Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

A clear title. – In the body there are three points: first, it is declared what falsity signifies simply and in a qualified sense (secundum quid) with respect to things; then two conclusions answering the question are set down. The first is: Falsity simply so called is not in things dependent on God, except perhaps in voluntary ones ¹. The second is: Falsity in a qualified sense is in things in two ways ². II. As to the first, he intends that the falsity of a thing simply so called consists in its disconformity to the intellect from which it depends; but falsity in a qualified sense consists in its disconformity to an intellect from which it does not depend. Both of these are proved together as follows. True and false are opposed: therefore where truth is first, falsity is first: therefore falsity is in the intellect, and not in things except in relation to an intellect: therefore the falsity of things simply so called consists in disconformity to the intellect which they regard per se: therefore to the intellect from which they depend: therefore falsity in a qualified sense consists in disconformity to an intellect per accidens: therefore, one from which they do not depend. The first inference is proved: because opposites are about the same thing. The second also: because truth is in the intellect, and not in things except in relation to an intellect. The third, however: because each thing is named "simply" from what belongs to it per se. The fourth: because the intellect from which a thing depends is regarded per se. The fifth, along with the sixth, is proved from the opposites of the third and fourth: namely, because from an intellect per accidens a thing is denominated secundum quid; and because an intellect from which a thing does not depend is per accidens. III. As to the second ³, the first responsive conclusion, namely, that falsity simply so called is not in things dependent on God, except perhaps in voluntary ones, is proved. Natural things depend on the divine intellect as artificial things do on the human intellect: therefore the falsity of natural things simply so called would consist in disconformity to the divine intellect: therefore in things dependent on God there is no falsity simply so called, except perhaps in voluntary ones. The antecedent is supposed. The inference is proved: because artificial things are called false simply so called insofar as they fall short of the form of the art. And this is made manifest from common usage: for someone is said to have made a false grammar because he fell short of the art of grammar. And similarly here to fall short is not taken negatively but contrarily, which is the same as being disconformate: for defect taken negatively constitutes an imperfect work, but taken contrarily it constitutes the false. And therefore, that the meaning might be clearer, I used the name of disconformity in the inferences. – But the second inference is proved. Whatever happens in things, except those in whose power it is to withdraw themselves from the order of the divine intellect, proceeds from the ordination of the divine intellect: therefore in things dependent on God, etc. And the exception is confirmed directly by the authority of Scripture; and, once confirmed by authority of Scripture on the opposite side, namely the truth of life said of a virtuous act. IV. Note here three things. The first is that the text proposes that natural things depend on the divine intellect as artificial ones do on the human, and yet does not infer, therefore in natural things; but most universally, therefore in things dependent on God, etc. He did this, however, because the same judgment holds of all things and of natural things: for all things, insofar as they depend on him, have established in him what befits them, to which they must be conformable, except voluntary ones. The second is that all things other than God can be compared to the divine intellect in two ways: in one way, as known things to the knower; in another way, as measured things to the measure, or regulated things to the rule. If they are compared in the first way, there is no difference between other things and voluntary ones with respect to withdrawal from the order relative to the divine intellect: since all things are equally naked and open before him. But if they are compared in the second way, thus is the difference posited in the text. For in other things nothing happens except from some order regulated by the divine intellect, even though that order may not befit this or that thing, as is clear in monsters. In voluntary things, however, moral deformity occurs not from any order established by God (for he establishes no order of things from which sin could arise; nor is there any rule in God to which sin could be conformable); but from the power of sinning of free choice, which as such is neither per se nor per accidens from God, as is clear elsewhere ⁴. The third is that in the text it is said except perhaps in voluntary ones, not because it is doubtful, but because it is not necessary that such falsity be found in voluntary things; or because it has not yet been determined concerning voluntary things. V. But the second conclusion ⁵, namely, that falsity in a qualified sense is in things in two ways, is explained. Natural things, related to our intellect, are both signified and causes; and they are sometimes signified according to something that does not inhere in them; and certain of them are apt by nature to occasion a false opinion about themselves: therefore in both ways falsity in a qualified sense can be said to be in them. – The antecedent is evident, as regards all its parts, inductively. The inference, however, is proved from the account of the false. And each member is confirmed by the authorities of Augustine and Aristotle, as is clear in the text. All things are clear.