Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

A clear title. – In the body there are three points: first, it is declared what falsity signifies simply and in a qualified sense (secundum quid) with respect to things; then two conclusions answering the question are set down. The first is: Falsity simply so called is not in things dependent on God, except perhaps in voluntary ones ¹. The second is: Falsity in a qualified sense is in things in two ways ². II. As to the first, he intends that the falsity of a thing simply so called consists in its disconformity to the intellect from which it depends; but falsity in a qualified sense consists in its disconformity to an intellect from which it does not depend. Both of these are proved together as follows. True and false are opposed: therefore where truth is first, falsity is first: therefore falsity is in the intellect, and not in things except in relation to an intellect: therefore the falsity of things simply so called consists in disconformity to the intellect which they regard per se: therefore to the intellect from which they depend: therefore falsity in a qualified sense consists in disconformity to an intellect per accidens: therefore, one from which they do not depend. The first inference is proved: because opposites are about the same thing. The second also: because truth is in the intellect, and not in things except in relation to an intellect. The third, however: because each thing is named "simply" from what belongs to it per se. The fourth: because the intellect from which a thing depends is regarded per se. The fifth, along with the sixth, is proved from the opposites of the third and fourth: namely, because from an intellect per accidens a thing is denominated secundum quid; and because an intellect from which a thing does not depend is per accidens. III. As to the second ³, the first responsive conclusion, namely, that falsity simply so called is not in things dependent on God, except perhaps in voluntary ones, is proved. Natural things depend on the divine intellect as artificial things do on the human intellect: therefore the falsity of natural things simply so called would consist in disconformity to the divine intellect: therefore in things dependent on God there is no falsity simply so called, except perhaps in voluntary ones. The antecedent is supposed. The inference is proved: because artificial things are called false simply so called insofar as they fall short of the form of the art. And this is made manifest from common usage: for someone is said to have made a false grammar because he fell short of the art of grammar. And similarly here to fall short is not taken negatively but contrarily, which is the same as being disconformate: for defect taken negatively constitutes an imperfect work, but taken contrarily it constitutes the false. And therefore, that the meaning might be clearer, I used the name of disconformity in the inferences. – But the second inference is proved. Whatever happens in things, except those in whose power it is to withdraw themselves from the order of the divine intellect, proceeds from the ordination of the divine intellect: therefore in things dependent on God, etc. And the exception is confirmed directly by the authority of Scripture; and, once confirmed by authority of Scripture on the opposite side, namely the truth of life said of a virtuous act. IV. Note here three things. The first is that the text proposes that natural things depend on the divine intellect as artificial ones do on the human, and yet does not infer, therefore in natural things; but most universally, therefore in things dependent on God, etc. He did this, however, because the same judgment holds of all things and of natural things: for all things, insofar as they depend on him, have established in him what befits them, to which they must be conformable, except voluntary ones. The second is that all things other than God can be compared to the divine intellect in two ways: in one way, as known things to the knower; in another way, as measured things to the measure, or regulated things to the rule. If they are compared in the first way, there is no difference between other things and voluntary ones with respect to withdrawal from the order relative to the divine intellect: since all things are equally naked and open before him. But if they are compared in the second way, thus is the difference posited in the text. For in other things nothing happens except from some order regulated by the divine intellect, even though that order may not befit this or that thing, as is clear in monsters. In voluntary things, however, moral deformity occurs not from any order established by God (for he establishes no order of things from which sin could arise; nor is there any rule in God to which sin could be conformable); but from the power of sinning of free choice, which as such is neither per se nor per accidens from God, as is clear elsewhere ⁴. The third is that in the text it is said except perhaps in voluntary ones, not because it is doubtful, but because it is not necessary that such falsity be found in voluntary things; or because it has not yet been determined concerning voluntary things. V. But the second conclusion ⁵, namely, that falsity in a qualified sense is in things in two ways, is explained. Natural things, related to our intellect, are both signified and causes; and they are sometimes signified according to something that does not inhere in them; and certain of them are apt by nature to occasion a false opinion about themselves: therefore in both ways falsity in a qualified sense can be said to be in them. – The antecedent is evident, as regards all its parts, inductively. The inference, however, is proved from the account of the false. And each member is confirmed by the authorities of Augustine and Aristotle, as is clear in the text. All things are clear.

The title from the beginning of the body is clear. – In the body there are two parts: first, he explains the meaning of the title; second, he answers the question, there: Therefore thus.

II. As to the first, he says that the sense of the question is whether sense is false, that is, having a false apprehension, that is, apprehending the thing otherwise than it is; and not whether it is false in the sense of knowing or saying what is false. And he proves this from the truth of sense: because truth is found in it in the same way, namely, as consisting in the apprehension of the thing as it is. And thus it is also clear what the falsity of sense signifies, namely, to apprehend the thing otherwise than it is.

