Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title, will is taken in two ways: first, for the act of willing; second, for the principle, or elicitive power, of the act of willing. Nor does it matter, for our purpose, which way one takes it: for where one is, there is the other, and conversely.

In the body there are three parts: first, the responsive conclusion is proposed to the question, together with its middle term; second, the middle term is proved, its force is made manifest, and the conclusion is drawn as regards the first part¹; third, the same is proved as regards the second part, at the end².

II. As to the first, the conclusion is: In God there is will, in such a way that His willing is His being (esse). — The middle term, however, is: will follows intellect. But in God there is intellect: therefore.

Note two things here. First, although the second part of the conclusion is not expressly stated in the text, but is concluded only at the end, it is nevertheless understood as implicitly proposed in the word “as,” when it is stated that will is in God just as intellect is. — Second, because the middle term concerns the proper subject of the will (for what is intellectual is per se and primarily volitional), proving that will follows upon intellect will be the same as proving a priori that the will exists, what the will is, and why the will exists; although the existence of will in general requires no proof, since we experience it in ourselves. And therefore what follows is especially worthy of attention, since it is about to disclose a difficult and profound mystery.

III. As regards the second³, the argument proceeds as follows. The intellect in act of understanding is actual through its intelligible form, just as a natural thing is through its form; therefore an intellectual nature, when it does not possess the good apprehended through the intelligible form, seeks it, and when it possesses it, rests in it; therefore in every being possessing intellect there is will; therefore in God there is will.

The first consequence is proved from the force of the proportional likeness between the natural form and the intelligible, assumed in the antecedent. Because every natural thing has these two features: the first is such a relation to its natural form or perfection that, when possessed, it rests in it, while when not possessed, it is inclined toward it; the second is that such a relation, in things lacking cognition, is called natural appetite.

The second, however, is proved from the same root in two ways: first, because each of those things pertains to the will; second, by proportion, because from the same cause there is animal appetite in anything possessing sense.

The third consequence is proven: because in God there is intellect.

IV. Concerning the first consequence there is a doubt: because the proportional likeness expressly turns away from the intelligible form to the good apprehended through it. For that process was required, so that it would be inferred: Therefore the intellectual nature is so related to the intelligible form that it rests in the form when possessed and is inclined toward it when not possessed; because the intelligible form is as it were a natural form. And yet in the text the turn was made toward the good apprehended through the intelligible form. This process, therefore, seems bad here, as being without foundation. - And the doubt is increased: because the intelligible form is within, whereas the good apprehended is without, as is clear in Book VI of the Metaphysics⁴.

There is also doubt concerning the second consequence. For from such a process nothing is obtained except that in intellectual nature there is an appetite for the intelligible form, or even for the thing apprehended; but it is not obtained from this that that appetite is an elicited act. Yet this was what had to be proved: for the proof of that consequence—namely, that this appetition pertains to the will—presupposes the very will we are seeking.

V. To make these points clear, we must first note the difference between natural appetite and animal appetite, insofar as the latter is divided into rational and sensitive, etc. They differ first, because animal appetite is a special genus of power of the soul, as is clear in II On the Soul⁵, whereas natural appetite is common to all things. Second, because natural appetite follows upon the formal ratio of a thing considered absolutely, whereas animal appetite follows upon its nature insofar as it is apprehensive. Third, because natural appetite is in act from nature alone, whereas animal appetite cannot pass into act except through apprehension.

Fourth, because to desire naturally is not an elicited act, but the very inclination of this thing toward that; whereas to desire animaliter is an operation, which is a second act. Fifth, because natural appetite is toward one thing, while animal appetite is toward many, in accordance with the multitude of goods apprehended. Sixth, because natural appetite belongs to a thing insofar as it befits that particular appetitive power, whereas animal appetite belongs to a thing insofar as it befits the whole, or the supposit. Seventh, because natural appetite is present in a thing in act from another, whereas animal appetite is from itself, since the good moves inasmuch as it is apprehended by the desiring subject itself, and not by another.

VI. From these things it is evident what we now intend, namely, that whatever is desired not insofar as it is apprehended is desired by natural appetite; but whatever is desired because it is apprehended is desired by elicited act of sensitive or intellective appetite. Hence apprehension itself can be desired in two ways. First, by natural appetite: and thus it is desired by the intellect, insofar as the intellect is naturally inclined toward this perfection of its own, which is to apprehend things. Second, by rational appetite: and thus it is desired by the will as something apprehended; as is clear when, considering how exalted and excellent a thing it is to see God, or to understand the natures of the heavenly bodies, etc., we wish to have that knowledge, and we would rejoice if we had it; for we experience within ourselves that these acts of will are works of will, not of nature. From this truth it is also plainly established that to desire by an elicited act follows upon apprehension, just as to desire naturally follows upon some nature, even the most imperfect one, for instance primary matter.

VII. And if you have considered that to know is for the knower to be in act the thing known; and that, since every esse is according to some form, this esse which signifies knowing is according to a form actually knowable within the genus of the knowable—you will see two things. First, that to constitute the intellect in act by means of the intelligible form is to constitute it in the esse of the thing actually apprehended as such. And consequently, in the course of the text's progression from intelligible form to the thing apprehended, in the first inference there was no fault, no distortion, but an artful expression; for it was speaking of the intelligible form not in the genus of beings but in the genus of the intelligible—not in any manner whatsoever, but insofar as it constitutes the intellect in the esse of the very thing apprehended apprehensibly. - Second, that since every esse follows upon appetite, and proportionally such an esse belongs to such an appetite, rightly (because there are only two genera of being: the first, according as a thing is something by natural esse; the second, according as a thing is something apprehensibly) one must posit a twofold appetite, and proportionally; namely, because the first genus of being consists in esse by way of a first act, while the second consists in esse by a second act, which is to apprehend, therefore to desire with an appetite following natural esse is not a second act but an inclination, as was said⁶; whereas to desire with an appetite following the esse that consists in cognition is a second act elicited from the appetitive power, consequent upon nature insofar as it is apprehensive. And this is truly the foundation assumed in the text: this is the proportional likeness between the natural form and the intelligible form. Hence it clearly began from this, that just as the natural form constitutes a being, so the intelligible form constitutes a knower—that is, a being in such a mode—as is evident here and from what precedes⁷.

VIII. And by this the solution to both doubts is clear⁸. For the proof of the second inference does not presuppose the will: but, from the first inference, the conclusion that tending toward what is apprehended but not possessed, and resting in what is possessed, belong to intellectual nature as such—which is to say that they are elicited acts—is most excellently inferred, therefore the will is there; because these acts pertain to the will, as experience testifies and reason convinces us.

IX. As to the third⁹, the second part of the conclusion is proved as follows. God's understanding is His own being (esse); therefore God's willing is His own being (esse). — The consequence is proved by proportional likeness, through the word just as. For since each is a second act, and immanent, etc., it must be that if one of them is identified with the divine being (esse), so also is the other.