Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title, will is taken in two ways: first, for the act of willing; second, for the principle, or elicitive power, of the act of willing. Nor does it matter, for our purpose, which way one takes it: for where one is, there is the other, and conversely.

In the body there are three parts: first, the responsive conclusion is proposed to the question, together with its middle term; second, the middle term is proved, its force is made manifest, and the conclusion is drawn as regards the first part¹; third, the same is proved as regards the second part, at the end².

II. As to the first, the conclusion is: In God there is will, in such a way that His willing is His being (esse). — The middle term, however, is: will follows intellect. But in God there is intellect: therefore.

Note two things here. First, although the second part of the conclusion is not expressly stated in the text, but is concluded only at the end, it is nevertheless understood as implicitly proposed in the word “as,” when it is stated that will is in God just as intellect is. — Second, because the middle term concerns the proper subject of the will (for what is intellectual is per se and primarily volitional), proving that will follows upon intellect will be the same as proving a priori that the will exists, what the will is, and why the will exists; although the existence of will in general requires no proof, since we experience it in ourselves. And therefore what follows is especially worthy of attention, since it is about to disclose a difficult and profound mystery.

III. As regards the second³, the argument proceeds as follows. The intellect in act of understanding is actual through its intelligible form, just as a natural thing is through its form; therefore an intellectual nature, when it does not possess the good apprehended through the intelligible form, seeks it, and when it possesses it, rests in it; therefore in every being possessing intellect there is will; therefore in God there is will.

The first consequence is proved from the force of the proportional likeness between the natural form and the intelligible, assumed in the antecedent. Because every natural thing has these two features: the first is such a relation to its natural form or perfection that, when possessed, it rests in it, while when not possessed, it is inclined toward it; the second is that such a relation, in things lacking cognition, is called natural appetite.

The second, however, is proved from the same root in two ways: first, because each of those things pertains to the will; second, by proportion, because from the same cause there is animal appetite in anything possessing sense.

The third consequence is proven: because in God there is intellect.

IV. Concerning the first consequence there is a doubt: because the proportional likeness expressly turns away from the intelligible form to the good apprehended through it. For that process was required, so that it would be inferred: Therefore the intellectual nature is so related to the intelligible form that it rests in the form when possessed and is inclined toward it when not possessed; because the intelligible form is as it were a natural form. And yet in the text the turn was made toward the good apprehended through the intelligible form. This process, therefore, seems bad here, as being without foundation. - And the doubt is increased: because the intelligible form is within, whereas the good apprehended is without, as is clear in Book VI of the Metaphysics⁴.

There is also doubt concerning the second consequence. For from such a process nothing is obtained except that in intellectual nature there is an appetite for the intelligible form, or even for the thing apprehended; but it is not obtained from this that that appetite is an elicited act. Yet this was what had to be proved: for the proof of that consequence—namely, that this appetition pertains to the will—presupposes the very will we are seeking.

V. To make these points clear, we must first note the difference between natural appetite and animal appetite, insofar as the latter is divided into rational and sensitive, etc. They differ first, because animal appetite is a special genus of power of the soul, as is clear in II On the Soul⁵, whereas natural appetite is common to all things. Second, because natural appetite follows upon the formal ratio of a thing considered absolutely, whereas animal appetite follows upon its nature insofar as it is apprehensive. Third, because natural appetite is in act from nature alone, whereas animal appetite cannot pass into act except through apprehension.

Fourth, because to desire naturally is not an elicited act, but the very inclination of this thing toward that; whereas to desire animaliter is an operation, which is a second act. Fifth, because natural appetite is toward one thing, while animal appetite is toward many, in accordance with the multitude of goods apprehended. Sixth, because natural appetite belongs to a thing insofar as it befits that particular appetitive power, whereas animal appetite belongs to a thing insofar as it befits the whole, or the supposit. Seventh, because natural appetite is present in a thing in act from another, whereas animal appetite is from itself, since the good moves inasmuch as it is apprehended by the desiring subject itself, and not by another.

VI. From these things it is evident what we now intend, namely, that whatever is desired not insofar as it is apprehended is desired by natural appetite; but whatever is desired because it is apprehended is desired by elicited act of sensitive or intellective appetite. Hence apprehension itself can be desired in two ways. First, by natural appetite: and thus it is desired by the intellect, insofar as the intellect is naturally inclined toward this perfection of its own, which is to apprehend things. Second, by rational appetite: and thus it is desired by the will as something apprehended; as is clear when, considering how exalted and excellent a thing it is to see God, or to understand the natures of the heavenly bodies, etc., we wish to have that knowledge, and we would rejoice if we had it; for we experience within ourselves that these acts of will are works of will, not of nature. From this truth it is also plainly established that to desire by an elicited act follows upon apprehension, just as to desire naturally follows upon some nature, even the most imperfect one, for instance primary matter.

VII. And if you have considered that to know is for the knower to be in act the thing known; and that, since every esse is according to some form, this esse which signifies knowing is according to a form actually knowable within the genus of the knowable—you will see two things. First, that to constitute the intellect in act by means of the intelligible form is to constitute it in the esse of the thing actually apprehended as such. And consequently, in the course of the text's progression from intelligible form to the thing apprehended, in the first inference there was no fault, no distortion, but an artful expression; for it was speaking of the intelligible form not in the genus of beings but in the genus of the intelligible—not in any manner whatsoever, but insofar as it constitutes the intellect in the esse of the very thing apprehended apprehensibly. - Second, that since every esse follows upon appetite, and proportionally such an esse belongs to such an appetite, rightly (because there are only two genera of being: the first, according as a thing is something by natural esse; the second, according as a thing is something apprehensibly) one must posit a twofold appetite, and proportionally; namely, because the first genus of being consists in esse by way of a first act, while the second consists in esse by a second act, which is to apprehend, therefore to desire with an appetite following natural esse is not a second act but an inclination, as was said⁶; whereas to desire with an appetite following the esse that consists in cognition is a second act elicited from the appetitive power, consequent upon nature insofar as it is apprehensive. And this is truly the foundation assumed in the text: this is the proportional likeness between the natural form and the intelligible form. Hence it clearly began from this, that just as the natural form constitutes a being, so the intelligible form constitutes a knower—that is, a being in such a mode—as is evident here and from what precedes⁷.

VIII. And by this the solution to both doubts is clear⁸. For the proof of the second inference does not presuppose the will: but, from the first inference, the conclusion that tending toward what is apprehended but not possessed, and resting in what is possessed, belong to intellectual nature as such—which is to say that they are elicited acts—is most excellently inferred, therefore the will is there; because these acts pertain to the will, as experience testifies and reason convinces us.

IX. As to the third⁹, the second part of the conclusion is proved as follows. God's understanding is His own being (esse); therefore God's willing is His own being (esse). — The consequence is proved by proportional likeness, through the word just as. For since each is a second act, and immanent, etc., it must be that if one of them is identified with the divine being (esse), so also is the other.

A clear title. – In the body of the article, two parts: first, he answers the question, that it is so; second, he shows how it is, at the end, there: But himself as end¹.

That first, the responsive conclusion is: God wills Himself and other things. – It is proved. Natural things, insofar as they are perfect, are naturally inclined to communicate their good to others; therefore it belongs to the nature of will that one communicate to others the good which one has; therefore this belongs especially to the divine will; therefore God wills Himself and other things.

