Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

The title is explained in the body. – In the body there are two parts. First, it is explained what was placed in the title, namely in how many ways ly necessary is taken: and a distinction is drawn between necessity absolutely so called and necessity ex suppositione, as is clearly evident. Second, there is set down the conclusion answering the question raised, namely: God wills something with absolute necessity; not all things, except ex suppositione.

This conclusion has three parts. And first, with respect to the first it is proved thus: The will, like any power whatsoever, has a necessary relation to its proper and principal object; therefore God of necessity wills that his goodness be; therefore God necessarily wills something. – The antecedent is proved in two ways, namely by induction and by reason. The induction is made in our will and in sight. The reason offered is: because it belongs to the nature of a power to tend toward that which is its proper and first object. But the consequence is proved: because divine goodness is the proper and adequate object of the divine will.

Next it is proved with respect to the second part, thus. Those things that are ordered to an end we do not will out of necessity when willing the end, unless they are such that without them the end cannot be: but God wills things other than himself insofar as they are ordered to the divine goodness as to their end, and without them the divine goodness can be: therefore God does not will things other than himself out of necessity. Therefore he does not will all things with absolute necessity. – The major is proved and made evident inductively by three examples, of which the first two pertain to the exception, and the third directly to the antecedent. But the minor is proved: because the goodness of God is so perfect of itself alone that nothing of perfection accrues to it from other things.

Finally the conclusion is proved with respect to its third part, thus. The will of God cannot be changed: therefore, supposing that He wills, He cannot not will: therefore, by necessity of supposition, He wills things other than Himself; which was to be proved. And thus the whole proposed conclusion has been proved.

II. Concerning the proof of the first part of the conclusion, note that that maxim, every power has a necessary relation to its proper object, is not understood with respect to the exercise of the act, but with respect to its specification: that is, it does not mean that every power is necessarily exercised upon its object (since we experience powers sometimes being idle); but rather that, if it is exercised, it must be exercised upon its proper object. For this amounts to saying that the act exercised has a necessary relation to the proper object of the power. And this is what is intended by that maxim: and it serves our purpose very well, in which the question concerns not the exercise of the act but the specification of the exercised act. For the question was not posed as whether God wills, but whether whatever he wills, he wills necessarily. Here it is plainly evident that what is inquired into is the specification of the exercised act, signified by the words whatever he wills: namely, whether it has a necessary or a non-necessary relation to the thing willed. – As for the truth of the induction, with respect to either of the examples introduced, this is not a matter for present speculation: namely, whether sight stands thus related to color, and our will to beatitude. For nothing of this bears on our purpose: since even if they do not stand so related to these things, they nevertheless stand so related to their proper objects, whatever those may be. For we offer examples so that learners may understand.

III. On the proof of the second part¹, a doubt arises: for it seems false that nothing of perfection accrues to the divine goodness from the volition of others. For both in the preceding article and in I Contra Gentiles, chapter 75, it is stated more explicitly that because God wills His own perfection, He wills other things. Therefore the perfectly willed being of the divine essence depends upon the volition of other things. And if this is so, since the divine essence must be most perfectly willed by God, it follows that therefore other things are necessarily willed by God: the opposite of which is determined here and there.

Nor can it be said for this reason, that the present text does not say that from the volition of others nothing of divine perfection accrues to goodness: but rather that from the very things willed by those others nothing of perfection accrues to it. For this would be childish. First, because in that case the process of the text, which inquires into the volition of others, would be pointless. Second, because the objection bears against the volition itself, even if this text had never existed.

Nor can it be said, again, that the perfect love of the divine goodness does not depend upon the volition of others; but rather the converse, namely, that the volition of others depends upon this, that the divine goodness is perfectly willed. For although this is true, as is said in the same place, nevertheless one does not escape the difficulty raised. For this standing, it still follows that other things are necessarily willed by God. For the divine goodness is necessarily willed by Him not only, but perfectly willed: but this is necessarily accompanied by the volition of others, as was said: therefore.

