Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

A clear title. – In the body of the article, two parts: first, he answers the question, that it is so; second, he shows how it is, at the end, there: But himself as end¹.

That first, the responsive conclusion is: God wills Himself and other things. – It is proved. Natural things, insofar as they are perfect, are naturally inclined to communicate their good to others; therefore it belongs to the nature of will that one communicate to others the good which one has; therefore this belongs especially to the divine will; therefore God wills Himself and other things.

The antecedent is declared and proved. It is declared, indeed, by distinguishing a twofold inclination of nature: namely, toward its own good, and toward the good of others. It is proved, however, from the effect: because every perfect agent acts so as to produce something like itself. – The first consequence is proved from the proportional likeness between natural inclination and rational inclination, which is the will. – The second, however, is proved: because every perfection is derived from the divine will as something like it, just as a house in timbers is like the house willed by the craftsman. – The third, however, has no need of proof.

II. Concerning this argument there is a doubt. This argument seems to be founded on this: that whatever perfection is found in the inferior must be posited proportionally in the superior. For upon this seems to be founded both the first and the second consequence. The first indeed, because, since the inclination of nature, insofar as it is perfect, tends toward the good of another, it must be granted that an apprehensive inclination also tends toward the good of another. The second also, because if this is found in any will, especially in the divine will, as being most perfect, and which makes things more like itself than any other will, and than any perfect agent whatever; since from it all perfection is derived. But in this argument thus founded lies hidden this false proposition, namely, that God's willing other things is a certain perfection of His will. Therefore the argument is bad. - That this proposition is contained within this argument is clear: because, if the inclination toward the good of another were not supposed to be a perfection, the argument would have no force, therefore it must be posited in the will, and therefore especially in the divine will; for we understand that all things common to God and creatures, such as will and intellect, etc., are transferred to Him with every imperfection removed, as regards what pertains to their being (esse). - But that this proposition is false is clear: because, if God willed nothing other than Himself, He would be equally perfect as He now is; therefore willing other things adds no perfection to Him.

III. To this one may reply in two ways, according to the two senses in which God's willing of other things can be understood: first, that He wills other things actually to be; second, that He wills other things potentially, that is, the being-willed of other things, whether or not He wills other things. And if this conclusion is understood in the second way, there is no ambiguity: for the being-willed of other things is a perfection in God, just as the power to make other things is a perfection of nature. Nor could God fail to have a will directed toward other things, even though He could have refrained from willing them.

If, however, the conclusion is understood also in the first way, it is difficult to solve. Yet what seems to me to be said is this: speaking of the will in general, the consequence is excellent. For love of friendship and liberality, etc., by which we will the goods of others, belong to the perfection of an act of the will; for otherwise such perfection would be lacking to acts of the will. In sign of this, charity is infused into the will: for grace does not change the nature of its subject, but perfects it in the manner of that very nature. Speaking, however, of the divine will, the consequence is good, but the proportionality must be weighed very carefully. If inclination toward the good of others is a perfection of a nature in the manner of a nature, it follows that to be inclined toward the good of others will be a perfection of the will in the manner of the will, that is, voluntary. And if to be inclined toward the good of others in the manner of the will is a perfection of the will; therefore, to be inclined toward the good of others in the manner of the divine will will be a perfection of the divine will. But when you say in the manner of the divine will, you add two limitations to the perfection: one is that it is voluntary; the other is that it is wholly free and dependent, as being conformed to the will of the first nature. Now to concede that God's willing other things is a voluntary and wholly free perfection involves no inconsistency. Nor does it follow from this that some perfection could have been lacking to God, namely, willing other things; but rather that a voluntary and wholly free perfection could have been lacking. For this is a condition diminishing the account of perfection with respect to that in which it is found, since it signifies that its opposite is not an imperfection.

IV. Concerning the same deduction², indeed even the words of the text, a doubt arises. For from this line of reasoning it seems to follow that God not only wills other things, but that He wills all things He is able to will. And this is expressed in the text, when it is said that it belongs to the divine will to communicate its goodness to others, insofar as this is possible. But this is false: for God could will many things which He does not will, as is evident.

To this it is briefly said that, since God's willing of other things, as will be made clear in the following article, is altogether free and has no cause whatsoever, it cannot be known except after the fact, or from revelation, that God wills other things; and consequently that He wills this or that. Nor was the process of this text made for the purpose of showing this: but for showing that willing other things pertains to the perfection—voluntary, however—of the divine will. But that the divine will wills all things or certain ones, this or those things, is not derived from this, nor can it be. For since voluntary perfection is concluded here, and the divine will is to itself its own law and reason, nothing else can rationally be said on this basis than what is said in the text, namely, that willing other things pertains to it, insofar as it is possible, taking possible from ordained power, and not from power simply. For this amounts to the same as if it were said, insofar as the divine will itself wills.

V. That, according to³, there is a twofold mode in which something is willed: namely as an end, and as ordered to an end. And it is said that God wills himself as an end, and other things as ordered to an end. And it is proved, or made manifest, how each of these is the case, when it is said, inasmuch as it befits the divine goodness that other things also participate in it. For we experience in ourselves that, when we love ourselves perfectly, we not only will ourselves to be, to live, and so on, but we also will for ourselves what befits us: and from this we will to be benefactors, not principally so that we may will good things for others; but, because we will what befits us, the good of others follows. Now, since it befits the divine goodness to be participated in, God wills good things for others because it befits himself, that is, his goodness. And consequently he wills himself as an end, and things other than himself as ordered to an end; because it is on account of himself, in the manner described.

Nor does this diminish the liberality or the love of God toward us, so highly commended; rather it reveals how immense is the lovableness of the divine goodness, and shows that no creature is capable of a lovableness of such a kind. For nothing is less true than that what cannot be loved in that manner is not loved by God. On the contrary, His most liberal love toward us is made manifest when it appears that it befits the divine goodness to be participated in such a way that its opposite would not be unbecoming; so befitting, indeed, that He gains nothing for Himself but confers it on us alone. Hence it is evident that for God to will this fittingness freely is to choose our good: because it is to will His own goodness in such a way that we also may exist. For He could, without any loss to Himself, will it also in such a way that nothing would participate in it, as is clear in the following article.