The antecedent is declared and proved. It is declared, indeed, by distinguishing a twofold inclination of nature: namely, toward its own good, and toward the good of others. It is proved, however, from the effect: because every perfect agent acts so as to produce something like itself. – The first consequence is proved from the proportional likeness between natural inclination and rational inclination, which is the will. – The second, however, is proved: because every perfection is derived from the divine will as something like it, just as a house in timbers is like the house willed by the craftsman. – The third, however, has no need of proof.

II. Concerning this argument there is a doubt. This argument seems to be founded on this: that whatever perfection is found in the inferior must be posited proportionally in the superior. For upon this seems to be founded both the first and the second consequence. The first indeed, because, since the inclination of nature, insofar as it is perfect, tends toward the good of another, it must be granted that an apprehensive inclination also tends toward the good of another. The second also, because if this is found in any will, especially in the divine will, as being most perfect, and which makes things more like itself than any other will, and than any perfect agent whatever; since from it all perfection is derived. But in this argument thus founded lies hidden this false proposition, namely, that God's willing other things is a certain perfection of His will. Therefore the argument is bad. - That this proposition is contained within this argument is clear: because, if the inclination toward the good of another were not supposed to be a perfection, the argument would have no force, therefore it must be posited in the will, and therefore especially in the divine will; for we understand that all things common to God and creatures, such as will and intellect, etc., are transferred to Him with every imperfection removed, as regards what pertains to their being (esse). - But that this proposition is false is clear: because, if God willed nothing other than Himself, He would be equally perfect as He now is; therefore willing other things adds no perfection to Him.

III. To this one may reply in two ways, according to the two senses in which God's willing of other things can be understood: first, that He wills other things actually to be; second, that He wills other things potentially, that is, the being-willed of other things, whether or not He wills other things. And if this conclusion is understood in the second way, there is no ambiguity: for the being-willed of other things is a perfection in God, just as the power to make other things is a perfection of nature. Nor could God fail to have a will directed toward other things, even though He could have refrained from willing them.

If, however, the conclusion is understood also in the first way, it is difficult to solve. Yet what seems to me to be said is this: speaking of the will in general, the consequence is excellent. For love of friendship and liberality, etc., by which we will the goods of others, belong to the perfection of an act of the will; for otherwise such perfection would be lacking to acts of the will. In sign of this, charity is infused into the will: for grace does not change the nature of its subject, but perfects it in the manner of that very nature. Speaking, however, of the divine will, the consequence is good, but the proportionality must be weighed very carefully. If inclination toward the good of others is a perfection of a nature in the manner of a nature, it follows that to be inclined toward the good of others will be a perfection of the will in the manner of the will, that is, voluntary. And if to be inclined toward the good of others in the manner of the will is a perfection of the will; therefore, to be inclined toward the good of others in the manner of the divine will will be a perfection of the divine will. But when you say in the manner of the divine will, you add two limitations to the perfection: one is that it is voluntary; the other is that it is wholly free and dependent, as being conformed to the will of the first nature. Now to concede that God's willing other things is a voluntary and wholly free perfection involves no inconsistency. Nor does it follow from this that some perfection could have been lacking to God, namely, willing other things; but rather that a voluntary and wholly free perfection could have been lacking. For this is a condition diminishing the account of perfection with respect to that in which it is found, since it signifies that its opposite is not an imperfection.

IV. Concerning the same deduction², indeed even the words of the text, a doubt arises. For from this line of reasoning it seems to follow that God not only wills other things, but that He wills all things He is able to will. And this is expressed in the text, when it is said that it belongs to the divine will to communicate its goodness to others, insofar as this is possible. But this is false: for God could will many things which He does not will, as is evident.

To this it is briefly said that, since God's willing of other things, as will be made clear in the following article, is altogether free and has no cause whatsoever, it cannot be known except after the fact, or from revelation, that God wills other things; and consequently that He wills this or that. Nor was the process of this text made for the purpose of showing this: but for showing that willing other things pertains to the perfection—voluntary, however—of the divine will. But that the divine will wills all things or certain ones, this or those things, is not derived from this, nor can it be. For since voluntary perfection is concluded here, and the divine will is to itself its own law and reason, nothing else can rationally be said on this basis than what is said in the text, namely, that willing other things pertains to it, insofar as it is possible, taking possible from ordained power, and not from power simply. For this amounts to the same as if it were said, insofar as the divine will itself wills.

V. That, according to³, there is a twofold mode in which something is willed: namely as an end, and as ordered to an end. And it is said that God wills himself as an end, and other things as ordered to an end. And it is proved, or made manifest, how each of these is the case, when it is said, inasmuch as it befits the divine goodness that other things also participate in it. For we experience in ourselves that, when we love ourselves perfectly, we not only will ourselves to be, to live, and so on, but we also will for ourselves what befits us: and from this we will to be benefactors, not principally so that we may will good things for others; but, because we will what befits us, the good of others follows. Now, since it befits the divine goodness to be participated in, God wills good things for others because it befits himself, that is, his goodness. And consequently he wills himself as an end, and things other than himself as ordered to an end; because it is on account of himself, in the manner described.

Nor does this diminish the liberality or the love of God toward us, so highly commended; rather it reveals how immense is the lovableness of the divine goodness, and shows that no creature is capable of a lovableness of such a kind. For nothing is less true than that what cannot be loved in that manner is not loved by God. On the contrary, His most liberal love toward us is made manifest when it appears that it befits the divine goodness to be participated in such a way that its opposite would not be unbecoming; so befitting, indeed, that He gains nothing for Himself but confers it on us alone. Hence it is evident that for God to will this fittingness freely is to choose our good: because it is to will His own goodness in such a way that we also may exist. For He could, without any loss to Himself, will it also in such a way that nothing would participate in it, as is clear in the following article.

The title is explained in the body. – In the body there are two parts. First, it is explained what was placed in the title, namely in how many ways ly necessary is taken: and a distinction is drawn between necessity absolutely so called and necessity ex suppositione, as is clearly evident. Second, there is set down the conclusion answering the question raised, namely: God wills something with absolute necessity; not all things, except ex suppositione.

This conclusion has three parts. And first, with respect to the first it is proved thus: The will, like any power whatsoever, has a necessary relation to its proper and principal object; therefore God of necessity wills that his goodness be; therefore God necessarily wills something. – The antecedent is proved in two ways, namely by induction and by reason. The induction is made in our will and in sight. The reason offered is: because it belongs to the nature of a power to tend toward that which is its proper and first object. But the consequence is proved: because divine goodness is the proper and adequate object of the divine will.

Next it is proved with respect to the second part, thus. Those things that are ordered to an end we do not will out of necessity when willing the end, unless they are such that without them the end cannot be: but God wills things other than himself insofar as they are ordered to the divine goodness as to their end, and without them the divine goodness can be: therefore God does not will things other than himself out of necessity. Therefore he does not will all things with absolute necessity. – The major is proved and made evident inductively by three examples, of which the first two pertain to the exception, and the third directly to the antecedent. But the minor is proved: because the goodness of God is so perfect of itself alone that nothing of perfection accrues to it from other things.

Finally the conclusion is proved with respect to its third part, thus. The will of God cannot be changed: therefore, supposing that He wills, He cannot not will: therefore, by necessity of supposition, He wills things other than Himself; which was to be proved. And thus the whole proposed conclusion has been proved.

