namely, when we will the end by one act and the things ordered to the end by another. The consequence is proved: because the divine will wills all things in its goodness by one act. The manifestation consists in a proportional likeness between intellect and will with respect to their manner of having or not having a cause. Having one indeed: because an intellect that understands principles and conclusions by different acts has caused knowledge. Not having one: because an intellect that understands principles and conclusions by the same act does not have knowledge of the conclusions caused from the principles; for the same reason, namely, that the same thing is not the cause of itself. Now that which introduces difficulty, namely, that God wills other things for the sake of an end, is preserved first by distinguishing that it is one thing to will other things for the sake of an end, and another to will other things to be for the sake of an end: and that the latter is true, but not the former. Second, by opening this up through an incipient proportionality. For an intellect understanding conclusions and principles by one act does not understand the conclusions from the principles, yet it understands the conclusions to be from the principles: and proportionally this holds in the will. - But the cause of this whole proportionality is touched upon in the text, where it is said, because the will follows the intellect. II. For the clarification of what is said here, and in the response to the third objection, note these four propositions. The first is, this is because of that; the second, God wills this to be because of that; the third, this is willed by God because of that other thing willed by him; the fourth, God wills this because he wills that other thing. Among these there is a manifest difference. For the first speaks of things absolutely; the second, however, of the same things as willed by God with simple will; but the third and fourth seem to include a causality of one volition with respect to another. And as far as appears from this text, these last two seem to be denied, since it is expressly said that God does not will this because of that. III. Truly, if we consider more attentively the intention of the Author, and the response to the third objection, together with the doctrine handed down in I Contra Gentiles, chapters LXXXVI and LXXXVII, then as regards the thing itself it must be said that the act of the divine will attaining this object willed, say the universe or man, on the part of the act lacks a cause, not only as such a being ens is concerned, but also as attaining such an object willed: so that the attaining willing of the divine will with respect to the universe, on the part of the act, is not caused by the attaining willing of the divine will with respect to his own goodness. And this is what he intends when he says that God does not will this because of that. Yet the same act on the part of the thing willed has a cause, so that the passive attainment of one is caused by the passive attainment of the other; that is, the being-willed of one is caused by the being-willed of the other. So that not only is man's being caused in the genus of final cause by the perfection of the universe: but even man's being willed by God is caused by the fact that the universe is willed by God. And if one presses from the passive to the active, the being-willed is caused by the being-willed, therefore the willing is caused by the willing: this inference must be denied. Or else one must distinguish, that such an inference holds when the passive equals the active; but when the action exceeds the passion, so that the action is one while the passions are many, it stands that the passion is caused by a passion without the action being caused. And deservedly: because causing and being caused require diversity; and therefore the unity of the action attaining so many objects willed excludes causality from itself; whereas the multiplication of passions according to the number of things willed does not exclude the causality of one from another. IV. As for the propositions ¹, it seems it must be said that not only the first two, but also the third sounds well. For it posits no dependence of the volition on the part of the act, but on the part of the thing willed: and it is expressly said in the passage cited ² that one thing willed by God is the cause of another's falling under the order of the divine will. The fourth, however, since it signifies dependence on the part of the act, must not be conceded or put into use: but must be devoutly expounded and interpreted on the part of the thing willed, if it is found anywhere. V. From this you also have the difference between the second argument and the third in the text. For the second speaks of the causes of things willed absolutely; the third, however, of the causes of things in relation to the divine will, yet on the part of the thing willed. For example, the first intends that one should not ask why man has hands; the second, that one should not ask why God willed man to have hands. And the former pertains to the first proposition: the latter to the third, properly speaking. - And thus you will understand the responses.