Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

The title from the beginning of the body is clear. – In the body there are two parts: first, he explains the meaning of the title; second, he answers the question, there: Therefore thus.

II. As to the first, he says that the sense of the question is whether sense is false, that is, having a false apprehension, that is, apprehending the thing otherwise than it is; and not whether it is false in the sense of knowing or saying what is false. And he proves this from the truth of sense: because truth is found in it in the same way, namely, as consisting in the apprehension of the thing as it is. And thus it is also clear what the falsity of sense signifies, namely, to apprehend the thing otherwise than it is.

III. With respect to the second, the responsive conclusion to the question is: The sense, with respect to its proper object, is not deceived except per accidens; but with respect to the common sensible and what is perceived per accidens, it can be deceived. – It is proved. The sense knows things by being assimilated to them: therefore it knows some things per se and first, some things per se but not first, and some things per accidens: therefore with respect to its proper sensible it is deceived only per accidens, while with respect to the others it can be deceived.

The antecedent is clear. The first consequence, however, is proved: because likeness is found in the sense in three ways, namely, per se primo, etc. The second consequence is not proved in the text except from this: that the sense is referred directly to the per se first sensible, but to the others consequently or per accidens; yet in the following article a reason will be assigned. As for the exception, that is except per accidens, it is made manifest and what sort of accident is meant, namely the indisposition of the organ; and it is proved: because this is common to all passive things, namely, that indisposition impedes their reception of form. And it is confirmed by experience in the sense of taste. IV. In response to the first, note the distinction of sense from Qu. de Ver., q. 1, art. 2. Sense is taken in two ways: in one way, as knowing things; second, as offering itself to the higher power. And this in two ways: namely, as a certain thing; and as indicative of things. In the first way sense has been treated here; and it was said ¹ that it is true with respect to its proper sensible object, etc. In the second way, however, namely as a thing offering itself in act to the higher power, it is always simply true, just like other beings, according to the determination in the preceding article. And in this way Augustine took "sense" in the authority cited. In the third way, however, namely as a messenger of things, it is sometimes false causally: because it is prone often to make a false estimation about a thing. Therefore the sense always makes a true estimation concerning its own disposition, but not concerning the disposition of the sensed things. And this is what the response to the text intends, distinguishing a twofold judgment through the senses: namely, concerning the sense itself in act, and concerning the thing sensed. And we are not deceived by the sense regarding the first, but regarding the second.