II. Concerning the proof of the first part of the conclusion, note that that maxim, every power has a necessary relation to its proper object, is not understood with respect to the exercise of the act, but with respect to its specification: that is, it does not mean that every power is necessarily exercised upon its object (since we experience powers sometimes being idle); but rather that, if it is exercised, it must be exercised upon its proper object. For this amounts to saying that the act exercised has a necessary relation to the proper object of the power. And this is what is intended by that maxim: and it serves our purpose very well, in which the question concerns not the exercise of the act but the specification of the exercised act. For the question was not posed as whether God wills, but whether whatever he wills, he wills necessarily. Here it is plainly evident that what is inquired into is the specification of the exercised act, signified by the words whatever he wills: namely, whether it has a necessary or a non-necessary relation to the thing willed. – As for the truth of the induction, with respect to either of the examples introduced, this is not a matter for present speculation: namely, whether sight stands thus related to color, and our will to beatitude. For nothing of this bears on our purpose: since even if they do not stand so related to these things, they nevertheless stand so related to their proper objects, whatever those may be. For we offer examples so that learners may understand.

III. On the proof of the second part¹, a doubt arises: for it seems false that nothing of perfection accrues to the divine goodness from the volition of others. For both in the preceding article and in I Contra Gentiles, chapter 75, it is stated more explicitly that because God wills His own perfection, He wills other things. Therefore the perfectly willed being of the divine essence depends upon the volition of other things. And if this is so, since the divine essence must be most perfectly willed by God, it follows that therefore other things are necessarily willed by God: the opposite of which is determined here and there.

Nor can it be said for this reason, that the present text does not say that from the volition of others nothing of divine perfection accrues to goodness: but rather that from the very things willed by those others nothing of perfection accrues to it. For this would be childish. First, because in that case the process of the text, which inquires into the volition of others, would be pointless. Second, because the objection bears against the volition itself, even if this text had never existed.

Nor can it be said, again, that the perfect love of the divine goodness does not depend upon the volition of others; but rather the converse, namely, that the volition of others depends upon this, that the divine goodness is perfectly willed. For although this is true, as is said in the same place, nevertheless one does not escape the difficulty raised. For this standing, it still follows that other things are necessarily willed by God. For the divine goodness is necessarily willed by Him not only, but perfectly willed: but this is necessarily accompanied by the volition of others, as was said: therefore.

IV. To this it must be said that the mode in which a thing is willed is twofold: one is intensive, the other extensive. And these differ in that the first grades the perfection of love, while the second does not, but extends it. And if it is sometimes found written that the second pertains to perfection, this must be understood of extensive perfection, and not simply. Hence, in the matter at hand, the divine goodness is necessarily willed by God most perfectly with respect to intensive perfection: because it is loved infinitely, just as it is infinitely lovable. But it is not necessarily willed perfectly with respect to extensive perfection, but freely. Now to be loved in this way—namely, according to a fittingness toward what is outside itself, or so that it may be poured out, shared, and multiplied according to its likeness—pertains not to intensive but to extensive perfection: and consequently it must be reckoned not among those things that fit God necessarily, but among those that fit Him freely. Therefore, since the divine goodness is thus perfectly willed by God freely, He freely wills other things: and not conversely. And therefore, strictly speaking, neither from other things nor from the willing of them does any perfection accrue to the divine goodness, even extensively: but conversely, from the extensive willing of His own goodness, God wills being (esse) and other perfections for others.

V. In response to the fifth and fourth objections, note most diligently the doctrine in I Contra Gentiles, chapter 82, concerning contingency in either direction (ad utrumlibet), which is found in two ways: namely, sometimes on the side of the cause, and sometimes on the side of that to which it is said; and you will fully understand what is said here so briefly.

From what is said here, and explained there, you may see how crude and² novel is the teaching of Scotus, in Book I, distinction XXXIX³, where he calls the divine will the first contingent cause. For it is not permissible to speak of contingency in the divine will. But, as the text says, it is necessary in itself, though it does not have a necessary relation to what is willed secondarily: if either necessity or contingency must be attributed to it. For we ought rather to call it by its proper name free, as St. Thomas teaches elsewhere⁴: since freedom is midway between necessity and contingency. Necessity posits an impossibility of being otherwise; contingency posits a possibility of being otherwise successively, that is, changeably; but freedom signifies a possibility of being otherwise without mutability.

VI. In response to the sixth, note that that proposition, whatever God knows, He knows of necessity, if it is understood of the knowledge of simple intelligence, which naturally precedes the act of the will, is most true: nor is there any doubt about it. And thus the text seems to intend this, since in this argument it treats of the knowledge of others as distinguished against their will. For of these it is true that they have being in God from necessity. – If, however, anyone takes this saying to concern all things known by God in whatever way, let him observe that contingent propositions, for instance that I am now writing, are not true necessarily but freely: and consequently they have being in God freely and not from necessity. Hence the aforesaid response has no place with respect to these. Yet there is a certain mode of necessity even in God's knowledge of these things which is not present in His willing of them. For every knowable thing must be known by God as soon as it is knowable; but not every willable thing must be willed by God as soon as it is willable, as is evident. And the reason for this diversity is that every truth must be in God, and consequently be known: because what is known, insofar as it exists in the knower, is known. But not every good must be or become actual in itself: and consequently it need not be willed by God. From this, moreover, the aforementioned difference among the various things known by God is evident. For those things which are knowable of themselves are known by God with absolute necessity; whereas those things which obtain truth, and consequently knowability, from the divine will are necessarily known, their truth being presupposed. But nothing other than God, however much goodness be supposed in it, is necessarily willed by Him, as is evident. Hence, formally speaking, the words of the text can be understood universally of knowable and lovable things: namely, that everything knowable is necessarily known by God; but not everything lovable is necessarily willed. For everything knowable necessarily has being in God, although the knowability of certain knowable things is not necessary; but not everything lovable has being or is to come to be necessarily. And this is well noted and rightly understood in the words of the text in the rendering of the aforesaid cause. For he does not intend to exclude necessity simply from all things, since he proves in Book II of the Contra Gentiles, chapter 30, that necessity does exist, but necessity of being: since nothing's being is simply necessary except God's. And those words indicate this, so that they may be necessary through themselves. And he intends simply that it is necessary for all things, or all knowable things, to have being in God.