III. With respect to the second, the responsive conclusion to the question is: The sense, with respect to its proper object, is not deceived except per accidens; but with respect to the common sensible and what is perceived per accidens, it can be deceived. – It is proved. The sense knows things by being assimilated to them: therefore it knows some things per se and first, some things per se but not first, and some things per accidens: therefore with respect to its proper sensible it is deceived only per accidens, while with respect to the others it can be deceived.

The antecedent is clear. The first consequence, however, is proved: because likeness is found in the sense in three ways, namely, per se primo, etc. The second consequence is not proved in the text except from this: that the sense is referred directly to the per se first sensible, but to the others consequently or per accidens; yet in the following article a reason will be assigned. As for the exception, that is except per accidens, it is made manifest and what sort of accident is meant, namely the indisposition of the organ; and it is proved: because this is common to all passive things, namely, that indisposition impedes their reception of form. And it is confirmed by experience in the sense of taste. IV. In response to the first, note the distinction of sense from Qu. de Ver., q. 1, art. 2. Sense is taken in two ways: in one way, as knowing things; second, as offering itself to the higher power. And this in two ways: namely, as a certain thing; and as indicative of things. In the first way sense has been treated here; and it was said ¹ that it is true with respect to its proper sensible object, etc. In the second way, however, namely as a thing offering itself in act to the higher power, it is always simply true, just like other beings, according to the determination in the preceding article. And in this way Augustine took "sense" in the authority cited. In the third way, however, namely as a messenger of things, it is sometimes false causally: because it is prone often to make a false estimation about a thing. Therefore the sense always makes a true estimation concerning its own disposition, but not concerning the disposition of the sensed things. And this is what the response to the text intends, distinguishing a twofold judgment through the senses: namely, concerning the sense itself in act, and concerning the thing sensed. And we are not deceived by the sense regarding the first, but regarding the second.

A clear title. – In the body there are three parts: first, in which intellect falsity is or is not; second, there: Hac tamen differentia, how falsity is found in that intellect in which it is¹; third, there: Quia vero falsitas, how and when falsity is derived from that intellect into the intellect in which it is not².

II. As to the first, this is the conclusion: Falsity is not in the intellect grasping what a thing is, but in composing and dividing. This conclusion is proved by an argument, and it is made manifest both in itself and in its proof by the proportional likeness of intellect and sense. – The argument, then, is this. A natural thing does not fall short of the esse that befits it according to its form, but it can fall short with respect to its accidents or consequents: therefore a cognitive power does not fall short in knowing that thing whose likeness informs it, but with respect to its accidents or consequents: therefore the intellect is not deceived about what a thing is, but in composing or dividing. – The antecedent is proved inductively in man. The consequence, however, is proved as follows: just as a thing is related to its esse through its form, so a cognitive power is related to knowing through the likeness of the thing known: therefore, if the thing cannot fall short, etc. The second consequence, as to its first part, is proved because the intellect is informed by the likeness of the quiddity. As to the second part: because, in composing, something is attributed to the quiddity that either does not follow from it or is opposed to it.

Now the proportional likeness is this: as the sense of sight is related to its proper sensible object, so the intellect is related to what a thing is; and just as the former is informed directly by the likeness of its proper sensible, so the latter by the likeness of the quiddity. And for this reason falsity is in neither, as such. Likewise, just as sight is related to common and incidental sensibles, so the intellect is related to judging of what follows from the quiddity or is accidental to it—which is done by composing or dividing. And for this reason falsity can be in both.

III. Concerning the antecedent, note that it can be interpreted both well and badly. Badly indeed, if it is understood that the esse of a natural thing cannot fail: for this is not true except in incorruptible things. Well, however, if it is understood that the esse of a natural thing cannot fail while that natural thing itself remains intact: and thus the text intends. Hence it does not say that no natural thing can fail; but it says that it cannot fail from the esse that belongs to it according to its form; as if one were to say that no thing having some form, while it has it, can fail from the esse that accords with that form. And this proposition is self-evident: because esse pertains to the ratio of form, as is clear in Book VII of the Metaphysics³.

IV. Concerning the proof of the consequence, namely the proportional one, just as a thing has being through its proper form, so a cognitive power knows through the likeness of the thing known, note that to know is the very esse of the species of the knowable, when it is truly in act in the genus of the knowable⁴; just as we said⁵ that to understand is the very esse of the intelligible species in act in the genus of the intelligible, and not of something existing in an intermediate way. Thus this is common to every cognitive power, whether of the sensitive or of the intellectual order, namely, that to know is the esse of the species by which it knows, taking that species, whatever it may be, in act in the genus of the knowable; whatever may be said of its esse in act in the genus of beings. And this is very much to be noted for the knowledge of the sensitive part and of the intellect.