IV. To this it must be said that the mode in which a thing is willed is twofold: one is intensive, the other extensive. And these differ in that the first grades the perfection of love, while the second does not, but extends it. And if it is sometimes found written that the second pertains to perfection, this must be understood of extensive perfection, and not simply. Hence, in the matter at hand, the divine goodness is necessarily willed by God most perfectly with respect to intensive perfection: because it is loved infinitely, just as it is infinitely lovable. But it is not necessarily willed perfectly with respect to extensive perfection, but freely. Now to be loved in this way—namely, according to a fittingness toward what is outside itself, or so that it may be poured out, shared, and multiplied according to its likeness—pertains not to intensive but to extensive perfection: and consequently it must be reckoned not among those things that fit God necessarily, but among those that fit Him freely. Therefore, since the divine goodness is thus perfectly willed by God freely, He freely wills other things: and not conversely. And therefore, strictly speaking, neither from other things nor from the willing of them does any perfection accrue to the divine goodness, even extensively: but conversely, from the extensive willing of His own goodness, God wills being (esse) and other perfections for others.

V. In response to the fifth and fourth objections, note most diligently the doctrine in I Contra Gentiles, chapter 82, concerning contingency in either direction (ad utrumlibet), which is found in two ways: namely, sometimes on the side of the cause, and sometimes on the side of that to which it is said; and you will fully understand what is said here so briefly.

From what is said here, and explained there, you may see how crude and² novel is the teaching of Scotus, in Book I, distinction XXXIX³, where he calls the divine will the first contingent cause. For it is not permissible to speak of contingency in the divine will. But, as the text says, it is necessary in itself, though it does not have a necessary relation to what is willed secondarily: if either necessity or contingency must be attributed to it. For we ought rather to call it by its proper name free, as St. Thomas teaches elsewhere⁴: since freedom is midway between necessity and contingency. Necessity posits an impossibility of being otherwise; contingency posits a possibility of being otherwise successively, that is, changeably; but freedom signifies a possibility of being otherwise without mutability.

VI. In response to the sixth, note that that proposition, whatever God knows, He knows of necessity, if it is understood of the knowledge of simple intelligence, which naturally precedes the act of the will, is most true: nor is there any doubt about it. And thus the text seems to intend this, since in this argument it treats of the knowledge of others as distinguished against their will. For of these it is true that they have being in God from necessity. – If, however, anyone takes this saying to concern all things known by God in whatever way, let him observe that contingent propositions, for instance that I am now writing, are not true necessarily but freely: and consequently they have being in God freely and not from necessity. Hence the aforesaid response has no place with respect to these. Yet there is a certain mode of necessity even in God's knowledge of these things which is not present in His willing of them. For every knowable thing must be known by God as soon as it is knowable; but not every willable thing must be willed by God as soon as it is willable, as is evident. And the reason for this diversity is that every truth must be in God, and consequently be known: because what is known, insofar as it exists in the knower, is known. But not every good must be or become actual in itself: and consequently it need not be willed by God. From this, moreover, the aforementioned difference among the various things known by God is evident. For those things which are knowable of themselves are known by God with absolute necessity; whereas those things which obtain truth, and consequently knowability, from the divine will are necessarily known, their truth being presupposed. But nothing other than God, however much goodness be supposed in it, is necessarily willed by Him, as is evident. Hence, formally speaking, the words of the text can be understood universally of knowable and lovable things: namely, that everything knowable is necessarily known by God; but not everything lovable is necessarily willed. For everything knowable necessarily has being in God, although the knowability of certain knowable things is not necessary; but not everything lovable has being or is to come to be necessarily. And this is well noted and rightly understood in the words of the text in the rendering of the aforesaid cause. For he does not intend to exclude necessity simply from all things, since he proves in Book II of the Contra Gentiles, chapter 30, that necessity does exist, but necessity of being: since nothing's being is simply necessary except God's. And those words indicate this, so that they may be necessary through themselves. And he intends simply that it is necessary for all things, or all knowable things, to have being in God.