A clear title. – In the body there are two parts: first, he proposes the conclusion; second, he proves the conclusion in three ways ¹. As to the first, he says three things. First, the responsive conclusion answering the question affirmatively, namely: The will of God is the cause of things. Second, what this means: namely, that God acts through will, and not through the necessity of nature. Third, that some have thought God acts through the necessity of nature. II. Here note that acting through the necessity of nature can be understood in two ways. First, as meaning the same as acting naturally, in the way in which natural agents, Physics II, text 49 ², and Metaphysics IX, texts 3 and 10 ³, are distinguished from agents by design. And thus acting naturally is acting not because the agent wills this, even granted that it wills it; but it is acting because it is such; as is evident in the generation of man; for although Socrates wills to generate, he does not generate because he wills, but because he is of such a natural disposition, etc. Second, it can be taken as meaning the same as acting not freely, in the way we say that God wills himself not freely but by natural necessity, and that we will the good. And although both opinions concerning God have been held—that he acts not because he wills, though willing, but because he is of such a nature, as is said in Summa contra Gentiles II, chap. XXIII; and that he acts because he understands and wills, yet having such understanding and willing by natural necessity, as is touched upon in the same place, chaps. XXVI and XXVII—nevertheless in the present text, acting through the necessity of nature is taken in the first way; so that the intention here is to show that God acts because he wills, and not because he is. From the conjunction, moreover, of the conclusion of the preceding article with this one, the solution of the second question is sufficiently had. For if he acts because he wills, as is shown here; and if he wills himself only naturally, and other things freely, as was shown: therefore he will act on other things because he wills them freely. III. As to the second, the intended conclusion is proved in three ways. First, from the order of agents, thus. Both nature and intellect act for an end: therefore for an agent acting by nature the end and the means are predetermined by some intellect: therefore an agent acting by intellect is prior to one acting by nature: therefore God is an agent by intellect and will. The antecedent is proved from Physics II. The first consequence is made manifest by the example of the arrow. The second is left as self-evident. The third is proved: because God is the first agent. – Nor let it trouble you that the first consequence has been touched so lightly. For it is a common conception of the mind that acting for an end requires the end to be known, either by the very thing tending toward the end, or by something directing it, as happens with the arrow: and since it is established that nature, as such, does not know, it is clear that it must be directed by a knower. – Between acting by intellect and acting by will, moreover, there is no difference in the matter at hand. Since neither does the intellect act without the will, which is the intellectual appetite; nor does the will act without the intellect, because the good understood moves it. And therefore no fault is committed in passing from the one to the other. IV. Second, it is proved from the reason of the natural agent, thus. An agent acting by nature acts because it is such: therefore it operates in one way: therefore it produces one effect: therefore it has a determinate being: therefore God cannot act by nature: therefore determinate effects proceed from that infinite goodness of his, according to the determination of intellect and will. The antecedent is proved from the effect: because as long as it is such, it makes nothing but such. – The first consequence, together with the second and third, is left as known. And indeed the first, together with the second, proceeds a priori. The third, on account of which the antecedent was introduced together with the preceding ones, infers the prior a posteriori, as is evident. – But the fourth is proved first: because the divine being is not determinate. That this is so is evident from the fact that it contains within itself the whole perfection of being. Second, the force of the proof is made manifest, arguing to the impossible: if infinite being caused naturally, it would cause something infinite in being; this is impossible; therefore. – The fifth consequence is evident from the force of the distinction among agents. V. And note that this argument concludes that God cannot naturally produce any single effect through himself alone. If, however, anyone were to posit that God alone causes nothing integrally, but, with other causes concausing, gives being itself to effects; he would say that the proper effect of the divine infinite being is to be indeterminate in itself, but always found determinate on account of secondary causes. But this disagrees with itself. For if the divine being is infinite, there must flow forth from it the being of all those concausing causes: since every mode of being must proceed from infinite being. And if this is so, then one must concede that God can produce some effect integrally through himself alone. Therefore not through the necessity of nature, unless an effect of infinite being could be given, as is said in the text. The argument therefore stands. VI. Third, it is proved from the relation of effects to their cause, thus. Effects preexist in the cause according to the mode of the cause: therefore effects preexist in God according to an intelligible mode: therefore they proceed from him according to an intelligible mode: therefore according to the mode of will: therefore the will of God is the cause of things. The first consequence is proved: because the being of God is his understanding. The second is proved: because effects proceed from a cause according to the mode in which they preexist in the cause. This is proved: because every agent acts like unto itself. The third consequence is proved: because the inclination toward doing what has been conceived by the intellect belongs to the will. The last is self-evident. VII. Concerning the proposition assumed in the proof of the second consequence, a doubt arises. For either it is false, or it is at variance with its own proof: both are unfitting: therefore. For the proposition of the text is this: effects proceed from a cause according as they preexist in it: and its proof is added: because every agent acts like unto itself. Then thus. Either the proposition intends the mode of the effect proceeding, or the mode of proceeding. If it intends that the effect proceeding from a cause has a mode of being like the mode in which it preexists in the cause, the proof indeed is consonant, as is evident: but the proposition itself is most false (since the house proceeding from the craftsman is not assimilated to the house in his mind in its mode of being); nor does it follow from that maxim, which is understood with respect to the form by which the agent acts. – But if it intends the mode of proceeding, namely, that the effect proceeds from the cause in that manner, or one like it, in which it preexists in it, then the proof is not to the point: because, as we said, it is understood with respect to the form by which the agent acts, and not with respect to the mode in which the form is in him. And nevertheless it has many instances against it. For although the house has intelligible being in the agent, it proceeds from him sensibly: and although heat has incorruptible and universal being in the light of the sun, it proceeds corruptibly and particularly. There is ambiguity, therefore, on every side.

VIII. To this it is said that that maxim, every agent produces its like, although it is not verified universally except with respect to form, is nevertheless not to be restricted to form: rather, it must be understood with the clause as far as it can. For we see that if there be a univocal agent of vehement power, it makes something like itself not only with respect to form, but also with respect to individual conditions: for a strong male begets a male, and an irascible man begets one irascible, as is said in Book VII of the Ethics⁴. In the manner, therefore, in which the effect proceeds from the cause, two things are to be considered: first, the mode of procession considered on the side of the cause; and second, the same mode considered on the side of the effect. For if we attend to the mode of proceeding on the side of the cause, it is verified universally that the procession is like the mode of existing in the cause: because it is that mode previously effected in the genus of efficient cause. So that, just as the form proceeding is from a form in the cause, and on this account is like it; so too the mode of proceeding, on the side of the cause, is from the mode of pre-existing in the cause, and consequently is like it: because every agent produces its like. And thus it is clear how that proposition assumed is true concerning the mode of proceeding, and it is excellently proved by that maxim. - But if we attend to the mode of proceeding on the side of the effect, then the proposition assumed, as was said, is not verified universally. Nor was its proof adduced for this purpose, nor the proposition itself: since this mode, properly speaking, is more a mode of participating in or receiving the cause than of proceeding from it. And therefore the objections brought forward do not militate against the intent: for they speak of the mode of participating on the side of the effect; but the text speaks of the mode of proceeding from the cause, on the side of the cause itself. For the house proceeds from art intelligibly, because from proairesis, as is said in Book IX of the Metaphysics⁵; although in matter it is received sensibly, and comes to be through organs. Likewise the effects of the heavenly bodies proceed from them incorruptibly and universally, according to the mode of the forms by which they act; for they proceed through their eternal actions, commensurate with those forms: although their participation at the sphere of generable things, etc., is full of corruption and disarticulation; because passion is not equal to action.