V. With respect to according to⁶, the conclusion is this: Falsity is in the composing intellect in two ways, namely formally and objectively. – It is proved, and it is made manifest. It is proved indeed: because truth is in the same intellect in the same ways. It is made manifest, however, from the difference with respect to sense, as is evident.

VI. With respect to the third⁷, a single conclusion is put forward, together with its corollary. The conclusion is: Falsity is in the intellect of what a thing is, per accidens. – It is proved and made manifest. It is proved indeed thus. Falsity is per se in the composition of intellects alone; therefore in the intellect of what a thing is it has its place by reason of the composition mixed in with it; therefore it is found in it per accidens. – All the consequences are evident. For the first rests on this, that from one such thing the rest must be said to be such, insofar as they participate in it, as is clear from I Posterior Analytics⁸. The second rests on this, that it is not of the essence of what a thing is to be composite, which is also evident.

The conclusion is made manifest, however, by distinguishing the two ways in which composition is admitted to the intellect concerning what a thing is. The first consists in the joining of the definition to the thing defined; the second in the joining of the parts of the definition, as is clear from the text. And these ways differ in this, that error in the second makes what a thing is false in itself, whereas the first makes it false with respect to this.

The corollary is that in knowing simple quiddities, the intellect cannot be false; it is either true, or there is no act of understanding at all.

VII. Concerning the first mode of falsity, and this corollary, a doubt arises. First, because the joining of a definition to what is defined lies outside the intellect's grasping what a thing is. For the intellect, in grasping what a thing is of a line, does not say, a line is a length whose extremities are two points; it says only, a length whose extremities are two points. For this is the definition, which alone is acknowledged to pertain to the first operation of the intellect; but that whole statement, a line is a length etc., is uttered by the composing intellect, just as it is also said that the line is curved or straight. Why, then, is the falsity of that joining rather than of this one assigned to the first operation? – Second, because this mode of falsity has its place in simple concepts just as in composite ones: for even the most simple concept can be joined to something to which it does not belong quidditatively. And thus even in simple concepts there can be error per accidens: the opposite of which the text of the corollary seems to state.

VIII. For the clarification of these points, know that, just as a thing is related to its being (esse), so is it related to being known: and therefore, to the extent that the conjunction of the definition with the defined differs from its conjunction with other things, so much does it matter that knowledge of that conjunction be required for what a thing is, and not of its conjunction with others. For the conjunction of the definition with the defined gives the definition its character as what a thing is: for no account is a quiddity except insofar as it is the quiddity of some being (ens). And therefore knowing what a thing is does not come about unless the conjunction of the definition with the defined is known. For if the definition were known without knowing whose thing it is, no quiddity would be known, but only what a name signifies: for one who apprehends such a definition would stand in relation to it as we now stand when forming the concept of a golden mountain, or of any other figment composed of non-impossible elements. The conjunction with the passions and other things, however, does not stand in this relation to what a thing is: since the account of quiddity is preserved without them. Therefore, since what a thing is essentially requires in its being (in essendo) that of which it is the quiddity, though not this or that particular one, it must also require it in being known. Hence, that conjunction pertains to the first operation of the intellect, just as does the conjunction of the parts of the definition; though the latter more so.

And since the conjunction of the definition with the thing defined, if judged in itself, arises from the composition of the thing defined (for if it were not composite, the abstraction of a definition from it would have no place in it, insofar as it is of itself; since nothing abstracts of itself from that which is altogether itself); therefore, if any quiddity is found to be so simple—namely, such that it is the quiddity of a simple thing—no error can arise concerning it on its own part, just as there is no composition. – And by this the answer to the objections is clear.

IX. In response to the first, note that quiddity is said to be the proper object of the intellect because the intellect, in general, is related to quiddity as sight is to color; so that it knows per se and in the first instance what a thing is, and by it alone is it perfected and moved per se primo. The reason for this is assigned, first, because the intelligible species is primarily of quiddity, as is said in the body of the article. Second, because in what a thing is is contained the knowledge of every composition, whether of agreement or disagreement: so much so that if anyone were to penetrate perfectly the quiddities of things, he would understand perfectly in them all propositions concerning their accidents, as will be made clear below ⁹ in the treatise on the Angels. Third, because what a thing is is knowable of itself, whereas composition is not knowable except through what a thing is. In sign of this, we know principles insofar as we know terms, as is said in I Poster. ¹⁰; and all doubts we judge by resolving them into what a thing is.

In the title, "contrary" is taken properly, as contrariety is distinguished from the other species of opposition.

In the body, one conclusion, answering the question affirmatively: The true and the false are contraries. – It is proved thus. The false is to say or to seem that being is not, or that non-being is: therefore the false signifies an inadequate apprehension of the thing: therefore the false posits something, and determines a subject for itself: therefore it is opposed to the true neither contradictorily nor privatively, but contrarily.

