Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

A clear title. – In the body, one responsive conclusion to the question, with one corollary. The conclusion is: The truth of the divine intellect is immutable; but that of our intellect is mutable. – Concerning this conclusion, three things are said. First, a reason is given why an answer is rendered concerning the truth of the intellect, when the question was asked about truth in general. And it is said at the beginning of the body that this is done because truth exists formally in the intellect alone; therefore also its mutability and immutability; for the other conditions follow upon being (esse). – Second, the conclusion is proved. – Third, the term mutable, posited in the conclusion, is explained. For it can be taken in two ways: namely, subjectively and terminatively. In the matter at hand it is said to be taken terminatively, and not subjectively; and the reason is that forms are called mutable in this way, that is, terminatively, not subjectively. Therefore the conclusion is proved as follows. The truth of an intellect is the conformity of the intellect to things; therefore it can vary on the side of the intellect and of the thing; therefore, if there be some intellect without any alternation of opinions, and whose apprehension no thing escapes, its truth is immutable; therefore the truth of the divine intellect is immutable, but ours mutable. - The antecedent is clear. The first consequence is proved: because every likeness can vary on the side of its extremes. But the second: because this variation on the side of the intellect consists in a change of apprehensions; but on the side of the thing, in a hidden change of the thing. But the third is left evident. The corollary, however, is: The truth according to which natural things are said to be true is altogether immutable. - It is proved: because it is the truth of the divine intellect.