The title is to be understood as it sounds: on the true cause. - In the body there is a single conclusion, answering the question in the negative: The divine will has no cause. - This conclusion is proved and made manifest; and at the same time that which creates difficulty in this matter is preserved, namely: God wills other things for the sake of an end. The proof is as follows. The will, willing by one and the same act both the end and the things ordered to the end, does not have its act of willing caused; therefore the divine will has no cause. - The antecedent is proved: because the same thing is not the cause of itself. And it is made manifest from the opposite case, namely, when we will the end by one act and the things ordered to the end by another. The consequence is proved: because the divine will wills all things in its goodness by one act. The manifestation consists in a proportional likeness between intellect and will with respect to their manner of having or not having a cause. Having one indeed: because an intellect that understands principles and conclusions by different acts has caused knowledge. Not having one: because an intellect that understands principles and conclusions by the same act does not have knowledge of the conclusions caused from the principles; for the same reason, namely, that the same thing is not the cause of itself. Now that which introduces difficulty, namely, that God wills other things for the sake of an end, is preserved first by distinguishing that it is one thing to will other things for the sake of an end, and another to will other things to be for the sake of an end: and that the latter is true, but not the former. Second, by opening this up through an incipient proportionality. For an intellect understanding conclusions and principles by one act does not understand the conclusions from the principles, yet it understands the conclusions to be from the principles: and proportionally this holds in the will. - But the cause of this whole proportionality is touched upon in the text, where it is said, because the will follows the intellect. II. For the clarification of what is said here, and in the response to the third objection, note these four propositions. The first is, this is because of that; the second, God wills this to be because of that; the third, this is willed by God because of that other thing willed by him; the fourth, God wills this because he wills that other thing. Among these there is a manifest difference. For the first speaks of things absolutely; the second, however, of the same things as willed by God with simple will; but the third and fourth seem to include a causality of one volition with respect to another. And as far as appears from this text, these last two seem to be denied, since it is expressly said that God does not will this because of that. III. Truly, if we consider more attentively the intention of the Author, and the response to the third objection, together with the doctrine handed down in I Contra Gentiles, chapters LXXXVI and LXXXVII, then as regards the thing itself it must be said that the act of the divine will attaining this object willed, say the universe or man, on the part of the act lacks a cause, not only as such a being ens is concerned, but also as attaining such an object willed: so that the attaining willing of the divine will with respect to the universe, on the part of the act, is not caused by the attaining willing of the divine will with respect to his own goodness. And this is what he intends when he says that God does not will this because of that. Yet the same act on the part of the thing willed has a cause, so that the passive attainment of one is caused by the passive attainment of the other; that is, the being-willed of one is caused by the being-willed of the other. So that not only is man's being caused in the genus of final cause by the perfection of the universe: but even man's being willed by God is caused by the fact that the universe is willed by God. And if one presses from the passive to the active, the being-willed is caused by the being-willed, therefore the willing is caused by the willing: this inference must be denied. Or else one must distinguish, that such an inference holds when the passive equals the active; but when the action exceeds the passion, so that the action is one while the passions are many, it stands that the passion is caused by a passion without the action being caused. And deservedly: because causing and being caused require diversity; and therefore the unity of the action attaining so many objects willed excludes causality from itself; whereas the multiplication of passions according to the number of things willed does not exclude the causality of one from another. IV. As for the propositions ¹, it seems it must be said that not only the first two, but also the third sounds well. For it posits no dependence of the volition on the part of the act, but on the part of the thing willed: and it is expressly said in the passage cited ² that one thing willed by God is the cause of another's falling under the order of the divine will. The fourth, however, since it signifies dependence on the part of the act, must not be conceded or put into use: but must be devoutly expounded and interpreted on the part of the thing willed, if it is found anywhere. V. From this you also have the difference between the second argument and the third in the text. For the second speaks of the causes of things willed absolutely; the third, however, of the causes of things in relation to the divine will, yet on the part of the thing willed. For example, the first intends that one should not ask why man has hands; the second, that one should not ask why God willed man to have hands. And the former pertains to the first proposition: the latter to the third, properly speaking. - And thus you will understand the responses.

In the title, note two things. First, that the will is taken here not for willing-with-a-condition, but for willing simply. - Second, that it is one thing to ask whether everything that happens, God wills; and another, whether everything that God wills, happens. Here the first is not being asked, but the second: for this alone the title signifies. Of the first, however, there will be discussion in article 9.

II. In the body, one conclusion, answering the question affirmatively: It is necessary that God's will always be fulfilled. — It is proved thus. In forms it is so that nothing can be lacking to a universal form, although something can be lacking to some particular form: therefore this same must hold in agent causes, namely that outside the order of an agent simply universal, under which all particular causes are comprehended, nothing can come about; although outside the order of some particular agent, something does come about: therefore it is impossible that the divine will should not attain its effect: therefore it must always be fulfilled.

The antecedent is declared in predicates essentially ordered, because there the universality of forms is manifest. — The first consequence is proved: because the effect is conformed to its agent according to its form. — The second consequence is proved: because the will of God is the universal cause of all things.

Beyond these proofs, however, the first consequence, which is the proper foundation of this conclusion, is confirmed and made manifest. It is confirmed indeed from the reason for falling short of the intended effect: namely, that there is the concurrence of another cause not contained, as such, under it. It is made manifest, moreover, in the effects of the stars and of the first heaven. — The second consequence also, which is the conclusion itself, is made manifest from the sinner, in whom the divine will seems not to be fulfilled. And all things are clear in the text.

III. Concerning this process, note four things. First, that the defect of which the text speaks is not taken here negatively, but contrariwise: for in each genus of cause, a defect can be found negatively with respect to the most universal cause. For blindness is not a being (ens): yet it is not contrary to being as such, but to such a being, namely sight. And the sinner, by sinning, falls short of the divine will negatively (for he does not do what God wills): but not contrariwise, as will be shown.

Second, that the same account holds with respect to the efficient and formal causes, insofar as this is expressed, namely universal extension: and it need not hold with respect to the rest. For this follows from that great maxim, the effect is conformed to its agent according to form: for manifestly from this it follows that the extension of the form and of the agent are proportioned to one another.

Third, what is notably said in the text is that the sinner seems to withdraw from the divine will. For the sinner does not simply act against God's consequent will: as is clear from the fact that God wills to permit this man now, in this way, and so on, to sin. But he acts against the divine will to this extent, because he acts against its antecedent will; and because he does what God has not willed by His consequent will; and because he acts against His precepts and prohibitions (which is what the text calls acting against one order of His will); and because he commits what is worthy of hatred by the divine will.

Fourth, that what is said here concerning the impediment of agent causes must be understood formally, below the order of effective causes as such: for if the impediments of matter as such were considered, it might perhaps be said otherwise. But of these there will be a fuller discussion below,¹ when we speak of the governance of things. For now this suffices: since the divine will is so universal a cause that even all the conditions of matter are subject to it.

Title is clear. – In the body there is a single conclusion, responsive to the question in the affirmative: The Will of God is altogether immutable.

It is proved. The will is of the good: therefore it can begin to will in only two ways, namely, because it begins either to be, or to have the good known to it: therefore it cannot begin to will without a presupposed change in the intellect, or in the disposition of its own substance: therefore it is not changeable without one of these changes: therefore the will of God is altogether immutable.

The first consequence is not otherwise proved; yet the consequent itself is declared, on both sides, from being heated and from counsel. – The second is self-evident. – The third, however, is made manifest from the difference between changing the will and willing a change. – Finally, the fourth is proved: because both the substance and the knowledge of God are altogether immutable.

II. Concerning these consequences, two things are to be noted. First, that the antecedent, as a commonly accepted proposition, is written in abbreviated form: for the term "understood" must be supplied. And then it is clearly evident that the first consequence needs no proof: since, if willing is only with respect to a good understood, a new act of willing must arise either from the newness of the good or from the newness of its being understood. – Second, that the third consequence is not found in itself in the text, but only in its proof: yet we have stated it explicitly for greater clarity.