The antecedent is proved from Metaphysics IV, text 27. The first consequence is evident, and it is confirmed by the meaning of the true, namely because it posits an adequate apprehension of the thing. The second, however, is evident in itself: because a disformed apprehension is something. The last, however, is proved from the difference between opposites that are contradictory, privative, and contrary: namely, because in the first, one is a pure negation without a subject; in the second, a negation in a subject; in the third, a position in a subject.

II. Note here that the text presupposes that true and false are opposed, as if this were self-evident; and it seeks only to determine the mode of opposition. And therefore the third consequence suffers no calumny. – The confirmation of the first consequence from the signification of the true is also most effective, if what is believed at Metaphysics IV ¹ is credited: for there no disparity with respect to signifying something positive is posited, and yet each is defined. For the true, says Aristotle, is being's esse, and non-being's non-esse: but the false is being's non-esse, and non-being's esse. Hence by the same reason by which the true signifies something positive, namely an enunciation conformable to being and non-being, so too the false signifies an enunciation disconformable to both; and it does not signify a negation of conformity, as those cited in the text supposed.

III. Concerning the first consequence, namely, that the false posits an inadequate apprehension of the thing ², note that it can be understood in two ways. In one way, that "false" would signify formally a disformed apprehension, as "black" signifies a collective color. In the other way, that it posits the relation of disformity formally, and the apprehension fundamentally; just as "unlike" signifies a relation, and posits a quality. It cannot be understood in the first way: for it would follow that one of two contraries, taken formally, would pass over into the other: which is unintelligible. For it cannot be perceived that whiteness becomes blackness, but rather that the thing which is white is changed into black. The consequence is evident from the Categories ³, where it is said that one and the same sentence is received as true and false. For if one and the same statement is at one time true and at another time false, and the statement formally signifies both the true and the false, then one of two contraries must formally receive the other. Hence from the very fact that one and the same sentence is at one time true and at another false, it is evident that the true and the false signify something in the sentence, and not the statement itself. In sign of this, since it should have been subjoined in the text that the false signifies something positive in a determinate subject, nothing else was subjoined except that the false posits an inadequate apprehension, so that you would understand that inadequacy is signified in the apprehension.

IV. There is, however, a point to be noted here: just as the like and the unlike are opposed as contraries, and they can be contrary to each other in two ways—namely in respect of the foundation, as when something white, which was like another white thing, changes into black, which is unlike the white; and in respect of the terminus, namely if the terminus were changed into black—so truth is indeed opposed as a contrary to falsehood, and this can happen in two ways. On the side of the terminus, when one and the same statement becomes false from being true on account of a change in the thing signified; as is clear in contingent matter. On the side of the foundation, however, when the foundations themselves are contraries. Now the foundation of truth and falsity, as is clear from what has been said ⁴, is an enunciation, or the intellect's acceptance of one. And among enunciations, as is proved in Book II of the Perihermeneias ⁵, contrariety is found first between the affirmative and the negative of the same predicate affirmed of the same subject, etc., one of which must be true and the other false. Therefore, from first to last, the intellect is changed from truth into falsity on the side of the foundation when it passes from the enunciation of one part of a contradiction to the other. But since the change on the side of the terminus in truth and falsity either is not a genuine contrariety (because the statement passes from one to the other without any change in itself); or if it is taken as a true contrariety, such as can exist among relatives, it does not have the character of contrariety from the change of the terminus (since the change of the terminus occurs both from contrary to contrary and from affirmation to negation, or conversely), whereas the change from truth into falsity on the side of the foundation does have the character of contrariety from the change between the foundations (because, namely, the change of the intellect from an affirmative opinion to a negative one, or conversely, is truly between contraries); and what is more, from the contrariety of the foundations there arises the contrariety of truth and falsity according to the terminus (for this is why the statement "Socrates is sitting", when he rises, is said to take on the other contrary, namely falsity, because it is contrary to that which is true, namely "Socrates is not sitting"; for unless there were a contrariety between the statements themselves, the change from truth into falsity would not have the character of true contrariety)—therefore the text makes mention only of the contrariety arising on the side of the foundation. And deservedly so: because we see that the nature of a relation follows most closely the nature of its foundation, since it is either identical with it or, as it were, a natural passion of it.

V. In response to the second, note that he there uses the term contrariety broadly, insofar as it also includes privative opposition; as is clear from good and evil taken transcendentally, and from the words added below, namely, just as every privation is founded in a subject, so every evil etc. The Author did this not out of carelessness, but because, as far as the force of the argument goes, the judgment is the same for contraries and for privatively opposed things, he wished to intimate that the proper response ought also to be the same, whether things are opposed contrarily or privatively. And for this reason he taught that the name of contrariety should be extended.