III. Concerning the first consequence ¹ a doubt arises, on account of the term sibi placed in the consequent. For it seems that that particle falsifies the consequent, so that it does not follow from the antecedent. It indeed renders the consequent false: because someone can begin to will because the good begins to be or to be known as good for another, as is clearly evident in the love of friendship. That it does not follow from the antecedent is clearly apparent: since the good of another is contained under the good understood in itself.

IV. To this it is said that, as is clear from Book VIII Ethic. ², the good is indeed lovable, but each one's own good is proper to him. And therefore the will is first of the good that is one's own, secondarily of the good of another. Hence it is also said there ³ that the friendly relations we have toward others have come from the friendly relations we have toward ourselves. On account of which this consequence, if it be understood of the good willed per se first, or willable, is excellent formally. But if it be understood universally of the good, as the antecedent sounds, the consequence holds also formally: and it is founded on this, that the mutability or newness of volition regarding what belongs to another arises from the mutability of love for one's own; and immutability regarding what belongs to another, from immutability regarding one's own goods. And this reasonably: because love of others arises from love of self. For from this it is clear that in the consequent the love of another, even if not formally, yet virtually is included: and consequently to begin to will because it begins to be or to be known as good for another is not a different reason or a different mode of beginning to will from those expressed in the consequent.

And thus both the objection of falsity and the objection of consequence cease. The objection of falsity ceases, because those other modes are not counted in the number with these, nor are they excluded, but are contained in these virtually; and the objection of consequence ceases, because, as was said, novelty of volition is inferred with respect to the good universally, though non-uniformly; for it is with respect to one's own good formally, and with respect to another's good virtually.

But the Author did this not only for the sake of brevity; rather, he was moved by this reason: because he was speaking of the divine will, concerning which it was clear from what had been said that it wills nothing other than its own goodness by willing, in such a way that it alone is for him the cause of willing. And so, in the matter at issue in the question, it sufficed to assume the universal major premise concerning his own goodness, most true formally; for the minor has already been proved ⁴, namely, Whatever God wills, he wills by willing his own goodness.

V. In response to the fourth, note carefully that his intention is to deny in God's will a power with respect to opposites: since in it there is no power at all, but his willing is either necessary simply, as willing himself; or necessary immutably, as willing other things. And the words of the text in the response clearly tend toward this, from the negation of the necessary absolutely, choosing the necessary immutably: as if he had said that from the negation of the necessary absolutely there does not follow a power, or a possibility according to some power; but it remains that it be posited as necessary immutably. For when it is said, God can will this or its opposite, the "can" does not denote a possibility according to some power; but a possibility from the habitude of the terms, as you have expressly in I Contra Gentiles, chapter 82. And therefore the Scotist imagination, in I, distinction 39, question 1, concerning a prior power naturally of the act without mutability, which he feigns in the divine will, is arbitrary: for every power is in contradiction with some mutability, as is held in IX Metaphysics⁵, and this argument made in the text proves it.

In the title, note two things. First, that this is a discussion of absolute necessity, by which certain parts of the universe are said to be necessary, such as the heavenly bodies and the intelligences; while others are said to be contingent, such as things fortuitous and casual and free. – Second, that it is one thing to ask whether all things are necessary, and another to ask whether necessity is imposed upon all things willed by God. For the first is not the business at hand: since there is no consideration here of the universe or of its parts, but of the divine will. The second, however, asks whether, from the fact that something is willed by God, it follows that that thing is necessary in itself absolutely. And this is what is inquired into here: for nothing else concerns this treatise except what things willed derive from the divine volition. This, then, is the meaning of the title.

II. In the body he does three things: first, he sets down the responsive conclusion to the question; second, concerning the reason for that conclusion, he treats of a certain opinion¹; third, he himself assigns the true reason for the conclusion².

III. As to the first point, the responsive conclusion is clearly evident in the text itself: the divine will imposes necessity upon certain things willed by it, and not upon others.

IV. With respect to according to³, he does two things. First, he recounts the opinion, namely, that certain thinkers supposed the reason for this to be the disparity of the agents' means: since some act through necessary intermediate causes, and some through contingent causes. Then he criticizes this opinion in two ways. First thus. The divine will is the first cause that cannot be impeded by any deficiency of a second cause; therefore the divine will does not have a contingent effect on account of a second cause. And the consequence is proved: because the effect of the first cause is contingent on account of the second cause⁴, from the fact that the effect of the first cause is impeded by the deficiency of the second; as is clear in the case of the sun and a plant, with respect to bringing fruit to completion. – Second, by leading to an absurdity, thus. The distinction between the necessary and the contingent is referred only to second causes; therefore it falls outside the intention and will of God: which is absurd.

V. Concerning the first argument there is a doubt, because the first proposition upon which the whole argument is founded seems false. For it does not distinguish between being modified and being impeded. A contingent effect, on account of the contingency of the second cause, does not arise from the first cause's being always impeded; but sometimes from the first cause's being modified in the second. And thus that opinion seems to have understood it: that, because the divine will is modified in a contingent cause, therefore it has contingent effects. Concerning the second argument also, there is a twofold ground of doubting. First, because the antecedent departs from what was in question, as has been declared in the title⁵: for it speaks of the distinction between the necessary and the contingent absolutely. Second, because the consequence is worth nothing. For even if contingency were on account of second causes, it still stands that contingency is willed by God: since those contingent causes themselves are willed by him, on account of the perfection of the universe, and consequently their effects as well. And thus both arguments seem to collapse on every side. Concerning the very censure of the opinion itself, too, a doubt arises: for it seems to be censured irrationally. Because, given that there be some other higher cause of contingency, nevertheless the nature itself of deficient or free second causes is the proper cause of contingency: and hence there ought to have been no place for censure, when its proper cause has been assigned to the effect, though not every cause.

VI. For the clarification of these points, it must be known that, although, as was said in the title⁶, one question is formally about the cause of contingency, and another about the cause of the contingency willed by God; yet since the divine will wills each thing to be on account of its cause, in whatever genus of cause, both questions coincide as to their subject matter. And therefore it is not beside the point—indeed it is necessary for this—to treat of the cause of contingency. And truly nothing else is here brought into question except what is the first proper root of contingency: and this in the genus of efficient cause. – Nor does the present discourse descend to this or that kind of contingency; rather it seeks absolutely the proper and first root of contingency: namely, whether it be some condition of secondary causes; or whether it be some condition of the divine will itself, which is the first cause of all things.

VII. And indeed the opinion recited and censured in the text believes that the root of this sort of thing is the condition of a secondary cause; that is, the defectibility, or possibility of contradiction, found in secondary causes. That this may be better understood, it must be known that a defective instrument can concur in the work of an art in two ways: in one way, so that the defect is not chosen by the artisan, but is a consequence of the instrument chosen, from the necessity of the matter; in the second way, so that the defect itself is chosen by the artisan. For example, a writer can use a bad pen in two ways: first, because he has resolved to use every kind of pen; second, because he has resolved to make bad letters. In the first case, when the writer, using a stone pen, forms bad letters, two things are to be noted. First, that both the badness of the pen and the badness of the letters do not fall under the choice of the writer, but the badness follows from the necessity of the matter: for he himself does not choose the bad pen, but because he chooses every kind of pen, from the necessity of the stony material a defect resulted in the pen. And therefore the deformity of the letters is traced back, as to its proper and first root, to the very condition of the pen; and not to the writer, who, if he used a suitable pen, would make good letters. And thus the condition of the pen impedes the writer's power, as modified through the pen. In the second case, however, the deformity of the letters, together with the defect of the pen, falls under the choice of the writer: indeed, by this very fact he chooses the bad pen, that he may form bad letters, insofar as he may have an instrument conformed to the evil effect intended. And thus the writer's power is indeed modified in the bad pen, but is not impeded: rather, the very defect of the pen serves it, since it was chosen for the modification of its power, that it might smoothly attain the defective intended effect.

VIII. Therefore, applying it to the matter at hand, the opinion just recited holds that because God in His glory determined to make use of secondary causes of every kind, and among the range of secondary causes certain defective ones, or ones indifferent to either alternative, are found, contingency follows on that account. And so understood, this opinion has been very well refuted. For it is blameworthy (as the text says, out of modesty on the part of the Author), because it gives an insufficient account of the cause of contingency. Indeed, as is touched upon at the end of the body of this article, and as can already be evident from what has been said⁷, it did not give the proper cause of contingency: since, while it called the condition of the secondary cause the proper root, it left no place for the first cause, in which the true root lies, as appears in the example given. – And by this the solution to the third difficulty is clear⁸.

IX. Both means have also been reasonably censured⁹. For although the power of the first cause can be modified in the second cause in two ways, namely with and without impediment on its part, as is manifest in the given example (for in both cases the writer's power was modified by the bad pen), nevertheless, whenever a defect in the effect is traced back to the condition of the second cause as to its first root, it is necessary that the condition of the second cause be impeding, and not merely modifying, the efficacy of the first. And because that opinion holds thus, therefore the first argument is efficacious against it. And so the first doubt¹⁰ has been clarified. But to what was brought forward in the second doubt¹¹, the response is clear from the same foundation. For there was no departure from our proposal: because the questions, as we have already said¹², coincide as to their subject matter. Nor would contingency fall under the direct divine will: but it would exist in the universe from the necessity of matter, that is, from the necessity of the natures of secondary causes, as appears in the given example. This, however, is highly unfitting: since contingency belongs to the primary parts of being (ens), and is found in the natures of purely sensible things, and in the natures of purely intellectual things, and in the nature intermediate between both, namely the human nature.

X. As to the third point ¹³, he does three things. First, he gives the true cause of the proposed conclusion, saying that it is the efficacy of the divine will. Second, he makes this clear, as follows. An effect follows from an efficient cause not only with respect to what is made, but also with respect to the mode of being or of being made: therefore those things which God wills to be made receive from his will not only that they be made, but also the mode in which he wills them to be and to be made: therefore some things have from it that they be made necessarily, and others contingently: therefore for some of these effects he has appointed necessary causes, and for others contingent ones. The divine will, then, does not impose necessity upon all that it wills, because its efficacy is so great that things are made even in the manner in which it wills. — The antecedent is made clear in the text in the generation of the son, with respect to the likeness of accidents. The first consequence is proved: because the will of God is a most efficacious cause. The second, however: because God wills contingency and necessity. This is proved from its proper final cause, namely, from the perfection of the universe. The third, moreover, is made clear: because contingent things presuppose contingent causes, and necessary things necessary causes, as causes proximate to themselves and conformable to them; otherwise all things would not be disposed harmoniously. And the last step is evident from the first to the last. Third, from the determination already made, he returns to reproving the aforementioned opinion ¹⁴, saying that it is entirely opposed to what that opinion had said. For from this it follows that God willed contingent causes precisely because he willed contingency in the universe; and not conversely, that because contingent causes are willed, contingency was consequently willed. And this has indeed already been explained in the examples given above ¹⁵. — Yet for a fuller understanding of this determination, beginners should know that to will something is one thing, and to make it another, as we experience in ourselves: and therefore in that will which is not only will but an efficacious cause, although with respect to what can be caused willing and making are the same, yet from willing one may proceed by inference to making. And so in the text, because God wills things and the modes of being and becoming of things, the argument proceeds to effecting them; namely, that since that willing is most efficacious, both the things and the modes willed come to be.

XI. On this matter, since this is its proper place, it must again be known ¹⁶ that after these writings of St. Thomas a new opinion arose concerning the first root of contingency, posited by Scotus in I Sentences, dist. II, qu. I, and dist. VIII, qu. V, and dist. XXXIX, qu. I ¹⁷. For he holds that the first root of contingency is indeed a condition of the divine will, and in this he agrees with us; but we say that this condition is the supreme efficacy of that will, whereas he says that it is the contingency of that will. And as far as our present purpose is concerned, by the name contingency in the divine will he means its liberty: so that he imagines that because God wills and causes freely, therefore there is contingency in the universe. And so firmly does he adhere to this opinion that he says nothing can happen contingently unless God omnipotent freely caused it. And he said that Aristotle, along with the other philosophers, granted contradictories when they asserted that something happens contingently and yet believed that God acts of necessity. He brings forward, moreover, many arguments, both in proof and in defense of his position. But since some of them pertain to the contingency of such things, that is, of things subject to the heavenly bodies—and of these there will be proper discussion when we treat of the governance of things below ¹⁸—therefore I have judged that only those should be brought forward here which concern contingency absolutely. I shall bring forward, then, first his arguments; secondly, I shall say what seems to me about this opinion ¹⁹; thirdly, his arguments will be answered ²⁰. XII. The first argument, and the most powerful one, that moved Scotus is this. A moving cause, insofar as it is moved, if it is moved necessarily, moves necessarily: but every secondary cause is a moving cause insofar as it is moved by the first: therefore, if it is moved necessarily, it moves necessarily. Hence, if the first cause does not cause contingently, nothing in the universe happens contingently. And thus contingency in the universe arises from this, that God wills and causes contingently. — And the minor is proved: because no secondary cause does anything except in virtue of the first. The second argument is this. The first cause naturally regards the effect prior to any other cause whatsoever: therefore, if it causes necessarily, every effect has in that prior regard a necessary relation to it: therefore no effect happens contingently. And the second inference is proved: because it is impossible that the same effect have the relation both of the contingent and of the necessary, with respect to the same cause or to different ones. XIII. But this opinion seems to me to be false both in itself and in its foundations. First, because from it follows that this part of the universe is not from God as from an agent acting with an end in view: which is against both the theologians and the philosophers. — And the inference is proved thus. The effect of an agent acting with an end in view, as such, must be chosen by him, as is clear from IX Metaphysics ²¹, where the rational power is said to be determined by deliberation toward action; but if contingency arises from the manner of God's willing, then it is not itself chosen, but follows upon the manner of choosing: therefore it is not the effect of God as an agent acting with an end in view. And thus contingency would be in the universe apart from God's intention, being consequent upon his manner of willing rather than upon his willing itself. Secondly, because even granted that the divine will willed and caused not freely but by natural necessity, provided the power of its efficacy were preserved intact, still contingency would be preserved in this universe such as it now is: partly because there would be defectible causes, partly because there would be free agents, namely men. — And this appears more clearly if we suppose the world not to be from God, but as it were from itself. For then it plainly appears that, from the very fact that not every effect has a per se cause, something happens contingently, as is clear from VI Metaphysics ²². XIV. To Scotus's first argument ²³, one can reply in several ways. First, by distinguishing the term moved, or is moved. For a secondary cause is moved by the first in two ways: in one way, by a motion prior to its own act, as a stick moves a stone while being moved by the hand; in another way, by a motion cooperating intrinsically with its own act. And whatever may be said of the major premise in the first sense, in the second sense it is false; and only in the latter sense is the minor true. For when someone wills something, or when the sun illuminates, the first cause need not cooperate by a motion prior to the act: rather it suffices, and is required, that it cooperate intrinsically with such a choice or illumination. And this because cooperation in each thing is according to the nature of each: for thus he disposes all things sweetly. Hence, whether God cooperates necessarily or freely, the created will uses that cooperation none the less freely. Secondly, by distinguishing the term insofar as moved. For it can signify the precise cause, and it can signify the cause. If indeed it signifies the precise cause, the minor is false: for a secondary cause does not move precisely on this account, that it is moved, but also from its own power. But if it signifies the concausal, the major is false: since it is possible for a secondary cause to be moved necessarily by the first, and at the same time for its being moved to be modified by the nature of the secondary cause. And thus the moving of the secondary cause proceeds not from its being moved alone, but from its being moved together with the proper mode of the secondary cause itself. Now from such a mode it can come about that it does not move necessarily, as is clear in defectible causes. — Moreover, the added proposition, namely, that a secondary cause does nothing except in virtue of the first, does not help. For the meaning is not that a secondary cause has no power except that of the first: but that the secondary itself produces no effect except by virtue of the first concurring, and joining the power of the secondary to its effect: since the first attains all things immediately by an immediation of power, as was declared in qu. VIII ²⁴. XV. To the second argument it is said that the first inference is worthless. For the first cause does not attain the effect of the secondary cause in itself, but modified by its own cooperation, according to the mode of the secondary cause itself. And therefore the effect of the secondary cause would in no prior regard have a necessary relation to the first; rather it would have of itself only a contingent manner of coming to be. For that assumed proposition is not to be understood as though there were some duration of nature in whose first instant the first cause regards the effect, and in the second instant the secondary cause: for this is a puerile sense; yet from it the inference seems to have proceeded. Rather it is to be understood with respect to independence and intimacy: for the first cause attains the effect of the secondary both more independently and more intimately than the secondary does, as is clear at the beginning of the Book of Causes ²⁵; and therefore it is said to regard it prior. From this sense, however, it is clear that the inference has no force.

In the title, note two things. First, that the will is not taken here as it extends to willing and not willing, in the way that seeing extends to seeing and not seeing, when by sight we perceive darkness: for it is clear that good and evil are opposed, and that they pertain to the will by willing or not willing. Nor again is willing taken as it extends to willing and nilling: since it is clear that God nils many evils, namely all those that he does not permit his elect to incur. Rather, willing is taken properly for a positive act in the manner of one accepting: for nilling signifies a positive act, but in the manner of one repelling. And that the will is taken in this way here is evident from the argument set down in the text to prove the responsive conclusion: for it is proved only in this sense. – Second, that evil is the privation of a due good: for all these conditions must belong to a negation, if it has the character of evil. But the evil of punishment, beyond this, includes the character of the involuntary, while that of fault includes the voluntary. Here, however, the question concerns evil in general: and it will be answered distinctly.

II. In the body, there is a single responsive conclusion answering the question, though it has several parts: God in no way wills the evil of fault; yet he wills per accidens the evil of natural defect and the evil of punishment. – It is proved. Evil is opposed to good: therefore it is impossible for evil to be desired, unless joined to a good more desired than the other good deprived through the evil. Therefore it is impossible for the evil of fault to be willed by God; yet it is possible for evil, both of natural defect and of punishment, to be willed by God.

The first consequence is proved: because the ratio of the good is the ratio of the appetible. And as to the first part, it is declared and made manifest in every genus of appetite, namely natural, animal, and intellectual: in natural action, and in the appetite of the lion, and in the will of the fornicator. As to the second part, however, it is proved: because every evil joined to some good is the privation of another. – The second consequence, as to its first part, is proved: because nothing is more willed by God than His own good, to which the evil of fault is opposed. As to the second, it is made manifest: because God wills one good more than another. And indeed in penal matters, He wills justice more than the good deprived by punishment; likewise in natural things, He wills the order of nature more than the life of this lamb eaten by the wolf.

III. Concerning the proof of the second consequence, note that in the text it is not said that the evil of fault deprives the divine good, but that it deprives the order to it. And on account of this, a doubt arises: because that argument seems to be of no force. For every evil deprives some order to the divine goodness, since every order to it is an order as to the ultimate end and first source, etc. Therefore, from the fact that the evil of fault deprives the order to the divine good, it does not follow that it cannot be willed by God per accidens. And if it follows concerning it, then also concerning any other evil whatsoever.

IV. To this it is briefly said that the evil of fault differs from other evils in this, that it, insofar as it is from itself, is privative of the divine good in itself, if it were capable of being privated: just as the love of friendship toward God is positive of the divine good in itself, if it were capable of being posited. Other evils, however, regard the divine goodness in some particular effect. And therefore both points are indicated with caution in the text: namely, both that it would privatively deprive of the divine good in itself, in what was said when he said that God wills nothing more than His own goodness; and that in fact it does not privatively deprive of it, but only in relation to it; which understand in itself, so that from this you may have the difference from the other evils. – And by this the answer to the doubt is clear. For the account is not the same concerning the order to the divine goodness in itself, and concerning the order to it according to some determinate participation of it.

V. In response to the first, two things must be noted. First, that in the text the judgment concerning the evil of fault in itself is made from the intention of the sinner, because the evil of fault is not an effect reducible to higher causes; rather, it has the very sinner as such for its proper cause. Now judgment concerning anything must be rendered according to its proper cause.

Second, that to the authorities of Augustine adduced in argument nothing is answered in the text: and (unless there be a defect in the codex) what is omitted does not seem omitted, because from what is said here the gloss on those words of Augustine appears, namely that they are to be understood per accidens: for evils to be, is a good coming-to-be not per se, but per accidens.

The title in the body, and clear from usage, as far as the meaning of the name is concerned: which suffices here. In the body, one responsive conclusion: God has free will. – It is proved. God wills not from a necessity other than himself: therefore, with respect to those things, he has free will. The consequence is proved: because free will belongs to those things that are willed not necessarily, or by natural instinct. This is made manifest both in us, with respect to happiness; and in other animals, with respect to those things they desire by natural instinct.

The title will be explained in the body, as far as that term is concerned: the will of sign. But "Ly" distinguenda signifies not a division of the will of sign itself into several parts; but its distinction from the will of good pleasure, of which the discussion has been conducted hitherto. So that the sense of the question is: Whether the will of sign in God is to be distinguished from the will simpliciter, or of good pleasure. II. In the body one conclusion, responsive to what was asked, affirmatively: In God the will of sign is distinguished from the will simpliciter. – It is made manifest. In God a sign of willing is called will: therefore will is said of God metaphorically: therefore the will of sign must be distinguished from the will of good pleasure. – The antecedent is declared by the authority of Matthew VI. – The first consequence is made manifest from the proportionality between the sign of some passion and the sign of volition, as is clear in anger and punishment, etc. – The second consequence, however, is made manifest from the difference between anger and willing, in this respect, that the former is found even properly in God. And from the terms: because the will of sign is nothing other than will said metaphorically; but the will of good pleasure is will said properly. Hence it is evident that the distinction of the divine will into the will of good pleasure and the will of sign is not a distinction of the thing, but of the word according to its several significations.